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Abstract
Hospitals come under the focus of health planners and policy makers because they
invariably consume large and increasing amounts of health care resources and
performance is commonly believed to fall short of that possible. The common response
by governments to this situation has been to implement hospital reforms. However,
emerging evidence from impact evaluations of such reforms shows little clear evidence
of performance enhancement. It is argued in this study that hospital reforms in most
countries are implemented without enough understanding of current performance, or
knowledge of hospital behaviour. Such information is necessary for effective design,
implementation and evaluation of reforms.
The aim of the study was to measure hospital performance and contribute to the
understanding of its determinants. The role of internal organisation and management to
hospital performance has been underplayed in most studies such that the workings of the
hospital remain a "black box". The study sought to demonstrate that understanding
hospital performance entails understanding not only the technical relationships of
dimensions of hospital performance but also the institutional context, and behaviour of
individuals or groups within it who ultimately shape hospital behaviour.
A multiple case study approach was used to study six tertiary hospitals in Zimbabwe.
Hospital performance was first assessed through analysis of utilisation statistics. This
was followed by an assessment of two dimensions of hospital performance: costs and
quality of inpatient services. Costs were measured using standard cost accounting
methods at hospital, ward and patient level. At patient level, a combination of.
prospective micro-costing and top-down costing methods was applied to cohorts of
patients suffering from selected tracer diseases: 207 malaria and 158 pulmonary
tuberculosis cases. The quality of hospital inpatient services was also measured at
hospital and patient level using structural and process approaches. The relationship
between cost and quality of services was then explored at patient level using tracer
conditions. A triangulation of methods was then used to explore internal organisation
and management: staff interviews, observations, attendance at hospital meetings and
review of administrative records.
Analysis of activity statistics showed that the six hospitals had different levels of
activity although they had similar roles in the referral hierarchy. Distinctive unit cost
patterns were observed across the hospitals. Unit cost variation across hospitals was
generally similar at hospital, ward and patient level. The results from the analysis of
activity statistics were predictive of hospital cost classifications. The quality of hospital
services varied across hospitals from both structural and process perspectives. There
was little convergence in results from hospital level structural quality assessment, and
process quality assessment. Cost-quality relationships in inpatient care showed a distinct
pattern across tracer diseases, which permitted classification of the six hospitals into
three performance categories. These classifications were used to relate quantitative and
qualitative results of the study.
The institutional contexts within which public hospitals in Zimbabwe operate is
explored and described. There are fundamental policy design weaknesses related to the
way hospitals are financed, governed and managed, which affect hospital performance.
Hospital staff appears apathetic about hospital performance because of lack of
appropriate incentives. Several hospital internal factors were reported as impinging on
hospital performance. These factors can broadly be summarised as lack of management
capacity and skills, inappropriate internal organisational and management structures,
and staff reward systems. The current incentive structure at individual and institution
level does not engender performance improvement.
Relative hospital performance did not vary systematically with different institutional
characteristics. For instance, compliance or non-compliance with mandated organisation
and management structures did not account for performance differences whilst weak
associations were found between relative performance, and differences in management
capacity and skills. The absence of direct relationships between institutional
characteristics and relative performance was not unexpected given the exploratory
nature of the study and the possible multiple interrelationships between these factors.
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Nonetheless, the study systematically describes and exposes current weaknesses in the
internal structure of public hospitals in Zimbabwe, and identifies those internal
organisational and management features considered important to performance.
The study concludes that there is considerable scope for improving hospital efficiency
and quality of services (with available resources) by changing internal organisation and
management of hospitals. Of particular importance is the need to change and align
incentives (monetary and nonmonetary) at both individual and institution level in ways
that promote performance improvement.
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION
1.0 Introduction
Hospitals have been at the fore of decision-makers', programme managers', planners'
and even politicians' agendas in the last three decades. Key concerns have been hospital
cost escalation, funding options, efficiency and effectiveness. Various forms of
financing and organisational reforms have been implemented in response to these
problems. What is evident is that most of the reforms planned or being implemented
especially in low and middle-income countries (LMICs) lack empirical evidence. Many
countries have been following global reform trends even in circumstances where
contexts differed markedly. The study argues that it is necessary to measure hospital
performance and understand its determinants as a precursor to implementing major
reforms. It also emphasises that an analysis of internal hospital organisational factors
has been a neglected but vital area in designing policies geared to improve hospital
performance. This chapter presents common problems in the hospital sector in
Zimbabwe in the first section. It then briefly describes health sector and proposed
hospital reforms in sections two and three respectively. Section four describes the study
rationale, and chapter ends with a description of how the thesis is organised.
1.1 Hospital costs and quality of services
Hospitals are an important part of a health care system as they provide essential curative
and supportive services to primary care facilities. However, they consume significant
and disproportionate amounts of resources compared to non-curative services. In the
financial year 1994/95, central and tertiary hospitals accounted for more than 33% and
11% of health expenditure respectively. All hospitals together consumed 70% of total
Ministry of Health expenditure (Table AI). This pattern of resource consumption has
not significantly changed over the years. Despite this skewed expenditure pattern,
problems of hospital cost escalation continue unabated. Paradoxically, there are
continued claims that public hospitals are under-funded, which raises questions about
the efficiency of hospital services delivery and the quality of services produced.
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Hospital care is by nature expensive but there is likely to be considerable scope for
doing more with available resources. This problem is not unique to Zimbabwe and
obtains in both developing and developed countries. Governments have responded to
these problems by introducing wide-ranging health sector reforms. A common feature of
these reforms is the desire to change the way health care markets work and the
organisation of health services in general.
1.2 Health sector reforms
In Zimbabwe, health sector reforms were triggered by results of a public service review
in 1987 which showed that the public service was inefficient and required
rationalisation. Social sectors including health were equally the target of criticism.
Proposals for reforming the health sector were made, particularly focusing on
strengthening management, health financing, contracting out, regulation of the private
sector and decentralisation of health services (MOH 1995). Implementation of these
reforms has been slow partly because of the prevailing turbulent social, political and
economic situation.
The most dramatic change yet to be introduced is decentralisation of health services.
The government's objectives in decentralisation are threefold: (1) to improve health
status and consumer satisfaction through effective and quality health services; (2) to
improve equity by improving access to quality care for disadvantaged groups; (3) and to
obtain greater value for money, through increased allocative and technical efficiency
(MOH 1996). Health services planning and management will be decentralised to Rural
District Councils (ROCS)I. The health care system has traditionally been hierarchically
organised based on the principles of primary health care. It has four tiers: the centre, the
region, the district and the primary level. The centre is responsible for setting national
policies and guidelines, monitoring standards and quality of services, allocating
resources, regulation and managing vertical programmes. The basic role of the regional
level is to ensure that districts adhere to government policies, and allocation of
. resources. There are eight provinces in the country and each has at least seven
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administrative districts. Over the years, the management system has been characterised
by unnecessary bureaucracy, lack of community responsiveness, inefficiency and poor
quality of services (MOH 1996). To rationalise the system, a new management and
planning structure has been proposed in which districts, provinces and hospitals are to
be given more devolved powers (Annex I). Decentralisation of services will entail
creation of autonomous boards to run districts and hospital services at all levels. Service
contracts will be used in financing health services thus creating a quasi-market through
a purchaser-provider split.
1.3 Hospital sector reforms
The hospital sector is organised as a four-tiered system (Annex 1.1) with six national
referral (central) hospitals. Each of the eight administrative provinces has a tertiary
(provincial) hospital that acts as a referral centre for other hospitals in that province.
There are about 29,000 public hospital beds, of which 25,000 are in hospitals'. The
number of beds per inhabitant is 2.8 per 1,000. Mission hospitals contribute a total of
7,000 beds mostly at secondary and primary care level (MOH 1997). Hospitals are
managed by policy prescribed executive committees. A typical hospital executive
consists of a medical superintendent; a matron, an administrator, a pharmacist and a
chief nursing tutor (MOH 1982).
The disproportionate share of resources consumed by the hospital sector has been the
major impetus for hospital reform in Zimbabwe. Ongoing and proposed changes have
been geared towards improving technical and allocative efficiency, and quality of
services. Three such reforms merit attention: hospital autonomy, contracting out of
services, and management strengthening. Hospital autonomy is considered as one of the
mechanisms for achieving wider health sector reform goals such as improving value for
money, efficiency, equity and rationalisation of health services. Albeit there are no
specific objectives for autonomous hospitals in the policy documents, autonomy is
generally considered to have three implicit objectives: (1) improvement of allocative
IRural District councils are the lowest levels of local government in the country.
22-3% of the beds belong to central hospitals
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efficiency and equity in the health sector, (2) improvement of internal efficiency within
the hospitals, and (3) improvement of consumer responsiveness and accountability
(McPake 1996).
Under autonomy, hospitals are to be run by statutory independent boards set up by the
Minister of Health. Such boards will be "corporate" bodies capable of employing staff,
owning and disposing of assets, acquiring and disposing of land and buildings,
borrowing money for capital investment and retaining fee revenue, among other things.
Hospital funding will be by block service contracts with provincial and national
authorities-similar to UK NHS reforms of 1991 (Glennerster and Le Grand 1995). One
central hospital (Parirenyatwa) is partially autonomous and is managed by a board. It is
funded on the basis of a non-contractual annual grant from government. A similar
autonomy structure is to be applied to all other hospitals except that funding will be
based on block contracts. Some aspects of autonomy have already been implemented,
for instance, hospital fee retention in 1996. Hospitals keep collected revenue for
improving service quality and quantity. Most hospitals have Hospital Advisory Boards
(HAB) members of which are appointed by the Minister of Health from the local
community. The role of these boards is limited to community involvement in the
wellbeing of the hospital. For instance, fund raising. Reform proposals indicate that
these boards will be transformed and given more powers to run the hospitals.
Along with creation of autonomous hospitals, contracting out of some services has been
introduced with the principal aim of divesting public functions, cost saving and
improving quality of health services. Hospitals can now solicit the services of private
providers for a variety of services such as security, laundry, equipment maintenance and
others. Within the public sector, contracts are conceived as a means of creating
transparency in trading, increasing accountability and controlling costs. The use of
contracts, within or external to the public sector, in purchasing health services is a
relatively new phenomenon in Zimbabwe.
. Over the last five years the MOH has been investing significant amounts of funds into
management strengthening through health personnel training. Decision-makers,
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programme managers, planners, hospital managers and others have been trained in
executive management and lor general management with the aim of improving
individual and system capacity. However, the impact of such training programmes has
never been evaluated.
1.4 Study rationale
The focus of this study was to contribute to an understanding of the determinants of
hospital performance. This is a fundamental issue that seems to be overlooked by policy
makers in designing hospital reforms. It is assumed, for instance that giving hospitals
greater autonomy, use of contracts and management training, creates appropriate
incentives for improved performance. This might not be the case in practice. Evidence
from LMICs shows limited success in contracting out of services (Bennett et al., 1997),
and hospital autonomy (Collins et al., 1996, Needleman et al., 1996). In the UK, similar
conclusions have been reached for NHS trust hospitals (Peck and Spurgeon 1993,
Bartlett and Le Grand 1994, Klein 1995, Ham 1997, SOderlund et al., 1997). The
reasons for limited policy success are not clearly understood. Furthermore, reforms in
LMICs tend to be implemented without adequate context-specific empirical evidence.
Hospital organisational reform is expensive and time-consuming (Over and Watanabe
1998), and therefore needs to be thought through thoroughly.
This study has both practical and theoretical contributions to make. As a starting point,
it seems logical in the reform process to explore and understand current public hospital
behaviour (performance) and its determinants. Information generated can then be fed
into policy design, implementation and impact evaluation. Such information is vital in
ensuring that incentive structures are adjusted appropriately to achieve policy aims
(Bartlett and Le Grand, 1994). Gilson (1992) argues that "through evaluation of current
performance and identification of the key factors influencing it, research can generate
improved monitoring systems, key information needs and identify steps to improve
performance ". The use of service contracts in the hospital sector is a new development,
. which requires knowledge and information on costs and quality, which is not currently
available. Anecdotal evidence suggests lack of public sector capacity to write effective
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contracts and inadequate information to permit such contracts to be designed and
evaluated. Information on costs and quality is important in judging the merits of
contracting and self-providing (Mills 1997), and in inferring pricing and purchasing
decisions. In addition, evaluations of reform policies have been constrained by absence
or incomplete baseline data to allow evaluators to make judgements on the success or
failure of policy changes. The study sought to provide the necessary baseline data.
This study represents one of the first attempts to conduct a detailed analysis of public
hospitals' internal organisation and management, incentive structures, and how they
influence hospital performance. An investigation of the internal organisation of
hospitals, that is how organisational characteristics, professional and management
practices affect behaviour is a key research priority for informing hospital sector
reforms. Most behavioural cost studies have not explicitly incorporated organisational
variables in theory or in empirical research, except hospital size, teaching status and
ownership. The workings of hospitals remain a 'black box' (Sloan and Becker 1981,
Conrad et al., 1996, McKee et al., 1997, Aiken et al., 1997). The proposed reforms
provide a unique opportunity for evaluating current performance. The study also
attempts to show that performance improvement is not only a product of identifying
deficiencies and taking appropriate action, it is determined as much by how providers
respond to changes in their environment (Wyszwianski 1988). Champagne et al (1993)
argue that managers (providers) play a critical role in performance, through their
behaviour, attitudes (e.g. risk taking and innovation), and cognitive structures (expertise
and analytical ability).
The aim of the research was to contribute to an understanding of the determinants of
hospital performance. In order to do that, the study first measured performance: hospital
costs and quality of services in six tertiary hospitals using a variety of methods. Second,
the relationship between costs and quality of services was explored within the context of
relative performance assessment. Third, the study qualitatively explores the inter-
relationships between hospital structure, organisation, management and incentives, and
performance. Based on these sets of analyses, some policy implications are drawn to
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inform hospital reform policy in Zimbabwe, and other LMICs planning or implementing
similar reforms
1.5 Organisation of the thesis
Chapter 2 presents a review of relevant literature which includes the following subject
areas: problems facing public hospitals in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), relevant issues in
organisation theory, theory and measurement of hospital costs and quality of services,
and conceptual frameworks for assessing cost-quality tradeoffs. The chapter ends with a
summary discussion and conclusions from the literature review. Chapter 3 presents the
study objectives and a summary of the methods used. Chapter 4 presents the country
profile and a description of the study settings. In Chapter 5 conceptual issues concerning
the measurement and interpretation of hospitals outputs are discussed and followed by
results of hospital performance assessment using activity statistics. Chapter 6 presents
results on hospital-level cost analysis. Patient-level costs analysis results are presented
in Chapter 7. This is followed by hospital quality analysis results in Chapter 8. Chapter
9 presents results of cost-quality tradeoffs analysis. Chapter 10 presents a conceptual
discussion of determinants of organisational performance followed by results of the
qualitative study. The chapter ends with a comparative analysis and summary of results.
Chapter 11 presents an overall discussion of methods and results of the study. Chapter
12 presents study conclusions, methodological, theoretical and practical contributions of
the study, policy implications and areas for future research.
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CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW
2.0 Introduction
This chapter reviews relevant literature on hospital performance, Section 2.1 presents a
review of generic problems affecting public hospitals in SSA. Aspects of organisational
theory that are relevant to organisational research are reviewed and put into context in
Section 2.2. This sets the background for a review of concepts and methods for
measuring hospital quality and costs, and empirical evidence (Section 2.3 and 2.4). The
merits and demerits of different measurement methods are examined. This is followed
by a review of cost-quality tradeoffs in assessing relative performance and how this
relationship may be explored (Section 2.5). The chapter ends with a summary discussion
and conclusions from the literature review (Section 2.6).
2.1 Public hospitals in Sub-Saharan Africa
2.1 The hospital market
Hospital markets in SSA are not as developed and diverse as in Western countries.
Hospitals are predominantly public and private not-for-profit (usually church-related)
hospitals (Gilson et al., 1997, Flessa 1998). The latter have historically provided
complementary services to public services especially in those areas not covered by
public services. Unlike not-for profits in Western countries (Bays 1979, Judge and
Zeithmal 1992), the majority of church-related hospitals provide services to the most
vulnerable and needy groups without surplus or profit motives. There is a small but
rapidly growing private for-profit hospital services market in the region especially in
urban settings. For instance, it is estimated that the number of private beds in Zimbabwe
more than doubled in the last five years. In South Africa the number of private beds
increased by 113% from 1988 to 1996 (Coburn et al., 1998). This rapid growth in many
countries has been fuelled by two factors: (I) expansion of private and social health
. insurance, community financing schemes, and (2) deterioration of public health
services. However, this growth of the private sector has created both benefits and
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problems. The benefits include, among other things: increased consumer choice, better
perceived quality of services, increased coverage (or access) and retention of key
personnel (e.g. specialists) in public sector. The problems emanate from lack of
appropriate government policies and legal frameworks for effective public-private
partnerships (Mills et al 2000). Private sector growth in South Africa is argued to have
negatively affected the public sector through staff drainage and loss of paying patients
(Monitor Company, 1996, Coburn et al., 1998). Nevertheless, the dominance of public
hospitals in the region and mounting evidence of poor performance has increased
attention on the activities of these hospitals in recent years (McPake 1996, Van
Lerberghe et al., 1997).
2.2 Role of public hospitals
The role of public hospitals in the health care system influences the service mix and
technology that they employ. A purely private hospital has the freedom to decide what
service to produce and how to produce it using economic.criteria. The choice of what
services to produce is determined by viability. There must be potential demand for the
services, which is signified by the existence of such things as insurance schemes (public
and private), possibilities of employer-based contracts, government or out-of-pocket
payments. The same is expected of autonomous "public" hospitals in which management
boards make corporate decisions. Private hospitals strive to be efficient and cost effective
to optimise revenue. However, the role of a public hospital in the health care system
imposes certain limitations to what service it provides. For instance, tertiary hospitals are
referral centres supporting a network of secondary or other lower level hospitals, and
primary care facilities (both private and public). Consequently, the services they provide
must be supportive of referring institutions. This means that the product range of the
hospital is not necessarily based on market viability criteria but on what the hospital is
expected to do in the health care system, that is, to be a referral centre and to provide
services according to need.
There are problems associated with such broad-based provider systems because the
performance of referral centres depends on the level of performance of referring units. If
referring units operate inefficiently, then their inefficiencies might be "exported" to
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referral centres. This form of inefficiency arises through late and inappropriate referrals
(false positive or unnecessary referrals). Sometimes patients are referred for non-technical
(clinical) reasons because of input shortages (e.g. drugs and doctors) at lower level
facilities (Barnum and Kutzin 1993, Van Lerberghe et al., 1997, Sanders et al., 1998,
Fiedler et al 1998). It is not uncommon to have secondary hospitals without doctors in
LMICs. Consequently, patients that could be treated at lower costs at lower level hospitals
end up being treated at the most expensive level. This creates allocative inefficiency
problems in the health system. Problems of cost shifting and patient shifting from the
lower levels to the tertiary level are likely to occur. This seems to apply also to private-for-
profit facilities depending on reimbursement methods used and the insurance status of
patients. Tertiary hospitals are thus subjected to an inefficient referral system in which
they are expected (by policy) to provide services to all referred cases.
2.3 Hospital costs escalation
Hospitals consume a disproportionate amount of resources compared to other health
services in developing countries. For example, in Zimbabwe, Sri Lanka, Tunisia, Malaysia
and Colombia centraVtertiary hospitals consumed 45% (in 1993),64% (in 1979),69% (in
1971), 17% (in 1973) and 36% of ministry of health expenditure respectively (Barnum
and Kutzin 1993, Mills 1990a). In the same countries Zimbabwe, Sri Lanka, Tunisia,
Malaysia and Colombia, districts consumed 13% (in 1981),36% (in 1979),9% (in 1971),
39% (in 1973) and 27% of ministry of health expenditure respectively (Mills 1990a). In
Angola hospitals accounted for 28.5% of development expenditure in 1992, in Egypt (in
Bani Swayf) 35.8% in 1993 (Wolowyna and Cressman 1996) and in the 1980s Kenyatta
National hospital in Kenya accounted for 8-15% of ministry of health expenditure (Sahn
and Bernier 1995). In Ghana, 40% of health expenditure for 1981 was consumed by
tertiary hospitals (Van Lerberghe et al 1997) and in South Africa hospitals consume 77%
of total public expenditure in 1996n (Coburn et al., 1998). Despite these relatively high
expenditures, problems of overcrowding, shortages of essential drugs, over-and under-
staffmg, low productivity, long waiting times and a host of others are not uncommon in
these hospitals. Hospitals lack capacity to adjust inputs to workload, and have no effective
mechanisms of cost control. There is no reason to suspect that the order of magnitude in
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relative resource use has changed in recent years. For instance, public and mission
hospitals in Zimbabwe currently consume about 70% of MOH expenditure. This has been
attributed to rapid increases in production costs, and the increasing demand for hospital
services. The problem has been compounded by the HN /AIDs scourge which has
significantly increased morbidity and mortality in SSA (UNAIDS 2000).
Despite this skewed financing scenario, arguments that hospitals are under-funded persist.
As earlier mentioned, public tertiary hospitals are sometimes inappropriately used in
LMIC-i.e., used as first line services and for unnecessary referrals. This is caused by
under-funding of secondary hospitals relative to tertiary hospitals. It would seem that
finding an appropriate balance in funding between different hospital levels is likely to curb
the "fire-fighting" role that referral hospitals currently play. That funding balance may be
derived from defining essential service packages for each level of hospital care.
The problem of hospital cost escalation may partly be attributed to reimbursement
procedures. Most public hospitals are funded through budgets: line item or global budgets.
A line-item budget refers to that budget where the government budgets by specific items
(e.g. drugs, personnel, provisions, etc). Movement of funds between line items is subject
to rules and regulations set by government. This type of funding is usually accompanied
by possibilities of extra-funding in case of cost over-runs. The objective of line item
budgeting is to allow the budget holder to control spending, particularly on staffing levels,
and limit the consequences of weak management (Barnum et al., 1995). The cost of tight
control of local management is usually loss of operational efficiency. Use of line items
sometimes restricts managers to inefficient input combinations. In addition, managers are
inclined to ensure that line item budgets are spent before the end of the financial year since
cost saving might result in reduced allocations in the succeeding year. However, in cases
where there is lack of good local management, line item budgeting may be argued to be
one of the practical alternatives. Modest efficiency gains can be realised under line item
budgeting if the centre monitors production and provides performance-based incentives,
such as bonuses, to local staff for improving efficiency. There is no substantial evidence
. that this is happening in many countries in the region.
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Global budgeting refers to a total payment amount agreed in advance to cover
expenditure for a given period of time. This is commonly the case with autonomous or
semi-autonomous hospitals (McPake 1996).. A global budget has two main
characteristics: it is not itemised, which means that managers can decide on appropriate
allocations across different cost items. However, it is difficult to change the budget
amount over the given expenditure period. The attendant advantages are that it provides
for management flexibility whilst holding managers accountable for their performance,
and creates incentives for cost minimisation by reducing the quantity of inputs used. If
used in tandem with contracts that specify provider performance and quality of care, it
creates incentives for use 'Ofefficiency and quality criteria in resource allocation.
The manner in which the budget (global or line item) is set plays a significant role in
influencing efficient behaviour. If the budget is set based on historical figures, which is
common in public hospitals in LMIC (Fiedler et al., 1998), then there is a strong
possibility that existing resource use patterns are maintained. If the budget is based on
unit costs per fixed input (e.g. number of beds) it provides an incentive to add capital
inputs (or maintain inputs even when not needed) in order to increase total revenues,
leading to increased costs and excess capacity in the long run (Barnum et al., 1995).
What is important in the determination of the budget is that efficiency is rewarded and
inefficiency is penalised but in reality such practice is rare in bureaucratic systems.
Another disadvantage of global budgeting is that it can create incentives for cost cutting
at the expense of quality especially in cases where there is no contract or specification of
standards of services required and poor monitoring mechanisms. Systems of hospital
financing in most SSA hospitals fall into these two categories or a mixture of both.
Problems that exist in the hospital sector are characteristic of the negative incentives
created by such forms of hospital financing.
2.4 Competition
It is argued that the existence of competition in the hospital market engenders efficient
. hospital behaviour. The theoretical rationale is that in a competitive environment, revenue
can be obtained only through the delivery of services on more...attractive terms to patients
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(costs and quality) than offered by other hospitals. A big market share positively affects
economies of scale, utilisation rates, learning curves', and quality of services (Thomson
1994). It is this market theory that has led to the introduction of internal markets (quasi-
markets) in the health sector where purchasers and providers are split, and services are
provided on a contractual basis as a way of promoting efficiency and quality of services
amongst providers (Ham 1990, Saltman and von Otter 1992,Woodward and Wilson 1994,
Glennerster 1998). Indeed, experience in the USA has shown that increase in market share
is associated with increase in return on investment (ROI). Internal markets rely on the
tendering process where the purchasing agency puts on tender particular services to be
contracted. Providers would then compete on the basis of cost and quality. The fact that
income to these providers is dependent upon the number and size of tenders they win
makes it necessary that there be continuous quality and efficiency improvements. The
concept of managed markets presupposes the existence ofa number of players within both
the private and public sectors. Such environments obtain in Western countries, especially
the USA where supportive arrangements and many players exist (HMOs, PPOs,
independent group practices and private hospitals) that can compete for the provision of
hospital care. In less developed countries competition in the provision of hospital services
is minimal, if it exists at all. This can be explained by two factors: first, the existence of
few players, and second, incontestability of the markets. In developing countries tertiary or
teaching institutions are mostly monopoly providers. The problem of low market
concentration is compounded by the amount of regulation in this sector and the
unavailability of capital which makes the market uncontestable (McPake and Ngalande-
Banda 1994). The concept of competition in the provision of hospital services cannot
apply to such settings. This situation makes public hospitals immune to efficiency
enhancing market conditions such as competition, and that nurtures inefficient behaviour.
However, competition may not always reduce costs in the hospital sector. Thomson
(1994) points out in a review of competition amongst hospitals in the USA that price
competition is the weakest form of hospital competitiveness. Instead, it is non-price
competition that increases hospital market share (Robinson and Luft 1985). Hospitals in
3 This means that high throughput allows for specialisation and experience with new technology, which
can reduce costs.
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their endeavour to increase market share invest, for example, in sophisticated technology
and high-cost amenities for patients that mayor may not add to clinical improvement.
However, in the process costs and prices of services increase. It is often difficult to justify
such investments on economic grounds. Studies of hospital competition and hospital costs
in the USA have shown higher costs in competitive hospital markets compared to less
competitive ones (Ibid). Whilst experiences from the USA cannot easily be "exported" to
less developed countries, this experience has public policy relevance in the sense that the
absence of competition in the hospital sector has positive and negative dimensions, and
suggests a role for other hospital efficiency and quality enhancing policy instruments. The
issue is not just one of relevance but rather anticipating change and optimal
implementation paths from developed countries' experience (Chernichovsky 1995).
2.5 Autonomy and Regulation
The hospital sector is highly regulated in most LMICs through direct and/or indirect
legislation, national policies and guidelines. This form of control affects the degree of
operational and strategic autonomy of hospitals and hence influences performance. The
level of autonomy depends on the type of hospital, which may be private (for-profit or
not-for-profit) or public. Private for-profit hospitals are autonomously run on a
corporate basis by individuals or corporate boards with the principal aim of making a
profit. Trustee boards usually govern private not-for profit hospitals in Western
countries. There is debate, however, about their performance motives (Judge and
Zeithmal 1992). In LMICs, church boards govern private not-for-profit hospitals even
though they are often substantially publicly funded (90% in Zimbabwe). They operate
autonomously but within broad government policies and guidelines.
This is not the case with public hospitals because they are part of a hierarchical and
bureaucratic structure. National health policies tend to promote economic efficiency,
equity, cost containment, and provision of public health services. Hospitals tend to have
limited choice in choosing what services to produce, for whom to produce, how to
. produce, and how much to charge for services. Therefore, the immediate concerns of
hospitals, which might well be just technical efficiency, and provisions of quality service
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are difficult to achieve in practice (because of equity concerns, for instance). The popular
argument for having such controls has been to safeguard public interest. Policies of
universal access are common across SSA countries as evidenced by the adoption of
primary health care principles. In some instances, these policies are implemented in ways
that negatively affect the viability of hospitals in the long run. Consequently, public
hospitals continue to consume the biggest share of government funds even though
problems of inefficiency and quality of service are common.
Regulations are also targeted at the quantity and price of hospital services in which case
government restricts expansion of hospital services in both the public and private sector,
and sets or approves fee schedules for hospital services. It would seem that regulations
have contributed to slowing the pace of private sector participation in some countries, and
that has meant that public hospitals remained under immense pressure. Experience in
developing countries such as Zimbabwe and Thailand shows that although there is a
myriad of legislative instruments governing the sector there is an apparent lack of a strong
institutional structure to enforce them (Bennett 1997,Kumanarayake et al., 2000).
2.2 Arguments from Organisation theory
Organisational theorists acknowledge that understanding organisations is a complex
process. This complexity derives from the multiplicity of factors that affect
organisational behaviour (Handy 1993, Buchanan and Huczysianki 1997, Mullins
1999). Cole (1995) defines organisation behaviour as:
.... a term applied to the systematic study of the behaviour of the individuals within work groups,
including an analysis of the nature of groups, the development of structures between and within
groups, and the process of implementing change. The rationale of organisational behaviour is to
predict and lor control individual and group behaviour in the pursuit of management goals, which
mayor may not be shared throughout the organisation."
This definition shows that by taking the individual and/or groups of individuals as
subjects of enquiry as proposed by economic hospital behavioural models our
understanding of hospitals may be enhanced. Jacobs (1974) acknowledges this view by
proposing two possible approaches to analysing hospitals: that is, looking at a hospital
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as a total entity (organism) or as a constituency of individual players that constitute it
(exchange model). The former is argued to be more complex and abstract than the latter,
because in practice it is difficult to establish an overall consensus of what all individual
actors aim to achieve.
Because of the diversity of factors that potentially influence organisational behaviour it
is vital that organisational research focuses on specific and contextually relevant factors.
At individual level incentives or broadly, motivation is key to understanding
organisations. Organisation theory offers motivational theories (of which incentive
theory is one) that can be selectively applied in understanding individual and group
behaviour within an organisation (Buchanan and Huczynski 1977, 1997, Cole 1995,
Mullins 1999). Clarity about what satisfies and lor motivates a person is particularly
important in engendering performance-enhancing behaviour. Satisfaction has to do with
the question ''why am I working here" and motivation with the question "why work
harder" (Mullins 1999, Buchanan and Huczynski 1997). A satisfied worker may not
necessarily be a motivated worker, and positively changing dissatisfying factors may not
necessary improve motivation (Hertzberg 1968). Performance enhancement is related to
the reward system. If rewards are linked to performance and their distribution is
perceived as fair, individuals are likely to work harder" (perrow 1973, Pfeffer 1995,
Handy 1993, Xingzhu 1999). Economic models tend to focus on monetary incentives
(easier to measure) but in some cases non-monetary incentives (e.g. prestige and
security) are more relevant (though difficult to measure) in enhancing individual or
group performance.
The nature of the organisation itself can create incentives and disincentives for its
workers. Buchanin and Huczynski (1997) argue that the organisational setting
influences the behaviour of people, for instance, co-ordination, accountability,
technology, structure of authority, communication and status, reward system and other
management controls to which people are subjected. The emphasis of organisation
theory seems to be on understanding institutional characteristics as a precursor to any
attempts to predicting organisation behaviour. Williamson (1990) concurs by arguing
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that the theory's insistence on workably realistic, as opposed to analytically convenient,
behavioural assumptions is a healthy approach. However, organisation theory starts
from the premise that individuals and groups within an organisation are driven by
management objectives whilst in the hospital sector management goals are defined by
government and users of services. That might make prediction of organisational
response to changes tenuous. Nonetheless, knowledge about institutional characteristics
is inevitably important in explaining performance.
2.3 Costs and emdency: theory and measurement
Economists define costs from a societal perspective as the value of resources used to
produce a good or service (Creese and Parker 1994, Drummond et al., 1997). That
means the cost of an intervention or activity includes direct cost of the intervention itself
(fixed and variable costs') plus other costs borne by participating agents (e.g.
beneficiaries) such as access costs and loss of productivity. Direct costs are those costs
specifically related to the activity under consideration and are usually financial
costs-the accounting definition of costs (Kumaranayake 1998). Financial costs refer to
the money spent on a specific activity. Such costs are supply side focused and exclude
demand side costs. In economic costing attempts are made to ensure that costs reflect
societal opportunity costs. If the market is imperfect and prices are distorted, shadow
prices are computed to reflect the real input costs, non-tradable items are given shadow
prices, exchange and discount rates are adjusted accordingly (Drummond et al., 1997).
Related to costs are two key economic concepts: technical and allocative efficiency.
Technical efficiency is defined as the maximum amount of services produced from a
given amount of resources or producing the same amount of services with fewer
resources (Rosko and Broyles 1988, Farrar 1993). Allocative efficiency refers to the
efficient allocation of inputs between outputs. In other words, putting resources to their
4 "Behaviour can best be changed by rewarding approved behaviour rather than by punishing disapproved
behaviour" (Perrow 1973).
• S Fixed costs are costs that do not vary with output in the short term. Short term refers to the period within
which fixed and semi-fixed inputs cannot be adjusted with output. Variable costs are those costs that vary
with output. In the long term, all inputs are variable.
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most rewarding use. A service is said to be economically efficient if no other input
combination results in an increase in output without increasing costs.
There are several ways of measuring supply side costs and efficiency. Before addressing
alternative measurement methods it is apposite to define additional cost concepts: total
costs, average costs and marginal costs. Total costs refer to fixed costs plus variable
costs, and average cost is defined as total costs divided by total output. Marginal costs
are defined as the cost of producing an extra unit of output. Measures of output are
particularly important in health care because there are not readily available to measure.
Ideal measures of health interventions are outcome indicators such as improvement in
health status (Butler 1995)(discussed further in Chapter 5)
The relative cost levels of a hospital can be measured using two broad approaches:
statistical (econometric) and cost accounting methods (Barnum and Kutzin 1993). Cost
accounting methods can be applied to a few hospitals only because the methods are
labour intensive and involve detailed examination of cost (or expenditure) records and
workload statistics. Statistical methods require cost and activity data for large samples
of institutions. Relatively less accurate data can be used provided the sample size is
large enough to cater for the loss in measurement error by increasing sampling variation.
It is possible using statistical methods to readily gain insights into marginal and average
costs, and to explore the existence of economies of scale or scope" which accounting
studies may not readily provide. Using different forms of cost functions (structural or
behavioural) it is feasible to show the causal relationship between cost and its
determinants (including input substitutability). Cost functions are built on the
assumption of cost minimisation and homogeneity of outputs (Folland et aI., 1997).
With statistical methods differences in case-mix' and severity" can be incorporated
through calculation of appropriate indices. Cost functions essentially capture the cost
behaviour of a hospital. On the other hand, cost accounting methods generate point
6 Economies of scale refer to a reduction in average cost due to increases in volume of output, and
economies of scope refer to reduction in average costs due to an increasing range of outputs.
7 Case mix refers to cases treated by a hospital classified on the basis of those criteria which are
. significant in explaining the differences in resource usage between the various cases treated
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estimates because the assumed underlying cost function is linear (Figure 2). The
function represents the sum of the products of the quantity of each input multiplied by
its respective price. Accounting cost functions represent the cost of production, at one
point, on a cost function (e.g. point A). This characteristic makes the cost function rigid
because it cannot allow for technical responses to input price or quantities changes.
Point A is the only point where actual and cost accounting methods converge if the
hospital is minimising costs. With accounting methods, marginal costs are assumed to
be constant, which is not always the case in practice. Econometric models can allow the
foregoing assumption to be tested.
Figure 2 Comparison between statistical and cost accounting methods
Cost accounting cost function
Cost
Quantity of Output
Source: Barnum and Kutzin (1993).
Innovative but laborious ways of calculating marginal costs and assessing economies of
scope and scale can be used with cost accounting methods (McPake 1992). For instance,
marginal cost for a hospital output can be estimated from total variable costs recorded at
different output levels (keeping other outputs constant). Similarly, economies of scale
can be estimated by calculating average cost at different volumes of output. Calculating
average inpatient costs based on the assumption that there are no outpatient services for
instance, and comparing that with average inpatient costs when the assumption is
relaxed might be insightful in assessing economies of scope. However, hospitals are
multiproduct firms in which estimation of economies of scale or scope is a much more
• 8 Case severity refers to the seriousness of the patient's clinical condition within a case type. Case
severity can be measured by proxy variables such as age, secondary diagnoses as indicators of
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complicated process than indicated above. For instance, economies of scale are
estimated using "ray average costs": the average cost of an output bundle at some
particular point along a ray. The behaviour of the ray average cost as outputs expand
proportionately forms the basis of the definition of multiproduct scale economies
(Butler 1995). With cost accounting methods, it is not possible when using cross-
sectional data to know whether a hospital is operating in the short-run or long-run
(Folland et al., 1997).
Abundant evidence exists on the application of statistical methods in assessing hospital
costs and efficiency in industrialised countries (McGuire 1987, Valdmanis 1990, Scott
and Parkin 1995, Hardley et al., 1996, Vitaliano and Toren 1993, Grannemann et al.,
1986, Jensen and Morrisey 1986, Zuckerman et al., 1993). In LMICs large databases
amenable to such statistical analysis are generally not available (Barnum and Kutzin
1993). A few such studies have been carried out in SSA (Wouters 1993, Bitran-
Dicowsky 1993, Anderson 1980, Kumaranayake, 1998), which reported limitations
linked to data quality and incompleteness. Cost accounting methods can easily be
applied given the quality and inadequacy of available data, for estimating efficiency in
developing countries (Mills 1990b, Lewis et al., 1996, Broomberg 1997, Hansen et al.,
2000). It is also feasible using cost accounting methods to achieve high levels of cost
disaggregation, for instance unit costs by ward or broad diagnostic group.
When measuring efficiency it is important to first define the product (or unit of output).
This poses difficulties in a hospital because of its multi-product nature. Cost studies
have thus tended to use intermediate measures of output like outpatient visits,
admissions (or inpatient equivalents') and patient days as units of analysis. The use of
different output measures is also indicated by the need to avoid the possibility of
making misleading interpretations of results associated with using one unit of analysis.
The same is true if only average costs are calculated without consideration of marginal
comorbidity, or other severity of illness scores (Fleming 1990).
9 Inpatient equivalents are an aggregate measure of inpatients and outpatient statistics converted into
inpatients. This is usually done by a factor of 4 (Barnum and Kutzin 1993)'
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costs 10. Misleading interpretations may occur because of misunderstanding of the three
cost components of inpatient services, which are overhead costs, hotel costs and
treatment costs. Overhead costs refer to costs that remain constant regardless of level of
production (e.g., lighting). Hotel costs are those costs associated with patient food and
bedding which are generally constant with each patient day. Treatment costs are costs
directly related to the patient (diagnostics, therapeutic and other services) and vary
according to the type of disease. These cost.components need to be understood at both
hospital and patient level.
As alluded to earlier, misleading interpretations may occur if one unit of output is used
in calculating average costs, and comparisons are made between hospitals. For instance,
comparison of costs per inpatient day between hospitals requires an understanding of
differences in patient lengths of stay. Hospitals with longer lengths of stay might exhibit
low average costs. This does not necessarily mean they are efficient because such lower
costs might be a reflection of inefficiencies associated with unnecessary hospital stay.
Patient treatment costs are incurred most during the first few days of admission and fall
as the patient is stabilised and initial diagnostic and other measures are completed
(Barnum and Kutzin 1993). It is preferable to use cost per case because variation in
length of stay is considered (Fleming 1990). Hospital service statistics used in tandem
with unit costs enable a better appreciation of the efficiency implications of unit costs.
Information on bed turnover rate, average length of stay and bed occupancy assists in
the interpretation of unit costs and comparison between hospitals and between the same
hospital over time. High occupancy rates, in cases of similar cost profile, lead to lower
average cost per patient-day since overhead costs are spread over a larger number of
used beds.
Hospital performance can be approached differently by just looking at hospital activity
indicators (pabon Lasso 1986, Mahapatra and Berman 1994, Broomberg 1997). Such
assessment involves application of the Pabon Lasso graphical construct that summarises
10 For instance, Hospital A might have a relatively higher average cost than Hospital B but lower
marginal cost. 1udging Hospital A on the basis of average cost might cause erroneous investment
decisions, that is, investing in Hospital B instead of Hospital A.
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bed occupancy rate (BORII) and turnover rate (BTR'2) given the Average length of stay
(LOS'l) (Pabon Lasso 1986). Mahapatra and Berman used the Pabon Lasso method to
assess hospital performance in Andhra Pradesh (India), taking into account service mix
and facility mix. The results obtained suggested that hospital activity indicators could
reasonably identify under- and better performing hospitals. The method can be used to
screen hospitals for detailed assessment.
2.4 QuaUty of services: theory aad measuremeJlt
The quality of a product is just as important in health care as it is in any other sector or
industry. Management of "health enterprises" requires knowledge about quality lest it
becomes difficult to judge productivity or efficiency or make rational resource
allocation decisions. Donabedian (1988) argues that ''without it, recruitment,
remuneration, and advancement could become arbitrary, prices idiosyncratic, and
competition blind".
2.4.1 Definition of Quality
Quality is an elusive concept that can be used in many ways depending on the
context (Donabedian 1980, Gilson 1995, De Geyndt 1995, Fleming 1990). The
concept of quality has evolved over time as people grappled with its non-unitary
nature and attempted to define it. There are many definitions of quality and only
three are highlighted here to show the diversity of views on quality of care;
" Quality of care is the degree to which health services for individuals and populations increase
the likelihood of desired outcomes and are consistent with current professional
knowledge"(Institute of Medicine 1990).
"Effective health care, that meets everyone's needs and that is delivered equitably, humanely and
efficiently" (Black 1990)
"A quality service means a service which gives people what they need, as well as what they want,
and does so at lowest cost" (Ovretveit 1992)
II BaR = (Number of admissions x LOS)/(36S x No. of Beds)
12 BTR =Number of admissionslNumber of Beds
J3 LOS = Number of Patient DayslNumber of admissions.
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Worth pointing out is that the last two definitions explicitly incorporate both provider
and consumer perspectives and imply that quality is not a cost neutral term. These
sample definitions serve to show that quality is multidimensional and can be perceived
differently by those involved in health service transactions (i.e. providers, patients and
consumers).
This study adopts the Institute of Medicine's (1990) definition as a comprehensive
definition, which maintains a distinction between quality and cost, compatible with their
separate treatment in this thesis. The term health services refer to a wide array of
curative, preventive and rehabilitative services provided by different practitioners
(public or private). The focus on the individual and populations depicts the different
perspectives to be considered. The phrase desired outcomes refers to health outcomes
that patients desire and highlights the crucial link between how care is provided and its
effects on health. It also acknowledges the need to inform patients and their families
about alternative interventions and anticipated outcomes, and includes patient and
family satisfaction with health care services. The phrase "increases the likelihood"
derives from the fact that quality is not identical to positive outcome. Good quality care
may still result in poor outcome and patients may recover despite poor quality.
Emphasis should then be put on both process and outcome of care. The need for quality
care to keep abreast with advancement in knowledge and technology is couched in the
phrase "consistent with current professional knowledge". Knowledge boundaries shift
with time (Chassin et al., 1998). This definition permits a supply or demand side
analysis of quality.
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Quality can be conceived through the structure-process-outcome paradigm
(Donabedian 1980)14.These elements of quality are in a chain linked to one another
in a causal fashion. Each has meaning in the context of the others (Wyszewianski
1988, Chassin et al., 1987). The underlying assumption linking these aspects in a
health intervention is that the particular medical technology under evaluation is
efficacious. Efficacious" means that its use in medical care under optimal
conditions achieves the most in patient outcome (Donabedian 1985, Bunker 1988,
Wyszewianski 1988).
2.4.2 Methods of assessing quality of services
Measuring quality is no easier than defining it. The structural (input-based)
approach to quality assessment is generally used because it is relatively simple (see
Table 2 and Annex II). Its limitation is that "structure" depicts potential capacity to
provide quality care, which may not necessarily be translated into quality services in
practice. Structural attributes are important to system design but are limited as
14Table 2 Donabedian's structure-process-outcome paradigm (1980)
Structure
Structure assesses the quality of health care through a study of the settings in which the care takes place.
This includes adequacy of facilities and equipment, administrative processes, qualifications of medical
staff and organization. This assumes that given proper settings and instrumentalities, good medical care
will tend to follow.
Process
Process considers not only that medical technology exists to achieve results, but also whether what is
known to medical care has been applied: clinical history, physical examination, diagnostic tests,
justification of diagnosis and therapy, technical competence, evidence of preventive management,
coordination and continuity of care, acceptability of care to recipient. This assumes that given the proper
procedures, good health outcome will tend to result.
Outcome
Outcome considers whether a change in a person's current and future health status can be attributed to
antecedent health care. It examines recovery, restoration of function and survival. The validity of
outcomes as a dimension of quality is seldom questioned. However, there are frequently multiple factors
that affect health outcomes in addition to the treatment protocol, such that it is not always easy to
attribute good health solely or even partly to good procedures.
Source: Adapted from Wouters (1991)
15 There is generally confusion in understanding the difference between efficacy measurement and quality
assessment studies. Quality-of-care studies ask the question: "Was the right thing done right?" Whereas
studies on efficacy address the prior question, "Is this the right thing to do?" Studies of quality require that it
be known, a priori, what intervention is efficacious for each given case. The two are different
(Wyszewianski 1988).
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instruments for quality assessment (Donabedian 1985). Use of both structural and
process measurement is likely to produce a better view of the quality of services.
However, for process to be a valid measure, it must be closely linked to the outcome
that we care about (Chassin et al., 1987, Donabedian 1988). This is particularly
difficult in a hospital situation given the multiplicity of processes that exist (disease
and non-disease specific) which potentially affect overall quality of services.
Process assessment can be done retrospectively or prospectively and using explicit
or implicit quality assessment criteria. Explicit criteria refer to criteria, which are set
up by a panel of competent practitioners (experts) based on current clinical science
knowledge and experience. Such criteria are based on expert consensus. Implicit
criteria are individual sets of rules based on clinical science training and experience
of a medical cadre. Medical decision making processes are not pre-specified but are
based on experience and what is deemed medically correct at a given point in time,
and for a given medical problem by the assessor (Donabedian 1982, Keeler 1992,
Mitchell et al., 1997). Which method is used in practice depends on the context
especially concerning availability, completeness and quality of data. In retrospective
analysis, medical records are usually incomplete and lacking clinical variables
necessary for process review (Donabedian 1985). In addition, it is infeasible to
review all processes but to focus on specific key processes in the hospital
production function--e.g. using the tracer method (Kessner et al., 1973). Two
prospective approaches can be used. First, using a sample of hospitalised patients
assessed on a given day based on medical records and where possible, direct
examination supplemented by patient interviews. Second, a cohort of admitted
patients could be studied by reviewing patients' needs at every stage of their
treatment until they are discharged. If done unobtrusively patient specific data can
generate valid insights into quality of services.
Outcomes are those changes, favourable or not in the actual or potential health
status of persons, groups or communities that can be attributed to antecedent care
(Donabedian 1985, Wray et al., 1995). One classic list of negative outcome
measures comprises what Lohr (1988) called "the five Ds": death, disease,
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disability, discomfort, and dissatisfaction. Outcomes are not only difficult to
measure but also difficult to interpret and attribute (Clearly and McNeil 1988,
Donabedian 1980, 1988, Wouters 1991). This is because numerous factors, other
than medical interventions affect outcomes, and it is difficult to attribute any
particular factor to the outcome. Correct performance does not invariably produce
successful outcome (Flood et al., 1982). The attribution problem is compounded by
data problems. That is why outcome indicators used must be closely related to care
provided, and subject to change if that care is altered. Without this relationship it is
difficult to tell what must be improved, even if we know that the quality of services
needs improvement. Where there are data problems, outcomes may be used as
generic screens for identifying health facilities that require closer quality of care
review (Williamson 1978a, Hayward et al., 1993). In practice the choice of which
approach to use depends, inter alia, on causal validity, relevance to objectives of
care, specificity, inclusivity, timeliness, availability of information, accuracy of
measurement and cost (Donabedian 1988). Nevertheless, it is desirable that each of
the approaches is considered where possible to enhance explanatory capacity.
There are few candidate methods for use in assessing quality of hospital services in
a developing country context (Annex II). Gonnella and Govan's (1975) staging
method emphasises the need to have homogenous groups (in terms of case mix and
severity) and to note the condition of cases before admission or uptake into the
system. The latter is valuable in the interpretation of medical processes and
outcomes for defined medical interventions (Silder 1995). Use of homogenous
groups considers case mix and case severity, differences, which are crucial for
comparison purposes. A group could be a cohort of cases as in the 'trajectory
method' (Brook and Stevenson 1970 quoted in Donabedian 1985), that is followed
through the system noting all the landmarks in the treatment process. They could
also be a selection of specific conditions or diseases from specific disease
categories, that is 'tracers' (Kessner et al., 1973). With the use of tracers it is
possible to make inferences for specific diseases or conditions without going
through the difficult task of reviewing all cases. Williamson's (l978b) Health
Accounting Method is valuable in systematising quality review processes. It relies
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on usmg pre-specified outcomes and any observed deviations from these
predetermined outcomes (achievable benefits) prompts review of antecedent care,
and of the system characteristics that influence the care. It consists of three steps.
The first step includes selecting conditions for review based on the belief that care
for these conditions may be deficient and adjustments to care are feasible and would
produce significant benefits in health. Step two involves specification of outcomes
and standards of performance to be achieved; and step three involves the actual
assessment of outcomes by a health accountant. Ifpre-specified standards (expected
benefits) are met antecedent care is not reviewed. Conversely, if standards are not
met and deviations cannot be explained by chance, then antecedent care is reviewed
for the entire group of cases selected for the study.
2.4.3 Empirical evidence on quality of services
There is abundant literature on quality of care from developed countries that has
increasingly used outcome measures of quality (Fleming 1991, Morey et al., 1992,
Keeler et al., 1992, Hayward et al., 1993, Carey and Burgess 1999). Improvements
in information technology have allowed quality of services researchers to capture
relevant data for outcome measures such as risk adjusted mortality rates,
readmission rates, and complications (DesHarnais and Simpson 1992). In addition
statistical methods that incorporate differences in case mix and severity between
institutions have been used. Whilst some commentators (Chassin et al., 1998) argue
that quality can now be precisely measured, others (Starfield 1998) argue that most
of the work on quality assessment is disease-focussed and does not focus on
"clinically relevant but nonclinical determinants" of health status and primary care.
On the contrary, the majority of quality-of-care studies in developing countries have
been structural and process assessments (See Table A2.1). The preponderance of
structural and process studies is more a reflection of practical considerations than
conceptual ones. Firstly, health facilities in LMICs are relatively structurally
deficient and therefore any such assessments are likely to be insightful. In extreme
cases of structural deficiency even process assessments may not be justifiable.
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Secondly, information systems are not robust enough to generate sufficient data that
can be used for effective outcome analysis. Inevitably, important parameters for
comparisons such as case mix and case severity are difficult to consider or construct
because of data quality problems. The inclination has been to do such case studies at
primary care level and less so in hospitals. The few studies that have been done at
hospital level have also been structural with limited process review. Bitran (1995)
and Broomberg (1997) are examples of recent studies in SSA that have attempted to
include outcome assessments. However, the outcome measures were only disease-
specific and based on limited tracer conditions.
2.5 Cost-quality tradeoff's: theoretical frameworks and measurement
Evaluating relative performance of hospitals requires knowledge about quality and cost
tradeoffs. It is inadequate to judge performance on the basis of either cost or quality
because of the inevitable need to explain one in the context of the other. For instance, it
is futile to draw efficiency conclusions in service production without knowledge of
quality. The general tendency has been to keep either quality or efficiency constant in
the interpretation. The need to understand this link is more pronounced in resource-
constrained environments (Hogan 1997). An understanding of cost-quality trade-offs
requires a clear conceptual understanding of the relationship. The relationship is not
obvious, and has often led to confusion in the interpretation of service quality and cost
studies (Brooten 1997). The fundamental question to ask in exploring cost-quality
relationships is "When does high cost mean high quality and when does it mean low
efficiency?" There is no immediate and obvious answer to this question. Much depends
on the service under examination and its context.
The tripartite classification of quality problems by Chassin et al., (1998) provides a
basic framework for understanding cost-quality relationships. Quality problems might
be classified as underuse, overuse and misuse of services. Underuse occurs when there
is a failure to provide health care when it would have produced a favourable outcome
for a patient (e.g. missed immunisation). Overuse occurs when a health service is
provided under circumstances in which its potential for harm exceeds the possible
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benefit (e.g. prescribing an antibiotic for a viral infection). Misuse occurs when an
appropriate service has been selected but a preventable complication occurs and the
patient does not receive the full potential benefit of the service (e.g. avoidable surgical
complications). Reducing overuse increases quality (by eliminating unnecessary risks to
patients) and reduces costs. Addressing misuse increases quality (by reducing
complications) and decreases costs (by eliminating treatments for complications).
Solving underuse simultaneously affects costs and quality. If a health intervention is
effective, its provision inevitably improves quality but at increased cost (with
exceptions such as immunisations and prenatal care).
Theoretical frameworks have been developed to understand cost-quality relationships
(see Schulz et al., 1983, Fleming 1990, Morey et al., 1992, Hogan 1997, Brooten 1997).
The most notable one is the integrative model of Donabedian et al., (1982). According
to this model, quality is defined as expected improvement in health status. The
determinants of health status improvement are resources available to the physician, and
the physician's choice of strategies of care. It assumes that ideal physicians only engage
in activities that maximise health without wasting resources, and non-ideal physicians
waste resources or even harm the patient if resources are used injudiciously, This
implies that, with ideal physicians quality improvements are necessarily costly. In
reality physicians are not "ideal" such that increases in costs may lower, increase or not
change quality. It is possible to increase quality without increasing costs, for example
through improvements in managerial practice (Fleming 1990). This model links with
Chassin and colleagues' (1998) definition of quality problems in that, ideal physicians
do not misuse, underuse or overuse services. Therefore, the direction of the relationship
between costs and quality depends on the type of quality problem.
Empirical studies on cost and quality relationships are by no means conclusive. The
relationship .can be either positive or negative (Schulz et al 1983, Morey et al., 1992,
Fleming 1990, Hogan 1997, Carey and Burgess 1999). This can be explained by several
factors: first, use of different quality definition and measurement approaches; second,
use of small sample sizes; third, different adjustments for case mix and case severity.
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Fourth, limited inclusion of organisational variables in the analysis; and fifth, use of
different databases that are not patient specific.
An alternative conceptual framework is described. The theoretical relationship between
quality and costs can be explored graphically as shown in Figure 2.1. Quality (Q) is
measured on the horizontal axis and is defined as a composite index of dimensions such
as structure, process and outcome. On the vertical axis are costs (C). Costs of the norm
(s) or expected quality are calculated using the ingredients approach (see Meng et al.,
2000). The simplifying assumption is that services are provided efficiently, and that
quality varies with costs.
Figure 2.1. Conceptual cost-quality relationships
Quality
Curve CQo shows the relationship between costs and quality (the best practice
curve). The curve traces all expected quality levels (norms) ofa specific service that
can be produced. Point e represents the point at which health services begin to be
effective using current technology and medical science knowledge. Setting different
quality standards would mean movement along the curve. Shifts in curves to the left
of CQo, for example CQ" represents a deviation from the best practice curve that
current technology allows and therefore inefficiency. At lower cost levels a small
increase in cost (C, to C2) results in a large increase in quality (Q. to Q2)'At higher
cost levels, small quality increments require larger increments in cost, reflecting
diminishing quality returns to cost increments. After a point (point C4) further
increases in costs result in no significant changes in the quality of services. Cost-
quality trade-offs of a particular service can be examined using this framework. If,
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for example, the chosen 'nonn' in the treatment of a hernia is at point Q2' then the
cost attached to it will be C2 that is point A on the graph. The decision to set the
norm at that level is a function of local circumstances (e.g., resource endowment
and social preferences) and expected outcome which implies a judgement of
allocative efficiency, or of where marginal rates of return (MRR) are equated across
interventions. This depends on available alternative interventions and the
opportunity cost of choosing one intervention against another. The MRR is higher at
lower levels of funding. Therefore norms are appropriately specified at a lower point
of CQowhen funding is more limited in the whole system.
If, in practice it is observed that the actual treatment costs of a hernia incurred by a
provider is at point B, service provision is deemed inefficient and the quality of care
inferior than that expected (at point A). A move from A to B depicts a change in
quality with constant costs. A shift from point A to Y represents a lowering of
standards and costs without reducing efficiency. If actual service provision is
observed at point C, the quality of care remains acceptable, at Q2' but costs become
unnecessarily high as additional costs are incurred due to inefficiencies in service
provision (provision of redundant and not harmful care). If additional services are
harmful then the quality of care is negatively affected. Conversely, a movement
from A to Z represents a more costly choice of the "norm", Additional costs
incurred are attributable to the provision of extra care that adds to the likelihood of
achieving the desired patient's outcome, not redundant care, but implies allocative
inefficiency ifpoint A truly equates marginal rates of return across interventions.
The framework provides a conceptual basis for examining costs and quality of
defined hospital services, and their interpretation. The main caveat is that the
relationship between cost and quality needs to be analysed within the context of
prevailing economic and social realities in a locality or country. This means that the
level of acceptable care should be realistic and achievable. Using the ingredients
approach (Babson 1972, Drummond et al., 1997) it is possible to calculate expected
costs of a quality defined service and compare them with the actual costs (Meng et
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al., 2000). It may be possible to simulate quality improvements and their cost
implications with this model.
2.6 Summary and conclusions from the literature review
An analysis of hospital internal organisation and management seems to be a good
starting point for understanding hospital behaviour. Organisational theory provides a
strong basis for widening economists' understanding of hospital performance, however
defined (Donabedian 1988, Wyszewianski 1988, Mitchell 1997, Carey and Burgers
1999). Its emphasis on understanding organisational characteristics permits us to
explore the peculiarities of organisations, and assess how such characteristics may
influence organisational performance. A few hospital performance studies that have
attempted to capture organisational factors have demonstrated the importance of such
factors and the need for further research (Becker et al., 1980, Sloan and Becker 1981,
Schulz et al., 1983, Champagne et al., 1993). However, these studies used limited sets of
organisational variables largely because of the quantitative approaches employed. For
instance, important organisational variables such as staff motivation and its
determinants are not considered. Qualitative approaches have the potential to allow
more such variables to be included and explored in the analysis.
Relative costs and efficiency can be measured using two approaches: statistical and cost
accounting. Of the two, cost accounting methods are more appropriate for a context such
as Zimbabwe where the information technology and system in general is not robust
enough to generate sufficiently disaggregated data across a large number of hospitals.
There is no national database of hospital costs that can be subjected to statistical
methods of analysis. By using cost accounting methods it is possible to explore costs at
relatively high disaggregation levels (cost centres), and data permitting, economies of
scope and scale. In addition these methods can be institutionalised, and be of regular use
to hospital managers. This study employed a combination of cost accounting methods
(step-down costing, resource use methods or ingredients approach) for assessing
inpatient costs and exploring efficiency issues.
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There is no universal definition of quality and neither is there a universal way of
assessing it. The definition used must be relevant to the objective of the assessment and
must consider the practicalities of its measurement. The majority of quality-of-care
studies carried out in LMICs have used structural and process approaches, and few of
these studies had hospitals as units of analysis. This is understandable given the
difficulties of assessing quality of services in contexts of data scarcity. Furthermore,
existing retrospective data is usually incomplete, inconsistent and inaccurate. Use of
such data is fraught with problems. Montoya-Aguilar (1994) argues that use of available
standards for quality performance assessment, particularly in developing countries, must
be limited to those which are appropriate to their health services and correspond to the
measurements of performance that they are able to carry out, without overburdening
their information systems and diverting staff from their basic functions.
The study aims to contribute to the development of appropriate methods for measuring
the quality of inpatient services through prospective strategies. Potential methods for
reviewing inpatient quality of services are: "staging methods" (Gonnella and Govan
1975), the "tracer method" (Kessner et al., 1973) and Williamson's (1978a) "Health
accounting method". Used in combination these methods can provide insights into the
quality of inpatient services. This multiple approach plus use of explicit criteria seems
suitable for complex organisations such as hospitals. Controlling for case mix and case
severity is a major challenge. Some studies have used "tracers" to gain insights on case
mix and case severity and for measuring outcomes (Broomberg 1997, Siriwanarangsun
1996, Gilson 1992). Use of hospitals at the same level of care combined with use of
tracers may assist in accounting for case mix and severity differences. The main
conclusion regarding quality assessment is that, measurement of structural and process
aspects of quality of inpatient services is feasible in the Zimbabwean context, and
relates well with the quality of care definition adopted for the study.
Cost-quality relationships pose conceptual and practical difficulties. Nevertheless
understanding the relationship improves our understanding and interpretation of relative
performance. The relationship may vary depending on the nature of service and its
context, definitions of quality and its measurement, measurement of costs and
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organisational variables. It may be argued that the relevant question for investigation
should not be whether or not quality is generally positively or negatively related to costs
but what is the relationship between cost and quality and how does it help explain
relative performance under a given context. This is supported by empirical evidence,
which clearly shows no systematic pattern of the direction of cost-quality relationships
(Fleming 1990). Furthermore, existing conceptual frameworks on cost and quality are
either complex or too simplistic to be applied in practice. This study proposes a
conceptual model of cost-quality tradeoffs, which can be used to explore the
relationships with limited data.
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CHAPTER 3 OBJECTIVES AND METHODS
3.0 Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to present the aim and specific objectives of the study and
a summary of the methods employed for each study component. The summary includes
the rationale and appropriateness of the approach taken, target population, sampling
procedures, data collection techniques and analysis. Detailed descriptions of the
methods used are given in the succeeding result chapters. The chapter is organised in
two sections. The first section provides the study aim, objectives, and hypotheses. The
second section presents a general summary of the methods used in the study.
3.1 Study Objectives
3.1.1 The AIM of the research
The AIM of the research was to contribute to an understanding of the determinants
of hospital performance.
3.1.2 General Objectives
1. To measure hospital performance.
2. To explore hospital quality-cost trade-offs.
3. To describe and assess hospital internal organisation and management.
4. To assess the relationship between (1), (2) and (3) above, and their implications for
hospital reform in Zimbabwe.
3.1.3 Specific Objectives
1. To use cost accounting methods to measure inpatient costs at both hospital, and
patient level in six public tertiary hospitals.
2. To determine appropriate methods for measuring quality of inpatient services,
and to use them to measure quality of services in six public tertiary hospitals.
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3. To explore hospital quality-cost trade-offs using tracer diseases: malaria and
pulmonary tuberculosis.
4. To describe the internal organisation and management of public hospital services,
and associated incentive structures.
5. To analyse how incentive structures, internal organisation and management relate
to costs and quality of services.
6. In the light of specific research findings, draw policy implications for hospital
reform in Zimbabwe.
3.2 Summary of Methods
3.2.1 Selection of Study Sites
The study was a comparative multi-case study and its general approach was both
quantitative and qualitative in nature. There are seven public tertiary hospitals in
Zimbabwe, and each covers an administrative province with an average of seven
districts. The study was carried out at six of them-coded hospital 1-6 (see Chapter 4
for detailed descriptions of study setting). The seventh hospital, Chinhoyi was excluded
from the study because of its atypical characteristics. Firstly, it was built in the early
nineties, and is therefore fairly new compared to the others. Secondly, the hospital is as
big as the national referral hospitals, and because of this has been experiencing
problems of under-utilisation (small catchment population) and low staffing. Under the
circumstances this hospital would have been an outlier in the study.
The hospitals were purposively selected to ensure comparability in terms of bed size,
range of facilities, catchment population, and geographical coverage. The choice of
hospitals at the same referral level was also an attempt to control for broad case mix
differences (Tatchell 1983, SOderlund 1994). The official average bed size of the study
hospitals was 200 beds with a range of 156 to 250 beds. In addition, the choice of
provincial hospitals was influenced by the design of hospital reforms currently taking
place in Zimbabwe. These reforms include inter alia giving hospitals greater autonomy,
and this process was to start with central and provincial hospitals. By first looking at
tertiary hospitals, the study results are better poised to have immediate relevance to the
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reform process. Although the study concentrates on provincial hospitals, the methods
used are applicable to any other types of public hospital in Zimbabwe.
3.2.2 Data Collection Methods
3.2.2.1 Hospital Cost Analysis
The study focused on inpatient services only for three reasons. Firstly, inpatient services
form the "core business" of referral hospitals. Secondly, an analysis of hospital inpatient
services entails a comprehensive look at both actual medical and nursing care (clinical
aspects), and all ancillary services. Lastly, other services can be incorporated once the
core cost structure has been established. Costs were considered from the provider's
perspective only. The analyses were carried out at three levels: hospital, ward and
patient level.
(a) Hospital/Ward level: cost for hospital inpatient services per ward were measured using
unidimensional ratio analysis methods-standard cost accounting methods. Intermediate
measures of health outcome (patient days and admissions) were used as hospital products
(Barnum and Kutzin 1993) (Chapter 6). To aid interpretation of cost analysis results,
hospital service indicators (bed occupancy rate, average length of stay, bed turnover rate)
were also analysed using the Pabon Lasso (1986)method (Chapter 4).
(b) Patient Level: Three tracer conditions (pulmonary tuberculosis, simple and severe
malaria) were used to permit a closer analysis of inpatient care production functions (see
Chapter 7). Tracers were selected by a panel of experts using two key criteria: (1)
prevalence of disease, that is its contribution to hospital admissions and mortality, and (2)
availability of generally agreed treatment guidelines. At each hospital, cohorts of
prospectively recruited inpatients were used to determine average costs per patient using a
combination of micro-costing or disease-specific costing (Drummond 1997), and top-
down costing methods. Input consumption by patient from admission to discharge was
recorded. Data collected included what was done to and for the patient, and excluded
overhead and capital costs. Direct recurrent inputs captured included nursing time,
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doctor's time, laboratory tests, theatre, radiography, hotel services (bedding and food),
drugs and other medical supplies. Average costs per case per diagnostic group were then
calculated and resource use profiles per case established. The latter was done to assist in
identifying how much of each resource input was used (Hutton 1997), and to permit an
examination of cost-quality relationships (see Chapter 9).
3.2.2.2 Quality of hospital services
As for cost analysis, quality assessment was carried out using a triangulation of methods
and at two levels: hospital and patient level (Chapter 8).
At hospital level: broad structural aspects of quality of services, that is staff, buildings
and equipment, and availability of drugs were assessed. These measures show the
hospital's capacity to supply services. An inventory of staff was carried out by ward,
and buildings were assessed through observation and discussion with managers. Drug
availability was assessed using a standard list of essential drugs drawn with the
technical input of an experienced pharmacist. Available inputs (structure) were then
compared with standard basic requirements for hospitals (norms or national guidelines)
based on an essential hospital package and frequent patient needs.
At patient level prospective quality analysis methods using explicit criteria for the three
tracers (simple and severe malaria, and pulmonary tuberculosis) were used: The reason for
using tracers was to allow for a detailed review of various components of hospital
services. The assessment was carried out using the same tracer cases used in the cost
analysis. In order to systematise the process, Williamson's (1978a) health accounting
method was adapted. The method is based on four stages: identification of tracers, setting
of standards using local experts, application of standard criteria by a paramedic (health
accountant), and review of results (actual versus expected). In this study, application of the
criteria meant prospectively following-up cohorts of patients presenting with malaria and
pulmonary tuberculosis from admission to discharge. The criteria included both structural
and process aspects of quality of services. Its construction was based on current clinical
knowledge (e.g. therapy and expected outcomes), resources available in the system and a
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consideration of other competing demands for those resources. The implicit assumption in
criteria setting was that the best possible use of resources was chosen against competing
demands on those resources (technical and allocative efficiency).
3.2.2.3 Qualitative research
Qualitative research was designed to address general objectives 3 and 4 because of the
exploratory nature of their logic of enquiry (Chapter 10). A multi-site case study design
was used, in which each of the six hospitals was the subject of inquiry. This approach
allowed for detailed assessment and in-depth understanding of hospitals operations. It is
argued that case studies permit development and testing of theories, which the study
attempted to do. The purpose of this study component was to answer two questions:
"What are the key internal organisational factors in the provision of public hospital
services?" How do current organisational and management factors influence hospital
performance? A triangulation of three methods was used to collect data: first, in-depth
interviews with hospital executives, heads of departments and doctors/specialists using
an interview guide; second, a review of policy documents; and third, attending meetings
and observation.
In addition, an analysis of perceived effects of hospital reforms on existing hospital
arrangements and performance was carried out. This was an ex ante analysis using two
tracer reforms: hospital autonomy and contracting out of services as subjects of discussion.
In the process the following general questions were investigated: "What are the
motivations of different hospital players?" "What are their perceptions of the current
internal hospital organisation and management, and performance?" and "What are the
perceived likely effects of proposed reforms on current incentive structures, and
consequently on hospital performance?"
3.2.3 Data Processing and Cleaning
Quantitative data on costs and quality was analysed using computer software
packages Excel and SPSS. A system of linked Excel spreadsheets was used in the
costing and sensitivity analysis. Data was checked for consistency using simple
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descriptive statistics, and tests for normality and outliers. This was followed by
appropriate data trimming before final analysis. This explains different values of n
in the analysis of specific variables.
Qualitative data was analysed using a modified "Framework approach"(Ritchie and
Spencer 1994) because it permitted a systematic and repeatable data analysis
process. The method is a deductive form of analysis and includes five stages:
familiarisation, identifying a thematic framework, indexing, charting, and mapping
and interpretation. Stage 1; 'familiarisation' involves randomly going through
interview data to get a feel for what is available. Stage 2; 'thematic framework'
involves identification of a thematic framework: The study had a loosely predefined
thematic framework based on predefined subject domains. Therefore, this stage
involved looking for emergent themes and discarding irrelevant original themes
through content analysis. Stage 3; 'Charting' involved application of the thematic
framework to individual interview data, and responses were tallied by theme
(category). Stage 4; 'Mapping and interpretation' involved the sifting and sorting of
data by core themes after which the data was analysed and interpreted with the
guidance of the research questions and study hypotheses.
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CHAPTER 4 COUNTRY PROFILE AND STUDY SETTINGS
4.0 Introduction
In this chapter a description of the country profile and the specific study settings is
presented as a means of understanding the background and environmental factors
that influenced directly or indirectly the study methodology and the results
generated. Most arguments advanced and interpretations of study results are
couched within the described context. Furthermore, an understanding of the context
puts into perspective the pertinent issues and limitations encountered in the study.
The chapter is divided into two sections. Section 4.1 presents the country profile and
section 4.2 presents profiles of the regions in which the study hospitals are located.
4.1 Country prome
4.1.1 Physical and administrative borders
Zimbabwe is situated in the southern part of the continent of Africa between latitude
15 30 and 22 30 South of the equator and between longitude 25 and 33 East of the
Greenwich Meridian. It covers an area of 390 757 km'. It is a landlocked country
bordering South Africa in the South, Mozambique in the East, Zambia in the North,
Botswana in the southwest, and Namibia in the East (Figure 4). The principal
physical feature is the high plateau, the "high veld" that runs from Southwest to
Northeast across the whole country. Land is divided into five natural regions
according to soil type, rainfall and other climatic conditions.
The country is divided into ten administrative provinces: Mashonaland East,
Mashonaland West, Mashonaland Central, Matebeleland South and Matebeleland
North, Midlands, Manicaland, Masvingo, Harare (the capital city) and Bulawayo (the
second largest city). Each province, in tum is divided into an average of seven
administrative districts. The district is the basic unit of government in the country.
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Figure 4 Map of Zimbabwe
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4.1.2 Climate and rainfall
Zimbabwe has a tropical climate with four seasons in a year: summer (November to
February), autumn (March to May), winter (June to August) and spring (September
to October). The average rainfall is 843 mm per annum. Temperatures can be as low
as 7°C in June and as high as 32°C in November. Droughts occur infrequently but
usually with devastating effects on agriculture and the economy in general. The
northern half of the country is less prone to drought and is considered the "bread
basket" of the country with annual rainfall of 800-1,200 mm. The southern half is
more prone to drought and experiences relatively low rainfall (400-800 mm) even in
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a normal season. The country is endowed with diverse places of scenic attraction
such as the Victoria Falls (the second wonder of the world), a clear testimony to its
diverse terrain.
4.1.3 Demographic features
In1992, Zimbabwe had a population of 10.4 million people (1992 Census), and it is
now estimated to be 11.8 million people of which 52% are women and 48% are men
(ICS 1997). The average population growth rate was 3.14% in 1992 and is now
estimated to be 2.1%. The drop has largely been attributed to the impact of
HIV/AIDs. Forty-five percent of the population is under the age of 15 years, 51% is
between the age of 15-41 years, and 3% are over the age of 65 years. Seventy
percent of the population resides in rural areas. Over 3.5 million people are
economically active of which 23% are communal farm workers, 55% are in other
formal employment and 22% are unemployed (1992 Census). Unemployment is
now estimated to be 45%. The crude birth and death rates are 43.5 and 9.49 per
1,000 respectively. According to the 1992 census report, infant and maternal
mortality is 66 per 1000 and 395 per 100,000 live births respectively. With the
devastating impact ofHIV/AIDs in the country, 20.3% prevalence among adults and
30% among mothers attending antenatal clinics (NACP 1998), these figures require
major revision upwards. Total fertility rate was 5.91 in 1992, and it decreased to 4.3
by 1994 (ZDHS 1994). Life expectancy at birth was 61 in 1990 but again because of
the AIDS pandemic; it is estimated to have been lowered to 41 years.
4.1.4 The Economy
Typical of LMICs, Zimbabwe's economy is driven mostly by agriculture and
mining, manufacturing, and transport and distribution. These sectors contributed
12.9%, 8.2%, 26.4% and 19% to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of ZW$13
billion by 1990 (EIU, 1992). Zimbabwe is the second largest tobacco producer in
the world after Brazil. Tobacco alone generates 40% of the countries foreign
currency earnings. Principal exports by 1990 were tobacco (US$341m), gold
(US$239m), ferro-alloys (US$155), nickel (US$10Im) and cotton (US$86m).
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During the period 1980 to 1987, the economy grew by an average of 3% (real GOP
growth) due to a growing and vibrant productive sector after the war. In 1987, the
country was able to generate US$I.5 billion in export earnings, enough for more
than 12-months import cover. GOP per capita grew from about US$200 in 1980 to
US$575 in 1987. Growth in the social sector, that is, health and education paralleled
economic growth. Enrolment for primary education increased from 800,000
children in 1980 to 2.5 million in 1995. Secondary level enrolment increased from
66000 pupils to 712 000 in the same period. By 1985, literacy and numeracy levels
had increased to 80% and 90% respectively.
By late 1990, economic growth had taken a downturn, as world market prices for
minerals and agricultural products plummeted, government borrowings in the
domestic market increased thereby crowding out the private sector, and inflation
reached an all-time high of 48.4% in 1992 (Bloch, 2000). The negative effects of a
command economy, in a growing open global market began to be felt. In 1991,
Zimbabwe implemented a five-year trade liberalisation and Structural Adjustment
Programme (SAP) with the support of the World Bank (WB) and the International
Monetary Fund (IMF). The concepts of free enterprise, open trading and cost
recovery became acceptable. The programme was implemented against a backdrop
of a high budget deficit of 10% and high domestic debt (WB, 1999), ill-prepared
domestic producers, inefficient parastatals and excessive controls on imports and
foreign currency, and an inward looking managerial culture.
The first five years saw a rapid increase in government foreign debt from 22.6% of
GOP in 1995 to 60% by 1999 (RBZ, 1999). Domestic debt in 1999 amounted to
ZW$68.2 billion (US$1.8 billion"), This led to company closures (mainly in the
manufacturing industry) and job redundancies, flooding of the market by cheap, and
sometimes low quality products, increase in budget deficit as government continued
to financially support inefficient parastatals and its high defence spending,
introduction of fees in education and strengthening cost recovery in health. The
quality of life of the general public did not improve. Poverty increased, and it is
16 1US$=ZW$38 (articifially pegged).
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estimated that 71% of communal households are very poor, 57% in resettlement and
small-scale commercial areas, and 21% in urban areas (PASS, 1995). Inequity
increased with an average Gini Coefficient of 56.83, ranked fifth in the world
(UNDP 1988). The SAP programme was extended for another five years under a
new name: Zimbabwe Programme for Economic and Social Transformation
(ZIMPREST, 1996-2000), this time emphasising social safeguards against the
negative effects of economic changes. By 1999, the country was experiencing its
worst economic performance since 1980. The budget deficit was more than 11% of
GDP, a staggering inflation rate of 70%, and an interest rate of 60%. The
Zimbabwean dollar depreciated from ZW$10.8 in 1996 to ZW$38 to the US dollar
in 1999 and interest payments to domestic debt reached 29% of total government
expenditure. In addition, corruption became rampant, shortages of foreign currency
became severe resulting in shortages of fuel and other imported inputs. Economic
growth declined from 3.5% in 1996 to 0.5% by 1999. All this is attributable to poor
macro-economic policies, and unsustainable foreign policies. Social sectors like
health and education have not been spared from the negative effects of this
economic morass.
4.1.5 The Health Sector
4.1.5.1 Health Policy
The Ministry of Health's policies in the 1980s were influenced by the "Growth with
Equity" economic policy adopted by the Government of Zimbabwe to redress pre-
independence imbalances. Accordingly, the MOH produced a policy document
"Equity in Health" with equity as the core policy value. The main thrust of the
,
policy was to improve access to services for the majority of the people. The
Zimbabwe Health for All Action Plan (1986) was a translation of these overall goals
into programmes and services. Deliberate emphasis was put in rural areas on rural
infrastructural development, training of staff, deployment of more staff and
establishment of the requisite managerial systems (MOH, 1999). Primary Health
Care, was and still is, the driving force of the entire health care system. However,
changes in the national and international socio-economic environment, and new
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health challenges such as HIVIAIDS have necessitated a re-examination of current
policies and programmes. Concerns for quality, efficiency and equity dominate in
most recent policy documents. In line with these changes the MOH has produced a
National Health Strategy for Zimbabwe (1997-2007): working for quality and
equity in health, to chart the way forward into the next decade. A key ingredient of
this strategy is health sector reform.
4.1.5.2 Structure of the health sector.
The public sector plays a dominant role in the health sector, providing about 70% of
health services. The private not-for-profit sector (Missions and NGOs) provides
about 20% of services, 90% of which are in remote rural areas (Hongoro 1995). The
rest could be attributed to the private for-profit sector in its various forms. The
public sector has 11,594 beds (62%), missions 6,024 beds (32%) and the private
sector 1,227 beds (7%)(MOH 1997). There is a rapidly growing private for-profit
sector" mostly in urban areas where relatively more people can afford to pay for
private services. By 1996, it was estimated that 75% of all registered doctors were
involved in some form of private practice. Data on the exact size, distribution and
growth of the private for-profit sector is not known because of lack of data from the
private sector. This is compounded by lack of supportive legislative instruments or
incentives to collect it (Hongoro and Kumaranayake forthcoming). A parallel
traditional sector thrives largely in rural areas. In 1996,more than 45 000 traditional
healers were registered with the national association-Zimbabwe National
Traditional Healers Association (ZINATHA). The role of traditional healers in the
health services delivery is acknowledged by an act of parliament, which makes
ZINATH~ a statutory body.
4.1.5.3 Organisation and management
The health delivery system conforms to the universal pyramidal structure built on
the foundations of primary health care concepts. The health system has four tiers.
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The first tier is the primary care level made up of clinics and rural health centres.
There are more than 1,250 such units. These units represent the first port of call into
the health system. The second tier is the secondary level made up of district
hospitals (6,970 beds). Each district (57) has a district or designated district hospital
(with +/-140 beds). District hospitals act as first referral centres, and are accordingly
equipped and staffed to provide secondary care. The third tier is the tertiary
(provincial) level made up of 8 hospitals (7 public and 1 mission) with a total of
2,487 beds. Tertiary hospitals are the third referral level from primary care facilities.
Specialist and more intensive services are provided at this level, and each hospital
supports an average of eight district hospitals in a province. Ideally, tertiary
hospitals should have a specialist in each of the following specialties: gynaecology
and obstetrics, ophthalmology, surgery, medicine, anaesthetics, paediatrics and
psychiatry. Nurses, environmental health and rehabilitation technicians are trained
at this level. The fourth tier is the quartenary or central level. There are six national
referral centres, two of which are specialist psychiatric hospitals. Central hospitals
form the pinnacle of the referral system (3,755 beds excluding psychiatry), and are
involved in training of doctors, nurses and other paramedical personnel.
There is a parallel management hierarchy to the services referral system. Primary
care facilities fall under the jurisdiction of the district, and are managed from that
level although operationally they are managed by a nurse-in-charge in collaboration
with a local clinic committee. At the district level, management is by a district
health executive (DHEI8) committee chaired by the district medical officer (DMO).
This committee is responsible for the district hospital and district wide activities. At
provincial level there is a provincial health executive (PHEI9) chaired by the
provincial medical director (PMD). This executive is responsible for the entire
province, all the districts and the provincial hospital. However, tertiary hospitals are
operationally managed by a hospital executive, chaired by a medical superintendent.
17 Includes general practitioners, group practices, corporate clinics, hospitals, laboratories, and nursing
homes, traditional and faith healers, dental units, and others
18 DHE consists of a district medical officer, nursing officer, pharmacist, environmental health officer and
health services administrator and the hospital matron.
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At central level the public sector is steered by various specialist departments headed
by directors who fall under the authority of the Ministry of Health-the permanent
secretary. One central hospital is semi-autonomous (Parirenyatwa) and is managed
by a board of directors but others are managed by traditional hospital executives led
by a medical superintendent. With current hospital reforms, some of these
management structures will change. Private for-profit and not-for-profit facilities do
not conform to this public organisational structure. The current strategic plan of the
MOH advocates for organised partnership with the private sector such that the
private sector effectively complements public services.
4.1.5.4 Disease profile
The country like many other developing countries faces a high disease burden
compounded by the HIV/AIDS scourge. Communicable diseases are still the main
causes of morbidity and mortality (Table 4). Malaria, pulmonary tuberculosis and
RIV related conditions are in the top five causes of hospital mortality.
Table 4.0 Leading Causes of Hospital Mortality, 1996
National,S years and over National, Total Ages
Disease and conditions Numbers Disease and Conditions Deaths
1. Pulmonary TB 2,948 1. Pulmonary TB 3,312
2. Malaria 2,527 2. Malaria 3,006
3. HIY/AIDS & other viral 1,575 3. ARI (lower tract) 2,524
4. Cardiovascular Diseases 1,081 4. HIY/AIDS & other viral 1,902
5. Intestinal infections 999 5. Intestinal infections 1,725
6. Extra-pulmonary TB 443 6. Perinatal conditions 1,223
7. Ill-defined conditions 439 7. Nutritional deficiencies 1,123
8. Diseases of the digestive system 415 8. CYD 1,081
9. Meningococcus & other meningitis 306 9. ARI (upper tract) 711
10.Anaemia 270 10. Ill-defined conditions 630
Total 15,066 Total 22,415
Source: MOH's National Strategic Plan (1999)
4.1.5.5 Health financing, trends and performance
There are three sources of government financing for the health sector: (1) taxes, or
budgetary appropriations; (2) private insurance or medical aid societies (MAS); (3)
19 PHE consists of the provincial medical director, pharmacist, nursing officer, environmental health
officer, and health services administrator, and two medical officers of health responsible for MCH,
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user fees or out-of-pocket payments. According to the latest study of health sector
expenditure, the public sector accounts for 51% and the private sector for 49%
(Schwartz and Zwizwai 1995: Table A4). As mentioned earlier, private for-profit
sector financial data are not collected. As a result, little is known about private
sector financing and performance, Conversely, private not-for profit data is captured
through the public information system. At least 90% of Mission facilities' recurrent
expenditure is drawn from the public sector (Hongoro 1995).
The public health financing outlook for the last 20 years is generally a declining
one. The decade beginning 1980 saw the government investing considerable public
resources in health, population, nutrition and education. The 1980-90 period saw a
marked increase in real health expenditure. Spending as part of GDP grew from
2.0% in the early 1980s to 3% by the end of the decade. Ministry of Health
expenditure as a share of total government spending increased and reached its peak
of 6.2% in 1990/91. Impressive gains in the health sector ensued. For instance,
infant mortality declined from 86 per 1 000 live births in 1982 (1982 Census) to 61
per 1 000 in 1990, life expectancy at birth increased from 55.7 in 1980 to 61 years
in 1990, total fertility declined from 6.2 to 5.9 in the same period, the crude death
rate declined from 10.8 in 1982 to 6.1 in 1987. Maternal mortality declined to 69
per 100 000 institutional live births by 1989.
However, the 1990s saw a reversal of many of these gains. The crude death rate
increased from 9.49 in 1991 to 12.2 in 1997.Maternal mortality rose to 395 per 100000
live births (1992 Census). The SAP which was introduced in 1991 emphasised, inter
alia, cost recovery in health. In the first five years of SAP it proved difficult for the
government to sustain the impressive health gains of the 1980s as the financial
allocations to the social sector started declining. Real per capita expenditure in health
declined by 37.8 % from Z$S7.72 in 1990/91 to $Z35.86 in 1995196.As a percentage of
GDP, MOH spending fell from 3.1 in 1990/91 to 2.2 in 199516while the share of total
government expenditure fell from 6.2% to 4.2% (Kwaramba 1996). The situation was
exacerbated by the increasing incidence of HIV1AIDS. By 1996 it was estimated that
epidemiology and disease surveillance.
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1.5 million people were mv positive and 300 000 had AIDS. Current estimates are that
one in ever 5 people is HIV infected, and about 700 people die every day (NACP 1998).
Immunisation coverage reached a high of 80% in 1992, but fell to 73% by 1997
(MoHCW, 1997, 1982, National Census, 1992, MoHCW Nutrition Surveys 1982, 1984,
1985). Infant mortality increased from 66 per 1000 live births in 1990 to 80 per 1000
live births in 1997. It is against this backdrop that Zimbabwe embarked on an ambitious
programme of health sector reforms,
4.2 Study setting: regional promes
There are eight administrative regions in Zimbabwe but this section provides the
background of six regions in which the study hospitals are located. The hospitals are
coded Hospital 1 (171 beds), Hospital 2 (160 beds), Hospital 3 (250 beds), Hospital 4
(235 beds), Hospital 5 (223 beds) and Hospital 6 (156 beds)", The regions in which the
study hospitals are located share the same codes. Table 4.1 shows a comparative
summary of the major characteristics of the regions. The regions have a similar number
of administrative districts (7-8 districts each) which inform us about their size and
similarity in organisation of the health services. The following section describes
background features of the regions, which have a bearing on hospital performance,
4.2.2 Demographic characteristics
The size and distribution of the population is likely to influence utilisation of services.
Table 4.1 shows variation in population sizes across the regions: region 5 has the largest
population and region 6 has the smallest.
20 Bed size numbers only include those that were used in the analysis, which are different from official
bed numbers.
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Table 4.1 Profiles of regional study settings: socio-economic & demographic factors, health
facilities & statistics
Provincel Mashonaland Mashonaland Midlands Masvingo Manicaland Matebeleland
Item Central [I] East [2] [3] [4] [5] South [6]
Admn. District. 7 7 8 7 7 7
Population: 867,3181 1,033,3361 1,302,2141 1,221,8451 1,537,676 591,747
Rural 92% 94% 77% 92% 89% 92%
Urban 8% 6% 23% 8% 11% 8%
CBR 37/1,000 33/1,000 3511,000 33/1,000 35/1,000 35/1,000
Crude Death 9/1,000 1211,000 10/1,000 11/1,000 1211,000 9/1,000
Rate
% natural 3% 2.34% 2.52% 2.22% 2.34% 2.58%
increase
Literacy rate 67% 80% 82% 76% 75% 78%
Land size 27,284 32,727 - 44,310 34,870 66,390
(km2)
Economic Base Agriculture Agriculture Agriculture Agriculture Agriculture Agriculture
Mining Mining Mining Mining
HHD Income3, ZWSII,912 ZWSII,629 ZWS18,259 ZW$10,389 ZW$10,170 ZW$9,644
4
Health Fac'ties:
Tertiary hosp. I I I 1 1 1
Tertiary beds 120 178 432 271 192 186
Sec. Hosp7 10 II 21 12 28 9
Second. Beds 850 1,123 2,660 2,056 1,164 1,007
Primary facil. 101 166 188 151 213 93
Staff:
General Drs 30 32 27 49 44 32
Consultants 3 0 4 0 6 2
Nurses 779 1,065 723 1,177 1,233 692
Dentist 1 1 3 5 2 2
Lab.Tech'gist" 20 19 19 30 10 16
Pharmacists" 14 20 18 16 19 16
Rad iographer= 11 IS 13 14 17 12
Population
based statistics.
Malnutrition 8.4% 7.2% 7% 4.7% 7.7% 10%
prevalencef
HIV prevalence 30%ANC 25% 22%ANC 28%ANC 45%ofANC 40%ofANC
mothers mothers mothers mothers mothers
TopS new ARI (23%) ARI (23%) ARI (19%) ARI (26%) ARt (21%) ARI (29%)
Cases seen Malaria (20%) Malaria (12%) Malaria (14%) III. def.{12%) Malara (17%) Skin d (14%)
OPDs Injuries (6%) Skin Dis. (7%) STD(9%) Skin d (11%) III.def(II%) Injuries (6%)
Skin dis. (5%) Injuries (6%) I1l.defin. (8%) Injuries (6%) Skin dis (9%) Malaria (6%)
STDs(5%) STDs(6%) Skin dis. (6%) STD(6%) Injuries (7%) STDs (6%)
Top 5 causes N. deliv. (30%) N.deliv. (24%) N.deliv. (30%) N deliv(30%) Malara (25%) N.deliv (30%)
of hospital Malaria (17%) Injuries (11%) Malaria (10%) Injuries (8%) N.Del.(23%) Malaria (7%)
admi'ns Intest. Inf. (8%) ARI (7%) ARI(8%) Skin 05(7%) Obstr'c(7%) Injuries (7%)
(5 years +) PTB(7%) TB(6%) PTB (7%) Malaria (7%) TB (4%) PTB(6%)
Skin dis. (6%) Malaria (6%) Injuries (6%) PTB (6%) Intest (3%) ARI (6%)
Top five causes PTB (28%) Cardio. (27%)6 PTB(25%) Viral D (21 %) Malar (28%) PTB (27%)
of hospital Malaria (13%) TB (13%) ARI (13%) PTB (18% TB (14%) Viral d(16%)
deaths Intest. Inf. (8%) ARI (11%) Malaria (11%) Malaria (II %) HIV (6%) ARI (I 1%)
(5 years+) ARI (8%) Viral Inf.(9%) Intest. Inf(9%) ARI (9%) ARI·LT (5%) Intest.inf(IO%
Oth'r viral (7%) Malaria (5%) Digestive (6%) Intest. inf (6%) P·circur (4%) Malaria (3%)
. I l 3 4Notes. 1992 census figures, 1997 census figures, Mean annual household income (in-kind and cash), 1996
figure, s weight for age, 6 1995 mortality figures, 7 Includes secondary and other referral hospitals. • includes
technicians.
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Population size, per se, is a major determinant of demand for hospital services, which
means those population differences, may help explain hospital performance variations.
Over 70% of the population in all regions is rural, and therefore access to tertiary
hospital services may vary depending upon the way health services are organised and
function at lower levels of care (including the referral system). Midlands has a
particularly high urban population of 23% compared to an average of 8%. Urban
populations tend to have greater chances of accessing tertiary care because of the urban
location of tertiary services. An analysis of the population distribution by age groups
and by region did not show any marked dissimilarities (eSO, 1992).
4.2.1 Geographical location
The distance of hospitals from major urban centres has implications for hospital input
procurement systems and staffing levels. The markers in Figure 4 show the locations of
the study hospitals. The hospitals are sited in regional cities/towns. Hospital 1 is located
80 km north of Harare, and hospital 2, is also 80 km from Harare but to the east. It
would be expected that these two hospitals would have better staffing levels and input-
supply systems because they are located close to the capital city. The government
central medical store is located in Harare and has two regional stores in Masvingo
(covering the south of the country) and Harare (covering the north of the country).
Hospital 3 is located 275 km south of Harare in the third largest city in the country.
Hospital 4 falls is 262 km south-east of the capital city. The hospital is located in a
small town but one relatively bigger than the provincial towns of regions 1, 2 and 6.
Hospital 5 is located about 263 km east of Harare in the fourth largest city in the
country. As a border city, it has much more developed infrastructure compared to
regions 1, 2, and 4. Study hospital 6 is located 600 km south-east of Harare but only 80
km east of Bulawayo-the second largest city in Zimbabwe. However, the regional
town is the least developed in terms of physical and social infrastructure. All the
hospitals except hospital 4 are located within or close to a major urban setting.
Nonetheless, there is a regional government medical stores close to hospital 4. On the
basis of geographical access and level of urbanisation, it would seem that that the
potential for attracting staff, and having better access to essential inputs was not
markedly different.
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The structure of regional population pyramids is broad-based with a high proportion of
people aged 0-20 years. This might be loosely interpreted to mean that age-specific
morbidity patterns were likely to be similar. The crude birth rate, crude death rate and
the percentage of natural increase in population were also similar across regions. It
could then be argued that the key demographic features to hospital performance were
likely to be population size, and its distribution between rural and urban areas.
4.2.3 Socio-economic characteristics
Socio-economic factors such as household income and people's level of education have
an influence on utilisation of hospital services. Educated people, although least likely to
be ill, are more likely to use health services than less educated ones. The literacy rate
was similar across the regions with a mean of 76% (67-82%). Despite the fact that the
majority of the population is rural-based and therefore likely to be exempted from
paying hospital fees, other access costs such as transport and drug costs are equally
important in influencing service utilisation patterns. Households with higher income are
more likely to use tertiary health services even if it means bypassing the referral system.
The economy of the country is largely based on agriculture (and mining in some
regions). Estimates of annual household income in 1996 were similar (Z$10,000-
12,000) except for Region 3, which had a notably high annual income of ZW$18,259.
This could be attributed to its relatively developed mining and processing industrial
sector. However, these figures do not show the distribution of household income
between rural and urban areas. Disaggregated information might have shown potential
differential access to health services in the regions. Urban populations tend to have more
annual household cash income, which increases their potential to access hospital
services. By policy, the referral system is supposed to ensure equal access through
exemptions and preferential treatment for those who comply with it but in practice the
system does not work as expected.
4.2.4 Morbidity and mortality patterns
Differences in demand patterns for hospital services may be explained by differences in
disease patterns (burden of disease) found in the regions. The disease pattern determines
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the hospital's case mix and hence contributes to its resource consumption pattern.
Normal deliveries" contributed the highest but similar proportion of hospital admissions
(30%) in all the regions except in Region 5 where malaria (25%) was the major cause
(Table 4.1). Malaria only contributed 6-7% of hospital admissions in regions 2, 4 and 6.
This might be a reflection of regional differences in malaria prevalence or capacity of
primary care facilities and preventive programs to contain and prevent malaria.
Pulmonary tuberculosis (FTB) contributed an average of 6% of hospital admissions
(range of 4-6%) across the regions. In sum, the pattern of the top five causes of hospital
admissions varied slightly across regions. HIV/AIDS, which is a major cause of
morbidity and mortality in the country, is high in all the regions although Region 5 and
and Region 6 have higher prevalence rates of over 40%.
Hospital mortality patterns serve to show the importance of particular diseases to the
workings of hospitals. A similar profile of communicable diseases as the major causes
of hospital mortality is observed across the regions: PTB, malaria, ARI, cardio-vascular,
intestinal, digestive and viral infections. Malaria and PIB stand out as major
contributors of inpatient care although malaria deaths are less in regions 2 and 6.
4.2.5 Health facilities
The capacity of regional health services to cope with the demand for services (disease
burden) varies and is likely to explain variation in hospital performance. Capacity can
be narrowly defined in terms of availability of beds and staff as shown in table 4.1.
Official bed statistics show that Region 3 and Region 4 had the highest number of
tertiary beds (432 and 271 respectively) and secondary beds (2,660 and 2,056
respectively) compared to the other regions. This translates to high numbers of beds per
capita, which shows that these regions had relatively better capacity to meet the demand
for inpatient services.
Capacity as measured by number of staff shows that the regions 4 and 5 had superior
staffing levels: for instance doctors (49 and 44) and nurses (1,177 and 1,233). Specialist
21 Normal deliveries not considered as a disease in true sense.
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consultants play an important role in the provision of tertiary care. Table 4.1 shows that
regions 1, 2, 4 and 6 are severely constrained. The level of specialist care expected of
tertiary hospitals is likely to be undermined, There is less variation in the numbers of
other professional groups. Observed variation in the quantity and quality of staff in the
regions is likely to impact on the performance of hospitals (explored in detail in Chapter
8). It is worth noting that there are other aspects of hospital capacity (plant size) such as
equipment and buildings, which are important to consider when interpreting
performance
22 1US$=ZW$38 (articifially pegged).
2l Includes general practitioners, group practices, corporate clinics, hospitals, laboratories, and nursing
homes, traditional and faith healers, dental units, and others
24 DHE consists of a district medical officer, nursing officer, pharmacist, environmental health officer and
health services administrator and the hospital matron.
2' PHE consists of the provincial medical director, pharmacist, nursing officer, environmental health
officer, and health services administrator, and two medical officers of health responsible for MCH,
epidemiology and disease surveillance.
26 Bed size numbers only include those that were used in the analysis, which are different from official
bed numbers.
27 IUS$ =ZW$8.00 in 1995/86 FY
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CHAPTER 5 ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION OF HOSPITAL
ACTMTY STATISTICS: WHAT CAN WE LEARN?
5.0 Introduction
The definition of output for the hospital sector is difficult, as for any other services
because outputs are intangible (Butler 1995, McGuire 1985, Donaldson and Magnussen
1992). Characterisation of the hospital market by input or output is equally difficult.
There is much heterogeneity in the sector, short stay hospitals (acute hospitals), long
stay hospitals (psychiatric and chronic or infectious diseases hospitals), and other
specialised hospitals. In order to understand hospital productivity, basic questions need
to be answered: What is a hospital? What does it produce? How is hospital output
measured? What factors influence its productivity and behaviour?
This chapter addresses four specific objectives. First, to define and discuss hospital
output, its relevance and the controversies surrounding its interpretation. Second, to
look at the effects of supply and demand side factors on hospital activity statistics.
Third, to review the Pabon Lasso (1986) method of evaluating hospital performance,
and apply it to the six study hospitals. Fourth, to discuss the results with particular
emphasis on the implications for costs and relative efficiency of the study hospitals.
5.1 What is a hospital?
This seems to be a very simplistic question but its answer may be elusive. An
understanding of what a hospital is allows for clarity in defining its outputs. A hospital
is defined as "an institution providing medical and surgical treatment and nursing care
for all ill and injured people" (The Concise Oxford Dictionary Ninth Edition). By
definition, the principal function of a hospital IS providing inpatient
services-hospitalisation of patients. In this study, the hospitals are acute hospitals
though they provide minimal specialised services such as psychiatric services. They all
have a regional teaching function for nurses and environmental health technicians.
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Hospital service mix (scope and scale of services) depends upon the national referral
hierarchy and the country's hospital policy. The majority of hospitals in LMICs have
substantive outpatient departments (Van Lerberghe et a11997, Mills 1990b).
5.2 Hospital Output: conceptual issues
A hospital is a complex organisation characterised by a myriad of inputs, processes and
outputs. There are four broad categories of hospital output: inpatient treatments,
outpatient treatment, teaching and research (Butler 1995). In some instances, hospitals
provide preventive services and supportive functions to primary health care services
(Lee and Hoare 1989). This diversity of services raises conceptual problems in the
definition of hospital output.
Rice (1966) argued that a hospital could be viewed as two firms in one. One firm
producing medically necessary treatments which are intermediate outputs, and the other
producing amenity services which are seen as a class of final outputs which can respond
to market signals. The risk of negative utility or undesired outcome from consumption
of amenity services is absent. Unlike amenity services, medically linked outputs are
difficult to define and interpret, and the risk of an undesired outcome exists. In other
words, consumption of medical services does not necessarily lead to the desired
outcome. Amenity services can be provided by other organisations outside the hospital
and can therefore be conceptually excluded in attempts to define hospital output. Itmay
be argued that medically linked treatments are the essential part of hospital activities,
which require consideration in the hospital output definition debate.
The major theoretical question that arises is whether hospital output can be defined in
terms of medical treatment itself or its effect on the health status of the patient. Some
commentators have taken a sympathetic view of the latter perspective based on the
argument that the ultimate objective of any health services is to improve health status
(Tatchell 1983, Torrance 1986, Sederlund 1994). It would seem that the argument that
the expected output of a hospital is a positive increment in patient health status is
conceptually plausible. However, health status improvement is not only a function of
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hospital care but also many other factors. Such factors include patient compliance with
treatment, social environment (housing and hygiene and nutrition), patient biological
and genetic constitution. Hospitals do not produce health but their services are an
essential input to improving health status. Because of the existence of confounding
variables, empirical measurement of the additive effect of hospital services to patient
health status improvement is a daunting task (an attribution problem). Furthermore,
there is no consensus on the measurement of health status itself. A number of concepts
have been used (e.g. QALYs, EUROQol, Life years gained, DALYs) and each has its
advantages and disadvantages (Dolan and Gudex 1995, Torrance 1986, Drummond et
al., 1997).
Butler (1995) suggests an alternative approach. He suggests that hospital output be
defined in terms of the treatment provided rather than the resulting change in the health
status of the patient. With this definition, measurement of hospital output would focus
on the degree to which hospitals provide the necessary inputs that can be expected to
lead to the desired health outcome. This definition has some practical appeal because
treatment inputs are measurable and it is compatible with a supply-side focus. Besides,
this treatment definition eschews the practical difficulties of assessing patient health
status improvement.
5.3 Patient Days and Admissions or Cases
Hospital cost studies have generally used patient days and admissions or treated cases"
as measures of hospital output (Tatchell 1983, Barnum and Kutzin 1993, Lewis 1996,
Broomberg 1997). The underlying logic of using these two measures of output is not
free from controversy. More often than not, the definition and understanding of the two
measures of output has brought confusion and contradictions in the interpretation of
hospital cost analysis results. A clarification of these terms from the outset is important
in setting out this empirical work.
28 Treated case or admission is defined as one episode of hospitalisation. Note that this is different from
an episode of illness, which might have more than one hospitalisation.
58
The confusion arises from the difficulty of empirically separating inputs and outputs
under these circumstances. A hospital bed-day can be viewed as an input to an admitted
case, and in tum a treated case as an input to improving individual or community health
status. In this case both patient days and treated cases are not end results themselves. I
use both measures in the study based on feasibility, and potential utility of results at
various levels of hospital management. The notion that a treated case (episode of
hospitalisation) is a better unit of measurement of hospital output (Butler 1995) is
inconsequential because both admissions and patient days are not in themselves hospital
outputs. The quality of admissions themselves is important because an inappropriate
admission is not a good measure of hospital output. Diagnostic related groups [DRGs]
(see Tatchell 1983, SOderlund 1994, Donaldson and Magnussen 1992, Rhodes et al
1997), Health-care resource groups (HRGs) and finished consultant episodes (FCE)
(Clark and McKee 1992, McKee and James 1997) are other improved measures of
hospital output. They offer opportunities for a tighter definition of hospital outputs but
also have disadvantages. DRGs, for example maintain the notion that health care
outputs are measured in terms of the number of patients treated. DRGs are not entirely
homogenous groups (Donaldson and Magnussen 1992). The study employs patient days
and admissions as units of hospital activity that can enable an analysis of the
relationship between hospital activities and costs. In addition, a detailed analysis of each
hospital is carried out as a strategy to acquiring insights into the underlying output
levels and patterns. The following reviews supply and demand side factors that
influence these indicators in order to aid the interpretation of performance.
5.4 Effects of Supply-side Factors on Hospital Activity Statistics
The effect of supply-side factors on hospital activity is underpinned by the way
hospitals behave. The hospital's objective function dictates its supply-side policies and
activities. However, a convincing hospital behavioural model is yet to be specified
(McGuire 1985). This is due to the difficulties associated in defining output,
heterogeneity of hospitals, lack of readily identifiable pricing mechanisms, and the fact
that the sector is not exclusively driven by profit but also by a wide range of social
goals. The hospital objective function can be viewed from two perspectives: the medical
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or economic perspective. From the medical perspective, hospitals aim to provide quality
services that current medical science knowledge penn its (clinical excellence). Clinicians
and clinical practice are dominant factors. Under such circumstances patients may be
over serviced (battery of diagnostic tests, polypharmacy, unnecessary stay and use of
sophisticated technology). Over servicing of patients may occur because of the desire by
clinicians to increase the likelihood of effectiveness of the intervention. The economic
view is that hospitals maximise the objective function of hospital decision-makers. This
might imply maximising hospital output within a budget and quality constraint or
maximising hospital revenue, for example. In contrast to the medical approach, hospital
administrators or managers may strive to minimise resource use in order to maximise
revenue, or increase output. Contemporary wisdom suggests that the economic model is
gaining prominence over the traditional medical approach. The dynamic context within
which hospitals are operating now, both in developed and LMICs, requires some form
of economic adaptation. The effect of these behavioural factors on hospital utilisation is
important in interpreting hospital service performance indicators (McGuire 1985,
Hornbrook and Goldfarb 1983, Farrar 1993, Bartlet and Le Grand 1994).
Two measures of hospital activity have been discussed so far-patient days and
admissions. The other service indicators are bed occupancy rate (BOR), bed turnover
rate (BTR), and length of stay (LOS). The bed occupancy rate is a measure of the
proportion of beds occupied to the total available (or potential) bed days, calculated on
an annual basis. Bed turnover rate measures the annual number of cases or admissions
per bed. The length of stay is a measure of the annual average patient stay in hospital
from admission to discharge in days. These measures, to some extent, are a reflection of
hospital organisation and management policies because management can influence
hospital utilisation in these and other respects.
Availability of hospital excess capacity (or excess beds) may influence hospital
admissions in which case supply induces demand (Smith 1972). Where there is excess
capacity, doctors' inclinations to admit cases even for diagnosis and elective surgery
may increase. Patients may unnecessarily be kept longer in hospital (delayed discharges)
in order to reduce service intensity per patient per day as a health worker strategy to
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reduce workload. The result is that the number of patient days is inflated unnecessarily.
Average costs per day computed using such inflated patient day figures create false
impressions of efficiency.
High bed occupancy rate can be due to shortages of essential inputs, for example
doctors and laboratory technologists. This phenomenon is not uncommon in LMICs.
Patients are admitted for days waiting for a doctor, or waiting for results of tests referred
to a higher level hospital. Some cases are referred to higher level hospitals for
diagnostic tests that could be done locally. All these inefficiencies can reduce the cost
per patient day.
Hospital admission and discharge policies can influence hospital activity measures.
Some hospitals discharge patients on specific days of the week and often delaying
patient discharge. Anecdotal evidence in Zimbabwe suggests that patients who visit a
hospital at night have a greater chance of admission than those who visit during the day.
This is because a doctor is usually not available to make the decision not to admit or the
patient comes from far, and there is no night transport.
Hospital reimbursement mechanisms can also influence the design of hospital admission
and discharge policies. In Zimbabwe, hospitals generate some revenue through user
fees. Those who eam less than ZW$400 (US$40) are exempted (MOH 1996). The
government pays for the indigent through a Social Dimension Fund (SDF). Hospitals
claim for reimbursements from this fund for government-responsibility-patients. In
practice this system does not work smoothly. In 1996, hospitals were allowed by central
government to retain fee revenue (through a Hospital Fund) for local use. This policy's
objective was to create incentives for hospitals to collect more user fees and improve the
quality of services. Two theoretical scenarios may be occurring concerning supply side
effects on hospitalisation. One is that, paying patients are readily being admitted in
hospital and discharged late (high admission rate, bed occupancy, and length of stay) to
increase revenue. The other scenario is that higher admission thresholds are applied to
non-paying patients who are likely to be discharged early (low admission rate, bed
occupancy and length of stay) to minimise costs. Whether or not this is happening is an
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empirical question, which this study did not address. The supply side discussion is
summarised in Box 1.
Box 1Effectof Supply-SideFactorsonHospitalActivityStatistics
Factor Bed Days Admissions Remarks
• Clinical Practice tJ. tJ. Function of incentive regime
• Hospital Policies tJ. tJ. Function of incentive regime
• Excess Capacity t t Supply induced demand
• Availability of Inputs tJ. J. Poor Quality of Care
• Reimbursement tJ. tJ. Function of type of payment
method
5.5 Effects of Demand-side factors on Hospital Activity Statistics
Demand for hospital beds can be crudely estimated by the number of used beds per
population (bed use per capita) per given time period. In cases where there is low bed
capacity but greater demand, higher bed occupancies, bed turnover rates and shorter
lengths of stay are expected. Hospital management is likely to respond to high demand
by minimising unnecessary admission and delayed discharge. This either increases
revenue and/or access to hospital services. The question is whether these high rates
reflect better performance or are simply problems related to the size of the hospital
(defined here in terms of beds). In comparing performance across hospitals it is
necessary to look at the size of the hospital versus its potential and/or actual demand
(utilisation data). The demand for hospital beds is uncertain (pauly and Wilson 1986),
and it is difficult to find an optimal bed size for a given population. However, hospitals
are expected to achieve bed occupancy rates that consider the need to leave 5-15% of
beds available for disinfection, bed repair, and emergencies (Pabon Lasso 1986). Luce
et al (1996) note that 80% utilisation of capacity in hospitals is the norm. A smaller
hospital will show high bed turnover rate for the same level of utilisation than a bigger
one. Absolute utilisation statistics are useful under such circumstances.
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Low hospital demand can be a product of poor perceived quality of services due to some
observable structural factors such as shortage of doctors, nurses and drugs. Potential
demand is not tapped leading to problems of under-utilisation. Poor quality of services
is a sign of inefficiency, and some empirical evidence from LIMCs suggests that
improvement in quality of service can lead to efficiency improvements (Bitran 1995).
The existence of alternative hospital services within the same catchment population of
the target hospital impacts on the level and pattern of demand for its services.
Competition in terms of price and! or quality affects hospital output considerably.
However, in the Zimbabwean context provincial hospitals are regional monopolies and
competition is not a major factor in explaining bed use. A summary of this discussion is
shown in Box 2.
Box 2 Effectof Demand-SideFactorsonHospitalActivityStatistics
Factor Bed Days Admissions Remarks
• Disease Burden t.1- t.1- • Morbidity levels influence demand
level and hence activity statistics
• Perceived Quality of • High-perceived quality is associated
services t.1- .1- with high demand and the obverse is
true.
• Competition t.1- t.1- • Function of the nature of competition
• Price of services t.1- t.1- • Function of price level and payment
system
5.6 Pabon Lasso Method: rationale, strengths and weaknesses
Work by Pabon Lasso (1986) on the evaluation of hospital performance in Colombia
has been inspirational to many interested in understanding and measuring performance
of hospitals in LMICs. The rationale of his work was centred on the need for
simultaneous analysis of several indicators of hospital performance. Analysis of
individual indicators of hospital use has often led to confusion and contradictions. The
strategy provides a holistic view of hospital performance. Pabon Lasso used a graphical
presentation in which bed occupancy rate (BOR) is shown on the X-axis and the bed
turnover rate (BTR) is on the Y-axis. The average length of stay is a ray from the origin
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by virtue of the mathematical relationship between BOR and BTR-LOS is equal to
365 x BORlBTR. The LOS increases as the ray moves from the origin clockwise. The
graph is divided into four sectors using the average BOR and BTR. Each sector has
specific characteristics: Sector 1 (lower left) indicates relatively low levels of bed
occupancy and bed turnover rate-suggestive of inefficiency; Sector 2 (upper left)
indicates relatively low levels of bed occupancy, high bed turnover rate, and short
hospital stays; Sector 3 (upper right) indicates relatively high levels of bed occupancy
and bed turnover rate-suggestive of greater efficiency (but capable of alternative
explanation); and Sector 4 (lower right) indicates relatively high levels of bed
occupancy, low bed turnover rate, and long hospital stays [typical of hospitals
specialising in chronic diseases] (Figure 5).
Confidence intervals for the mean BOR, BTR and LOS are calculated using a given
significance level (e.g. 5%) and charted on the graph. The intersection of these lines
defines a rectangle signifying the "expected average/normal practice" of all the hospitals
under review. Hospitals that fall within this area are considered normal performers and
those that do not as outliers. Outliers can either be good or bad performers depending on
their sector location on the graph.
This method is amenable to application in the Zimbabwean context because it is simple,
and available data can be used to make such analysis. Most importantly, the method can
easily be institutionalised for use by hospital administrators and managers at regional
and national levels. Currently in Zimbabwe, district, regional and national managers do
not have a ready method for identifying non-performers in a systematic way. Poor
performance is only identified when there is a disaster or crisis in a particular hospital.
The specificity and sensitivity" of the method in identifying outliers can be manipulated
by changing levels of significance (the probability that the observed scenario is by
29 Specificity in this case implies the ability of the method to detect true outliers. Increasing the
significance level, for example to 1%, reduces the element of chance in identifying outliers (reduces the
number of false positives). Sensitivity implies the ability of the method to capture all outliers. A high
significance level increases chances of capturing all outliers (high sensitivity). Sensitivity can be
increased by increasing the confidence level, and specificity can be increased by reducing it.
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chance). Hospital managers have the discretion of choosing the levels of stringency in
judging hospitals in their context. The method is useful in screening hospitals and
identifying those that require attention but it does not tell us anything about the
underlying circumstances (e.g. utilisation patterns and quality of care, etc.) of observed
scenarios. The other limitation is that the expected level of performance is defined using
the general performance of all the hospitals under review. This means that the yardstick
for performance assessment is an "average." It is possible to have an entire sector of
poorly performing hospitals, and use of the "average" might create false impressions
about hospital performance. Nevertheless, the utility of the method is maximised if it is
employed as a systematic screening mechanism and nothing more. In this study, the
method is used as a first step to characterising the study hospitals. The results obtained
are useful in the interpretation of hospital cost analysis results. The main disadvantage is
the relationship of any ofthe three measures to output as discussed in the last section.
5.7 Application of Pabon Lasso Method to Study Hospitals
The bed size for the study hospitals ranged from 156-250 beds, and their performance
profile is shown in Table 5. There are no marked differences in bed size to warrant
suspicion about possible differences in utilisation due to differences in bed size. The
hospital performance indicators" for each hospital were plotted on Pabon Lasso's graph,
and the results are illuminating (Figure 5). What is interesting is that the hospitals are
quite diverse (spread on the graph) in their performance.
30 Confidence Intervals were calculated at 5% Significance Level: BOR (mean = 84.8, Cl = 76.6-93.1),
BTR (mean = 60, Cl = 45.8-74.6) and LOS (mean = 5.3, Cl = 4.2-6.3).
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Table 5.0 Background and hospital performance indicators, study hospitals, 1997/98
Hospital Provincial Beds Beds BOR BTR LOS Pat.Day Admiss %age Mat
Population 1103 (%) (%) (days) 11,000 11,000 Admissions
1 857,318 171 2.0 97 83 4.24 70 17 25
2 1,033,336 160 2.0 77 62 4.56 44 10 38
3 1,302,214 250 1.9 81 57 5.23 57 11 26
4 1,221,845 235 1.9 80 52 5.57 56 10 31
5 1,537,676 223 1.5 92 65 5.18 50 9 37
6 591,747 156 2.6 82 43 7.05 79 11 29
Notes: Number of beds and performance indicators are based on stanstics from selected In patient wards
(MSW. MMW, FSW, FMW, CMW, CSW, and MAT)
Hospitals 3 and 4 fell in sector 1. They all fell within the "expected performance area"
which means that they performed in accordance with expected performance of hospitals
at that level. The hospitals had similar bed use rates (admissions) of 11 per 1,000 and 10
per 1,000 respectively. The number of tertiary beds per population is the same for the
two hospitals-2 beds per 10,000 people. Hospital 5 fell in sector 3 and within the
expected performance zone. It has 1.5 beds for 10,000 people. These results generate an
expectation that hospital cost analysis results for the three hospitals (3, 4 and 5) will
reflect average or expected performance.
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Figure 5. Simultaneous Analysis of Hospital Service Indicators for the
Six Provincial Hospitals
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The other two hospitals (1 and 6) were outliers but with different "distances or
deviations" from the expected performance zone. The magnitude of the deviation from
the norm helps to distinguish between hospitals that fall within the same sector. Hospital
6 was located in sector 1 (suggestive of inefficiency). It had a comparable bed
occupancy rate of 82% and the lowest bed turnover rate (43%). This is characteristic of
hospitals with low bed turnover rates and/or longer length of stay due to excess bed
capacity. It had the highest average length of stay of 7 days. Low demand seems an
unlikely reason for this poor performance given its bed use. What is interesting is that
the hospital had the highest bed use per capita of 0.079 (79 inpatient days per 1,000
people), and 11.2 admissions per 1,000 compared to an average across hospitals of 11.3
per 1,000 for 1997/8 year. Excess capacity seems to be a likely cause. The region has a
population of 591 747 (Census 1992), and the number of beds per 10000 is 2.6. This
figure is the highest of the group, even though other regions have populations at least
twice its population size. Further analysis of other possible determinants for this poor
performance is required.
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Hospital 2 is located in Sector 2 on the border of the expected performance zone. Its
performance is rated intermediate with high bed turnover but relatively low bed
occupancy rate. This could be due to unnecessary hospitalisation or a high number of
normal deliveries in the hospital. The contribution of maternity cases (both normal and
abnormal) was highest at 38% of total admissions. Inpatient days were 44 per 1,000, the
lowest of the group, and the number of tertiary beds per 10,000 for the region is 2
(equals the average across the regions). Admissions were 10 per 1,000, which is
comparable with other hospitals. The low patient day per capita (0.044) bears testimony
to its high bed turnover rate.
Hospital I is located in the most desirable area (Sector 3): high bed occupancy and bed
turnover rates. It is an extreme outlier with the highest performance indicators. It had 70
inpatient days per 1,000 and the highest admissions rate of 17 per 1,000 (1.5 times the
average of 11 per 1,000). The number of tertiary beds is 2 per 10,000 and that is
comparable with other regions. It seems other external and internal supply side factors
(organisation and management, and regional referral systems) are possible explanatory
factors.
It is clear from this analysis that each hospital is showing a distinct pattern in utilisation
which justifies a detailed case study analysis to fully understand the apparently diverse
determining factors. In order to explore whether or not similar differences obtained at
ward level across hospitals, the Pabon Lasso framework was applied to medical ward"
data (Table 5.1 and Figure 5.1).
31 This include combined statistics for the female, male and children's medical wards. BTR (mean
=54.66,95% Cl = 38.79-70.53), BOR (mean = 69.39, Cl - 50.49-88.30), and LOS (mean = 4.75, Cl =
3.48-6.02).
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Table 5.1 Medical Wards Activity Statistics, Provincial Hospitals (1997/98)
Hospital/Indicator Medical Beds BOR BTR LOS
1 81 92.98 81.93 4.1
2 78 54.28 49.23 4.0
3 117 45.75 53.54 3.1
4 112 71.28 43.63 6.0
5 94 85.69 59.82 5.2
6 72 66.36 39.81 6.1
Medical wards for Hospitals 1 and 5 are placed in sector 3 with Hospital 1, a distinct
outlier. Hospital 6's medical wards are placed in sector 1. This picture is similar to that
observed at hospital level except that Hospital 4 is now placed in sector 4 (characterised
by long stay), and Hospital 3 and Hospital 2 are placed in sector 2 and 1 respectively
swapping their earlier positions. The analysis of the results applied to medical wards is
similar to that for the whole hospitals. These findings support the argument that the
hospital is the appropriate level of analysis for this study.
5.8 Summary of findings and remarks
The Pabon Lasso method showed that 50% of the hospitals were outliers, whilst the
other 50% (Hospitals 3, 4 and 5) fell within the range of average performance. The
hospitals fell in sectors 1, 2 and 3, and none in sector 4. Hospital 1 appears to be an
impressive performer and Hospital 6 the opposite. Similar results were found when
utilisation indicators of medical wards were placed within the same framework.
Variation in hospital service statistics is a function of many factors: demand or supply,
hospital size, clinical practice, morbidity patterns, and randomness (McPherson 1988,
Rhodes et al 1997). Therefore it is hazardous to make firm conclusions based on these
results without exploring the other factors. Succeeding chapters attempt to provide some
answers and clarifications of these issues. The major finding here was that, even though
the study hospitals were tertiary hospitals, they had some distinctiveness, and it would
have been improper to treat them as homogenous in evaluating performance. Each one
of them deserved a thorough analysis of possible determinants of its performance.
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Figure 5.1 Simultaneous Analysis of Hospital Service Indicators for
the Six Provincial Hospitals' Medical Wards
30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Bed Occupancy Rate (%)
70
CHAPTER 6 COSTS OF HOSPITAL SERVICES IN PUBLIC
HOSPITALS
6..0Introduction
Hospital costing is a complex process especially in developing countries where data
quality and accuracy is a problem. However, it is important that hospital costs be
understood as they consume significant amounts of resources (Barnum and Kutzin
1993, Zwanziger et al., 1993). Furthermore, an understanding of resource use and flows
within a hospital creates opportunities for effective and efficient use and control of
resources. Costs and technical efficiency are key dimensions of hospital performance. It
is important to state at the outset that concepts of hospital efficiency measurement are
still in an evolutionary process and there is still some debate as to which model best
meets the peculiarities of a hospital. This chapter has two main objectives: (1) to
provide a detailed cost analysis of six tertiary hospitals in Zimbabwe using cost
accounting methods at two levels-hospital and ward level, and (2) to draw insights into
relative efficiencies at both these levels. The first section describes the methods used in
the study and the second section presents the results of hospital costs analysis. The third
section is a discussion of the results, and tentative conclusion.
6.1 Methods
6.1.1 Data collection techniques
The study employed a cost accounting procedure for hospital costs analysis-the step-
down costing method to measure unit (average) costs (Luce et al., 1996, Drummond et
al., 1997). This method was chosen because there are only seven provincial hospitals in
the country, and the use of statistical methods would have yielded no better results than
a detailed examination of each hospital cost that this method entails. The application of
statistical methods in assessing hospital efficiency in a few African countries (Anderson
1980, Bitran-Dicowsky and Dunlop 1989, Wouters 1995, Kumaranayake 1998) has
yielded interesting results but of questionable quality and use because of the nature of
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The third step was the identification of other departments that provide services to the
final departments. These can be put into four different categories. Category 1 is what
might be called the para-medical services such as theatre, dietetics and physiotherapy.
Category 2 consists of the medico-technical functions such as laboratory, x-ray,
pharmacy and dietetics. Category 1 and 2 are generally known as intermediate
departments. They provide services to other departments but also provide direct services
to patients. Category 3 includes ancillary departments, which include logistics/transport,
hotel services and laundry. These services are required for all the other departments to
function. Category 4 includes overhead departments (administration, utilities, domestic
services and maintenance). These departments provide indirect services to all other
departments. The last category includes infrastructure (buildings, maintenance, and
fixed equipment and others). Again, this category serves all the other departments.
Once the anatomy of the hospital was clearly defined and understood (see Table A6.0
for a typical tertiary hospital), the fourth step was to establish the total costs for the
hospital in the financial year 1997/98. Total cost did not just include expenditure of
government votes but also expenditure of any other extra-budgetary resources
(including donations). Public hospitals in Zimbabwe get budget allocations for non-
salary recurrent expenditure as line items, and accordingly, expenditure is recorded by
line item. The line items include: medical and surgical, office miscellaneous, post and
telecommunication, printing and stationery, domestic services, vehicle hire, travel and
subsistence, official travel, fares, fuel, lights and water, laundry and bedding, and linen.
All extra-budgetary purchases and expenditures from the Hospital Services Fund" were
broken down by line item and added to the total line item costs per year. In order to
calculate salary costs, an inventory of staff (type, grade and number) by department was
carried out. The total annual salary cost was calculated by multiplying the number of
people by their salary grade midpoints (including allowances). Through this process a
complete picture of the total recurrent costs for the hospital was established.
32 Hospital Services Fund is a fund set up by hospitals from the user fee revenue collected and any donor
funds.
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The fifth step was to establish the annual equivalent capital costs for each hospital by
department. A thorough inventory (quantity and type) of all the equipment and furniture
in each hospital department was carried out. The inventory was then subjected to a
screening process to identify the real capital items using both the WHO definition- any
item that costs US$100 or ZW$3,70033 (WHO 1994), and lasts for more than one year.
Replacement costs were obtained through a market price survey conducted in Harare
where most of these items are procured through the Central Purchasing Authority. There
was no evidence in Zimbabwe that suggested significant regional price differentials for
medical equipment and furniture. Private procurement of equipment and furniture was
rare except in cases of donations. For donated items the prevailing market price was
used.
Using Excel spreadsheets, the annual equivalent costs were calculated through an
annuitisation process. This method was chosen because it takes into account both
depreciation and the opportunity cost of capital (Kumaranayake 2000). The real market
discount rate of 5%, and 5 orl0 economic life years (ELY) for equipment and furniture
(to years where the manufacturer specified) was used. A real market discount rate of
5% was used because it corresponded with the average real interest rate in the money
market for assets such as treasury bills and bank deposits in the past 4 years in
Zimbabwe (CSO 1997, Hansen et aI., 2000). The Zimbabwean Government does not
prescribe the discount rate for public projects or investments, as the government does in
the UK and Canada. A rate of 5% is widely used in cost analyses (Crease and Parker,
1994, Drummond et al., 1997, Gold et aI., 1996). However, there is still disagreement
on the choice of the discount rate and the theoretical underpinnings of discount rates
(Krahn and Gafni 1993). Because of this, it has been argued that sensitivity analysis
using discount rates of 3-10% is necessary. However, sensitivity analysis was not
conducted for this owing to the centrality of recurrent costs to its conclusions (11.3.2)
Nonetheless, capital costs are presented as total costs by ward and hospital to allow for
future manipulation of the data.
331997/987 annual average exchange rate was lUS$=ZW$37
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Buildings were a problem to cost because most of them were built more than thirty
years ago which technically means a zero book value should be ascribed despite the fact
that these buildings are in use. An alternative was to use rental value but this was a
problem to establish because the study hospitals are located in regional towns where
property/ rental markets are underdeveloped. To address this problem information was
sought from the Ministry of Health's quantity surveying unit (Family Health Project
JI34) regarding the replacement costs of a typical 2DD-bedprovincial hospital. A figure of
ZW$250 million was established. This figure was annualised using a building life span
of 30 years. The annual building equivalent cost was then directly allocated to hospital
departments on the basis of floor area. This meant that the only source of variation in
building costs across the hospital was between departments (depending on their size)
since the aggregate was the same. This was clearly a second best solution in comparison
with the use of hospital space and construction costs per square metre.
The sixth step was to apply the step-down costing procedure by allocating all direct
costs to medico-technical, ancillary and overhead cost centres (Table 6). Some of the
line items could not be allocated to any specific intermediate department. Accordingly,
these were allocated to all the departments directly through various criteria depending
on the availability and quality of use or consumption data for each line item. Difficulties
were encountered in apportioning relatively unimportant costs like office miscellaneous
and printing and stationery. In all the hospitals there were no complete records on the
use of office miscellaneous funds, and it was allocated on the basis of number of
departments in the hospital. In such cases it was important to make sure that the hospital
cost structure was not unnecessarily affected by allocating costs that do not have reliable
use pattern data. Domestic services and utilities were allocated to all departments on the
basis of floor space. Hospital architectural plans, and in some cases actual measurement
of the floor areas was carried out in order to have reliable apportionment proportions.
Each of the hospitals had a nursing and lor environmental health technicians' school.
Eighty percent of the printing and stationery costs were allocated to the hospitals and
20% to the schools (reached after discussing with the schools authorities). The 80% of
34 Family Health Project is a World Bank funded infrastructural development project responsible for
construction and refurbishment of Ministry of Health facilities.
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the printing and stationery costs was allocated to the final cost centres on the basis of
number of inpatient admissions by ward. Post and Telecommunication was allocated to
departments on the basis of number of staff in each department. This vote is largely
used for paying telephone bills.
Table 6.0 Step 1:Allocation of Line Item Costs to Intermediate Departments
Line Item Department ReasonslRemarks
Doctors and Matrons' salary All medical departments Allocated on the basis of patient
costs days by ward
Mortuary All inpatient departments Shared on the basis of inpatients
Provisions Kitchen Line item for purchasing inpatient
food
Medical & Surgical Pharmacy For drugs and other medical
supplies
Office Miscellaneous All departments For office miscellaneous
Printing & Stationery Hospital stationery
Fares Administrations Air, bus or train tickets for
business travel
Travel & Subsistence Administration Subsistence money on business
travels
Vehicle Hire Transport For hiring vehicles from CMED
Bedding and Linen Laundry For purchasing hospital and
repairs
Fuel,lights & Water All departments
Domestic Services All departments For housekeeping
Official Travel Administration For official mileage on business
travel
Laundry Laundry For washing detergents or
purchase of laundry services
Post & Telecommunication All departments For telephone bills
After allocating all direct costs to intermediate costs and other costs directly to the final
units, the next step was to allocate intermediate department costs to the final or primary
cost centres using different apportionment methods as shown in Table 6.1. Some
intermediate departments have reciprocal relationships (for example administration with
laundry and kitchen) and such costs could be allocated in a number of ways, for
example, using simultaneous equations or introducing a fourth level in the step-down
analysis where the allocated administrative costs are built back into the final cost centre
(Drummond et at, 1997). The latter approach was used in the study.
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Table 6.1 Step 2: Allocation of Intermediate Department Costs to Final Cost Centres
Department Apportionment Criteria
Theatre Allocation was based on theatre utilisation statistics by source of patients (fmal
cost centres). In cases where these statistics were unavailable, apportionment
was done on the basis of admissions. The assumption being that patient
volume is directly related to theatre workload
Pharmacy Costs apportioned on the basis of patient days, and outpatient equivalents
calculated using actual drug consumption figures for a sample of inpatients and
outpatients (Ratio of 1:7)35
Laboratory Allocation was on the basis of laboratory proportionate use by source or
admission proportions
Administration Administration was shared on the basis of patient days and outpatient
equivalents
Mortuary This was shared on the basis of admissions
Laundry This was shared on the basis of patient days
Physiotherapy This was apportioned on the basis of admissions
CSSD Apportionment was on the basis of proportionate use by final cost centres
(packs sterilised).
Kitchen This apportioned on the basis of patient days after adjusting for staff shares
where this occurred.
The final stage was the calculation of unit costs by dividing total recurrent costs, and
total costs of the final cost centres by the number of inpatient days, admissions and
number of beds. Service statistics for each ward were compiled from the inpatient
registers. In Hospitals 1, 2 and 4 wards were not organised into surgical and medical
wards but by sex and age: male, female and children's wards. For instance, the male
ward had both surgical and medical patients and utilisation statistics were combined.
Statistics from Hospital 3, which had complete and reliable statistics by ward, were used
to calculate the relative proportions for allocating costs by ward for hospitals 1, 2 and 4.
By design, this adjustment did not affect the overall unit cost per patient but the pattern
of resource use between wards. An alternative option was to ask sisters-in charge of
wards to estimate patient mix, but this was likely to be variable and subjective. The final
outputs of the process were average costs per patient day, per admission and per bed
including and excluding capital costs for the six hospitals.
35 An outpatient equivalent was calculated on the basis of inpatient day equivalents and the average
length of stay. An inpatient day equivalent was calculated on the basis of a ratio (1/7) established by
comparing drug consumption by inpatients and outpatient in a sample of patient over a given period.
Literature recommends ~ (Barnum and Kutzin 1993) based on some American studies, which was not
deemed appropriate in this study.
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6.1.3 Limitations
The use of a cost accounting method to estimate relative efficiency (average cost or unit
cost) has inherent problems. It assumes, for instance constant marginal costs (see
Chapter 2). However, we expect that the marginal cost of treatment in acute hospitals is
high during the first days in hospital and lower in the last days, and therefore assuming a
constant MC might result in overestimation of daily costs. Within a given operation
scale it is possible to increase the number of outputs without necessarily increasing the
costs. Whilst it is important to know changes in costs due to changes in input prices (for
example), public hospitals are hamstrung by bureaucratic rigidities such that their input
and output mix is not responsive to such price changes.
The results of costing studies can be difficult to interpret if the case mix and case
severity is unknown (See Chapter 5). Butler (1995) defines case mix as:
..... the mix of cases treated by a hospital classified on the basis of those criteria which are significant
in explaining the differences in resource usage between the various cases treated".
Mahapatra and Berman (1994) used a similar definition. Key to the definition of case
mix and case severity is that resource use intensity per group of cases is homogenous.
Common approaches to dealing with case mix are: using several output categories based
on some classification scheme (ICD-I0 and DRGs), and the development of case mix
indices. There has been little application of the ICD-I0 or DRGs in LMICs due to data
problems. Variants or adaptations have been used in a few developing countries: for
example, in El Salvador by Fiedler et al., (1997). Fiedler and colleagues categorised
hospital admissions under three broad diagnostic groups (medical, surgical and
maternity). The assumption was that major surgeries and maternity cases would give an
idea of the case mix. Nonetheless different approaches to case mix standardisation are
problematic because it is difficult to find a comprehensive classification scheme that
results in few homogenous categories that are practical to handle, and can be easily
institutionalised.
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Despite the availability of theoretical constructs that are practically defensible in
developed countries but not so in most LMICs, this study took an approximate but
pragmatic approach to addressing the issue of case mix in Zimbabwe. That is using
wards (medical, surgical and maternity split by age and sex) as the broad diagnostic
groups (Mahapatra and Berman 1995). Clearly, this attempt at standardisation leaves
some scope for case mix variations to contribute to an explanation of unit cost variation.
Using wards loosely defined here as diagnostic groups, unit costs were calculated.
6.2 Results
The following results include hospital outpatient costs, even though this was not part of
the principal focus of the study. Inclusion of OPD costs enables an analysis of the
appropriate use of the hospital, and the relative cost consequences of inpatients and
outpatients.
6.2.1 Unit Cost Analysis
6.2.1.1 Hospital Level
The total annual cost for inpatients (selected wards mentioned earlier) and outpatients
(including casualty and ANC) for the six tertiary hospitals was ZW$201.211 million,
with an average of ZW$33.535 million per hospital. Of this total, 79% (ZW$159.080
million) was for inpatient and 21% (ZW$42.131 million) was for outpatients", Hospital
specific relative proportions of inpatients and outpatients ranged from 74-85% and 15-
26% respectively. To a large degree, the distribution of costs reflects an expected
resource use pattern where hospitals focus on their core business, which is
hospitalisation. However, the percentage of outpatient services that hospitals provide
depends on country policies. Table 6.2 shows total costs per hospital broken down into
recurrent and capital costs.
36 These figures are based on aggregate inpatient and outpaient totals for the six hospitals. Inpatients costs
constituted 76-79% of total costs and outpatients costs 21-24% fo total costs
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Table 6.2 Hospital Costs by Study Hospital (ZW$'00037)
Hospital Recurrent Costs Capital Costs Total Cost
1 7,876 (64%) 4,400 (36%) 12,276 (100%)
2 7,270 (41%) 10,568 (59%) 17,838 (100%)
3 29,231 (69%) 13,222 (31%) 42,453 (100%)
4 28,011 (70%) 11,853 (30%) 39,865 (100%)
5 22,920 (41%) 32,507 (59%) 55,427 (100%)
6 20,256 (61%) 13,097 (39%) 33,353 (100%)
Total 115,564,845 85,646,902 201,211,747
Hospital 5 had the highest total cost of ZW$55 million in 1997/98 financial year.
Hospital 1 had the least total costs with ZW$12 million followed by Hospital 2 with
ZW$17.8 million. Hospitals 3, 4 and 6 had average hospital costs. Four hospitals had
recurrent cost proportions to total costs of more than 60% (ranged from 61% to70%)
whilst Hospitals 2 and 5 had proportions of 41% each. Recurrent costs were a major
component of hospital costs, and therefore important in analysing cost structures and
cost efficiency across hospitals.
The proportion of annual equivalent capital costs to total costs ranged from 31-59%.
Hospitals 5 and 2 had the highest with 59% apiece. A total annual equivalent capital
cost of ZW$85.6 million for the six hospitals is indeed low given the lack of
comprehensive and audited capital equipment and furniture lists at some of the
hospitals. Although these capital costs are the best estimates to date, the major source of
hospital cost variation between hospitals seems to be in recurrent costs. Moreover,
capital costs are controlled from the centre and are therefore less likely to reflect
different organisational and management practices across the hospitals.
37Annual average exchange rate for 1997/98 was 1US$= ZW$37
80
Figure 6.0 Hospital Recurrent Costs by Ward
Across Hospitals FY 1997/98
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6.2.1.2 Ward Level
Costs for six hospital inpatient departments are presented: male medical ward (MMW),
male surgical ward (MSW), female medical ward (FMW), female surgical ward (FSW),
children's medical ward (CMW), children's surgical ward (CSW) and maternity ward
(MAT)38. These departments were identified as core hospital primary service
departments39, common across study hospitals and therefore comparable. Outpatient
costs are also presented for comparison purposes, and to allow for rudimentary
exploration of allocative efficiency questions. Figure 6 shows the total recurrent cost
profile of the study hospitals by ward.
The profile reflects a similar pattern to that observed at hospital level. Hospitals with
high recurrent cost proportions (e.g. hospital 3, 4 and 6) had relatively high
departmental costs. Hospitals 1 and 2 had consistently lower departmental recurrent
costs (even lower than the average) compared to the rest. The maternity ward and the
outpatient department had high levels of costs probably associated with high activity
volume.
When capital costs are included HospitalS's total ward costs become consistently
higher across wards (Table 6.3). Total ward costs ranged from ZW$1-9 million dollars
per annum.
38 Other departments that are not necessarily present in each hospital, namely male orthopaedic ward,
post-natal ward, gynaecological ward, intensive case unit (present at Hospitals 5 and 3), psychiatric ward,
and eye unit are not included.
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Figure 6.1 Hospital Costs Per Patient Day
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The average recurrent and total costs per patient day are shown in Figure 6.1 (see also
Tables A6.1 and A6.2). The recurrent cost per day ranged from ZW$130-433 with a
mean of ZW$306. Hospital 6 had the highest with ZW$433 followed by Hospital 4 with
ZW$410. Hospital 1 and 2 had average recurrent costs per patient day of ZW$161 and
ZW$131 respectively. These costs were 50 percent of the average across the study
hospitals.
Table 6.3. Total Cost by Ward by Study Hospital in ZW$'OOO(FY97/98)
HOSPITAU MMW MSW FMW FSW CMW CSW MAT OPD TOTAL
WARD
1 1,574 1,047 1,394 1,182 1,090 998 3,415 3,148 13,848
2 1,183 1,617 1,792 1,786 2,057 1,811 3,891 3,701 17,838
3 6,506 5,602 4,338 3,559 3,401 3,769 8,787 6,491 42,453
4 5,336 4,740 4,813 4,586 2,749 2,388 6,992 8,261 39,865
5 6,711 5,112 6,803 7,505 4,192 3,879 8,709 12,517 55,428
6 3,249 4,476 3,344 2,662 2,707 2,349 6,553 8,014 33,354
The average total cost per day provides different hospital rankings (Figure 6.1). It
ranged from ZW$204-739. The overall mean average total cost per day was ZW$535.
HospitalS had the highest average total cost per day ZW$739 followed by hospital 6
with ZW$713. Hospitals 1 and 2 maintained low patient day cost profiles.
39 Zimbabwe does not have a defmed package of tertiary hospital care
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Hospital6 had the highest average recurrent cost per admission ofZW$3,816, Hospitals
5,4 and 3 were in the region of ZW$1,500 to ZW$2,500, and hospitals 1 and 2 had the
least cost with ZW$554 and ZW$733 respectively (Figure 6.2 and Table A6.1). The
mean recurrent cost per admission was ZW$1,712, which is at least twice as much as
that for Hospitals 1 and 2.
The total cost per admission ranged from ZW$863 to ZW$5,023, and the mean across
the hospitals was ZW$2,961. The cost per admission profile is similar to that depicted
by recurrent costs: lower costs for Hospital 1 and Hospital 2, highest cost for Hospital 6,
and intermediate costs for the rest. Only hospital 5 changes in ranked position
depending on whether on the inclusion or exclusion of capital costs.
Figure 6.2. I-bspital Costs Per Admsslon Across Study
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Cost per bed is the total cost of admissions per bed during one year. This means that
holding everything else constant and assuming positive marginal cost per admission, an
increase in the bed turnover rate results in an increase in the cost per bed. Recurrent cost
per bed ranged from ZW$45,388 to ZW$129,848 per annum, and the mean was
ZW$93,374 (Figure 6.3). The cost per bed for hospitals 6, 5, 4 and 3 was comparable.
Again, hospitals 1 and 2 had relatively lower costs per bed. Lower costs could mean low
hospital throughput (low admission rates), which might mean productive inefficiency.
The key question that emerges from this analysis is whether or not this consistency in
low unit costs (per patient day, per admission and per bed) in Hospital 1 and Hospital 2
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can be interpreted as technical efficiency or poor quality of services, or simply case mix
differences.
Figure 6.3. Cost Per Bed Across Hospitals
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A number of factors might explain the consistently low relative unit costs for Hospital 1
and Hospital 2, and the consistently higher relative costs of the other four hospitals.
Possible explanations include throughput levels, relative technical efficiency, hospital
size (in terms of number of beds), management, staffing levels or relative budgetary
appropriations by government. More explanatory power is generated through an
analysis of these factors. These issues are discussed in succeeding sections.
An analysis of unit costs at hospital level may obscure possible differences between
inpatient departments because of the high level of aggregation. Whilst wards, to a large
extent reflect costs for fairly homogenous groups of patients (at least in terms of case
mix but not necessarily case severity), they still harbour a fair amount of heterogeneity.
In this study, the effect of case severity could have been further reduced by separating
the costs of ICUs40, but these were only present at Hospital 5 and Hospital 3. The ICUs
as they exist now are not well-defined departments. They simply represent beds set
aside in the main wards for very ill patients-rnore akin to a separation ward. Because
of this, computed ward costs include rcus' costs where they existed.
040 Itwas impossible anyway to separate the costs of lCUs (basically separate beds in the main wards)
because there was no mechanism of apportioning the shared resources like staff, drugs, etc.
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On a ward to ward basis there is some general similarity in the disparity pattern in the
recurrent patient day costs as that observed at hospital level of analysis (Figure 6.4).
What is noticeable, however, is that hospitals 5, 6, 4 and 3 had relatively higher average
recurrent cost per patient day per ward compared to hospitals 1 and 2 except for the
maternity ward. Hospital 2 had the least recurrent patient day costs which were
invariably below ZW$200 across the six wards. The relative performance of the six
hospitals on a ward to ward basis was generally similar to that suggested by hospital
level results.
Maternity costs were generally higher across the hospitals-Hospital 1 had the highest
with ZW$504 and Hospital 2 had the least with ZW$158. For Hospital 1, the recurrent
cost per day between different medical and surgical wards was the same, that is,
between MMW and MSW, FSW and FMW, and CMW and CSW. This is interesting
because like in the other hospitals, cost differences were expected due to the differences
in broad case mix between the medical and surgical wards. What is also interesting is
that Hospital 1, which generally had lower costs was the most costly for maternity. This
higher relative cost for maternity can be attributed to the shorter stays in hospital (3 days
compared to a national average of 6 days (MOH 1998)). Maternity cases
(uncomplicated cases) are usually discharged a day or two post partum.
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Figure 6.4 Average Recurrent Cost Per Patient Day Across
Study Hos pitals
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In order to explore the relative importance of intra-hospital and inter-hospital variation
bivariate Pearson Correlation Coefficients (r) were computed between ward average
recurrent cost per patient day and the mean average recurrent cost per day of other
wards. Table 6.4 shows some descriptive statistics for the average recurrent cost per
patient day across the six hospitals. The range for the mean cost per day for all wards
the hospitals was ZW$334-392. There was a significant correlation between ward
average recurrent costs per patient day across the hospitals except for the male medical
ward. This high correlation suggests that the hospital is the appropriate unit of analysis
for the understanding of cost variation.
Table 6.4. Descriptive statistics of recurrent cost per patient day across hospitals
Hospital Range
Wards Min. Max. Mean! r41 p-value
MMW 166 526 388.33 0.77 NS
MSW 161 459 346.67 0.97** 0.024
FMW 169 424 355.00 0.99* 0.000
FSW 172 401 333.67 0.94* 0.005
CMW 160 441 371.50 0.99* 0.000
CSW 153 418 348.33 0.99* 0.000
MAT 158 504 392.00 0.82** 0.048
Note: * significant at 0.01 significance level, ** significant at 0.05 level, ! = mean ward average cost per patient
day across similar wards for all the six hospitals.
41 Measures the relationship between unit costs per ward and the overall mean unit cost of other wards.
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Figure 6.5. Average Recurrent Cost Per Admission Per Ward
Across Study Hospitals
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Figure 6.5 shows the recurrent cost per admission for the six hospitals. Hospital 6 had
consistently higher costs per admission for most of the wards (MMW, MSW, FSW,
CMW, CSW and MAT, with ZW$2,997, ZW$4,3S8, ZW$3,629, ZW$3,068, and ZW$
5,204 respectively) except for FMW (Table A6.3). This is expected of a hospital with
relatively low bed turnover-comparable cost per patient day but high cost per
admission. Hospital 2 had consistently the lowest cost per admission across the wards
followed by hospital 1. The pattern of cost per admission differences repeats itself by
ward which shows general consistency is resource use differences across the hospitals.
Pearson correlation coefficients between each ward and the mean of the others produce
a similar conclusion when carried out for admission costs as for patient days (Table
6.5). All this confirms the fact that the hospital is the appropriate unit of analysis for the
understanding of cost variation.
Table 6.5. Correlation Coefficients of recurrent cost per admission across hospitals
Ward MMW MSW FMW FSW CMW CSW MAT
R 0.85* 0.85* 0.83* 0.95** 0.71 0.83* 0.62
p-value 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.00 0.12 0.04 0.19
Note: *'" significant at 0.01 level, ...significant at 0.05 level
Recurrent cost per bed depicts a different scenano from the general cost pattern
presented this far (Figure 6.6). The cost per bed was particularly high for hospitals 4, 3
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and 1 maternity wards with ZW$286,500, ZW$280,900 and ZW$215,800 respectively.
High maternity costs per bed could be due to a high turnover rate of short stay patients.
Hospital 2 had the least cost per bed in all departments. Hospital 5 and Hospital 6 had
consistently high or above average recurrent costs per bed across the wards.
Figure 6.6. Average Recurrent Cost per Bed per Ward
Across Study Hospitals
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Correlation analysis was slightly less convincing in pointing to the hospital as the
appropriate unit of analysis in the case of cost per bed (Table 6.6). The correlation
coefficient was strongly significant for the female surgical ward, significant for male
medical, and children medical ward. For the rest of the wards, there was no significant
relationship. Maternity ward bed costs show no relationship with the other hospital ward
unit costs (r = 0.29). This suggests that maternity wards exhibit differences in use
patterns (demand factors and clinical decisions), and consequently resource use patterns
(e.g. staff numbers and mix).
Table 6.6. Relationship between ward recurrent cost per bed across hospitals, 1997/8 FY
Ward MMW MSW FMW FSW CMW CSW MAT
R 0.85*
0.03
0.78
0.07
0.92** 0.61
0.20
0.90*
0.01
0.79
0.06
0.29
0.57p-value 0.01
Note: *. significant at 0.01 significance level, ...significant at 0.05 significance level
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6.3 Summary of Ondlngs
The distribution of costs between outpatient and inpatient services across the hospitals
ranged from 74-85% and 15-26% respectively. The results also show that the major cost
component per output was recurrent costs (at least 60% of total costs for hospitals 1, 3,
4, 6, and 41% for hospitals 2 and 5). Hospitals 5 and 2 had capitalisation levels of 59%.
This partly explains why Hospital 5 had relatively higher average total costs per case at
both hospital and ward levels. Hospitals 1 and 2 had lower costs per patient day and per
case at both ward and hospital level. Hospital 5 had the highest costs per unit of output
in most departments and even at hospital level. Hospital 3 and Hospital 4 had moderate
costs. Hospital 6 had comparable unit costs per patient day but high costs per admission,
possibly because of longer hospital stays. A summary of ward unit costs is given in
Tables A6 and A6.1.
There were strong relationships between ward unit costs (recurrent) suggesting that the
underlying resource use pattern did not differ across wards in each hospital except for
maternity ward. The demand and utilisation pattern of hospital maternity services could
be attributable to this. Maternity wards had characteristically high bed turnover rates
due to high numbers of normal deliveries. The unit costs were also relatively high,
which could have been caused by the apportionment methods used in the analysis,
which relied on the number of cases without regard to severity. Overall, it would seem
that the hospital was the appropriate level of analysis for this study. This justifies the
focus on organisational structure of the hospital (rather than ward structure) in
explaining performance variations.
These results need to be supported by an understanding of the differences in quality of
services provided by these hospitals.
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CHAPTER 7 HOSPITAL COSTS USING TRACER DISEASES:
MALARIA AND PULMONARY TUBERCULOSIS
7.0 Introduction
There are intrinsic problems to step-down costing methodologies. First, the costing
process itself is somewhat remote from the actual cost function because it assumes that
the underlying cost function is linear. Second, resource use inefficiencies are hidden,
because the implicit ·assumption is that apportioned aggregate costs are incurred
appropriately. Unnecessary costs can be incurred through idle staff time, over-
prescription of drugs, unnecessary diagnostic tests, inappropriate length of stay and
other redundant activities. Using a combination of the "tracer" method and micro-
costing method has the potential of resolving these problems.
7.1 The Tracer Method
Kessner et al., (1973) define a tracer as "a specific health problem, that, when combined
into sets, allow health care evaluators to pinpoint the strengths and weaknesses of a
particular medical practice setting or entire health service network by examining the
interaction between provider, patients and their environment." What is important is that
tracers must be identifiable and distinct conditions capable of complementing each other
in shedding light on the system (or its components) under review. This method has been
mostly used for assessing process and outcome aspects of quality of care (payne et al.,
1984, Mates and Sidel 1981).
The selection of tracers is crucial because it determines the validity of extrapolating
from the analyses. Kessner and colleagues used the following selection criteria: (1) A
tracer should reflect the activities of health professionals-they should be conditions
with significant functional impact. That is, those conditions that are likely to be treated,
and can cause considerable functional impairment; (2) Condition should be well defined
and easy to diagnose; (3) Condition must be prevalent to allow for sufficient numbers;
(3) Condition must be susceptible to the quality and quantity (or both) of the services
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received by the patient; (5) There must be consensus on minimal standards for
managing the condition; and (6) The effects of nonmedical factors (social, cultural,
economic and behavioural) on the tracer, and its epidemiology should be well
understood. This criteria is adaptable and serves as a workable framework for effective
application of the method by ensuring that tracers selected, reflect as mush as possible
the target health system (or its components). Tracers can be used for a variety of
evaluation purposes in health care (Kessner et al., 1972). For example, exploration of
macro level health costs and economic efficiency (Arredondo 1997), institutional
disease costing (Babson 1972, Kirigia et al., 1998, Sanyika et al., 1999), provider
behaviour and quality of care (Mates and Side11981, Payne et al., 1984) and differences
in patient severity across hospitals (Lezzoni et al., 1996) are all implemented
applications.
7.2 Micro-costing
Micro-costing is a concept based on principles of industrial engineering science, which
use input-based methods of measuring resource use. It is argued to be the most detailed
costing approach (Babson 1972, Drummond et al., 1997), especially when used in
conjunction with randomised clinical trials or observational research (Luce et al., 1996).
The approach involves direct enumeration and costing of inputs consumed in the
treatment of a particular patient. Input costs are then summed to obtain a total cost
which can be converted to desired units of interest- e.g. cost per case or cost per day.
In a hospital context, data collection is done using time and motion surveys", medical
chart reviews, patient diaries and periodic interviews with staff and patients. This
approach can also be applied to retrospective data but it requires sophisticated
information systems, and it is difficult to track some inputs after the fact (Luce et al.,
1996). It is meaningful to use micro-costing when gross measures, for example average
cost per day, correspond poorly with resource use or when the cost of an input is
integral to the analysis (Eisenberg et al., 1984), The method has been successfully
applied in various contexts (see Babson 1972, Eisenberg et al., 1984, Kirigia et al.,
42 Eisenberg et al. (1984) defme time and motion analysis as involving the observation of workers
carrying out their usual activities and recording the time consumed during each step of the process.
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1998, Saunders et al., 1998, Sanyika et al., 1999) Its main demerit is that it requires
intensive research. Frequently, micro-costing is used in combination with gross-costing
(see Chapter 6) in a single analysis in order to capture the advantages of both methods.
Use of tracer diseases in exploring hospital cost structures has an additive and
complementary value to results obtained using cost accounting methods at hospital
level. Systematically selected tracers can permit a systematic review of hospital resource
use and efficiency issues. The rationale for conducting detailed disease costing
(microanalysis) is that it can inform and complement hospital level costing (gross-
analysis) in a number of ways. It allows for an exploration of different hospital cost
components--<irugs, medical supplies, laboratory, x-ray and hotel services. By using
common diseases across hospitals with clear case definitions, the problem of case mix,
and to some extent case severity, in comparing hospitals could be partially addressed.
This chapter seeks to address three objectives. First, to cost services for malaria (simple
and severe) and smear positive pulmonary tuberculosis using a combination of micro-
costing and gross-costing methods at the six study hospitals. Second, to profile patient
costs by major input category, as a means of exploring resource use patterns and
potential areas of resource wastage or inefficiencies across hospitals. Third, to relate
patient level cost analysis results to hospital level cost analysis results in an attempt to
predict and explain the variation in average costs at that level.
The first section 7.3, describes in detail the methods used, followed by results in the
second section 7.4. The results are presented in two parts: pooled, and by hospital. The
results are discussed and some conclusions drawn in the last section 7.5
7.3.0 Methods
The study design was prospective and used two tracer diseases, pulmonary tuberculosis
and malaria. The choice of tracers was made by a selected panel of experts in one region
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of the country (Mashonaland East). The panel" consisted of three public health
physicians and two senior nursing officers with considerable experience in the health
care delivery system in Zimbabwe. The panel of experts served as a conduit for building
consensus and creating opportunities for utilisation of the results. The selection process
was guided by Kessner and colleagues' criteria.
Malaria and pulmonary tuberculosis were chosen because they are two of the top ten
causes of hospital admissions and deaths (provincial Health profiles 1997). In some
provinces they top the list. For example, in Midlands Province, 3, 965 TB cases were
hospitalised (7% of total admissions) in 1997, and 438 died (20% of all hospital deaths).
Similarly, 6,525 malaria cases were admitted in hospitals (11% of total admissions), and
228 died in hospital (9% of all hospital deaths). The Department of Disease Control and
Epidemiology in the MOH&CW headquarters supported the choice and provided
revised national management guidelines for the tracer diseases for the study.
The case definitions used in the study are critical in the interpretation of costs and
deserve to be mentioned. Case definitions vary with age, levels of malaria transmission
and acquired immunity (McGuinness et al., 1998), and controversies surrounding
definitions are not unusual (WHO 1990). In this study, a patient was classified as having
simple malaria if she presented with a fever and either lived in or had travelled in a
malarial area within the past three weeks (MOH 1998). Fever, is obviously associated
with many other diseases. However, in malaria endemic areas asymptomatic infection is
common such that using fever and presence of parasitaemia may lead to over-diagnosis.
Low density parasitaemia may require no therapeutic intervention (Redd et al., 1996,
McGuinness et al., 1998). In highly malarious areas, it is advised that any child
presenting with a fever, whether or not the other obvious causes are present should
receive malaria treatment (Redd et al., 1992). The Ministry of Health's policy on
malaria is that of presumptive treatment, and laboratory confirmation is only required at
hospital level. Similar situations prevail in Malawi (Redd 1996), the Gambia (Moller et
43 Provincial Medical Director for Mashonaland East province, Medical Officer of Health (Maternal and
Child Health), Medical Officer of Health (Disease control and Epidemiology), Provincial nursing officer,
and Provincial community nursing officer.
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al., 1996) and many others. Such a policy is obviously associated with the problem of
false positives but the benefits of such a policy are argued to outweigh the costs.
A patient was considered to have severe/complicated malaria if she had one or any of
these signs: impairment of consciousness, fits/convulsions, pallor, jaundice, "Coca-
Cola" urine, breathlessness, prostration, low blood pressure, persistent vomiting or
bleeding from the mucosa (MOH 1998). One or more of these features in the presence
of asexual parasitaemia confirms severe malaria (WHO 1990). However, WHO
acknowledges the controversies associated with definitions, and argues that for practical
purposes clinical suspicion alone, on cases previously exposed to PJalciparum should
prompt a therapeutic trial of an effective antimalarial.
The case definition for tuberculosis was described according to site and sputum status or
history. Using the former, sputum positive pulmonary tuberculosis refers to a patient
with two consecutive positive sputum smear examinations or with one positive smear
examination and a chest X-ray suggestive for tuberculosis. According to history, a new
case is defined as a patient who never received a full course of TB treatment or received
treatment for less than one month (MOH 1994). The treatment protocol used for such
patients is Category 1 High priority: 2 months of intensive treatment followed by a
continuation phase of four months. The drug regimens are given in the Essential Drug
List for Zimbabwe (EDLIZ, 1994).
Case recruitment for malaria was done using case definition (or principal clinical
diagnosis), and for TB it was entirely on the basis of case definition criteria. The
operationalization of case definitions was understandably a function of health provider
compliance with the guidelines, and to some extent the knowledge and experience of
research assistants used in the study. The study did not seek to evaluate the national
protocols but simply to use them as constructs of experts' consensus whatever their
shortcomings.
For practical purposes secondary diagnosis was not considered in the recruitment
exercise. Comorbidities were common confounders especially for TB cases. In 1998, it
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was estimated that 90% of all admitted TB cases were HIV-related (MOH, 1998).
During the study no HIV/AIDS related drugs were available in public hospitals, which
could have significantly inflated the costs. These could be obtained through the private
sector. An attempt was made in the study, however, to explore costs of secondary or
opportunistic infections by separating TB drug costs from non-TB drugs. As the results
will show, a greater proportion of drug costs was TB related. HIV/AIDS morbidities
considerably influence patient management and in the Zimbabwean context where HIV
prevalence among adults is 20.3%, cases are likely to be homogenous in that respect.
HIV serostatus increases length of stay in hospital (Migliori et al., 1999), but because of
home-based care programmes for chronic illnesses that are in place, this may not have
applied to the patients studied. Overall cost of treatment for TB was likely to be affected
by comorbidity as treatment may have included attempts to control HIV related
conditions (Saunderson, 1995, Nuun et al., 1993), however homogeneity is retained
given 90% HIVIAIDS prevalence among the patient group.
The target sample size was set at 300 TB cases and 300 malaria cases, that is, 50 cases
of each disease at each of the sample institutions. Time and resource constraints
influenced the sample size. However, only 207 malaria cases and 158 TB cases were
recruited for a variety of reasons. Data collection commenced in January 1999 and
ended in June 1999. The malaria season in Zimbabwe starts around November and ends
in April, and this meant that by the time the researcher reached the last hospital
(Hospital 6) the malaria season was over. Therefore no malaria data for Hospital 6 was
collected. Optimal timing of the study could have avoided this problem. However, it
was impossible to time activities perfectly. The start date was pre-determined by the
PhD programme. Working with hospital staff on other aspects of the study (qualitative
component) was difficult to time because of the unpredictable nature of hospital
activities. For example, it was not uncommon to have an interview with a doctor
interrupted by an emergency, or for key hospital staff to be called to a meeting or
workshop at headquarters without notice. The other reason for under-recruitment was
that the process of selecting cases meant that all cases presenting with signs and
symptoms of the two diseases were initially recruited (to ensure effective capture), and
some cases were eventually dropped when it became clear that the condition was
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something else. However, the fall out rate was minimised because the research assistants
were experienced nurses, who could recognise malaria symptoms, and read and
understand patient notes competently. In some cases, patients stayed in hospital for
more than a month when research assistants were only employed for a month. These
were also excluded. TB data from Hospital 5 was totally discarded because of poorly
recorded patient information, which was inconsistent and inaccurate.
Patient recruitment was carried out in the morning at the hospital outpatient or casualty
department. Any case that presented with signs and symptoms of any of the tracers, and
was subsequently admitted was recruited into the cohort. Research assistants worked
closely with hospital admission staff to make sure that most of the cases were recruited.
Suspected TB cases identified and followed before admission for at least a day at the
outpatient department when they came for laboratory tests and/or chest X-rays. This is
because suspected cases were only admitted after confirmation of diagnosis. Once
recruited each patient was given an identifier code and followed up from the time of
admission in hospital to discharge.
A mixture of bottom-up (micro-costing) and top down (gross) costing was used in the
study. Input consumption data was collected using composite forms (Annex VII.I and
VII.II) for both quality and cost assessment. Information sources were patient daily
records, the patient himlherself, laboratory and ward staff. Research assistants checked
every day at varied time intervals what was done to and for the patient. The form
captured inputs used in managing the patient directly or indirectly (resource use). The
inputs included number and type of laboratory tests carried out, number of chest x-rays
taken, drugs administered (type, doses and period) including what was prescribed and
provided at discharge, medical supplies provided (type and quantity), number of days in
hospital, frequency of meals per day, and staff (doctors, nurses and general hands)-
numbers and grade mix.
96
Unit prices obtained from the Government Medical Stores" were used to convert input
quantities into costs. The calculation of staff time was not entirely bottom-up as for the
majority of inputs. Staff time is usually spread over a number of activities:
administrative, domestic, clinical and "idle time". Ideally, time distribution could have
been captured by time and motion surveys. Instead, staff costs were calculated using
average nursing, doctors' and general hands' full time equivalents per day, and the
average number of inpatients in the ward. Equivalent salary costs per hour per staff
category and the length of stay were used to calculate total staff costs per case. This
approach may have overestimated staff time actually invested in managing a patient.
The time requirement for two people to follow up at least five patients a day, and
attempt to observe staff time use per patient exceeded researcher time available.
Similarly, the cost of bedding and linen was computed as an average cost per day. That
is, annual bedding and linen costs plus laundry costs divided by the annual number of
patient days. The average cost per meal per day was calculated using total annual
kitchen costs attributable to patients and the total number of inpatient days. Food costs
per case were obtained by multiplying the average cost per meal per day by the number
of meals per patient per day and by patient length of stay. In the case of all these costs,
the hospital level cost estimates of Chapter 6 were improved on to the extent that ward
level costs were computed, and the resource requirements of a truly bottom up approach
exceeded those of the study.
Some of the laboratory cost data was obtained from a detailed costing study of
laboratory services in Zimbabwe conducted by DANIDA in 1999 (unpublished). As a
way of validating some of this data, a detailed costing of malaria tests (MPs), and TB
sputum microscopy tests was carried out at Hospitals 4 and 6. With the assistance of a
Laboratory Technologist estimates of technical ingredients for each test were
established and costed. The results were cross-checked with the results of the DANIDA
study and no significant differences were observed. Input quantities and purchase prices
were essentially the same for public hospitals because of the central procurement
system. The only possible source of differences between hospitals was in staff costs. In
44 Government Medical Stores (GMS) is the central procurement and distribution unit for drugs and
medical supplies for public facilities. Private sector suppliers are only used for products out of stock at
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other words, the same test conducted by a laboratory technologist cost more compared
to one done by a junior technician. In the end cost results for Hospital 4 and 6 were used
for the other four hospitals. This approach had the risk of over or underestimating
laboratory costs of other hospitals but because the cost contribution to patient costs was
negligible, it was unlikely to have any notable effect on patient cost variations. The
same was done for chest x-ray. The relevant inputs for an adult patient chest x-ray in
hospital were costed with the help of the chief radiographer. These costs were small and
I had to weigh the benefits against the costs of doing such detailed costing at each
hospital.
Patient level costing did not include overhead costs (administration, utilities, etc.), not
because there are not important but because the aim was to establish costs that vary with
patient management activities. Overhead costs were adequately captured at hospital
level (see Chapter 6). These could easily be incorporated but because I sought to
understand how costs varied with patient care, their magnitude and the sources of this
variation, they were purposefully omitted.
Data analysis
Each hospital and patient in the cohort had a unique code number. Patient specific data
was organised according to these codes. Patient background characteristics such as age,
sex, weight, referral status, case severity for malaria, length of hospital stay, results of
laboratory tests and condition of patient at discharge were captured in SPSS files. Data
on input consumption and unit prices were captured in EXCEL spreadsheets. Patient
costs were then categorised according to major input categories, that is, staff, drug costs,
medical supplies, and hotel services. Hotel services included bedding and linen, laundry
services and food. Costs per case were calculated for the entire sample, and the two data
sets were screened for outliers using cost per case as the key variable. Outliers were
removed from the sample such that 197 malaria cases and 151 tuberculosis cases
remained for further analysis. Sample data were trimmed because outliers distort the
general distribution of data and ultimately statistics calculated therefrom
GMS. In fact, GMS approves private procurement.
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Costs per case were further broken down by case severity for malaria, and by hospital.
In order to link patient costs and background variables, patient codes were used to
combine the data sets. Statistical analysis involved descriptive statistics, cross
tabulations and Pearson Chi-square for discrete variables, analysis of variance and F
tests for continuous variables.
7.4 Results
The findings are presented in two parts for both malaria and pulmonary tuberculosis: (a)
results of a pooled analysis and (b) a separate analysis for key cost variables by hospital.
For malaria, cost results are further categorised by level of malaria complication or
severity.
7.4.1 Malaria: Pooled Analysis
Of the 197 enlisted malaria patients, 53% (104) were referred cases and 47% (91) were
self-referred cases. A figure of 47% of first contact malaria cases at tertiary hospitals
reflects underlying problems associated with the hospital referral system. Allocative
efficiency losses at hospital and system level are likely to occur under such
circumstances. Fifty-three percent (105) of the patients were females and 47% (92) were
males. Patient ages ranged from a year to eighty-four years, and the mean age was
twenty-six years. The number of simple and complicated or severe malaria case was 83
(42%), and 114 (58%) respectively. Worth noting is that 52% (47) of the 91 self-
referred cases were simple malaria cases further reflecting referral system problems".
The hospital case fatality rate was 17%, strikingly high compared to other diseases.
In order to validate the principal clinical diagnosis at admission, the results of malaria
microscopy tests (MPs) were recorded for 154 cases. 76% (117) of the cases were
45 At this level of analysis (pooled), malaria severity was not independent of referral status (F test,
p=O.02)
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positive and 24% (37) were negative. Some of the 37 negative cases could have been
false negatives. Direct recurrent costs per admitted malaria case are shown in Table 7.1.
Table 7.1. Mean Cost Per Case of Malaria inZW$ (N=197, FY1997/8)
Cost Category Simple Malaria Complicated Malaria Malaria
(n = 83) (n = 114) (n = 197)
Mean Cost per case 1,012 (100%) 1,905.49 (100%) 1,528.28 (100%)
Staff 294.60 (30%) 566.79 (30%) 452.11 (30%)
Diagnostic 41.48 (4%) 51.92 (3%) 47.57 (3%)
Drugs 23.38 (2%) 73.54 (4%) 49.67 (3%)
Medical supplies 0 51.93 (3%) 32.78 (2%)
Hotel services" 652.77 (64%) 1,161.31 (61%) 947.05 (62%)
Notes: • Hotel services include food, bedding and linen, and laundry services.
The general mean cost per case of malaria was ZW$1,528, and it ranged from
ZW$143.96 to ZW$S,S80. The median cost per case was ZW$1,2S4.72. The mean costs
per simple and severe malaria case were ZW$I,012 (ZW$134.96-3,631.6S) and
ZW$I,90S (ZW$197-S,S81) respectively. The median cost per case was ZW$718 for
simple malaria and ZW$I,892 for severe malaria. Severe malaria cost almost twice as
much as simple malaria. However, there were no differences in component costs per
case, except for medical supplies costs, which were insignificant for simple malaria, and
only 3% for severe malaria. The question of whether case severity explains differences
in costs is discussed in the succeeding sections.
Hotel services are the major cost component (62%) of malaria costs per case followed
by staff costs (30%). Patients invariably were provided three "balanced" meals a day
(see Chapter 8), and this was costly. It was evident in the study hospitals that a
significant proportion of retained fees was used to purchase food for patients and
maintain hospital dietary standards. At the time of the study, a hospital equivalent meal
(For example, "Sadza46" and stew) in the private sector cost about ZW$30-S0. Using
these prices, three meals a day in hospital cost about ZW$90-1S0. In addition, hospital
46 Sadza is some form of hard porridge meal traditionally prepared with com flour or any of the small
grains like finder millet and rapoko. This meal is eaten at least once a day in Zimbabwe.
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reforms introduced in the late 1990s advocated contracting out of non-core hospital
services. Laundry services in the six hospitals were out-sourced, and this meant that
hospitals were paying market prices (costs). All these factors explain why hospital stay
(bed use) per se was a major contributor to overall cost per case. Hospital length of stay
is a major concern for hospitals.
•
Average staff costs per case were probably overestimated because ward staff time is
usually distributed across nursing care, domestic and administrative duties and idle
time. This study assumed available staff time was used productively (no idle time).
Drugs, diagnostic tests and other medical supplies contributed relatively little to the
overall patient cost (10%). Antimalarials commonly used were chloroquine, fansider
(pyrimethamine and sulphadoxine) and quinine. Drugs consumed per case are not
substantial. For example, patient treatment could be three tablets of fansider in total
which cost ZW$10.32/1 000 tablets. Consequently the contribution of drug costs to total
patient cost is likely to be small. The common test used for malaria was malaria parasite
test (MPs) which costs ZW$32 per case. This explains why diagnostic costs were also a
small proportion of cost per case.
The results show that inappropriate admissions can result in considerable resource
wastage especially hotel services, and to some extent staff time. It is more expensive to
treat a simple malaria case at tertiary level than at lower levels of the hospital system.
The average cost per day for simple and severe malaria was estimated to be ZW$304
(ZW$82-617) and ZW$401 (ZW$162-977) respectively.
7.4.2 Malaria: Analysis by hospital
Analysis of cost per case of malaria by hospital provided an opportunity for an in-depth
look at variations in unit costs across the sample hospitals. The underlying logic was
that tracer costs would clarify variations or similarities in unit costs across hospitals.
The existence of a national malaria treatment protocol might imply that the effect of
clinical practice on variation in costs could be minimised although this depends on
compliance. Background characteristics of malaria patients by hospital are shown in
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Table 7.2. Hospitals 1 and 2 had high proportions of simple malaria cases, 73% and
59% respectively. All the hospitals except hospital 5 had high proportions (exceeding
50%) of self-referrals. Notably, hospital 5 had a high proportion of referred cases and
severe cases (as expected of a tertiary hospital). Hospitals 4 and 3 had similarly high
proportions of severe malaria cases and higher mean lengths of stay compared to
hospitals 1 and 2. However, it is important to note that for all the five hospitals case
severity was independent of referral status (p>0.05, X2-Fisher's Exact test).
Table 7.2 Descriptive statistics of admitted malaria patients by hospital
Hospital/ [1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Variable (n=56) (n=34) (n=47) (n=37) (n=23) p-value
Mean patient age 22 25 34 22 30 NS
Patient sex:
Female 31(55%) 13(38%) 23(49%) 16(43%) 22(96%)
Male 25(45%) 21(62%) 24(51%) 21(57%) 1(4%) <0.00011
Simple malaria 41(73%) 20(59%) 8 (17%) 10(27%) 4(17%)
Severe malaria 15(27%) 14(41%) 39(83%) 27(73%) 19(83%) <0.00011
Referral status:
Referred 28(50%) 12(35%) 20(44%) 18(49%) 21(91%)
Self-referred 28(50%) 22(65%) 25(56%) 19(51%) 2(9%) <0.0011
Length ofstax{daxs} 3 4 5 6 5 <0.0012
Mean LOS simple 2.9 3.2 3.4 5.0 4.8 <0.022
Mean LOS severe 3.4 5 5.1 6.6 4.6 <0.032
Case Fatality Rate 6 (11%) 6(17%) 8 (17%) 6 (16%) 5 (25%) <0.0011
Lab. Results:
Positive 27(48%) 18(55%) 45(98%) 8(32%) 19(86%)
Negative • 15(45%) 1(2%) 17(68%) 3(14%) <0.00011
Notes: • 27 cases were positive and results for 29 cases were not recorded, The same is true for 1 case for
hospitalS, 7 for hospital4 and 1 for hospital 3. 1 = Chi-square test, 2 = F test (ANOVA).
A greater proportion of patients were malaria positive" in all the hospitals especially
hospital 3 with a 98% positivity rate (p<O.OOl).Although little can be said about the
case fatality rate at this stage similar proportions of cases died across the hospitals
47 Questions about the efficacy of malaria microscopy tests, and whether the patients actually had malaria
or just parasitaemia is not relevant in this study. All cases that were clinically categorised by health staff
as having malaria were considered as such and treated accordingly.
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(p<0.001). In all, there were significant differences in patient sex distribution, lengths of
stay, patient referral status and case severity mix across the hospitals.
Hospital 1 had the lowest mean cost per case followed by hospital 2 (Table 7.3).
Hospital 4 had the highest mean cost per malaria case-at least twice as much as that of
hospital 1. Hospital 3 and hospital 5 had mean costs above the overall mean cost per
case of ZW$I,528. Malaria cost per case results confirm hospital level cost analysis
results (ranking) where hospital 1 and hospital 2 had consistently lower unit costs. The
mean or median costs show a similar ranking of hospitals, and the range shows how
individual mean costs per case varied in each hospital. Differences in case mix and
consequently length of stay appear to be the most important explanatory factors.
Table 7.3. Cost per malaria case by hospital in ZW$ (1997/98)
Hospital Mean Median Range
[1] 864.97 650.85 134.96-3,517.06
[2] 1,055.01 700.70 196.77-3,666.45
[3] 1,866.59 1,845.76 234.55-3,961.63
[4] 2,357.80 2,465.37 370.50-3,961.63
[5] 1,852.39 1,818.88 478.31-3,629.97
A breakdown of costs per case by input category shows that hotel services constitute a
notable proportion of hospitalisation costs (Table 7.4). Hospital2 was an exception with
50% of costs attributable to staff time and only 38% to hotel services. Low hotel
services could be a reflection of poor quality of food and laundry services or efficiency
in the provision of these services. Innovative and effective food and laundry services
procurement systems could explain these low costs. Hospital 2 (just like hospital 1) is
close to the capital city Harare (about 80 km) compared to other hospitals, and is located
in a prosperous commercial farming area. Alternatively, the outlying proportions could
be driven by high staff cost, which could be attributable to relatively higher staff
numbers and grades. This issue is addressed at length in Chapter 8.
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Table 7.4. Cost distribution, malaria (ZWS)
Hospitall [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] p-value
Cost Category
Staff 183 (21%) 532 (50%) 471 (25%) 700(30%) 549 (30%) NS
Diagnostic 29 (3%) 57 (5%) 46(2%) 34 (1%) 103 (6%) <0.001
Drug 30 (4%) 37 (4%) 48 (3%) 77 (3%) 74 (4%) <0.01
Medical Sup. 15 (2%) 27 (3%) 38 (2%) S4 (2%) 40 (2%) NS
Hotel Services 608 (70%) 401 (38%) 1263 (68%) 1497 (63%). 1088 (59%) <0.001
Total 865 (100%) 1055 (100%) 1866 (100%) 2363(100%) 1852 (100%)
There were significant differences in the proportions of hotel services costs (p<O.OOl),
drug costs (p<O.Ol) and diagnostic costs (p<O.OOl) across the hospitals implying that
hospitals employed different resource use strategies (or input mix) in the production of
hospital care for malaria cases. However, all the hospitals (except hospital 2) had similar
proportions of staff costs and this could be attributable to similarities in staffing patterns
(not necessarily staff time use patterns) in malaria management at these hospitals.
Staffing levels and patterns are reviewed in succeeding chapters.
Hospital ranking does not change when cost per case results are dichotomised by case
severity=simple and severe malaria (Table 7.5). Hospital 1 and hospital 2 maintain
their positions in the group with lower unit costs compared to the other three hospitals.
This implies that their low cost is not wholly explained by lesser case severity. The cost
per simple case of malaria is oddly high for hospital s. This may be due to a relatively
small sample size of four simple malaria cases, which is likely to be unrepresentative.
Apart from that, Hospital 4 maintains its position in the group as the most costly per
hospitalised malaria case. The mean cost per simple malaria case is significantly less
than the mean cost per severe malaria case. In some instances, is the difference is almost
twofold (hospital 1 and 2). This is explained by significant differences in the mean
length of stay by severity across the hospitals (Table 7.2).
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Table 7.5.Mean cost per case for severe and simple malaria (ZW$)
Mean Cost/Hospital [1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Severe malaria
(Range)
simple malaria 693 769 1317 1970
(Range) (135-2725) (238-1930) (327-2692) (371-3631)
n = 41 n =20 n = 8 n = 10
1,336 1524 1936 2501
(314-3517) (253-3666) (197-5580) (458-3962)
n = 15 n = 14 n = 39 n = 27
2498*
(1879-3087)
n=4
1716
(478-3630)
n= 19
Notes: ...HospitalS had 4 simple malaria cases, and therefore the figure is suspect.
There seems to be no significant difference in the distribution of component costs per
case between severe and simple malaria, and between total malaria and each of the
severity categories (Table 7.6 and Table 7.7). Differences in cost levels can be observed
in diagnostic and drugs cost categories between severe and simple malaria. Otherwise
resource use patterns appear to be fundamentally similar and overall cost differences are
determined by length of stay.
Table 7.6. Cost distribution, simple malaria (ZW$)
Cost Hospital [1] Hospital [2] Hospital [3] Hospital [4] Hospital [5]
Category
Staff 153 (22%) 350 (45%) 368 (28%) 593 (30%) 574 (23%)
Diagnostics 28 (4%) 60(8%) 32 (2%) 32 (2%) 131 (5%)
Drugs 27 (4%) 26 (3%) 6 (0.4%) 17 (1%) 28 (1%)
Hotel services 485 (70%) 334 (43%) 911 (69%) 1328 (67%) 1764 (71%)
Total 693 (100%) 769 (100%) 1317 (100%) 1970 (100%) 2498 (100%)
Table 7.7. Cost distribution, severe malaria (ZW$)
Cost Category Hospital [1] Hospital [2] Hospital [3] Hospital [4] Hospital [5]
Staff 263 (20%) 824 (54%) 483 (25%) 740 (30%) 543 (32%)
Diagnostics 32 (2%) 55 (4%) 48 (2%) 35 (1%) 97 (6%)
Drugs 63 (5%) 67 (4%) 56(3%) 100 (4%) 83 (5%)
Med.Supplies 34 (3%) 58 (4%) 44 (2%) 72 (3%) 48 (3%)
Hotel services 943 (70%) 520 (34%) 1305 (67%) 1560 (62%) 945 (55%)
Total 1335 (100%) 1524 (100%) 1936 (100%) 2508 (100%) 1716 (100%)
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The costs per day for malaria by hospital are shown in Table 7.8. Hospitals 1 and 2 have
lower average cost per day despite their similar lengths of stay to other hospitals.
Utilisation levels cannot explain this cost variation either because the medical wards of
hospitals 5 and 1 are characterised by high BOR and BTR (see Chapter 5) but they have
the highest and the least average cost per day respectively. These results seem to suggest
differences in either severity mix and/or institutional factors, for example, resource
endowment, quality and clinical practice, may explain the observed cost variations.
Table 7.8. Average cost per day per malaria case by hospital (ZW$), 1997/98
Hospital Average cost per day Range
1 292 82-735
2 337 74-1273
3 379 197-583
4 402 185-804
5 481 120-1333
When mean costs per day are considered for simple malaria cases, no apparent
difference in hospital ranking is observed. Hospitals 1 and 2 continue to have lower
costs and hospital 4 and 5 high costs (Table 7.9). However, there are significant
differences in the mean cost across hospitals (p<0.001). The cost component distribution
pattern is similar to what was observed for cost per case. Hotel and staff costs are the
major cost components.
Table 7.9. Cost distribution of mean cost per day for simple malaria in ZW$, 1997/98
Hospital/Cost category 1 2 3 4 5
Staff 57 (22%) 117 (43%) 116 (30%) 123 (32%) 117 (22%)
Diagnostics 13 (5%) 27 (10%) 13 (3%) 8 (2%) 19 (3%)
Drugs 13 (5%) 11 (4%) 2 (1%) 4 (1%) 7 (1%)
Hotel services 181 (69%) 117(43%) 260(67%) 250 (65%) 399 (73%)
Cost per day 264 (100%) 272 (100%) 390 (100%) 385 (100%) 543 (100%)
The cost profile for patients who had severe malaria is shown in Table 7.10. As
expected, the costs per day are higher than the cost per simple malaria case (Table 7.9).
Noticeable differences in drug costs, hotel and diagnostic costs can be seen between
simple and severe malaria cases. Observed small differences in staff costs between
severe and simple malaria cases are explained by the method used in the calculation of
staff costs which did not specifically consider time spent per patient. It would be
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expected that more time is spent per severe case given the extra nursing time and
intensive treatment they normally require. Nonetheless, severe malaria had generally
higher costs per component cost across hospitals. What is interesting is that there was no
significant difference between the cost per day for severe malaria across the hospitals
(p>0.05). This was also true for simple malaria cases which seems to suggest that case
severity was not a major factor in explaining malaria cost per day differences across
hospitals. Assuming similar institutional practices amongst the hospitals, the most likely
factor driving the cost differences was length of stay.
Table 7.10. Cost distribution of mean cost per day for severe malaria in ZW$
Hospital/Cost category 1 2 3 4 5
Staff 74 (20%) 197 (53%) 98 (25%) 116 (28%)
Diagnostics 13 (3%) 14 (4%) 15 (4%) 7 (2%)
Drugs 29 (8%) 16 (4%) 17 (4%) 17 (4%)
Med. Supp. & other drugs" 21 (5%) 14 (4%) 13 (3%) 13 (3%)
Hotel services 248 (65%) 127 (35%) 241 (63%) 258 (63%)
127 (28%)
24 (5%)
24 (5%)
14 (3%)
257 (58%)
Cost per day 383 (100%) 368 (100%) 385 (100%) 411 (100%) 446 (100%)
Notes: • Otherdrugsincludedrugsthat are not antimalarials.
7.4.3 Tuberculosis: Pooled Analysis
Tuberculosis patients were not classified by level of illness severity, and the results
presented here are based on a total sample of 151 admitted patients (WHO Category I
cases). A fairly high proportion of TB cases (55%) was self-referred, and 45% were
referred. It is not clear why more TB cases self-referred. One intuitive explanation is
that people perceive tertiary level institutions to be better equipped and staffed to
diagnose and treat tuberculosis properly. The mean age of patients was 32 years (ranged
from 1 to 78 years). Out of the 151 cases, 64 (43%) were females and 85 (57%) were
males. Hospital 3 was atypical in the group in that all patients diagnosed pulmonary TB
positive, were referred to a nearby infectious disease hospital. This meant shorter
lengths of stay and hence lower costs per case. Costs results are presented separately,
including and excluding Hospital 3, to correct for its distortionary effect on the overall
mean cost.
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The mean cost per tuberculosis case reflects all of the direct costs incurred by patients
admitted for the first time with smear positive TB (or indicative x-ray results), for their
intensive phase treatment (Category 148). The mean and median cost per TB case,
including Hospital 3, were ZW$2,057 and ZW$l, 666 respectively (Table 7.11). After
excluding Hospital 3, the mean and median cost per TB case were ZW$2,203 and
ZW$I,831 respectively. The distribution of component costs per case remains the same.
Hotel services and staff costs were the major contributors to patient costs. The
proportions are similar to those found for malaria. Drugs and medical supplies constitute
a small proportion of mean case costs. At the time of the study, hospitals had adopted
the directly observed treatment approach" (DOTS), and patients were kept for lesser
periods in hospital before discharge for home or local clinic treatment. In hospitals 5
and 3 patients were transferred to a specialist infectious disease hospital immediately
after they were diagnosed TB positive. This meant that the hospital costs incurred whilst
waiting for laboratory results were largely amenity costs, staff costs and initial doses of
TB drugs.
Table 7.11 Mean Cost Per TB case, Provincial Hospitals in ZW$ (n=151, FY1997/8)
Cost Category All Hospitals i Range All Hospitals2 Range
(n=125) (n=151)
Cost per case 2,203 (100%) 340- 6,010 2,057 (100%) 340-6,010
Staff costs 738 (34%) 66-3115 669 (32%) 18-3115
Diagnostic costs 130 (6%) 0-192· 132 (6%) 5 -39
Drugs & Med. Supp. 17 (1%) 1-140 15 (1%) 5 -101
Hotel services 1,317 (60%) 58 -4,419 1,247 (61%) 58 -4,419
Notes: 1 excludes and 2 includes hospital3. • 0 means that no test was done
48 Such patients are classified as Category I patients according to the National TB treatment Guideline.
These are cases with pulmonary TB, admitted for the first time with TB and with no evidence of
resistance to TB drugs (MOH, 1994).
49 To reduce congestion in hospitals, and to contain hospital costs, TB patients are kept in hospital for a
shorter period of time (1-2 weeks) during intensive phase of treatment compared to the conventional 2
months in hospital. Once patients are stabilised, they are discharged for continued home treatment. What
is important is that someone close to the patient (relative or Village Health Worker) is trained to directly
observe the patient taking medication at prescribed times. Direct observation improves treatment
compliance and treatment success rate (MOH,1998).
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The mean length of stay in hospital was seven days. Patients could be admitted for one
to 32 days. The length of stay was greatly influenced by case severity, clinical practice
and whether or not there was a specialised infectious disease hospital nearby.
7.4.4 Tuberculosis: Analysis by hospital
Tuberculosis patient characteristics were generally similar across the study hospitals.
Hospital4 had the highest proportion of self-referred cases (69%) a similar scenario was
observed for malaria cases (Table 7.12). For the remaining hospitals, the majority ofTB
cases were referred. Hospital 6 had the highest mean length of stay of 10 days followed
by hospital 4 with 9 days. Hospital deaths due to TB ranged from 8-19% (excludes
home deaths). These short stays can be explained by the implementation of DOTs, and
home based care programmes.
Table 7.12 Background characteristics for TB patients by hospital (n=151).
HospitalJ [1] [2] [3] [4] [6]
Variable (n=30) (n=37) (n=26) (n=32) (n=26) p-value
Mean patient age 33 33 33 30 38
Patient sex:
Female 17 (57%) 12 (33%) 11 (42%) 13 (42%) 11 (42%)
Male 13 (43%) 24 (67%) 15 (58%) 18 (58%) 15 (58%) NS
Referral status:
Referred 16 (53%) 19 (51%) 17 (65%) 10 (31%) 19 (76%)
Self-referred 14 (47%) 18 (49%) 9 (35%) 22 (69%) 6 (24%) <0.01
Length of stay( days) 5 6 4 9 10 <0.001
Case Fatality Rate 4 (13%) 3 (8%) 5 (19%) 5 (16%) 2 (8%) <0.001
Patient profile by sex in the cohort was similar. There were significant differences in the
average length of stay (p<0.001), referral status of patients (p<0.01) and hospital deaths
due to TB (p<O.OOl)across the hospitals. Similar results were obtained for malaria.
Table 7.13 shows the cost per case of tuberculosis by hospital. Hospital 6 had the
highest cost per case with costs ranging from ZW$1,315 to ZW$6,010. This is linked to
its relatively longer length of stay (10 days), and low bed turnover rate (see Chapter 5).
For hospital! and 2 the scenario is similar to that of malaria, they had the least cost per
case. Hospitals 4 and 3 had intermediate costs. All these results were in line with the
109
predictions of the Pabon Lasso method. The wide ranges in cost per case for all the
hospitals can be explained by differences in case severity and length of stay.
Table 7.13. Cost per tuberculosis case by hospital in ZW$ (1997/98)
Hospital Mean Median Range
1 1,532 1,249 454-4,546
2 1,462 1,305 340-3,842
3 1,358 1,075 392-3,673
4 2,695 2,566 515-5,752
6 3,425 3,000 1,315-6,010
A decomposition of the mean cost per TB case shows that the input cost pattern is
similar across hospitals (Table 7.14). Drug costs are particularly low because most
patients had short stays in hospitals (beginning of intensive phase treatment). In
interpreting these results it is important to realise the difference between drug costs for
an episode of TB, and drug costs during hospitalisation. The former is likely to be
higher than the latter.
Table 7.14. Distribution of mean cost per TB case in ZW$, Provincial Hospitals,
1997/98
Cost Category Hospital[1] Hospital[2] Hospital[3] Hospital[4] Hospital[6] p-value
Staff 298 (19%) 638 (44%) 321 (24%) 632 (23%) 1520 (44%) <0.001
Diagnostic 148 (10% 159 (11%) 139 (10%) 93 (3%) 115 (3.4%) <0.001
Drug 10 (1%) 10 (1%) 6 (0.5%) 13 (0.5%) 22 (0.6% <0.001
Medical Sup. 0.12 (0%) 6(0%) 0.6 (0%) 2 (0%) 6 (0%) <0.05
Hotel Services 1076 (70%) 684 (44%) 891 (66%) 1955 (73%) 1762 (51%) <0.001
Total 1532(100%) 1462 (100%) 1358 (100%) 2695 (100%) 3425 (100%)
Staff and hotel services constitute the greater part of costs per hospitalised TB patient.
Diagnostic costs were relatively high compared to similar costs for malaria. Common
tests conducted for TB were: three sputum microscopy tests at admission, a chest x-ray,
full blood count, and Erythrocyte Sedimentation Rate (ESR). Diagnostic costs were low
in Hospital 4, where frequent shortages of reagents and breakdown of equipment
occurred. For a period of five months no laboratory tests for TB were carried out in
1998 (personal communication with the Chief Laboratory Technologist). For Hospita16
diagnosis for TB was mainly through sputum microscopy and chest x-rays. There was
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much less intensity in laboratory investigations. This explains differences in diagnostic
costs across hospitals.
The average cost per day for tuberculosis showed a similar variation pattern across
hospitals as for malaria (Table 7.15). Hospitals 1 and 4 had the least cost per day whilst
hospital 6 had the highest cost per day. This can be explained by differences in length of
stay. Wide ranges in the average cost per day are explained by wide variations in length
of stay and diagnostic intensity. The median average cost per day values depicts this
variation to some extent.
Table 7.15. Average cost per day for TB by hospital in ZW$ (1997/98)
Hospital Mean Median Range
1 320 314 271-453
2 238 220 164- 422
4 385 389 157- 515
6 378 379 164-489
7.5 Summary of filteUngs
This part of the study attempted to measure in detail the costs of hospital services using
malaria and pulmonary tuberculosis as tracers. It examined patient and hospital
characteristics that impinge on hospital costs, differences in input mix and variations in
mean cost per case and per day. 'Tracer diseases allowed for detailed examination of
costs of hospital services, a clearer understanding of cost categories and relative
efficiencies by ward and hospital.
The main recurrent cost components per case (admission) were hotel services (44-70%)
followed by staff costs (20-44%). Drug costs and medical supplies constituted 10%.
This means that hospitalised cases incurred significant costs whether treatment was
given or not.
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A comparison of mean costs per malaria patient across hospital showed that hospital 1
had the least costs followed by hospital 2. Hospitals 4 and 6 had high costs per case
probably due to relatively longer lengths of stay and high proportion of severe cases.
Hospitals 3 and 5 had intermediate costs.
Hospital 3 had the lowest cost per TB case treated because of its non-admission policy
for confirmed TB positive cases. This resulted in atypically short lengths of stay. The
pattern of cost variation between the hospitals was similar to that observed for malaria
where hospitals 1 and 2 had lower costs compared to the rest. Hospital 6 had the highest
cost per tuberculosis case treated.
The ranking of hospital "costliness" by tracer disease dovetails well with the rankings
using average costs at ward and hospital level. This suggests that the tracers are likely to
have succeeded in representing the behaviour of the hospital as a whole, and that
hospital level data comparisons are not likely to be seriously confounded by case mix
differences (although other explanations are theoretically possible). What could not be
said at this stage, was whether or not these cost differences reflected efficiency or poor
quality of services.
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CHAPTER 8 QUALITY OF HOSPITAL SERVICES
8.0. Introduction
The difficulties of measuring quality of health services correspond to those of defining
it. The measurement method used is a function of how quality is defined. Secondly, it is
influenced by what is feasible given the prevailing circumstances. This study sought to
define and measure quality in a manner that was both sensitive to the context, and
capable of exposing vulnerable areas for improvement.
Many have grappled with the conceptualisation and operationalization of quality of care
concepts (Donabedian 1966, 1980, Shortbridge 1974, Amonoo-Lartson 1981, Black
1990, Bitran 1995). There appears to be no consensus on a universal definition of
quality, owing to differences in opinion, its complex multifaceted nature and different
purposes for seeking a definition. How comprehensive can one be in defining quality?
Attempts to be comprehensive have often led to quality definitions that are difficult to
measure in practice. The study adopted the Institute of Medicine (1990) definition that:
" Quality of care is the degree to which health services for individuals and populations
increase the likelihood of desired outcomes and are consistent with current professional
knowledge". Shortbridge (1974) argues that:
"As long as the researcher can defme the aspects of care which he is studying and describe the means
used to measure them there is no drawback, for each reader can then evaluate for himself their
centrality to his concept of care, and the appropriateness of the measurement process."
The application of the structure-process-outcome paradigm (Donabedian 1980) permits
quality judgement at different stages in the production of medical services. Each aspect
of the triad is explained in the context of the other (Donabedian 1988, Wyszewianski
1988). Knowledge of the relationship between structure and process is limited, but
much is known about the relationship between process and outcome (Mates et al., 1981,
Donabedian 1988). Most quality assessment studies in LMICs have tended to focus on
structural and process aspects of quality (De Geyndt 1995, Gilson 1992) because of the
twin problem of data unavailability and quality. Furthermore, these studies have relied
mostly on retrospective data and patient satisfaction surveys, Little attention has been
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given to assessing the quality of inpatient services, and even less so using prospective
approaches. This study attempted to correct for data deficiencies in estimating quality of
inpatient services by using prospective patient-specific methods.
Quality analysis used a tracer approach (Kessner 1972) as used for cost analysis, and
discussed in Chapter 7. The use of tracer diseases in combination with explicit
management criteria may provide an understanding for improving hospital services
quality. Numerous approaches are used in setting explicit criteria: review of literature,
panel of experts, and use of consensus building methods like the Delphi technique
(payne et al., 1984, Mates et al., 1981). When using a panel of experts, it is important to
ensure that the panel represents the constituency subject to assessment (Donabedian
1988). It appears ambitious, if not pointless; to use specialists who are accustomed to
working in well-resourced institutions to define quality standards for poorly endowed
district hospitals, for example. The two main demerits of explicit criteria design are lack
of adaptability to patient characteristics, and problems with relative values of different
criteria in relation to expected outcome. The latter can be addressed by using weighting
systems (discussed later). The former relates to the restrictive nature of explicit
protocols in tailoring patient management to specific conditions for the patient. For
instance, patients have different allergies to different drugs. Explicit criteria attenuate
the advantages of clinical autonomy.
Comparisons of quality performance require some form of measurement scale. There
are broadly two types of scales: (1) categorisation of care into qualitative divisions such
as "excellent," "good," "fair," or ''poor.'' Percentages of cases that fall in each category
are calculated for comparisons or rankings; (2) use of scores for specified aspects of
care. Scores are quantitative measures assigned to specified components of care that can
be weighted to reflect the relative importance of each factor to the total quality score or
index. Assignment of scores and weights is done through a panel of experts or literature
review. Different providers are then ranked according to the scores, and also against an
expected yardstick quality score (Montoya-Aguilar 1994). For example, a Provider
Performance Index (PPI) calculated using scores was successfully used to assess
provider behaviour, and the relationship between process and outcome of care (Mates et
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a11981, Payne et al., 1984). Numerical scores give a picture of various components of
quality which can be hidden if scales of "good" or "bad" are used, for example.
However, the use of numerical scores faces two major challenges; (1) in some instances,
medical care has an all-none aspect which numerical scores usually do not reflect. Care
can be good in many aspects and be disastrously inadequate on the whole due to a vital
error in one component. It is argued that this is not a problem if there is demonstrated
interrelationship between the different components (Donabedian 1966); and (2) the
manner in which different components are weighted to arrive at a total score remains
SUbjective. The problem relates to the value of different items or procedures in the
management process. In most cases a panel of experts decide on weights to be used.
There are problems related to the interpretation of the numerical interval between points
on a scale. Donabedian (1966) argues that it is unlikely that numerical scores derived for
the quality assessment have the property of equal intervals. This implies that it is
inappropriate to calculate mean scores, or perform any other arithmetic manipulation,
and this view is therefore inconsistent with drawing institutional level inferences from
the data. Uses of this approach tend (as here) to disregard this view. In this study, a
panel of experts assisted in designing the weighting system, and its credibility should be
judged on that basis.
In this chapter two main objectives are pursued. First, to assess the quality of inpatient
services at two levels: hospital level structural quality assessment, and patient level
assessment using tracer diseases. Second, to explore the extent to which disease or
patient-specific quality assessment can provide insights into the overall quality of
inpatient services.
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 8.1 presents the methodology used in
quality assessment at both hospital and tracer level. Results on hospital level quality
assessment are presented in section 8.2.1, and this is followed by the results on tracer
quality assessments in section 8.2.2. The chapter ends with a brief discussion and
summary of the results in section 8.3.
I1S
8.1 Methods
8.1.1 Hospital level analysis
At hospital level, four dimensions of structural quality were measured in the study:
hospital financial resources, staff, availability of drugs, and condition of buildings. Each
is discussed in turn.
Financial resources: Data on available financial resources were collected as part of
hospital cost analysis (see Chapter 6), and included government allocations plus any
donations in the financial year 1997/98. In-kind donations were converted into
equivalent dollar amounts using prevailing market prices. Only financial resources to
support recurrent hospital activities are considered in this chapter.
Staff: An inventory of staff levels by category, grade and department was carried out at
each hospital. Collected data were verified with audited hospital staff reports for the
financial year 1997/98 as a way of exploring staff attrition, and movements within the
hospital. The staff list provided a cross-sectional view of the staffing situation for the
year under review. Comparisons were made between the actual staffing situation and
expected standards. The study used minimum staffing standards obtained from a recent
human resource study report for the MOH&CW (Initiatives Incorporation, Boston,
1999). Worth pointing out is that the calculation of standards was based on the need to
deliver core health services at minimum acceptable levels of quality. The following
quotation summarises how this was done:
"Defmition of the minimum staffing standards was derived from an assessment of staffing
standards currently in force at existing health facilities/programmes; from consultations with
heads of professions regarding the future roles of their profession, the constraints facing their
delivery of acceptable standards of service; and their perceptions of standards required to deliver
a minimum quality of service Minimum staffing standards were also derived from workload
and population based measures" (Initiatives Incorporation, Boston, 1999).
In making comparisons with the norms, appropriate adjustments were made for
differences in bed size. Adjustments were necessary since the calculation of norms was
based on a 200-bed tertiary hospital with mean bed occupancy rate of 71%. In addition,
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available staff time was calculated using a 204-day working year after subtracting 57
vacation days. This might have caused some overestimation of available staff time since
sick and study leave days were excluded. Exclusion of these days was prompted by the
quality of records available, which were not amenable to systematic review. Acute
shortages of staff meant that most people did not take leave and opted for cash-in-lieu of
leave instead. Workload statistics for 1997/98 FY were used to calculate workload-
based staff ratios.
Drugs: Availability of drugs is a good indicator of structural quality especially in
resource constrained contexts. A standard checklist of essential drugs and medical
supplies at tertiary level was developed at one of the hospitals (Hospital 4) with
technical assistance from the pharmacist. The list evolved from a basic question: Which
drugs are indispensable at this level of care? Drug selection used two criteria: (1) drug
category according to the Essential Drug List of Zimbabwe (EDLIZ 1994). Tertiary
hospitals can dispense drugs in categories A (primary facilities), B (secondary
hospitals), and C (tertiary hospitals), and (2) utilisation levels. It was intended to select
those drugs that could reflect the dynamic relationship between demand and supply of
services. Therefore, the drugs selected could belong to any category. If the most needed
drugs were not available most of the time then the capacity of the hospital to provide
quality of services was questionable. The list was not exhaustive but it provided a
sample view of the availability of an important input in patient hospitalisation. A list of
33 items was drawn up (Annex III). Using this list, pharmacy stock cards for each listed
drug for the period Iuly 1997 and Iune 1998 were retrieved. From these cards, data was
abstracted on frequency of stock outs by item, and the period each drug was out-of
stock. The limitation of using this approach was that the drug list developed might have
biased the results because it was based on one reference hospital probably facing a
unique disease and utilisation profile. Also, most of the drugs chosen were not
exclusively for tertiary care. Nonetheless, selected drugs reflected current utilisation
patterns (need), which the study sought to investigate. Similar data could not be
obtained from hospitals 3 and 2 because of physical constraints (uncooperative
pharmacists),
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Buildings: A number of criteria were used to assess and compare the quality of hospital
buildings. These included: (a) availability of space as shown by presence or absence of
floor beds and isolation wards, proximity of hospital beds, separate staff duty rooms, (b)
whether or not the building was ventilated as shown by "stuffiness", presence or
absence of working ventilators, (c) roof leaks as shown by spoiled ceilings, or presence
or absence of holes, and (d) adequacy of lighting. Each hospital department was visited
and assessed (through observations) during the course of the study and in addition,
heads of departments were asked to comment on the condition of their physical-working
environment.
8.1.2 Patient level analysis
The same arguments advanced for use of tracer conditions in costing (see Chapter 7)
apply for quality analysis. The basic hypothesis was that it is possible to review in
greater detail both structural and process aspects of quality of inpatient services using
tracer conditions. The same tracer conditions and patients used for micro-costing were
used for quality assessment. Case recruitment is described in Chapter 7. A total of 135
cases of pulmonary tuberculosis, 98 simple malaria and 104 severe malaria cases were
used in the analysis. Tuberculosis data from hospitals 3 and 5 were excluded in the
analysis: hospital 3 because its policy was to refer all cases diagnosed with TB to a
nearby infectious disease hospital. Suspected TB patients were admitted for presumptive
treatment and/or investigative purposes only. Hospital 5 data quality was poor, and just
like hospital 3, it referred all confirmed cases to an infectious disease hospital. These
data could have affected the results considerably. However, some results for hospital 3
are presented separately for illustrative purposes.
Explicit normative quality criteria for the selected diagnostic groups were developed
from the respective national management guidelines with the guidance of a selected
panel of experts (see Chapter 7). The national guidelines formed the core upon which
other clinically relevant but non-clinical process and structural factors were added
(Annexes VII.I and VII.II). The criteria included diagnostic, therapeutic management,
patient and environmental hygiene, documentation and nursing variables. Each quality
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component was assigned a score weighted according to its relative importance in
increasing the likelihood of the desired positive outcome. The value attached to each
variable was naturally dependent upon panellists' consensus perceptions and
experiences. In the end quality cluster categories for pulmonary tuberculosis had these
cluster (or group) weightings-structural factors (56%) and process factors (44%).
Simple and severe malaria had structure and process weightings of 32% and 68%, and
28% and 72% respectively (Table AB.l). Process aspects of quality assessed were
entirely patient-specific. Organisational and policy related process factors were
excluded not because there are not important but because of some physical constraints.
For each study site, two research assistants (health accountants) with nursing experience
were recruited for patient recruitment and follow-up. The first two days were devoted to
training of research assistants in the application of the explicit criteria followed by trial
runs on at least two inpatient cases each. This was essential for standardising data
abstraction and ratings. Continuous consultations between the research assistants, and
the principal investigator on data collection were held as much as possible as a data
quality control strategy. Patients were recruited from the outpatient and casualty
departments. Once recruited, they were visited every day, and as and when necessitated
by critical moments in their treatment process. Data was captured from patient charts
and interviews (where possible), and ward staff (on non-sensitive aspects or verification
of patient records). The Hawthorne effect was not likely to be pronounced because data
.collection did not involve observation of the actual treatment, for instance, giving an
injection, but involved checking (through records and patient interviews) at timely
intervals whether the injection was given or not. In the last three years hospitals in
Zimbabwe introduced public relations officers whose role, inter alia, was patient
welfare. These cadres regularly interviewed patients at random in the hospital, and
therefore it was not unusual for hospital staff to see their patients being interviewed
during the study.
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8.1.3 Data Analysis
At hospital level, staff availability was measured in terms of staff numbers and grades.
Workload related staff ratios were calculated using activity statistics for 1997/98.
Existing staffing levels were compared to expected national norms, For drugs, the
frequency of drugs stock outs and period of stock outs was calculated, and rated on a
"satisfactory/unsatisfactory" scale. Descriptive statistics were accordingly calculated.
Available recurrent resources per bed were computed by hospital.
At patient level, a number of systematic steps were taken. Data were coded by hospital
and by patient and entered into the computer using SPSS software. A total of 37 factors
(or variables) for TB, 42 for simple malaria and 39 for severe malaria were created, and
each entry, except for non-background variables represented a weighted score. A mean
score was computed for each case by considering the number of applicable variables to
each case. This meant that a case was judged by the variables applicable to it. For
example, if a patient was not comatose, it was not necessary to refer her to the coma
scale. A lower score would not be applicable in that case. Using these mean scores, a
global mean score inclusive of both structural and process factors, a mean structural
score and a mean process score were computed by hospital. These hospital scores were
compared across hospitals, and to the expected minimum" mean scores. The expected
scores were calculated using maximum scores for each applicable factor for each tracer.
By calculating sub-category or cluster scores it was possible to examine which factors
influenced the global score. Statistical analyses were done to test for significant
differences amongst hospitals.
50 Note the difference between minimum quality scores which reflect achievable standards given the
constraints, and optimal scores which reflect desirable standards beyond minimum standards which
require more dedication and determination to achieve (Heidemann 1993).
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8.2 Results
8.2.1 Hospital level analysis
8.2.1.1 Financial resources
The level and to some extent the scope of health service provision is usually determined
by availability of financial resources. In other words hospital resource endowment can
influence both the quantity, and quality of services hospitals can provide. Table 8.1
shows nonsalary financial resources that were available to the six hospitals in the
1997/98 financial year. Hospitals 1 and 2 had the least resources per bed whilst hospital
5 had the most.
Table 8.1 Availability of non-salary recurrent financial resources in ZW$, 1997/98 FY
Hospital 1 2 3 4 5 6
Recurrent funds 11,049,087 10,286,549 18,737,154 21,199,599 23,045,891 14,500,699
Number of beds 171 160 250 235 223 156
ZW$ per bed 64,615 64,291 74,949 90,211 103,345 92,953
Hospitals 4, 5 and 6 were better endowed financially to potentially provide greater
quantities and better quality of services than hospitals 1, 2 and 3. A caveat to this
interpretation is that public hospitals usually do not decide on quantity targets of
services (externally driven) but provide as much as available resources permit them.
Therefore the probability of delivering quality services is influenced by many other
factors.
8.2.1.2 Staff
Staff availability needs to be interpreted in terms of the role of tertiary hospitals in the
referral chain. Tertiary hospitals are expected to be appropriately equipped and staffed
to provide specialist and intensive care to referred patients, who are supposedly severely
ill and/or have complications. In Zimbabwe, the situation is odd in that provincial
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hospitals also have a secondary function" for their immediate surrounding population.
These hospitals are located in urban administrative districts, and are the referral
hospitals in those towns.
Table 8.2 shows staff availability by category at the study hospitals compared to
expected levels sufficient to provide minimum acceptable services", Much variation in
staff availability can be observed in the clinical and medical staff category (doctors and
nurses), and less so in the medico-technical (laboratory, pharmacy, rehabilitation and
dietetics), administrative and ancillary categories (See Table A8.2 and A8.3). Hospitals
5 and 3 had at least four specialists to provide specialist care and support to general
medical officers. Hospital 6 had two resident specialists whilst hospitals 4 and 2 had
none. Hospital 1 had one specialist ophthalmologist. Clearly, this lack of specialists
undermined the hospitals' capacity to adequately fulfil their role as referral centres for
secondary hospitals. This implies that some patients were unnecessarily referred to
higher levels of care, resulting in system inefficiencies.
'I A tertiary hospital serves an average of eight districts, including the urban district. This means that
about 13% of its services, excluding self-referrals, are justified secondary functions. However, the
distinction is not clear.
52 To interpret Table 8.2 look at the frequency of +++, ++, + and. per hospital, and across hospitals.
+measures the degree of proximity to the norm,
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Table 8.2. Rating of Staff Availability by Category, Tertiary hospitals 1997
Staff Category [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
(171 (160 (250 (235 (223 (156 beds)
beds) beds) beds) beds) beds)
Norm"
(200 beds)
a) Medical
Specialists
GMOs
Med. Sup.
RGN/SCN
Pharmacist
Pharmacist Tech.
Matrons
b) Medico-tech.
Therapists
Orthopaed. Tech
Rehab. Tech.
Lab.Technologist
Dietician
Radiographer
X-Ray Operator
Clin.Pyschologist
+ ++ +++ +
++ ++ ++ ++ +++ ++
+++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++
+ ++ +++ ++ ++ +
+++ +++ +++ ++ ++ ++
+ ++ + ++ ++ ++
++ ++ +++ +++ +++
+ ++
+++
+++
+++
++ +
7
10
1
293
2
5
2
6
1
4
6
1
5
2
2
c) Administ'ive
Med. So. Worker + + 2
Inst. Dom.Super. ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ 4
Hosp.Admin" +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ +++ 3
Clerical & Secre ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ + 21
Ancillary" ++ ++ +++ ++ +++ ++ 9S
++ ++
+++
+
++
+
+++
+
+++
++
++
+
Notes: a Workload based minimum staffmg standards for clinical care facilities. Calculated using an
average hospital with 200 beds, and 71% bed occupancy rate.
b Includes the hospital administrator, senior executive officers, and executive officers
C Includes drivers, X-ray attendant, domestic supervisors, equipment technician, nurse aids and
general hands.
+++ means 100% of required posts occupied, ++ means at least 50%, + means less than 50%,
and - means 100% vacancy rate.
++
+++
++
+++
All the hospitals had at least 50% of general doctor requirements. Hospitals 3 and 5 had
eight and nine GMOs out of the required ten respectively. Hospital 6 had the least with
five GMOs. Hospitals 1, 2 and 6 had low nurse numbers compared to the norm even
after adjusting for their size". Hospital 3 had a relatively high contingent of nursing
staff with 95% of expected nurses in post. There is general similarity in staffing patterns
for the medico-technical and ancillary departments across hospitals. However,
considerable differences in medical staff categories (doctors and nurses) exist. Hospitals
1,4 and 6 were relatively short staffed with 50%, 43%, and 43% of their medical, and
++ ++ ++++
53 For instance, hospital I needed (1711200)x 293 nurses at the minimum compared to 110 available.
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medico-technical establishment posts less than 50% filled respectively". Hospitals 5, 3
and 2 had 86%, 71% and 64% of similar established posts occupied respectively.
Assessment of staff availability provides information about staffing levels but not about
adequacy of staff given hospital workload. A comparison of staffing levels using
workload data is shown in Table 8.3. It is clear that there is shortage of staff across
hospitals.
Table 8.3. Workload based staff to patient day ratios" in medical facilities
Staff Category [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] Norm
General Medical Officers 42: 1 37:1 45: 1 48: 1 41: 1
Nurses 4:1 2.7:1 1.6:1 2.3:1 3.0:1
Pharmacists 148:1 111:1 181:1 335:1 368:1
Pharmacist Technicians 295:1 55:1 362:1 167:1 123:1
Laboratory Scientists 295:1 111:1 121:1 167:1 61:1
Radiographer 148:1 111:1 181:1 112:1 123:1
Inst. Domestic Supervisors 148:1 111:1 181:1 112:1 184:1
Clerical & Secretarial staff 30:1 20:1 20: 1 30:1 26: 1
Ancillary 6:1 3:1 2:1 4:1 2.5:1
46:1
4.6:1
229:1
115:1
115:1
115:1
115:1
25:1
4:1
20:1
0.65:1
105:1
40:1
30:1
40:1
50:1
9:1
2:1
Doctors' inpatient workloads were twice as great as the expected for all the hospitals.
This is clearly demonstrated in Figure 8.1. Involvement of doctors in management in
clinical work, which was normally the case, slightly improves the observed ratios.
However, the opportunity cost of such practices may be considerable. A different
situation obtains if specialists are considered in judging hospital clinical capacity
amongst the hospitals. In this case, hospitals 5 and 3 would assume clinical superiority
with better ratios of25:1 and 30:1 respectively.
The shortage of nurses was evident across the hospitals (Figure 8.2). Hospitals 1 and 6
experienced the most acute shortage of nurses with ratios of patients: nurses six to seven
times the norm. Current nursing staff levels need to be increased by a similar margin to
close that gap. These hospitals depended mostly on student and auxiliary nurses, and
general hands. This coping strategy may compromise the quality of nursing services.
Hospital 5 and 2 require a fivefold increase in number of nurses to reach acceptable
54 Percentages were calculated using 14 staff categories out of 20. That is, excluding ancillary and
administration staff, and clinical psychologist. The proportions less than 50% were: Hospital [2] 5/14,
Hospital [3] 4/14, Hospital [5] 2/14 and Hospital [6] 6/14.
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standards. Whilst hospital 4 and 3 had slightly better nurse to patient day ratios
compared to others, the ratios were still below expected standards. For other non-
medical staff, hospital 1 and 2 had relatively better pharmacy staff levels. Similar
shortages were found for other staff categories across the hospitals.
Figure 8.1. Doctor to patient day ratios, Tertiary
Hospitals 1997/98
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Quality of hospital staff was assessed by looking at different staff grades across
hospitals. Five principal categories of hospital staff are reviewed (specialists, nurses,
laboratory, administrative and radiography staff), and these are shown in Table 8.4.
Hospital 5 had a superior specialist mix given that it had six out of seven required
specialists. As mentioned earlier, lack of specialists at hospitals 2, 4, and I was a
notable structural deficiency in tertiary care provided by these hospitals.
There was no standard grade mix for nurses. Nonetheless, no apparent differences in
grade mix of nursing managers existed across hospitals. The mix of state certified
nurses (SeN) and state registered nurses (SRN) was similar across the hospitals. The
current upgrading programmes of SCNs to SRNs will gradually diminish these grade
differences. On the basis of grades, the quality of nursing staff was similar across the
hospitals. Hospital 5 had six laboratory technologists compared to an average of two at
the other hospitals. Administrative staff mix was limited across the hospitals though
each hospital had at least an administrator. From these results it seems that general
scarcity of staff across hospitals is likely to seriously undermine quality of care and
likely to be a more important determinant of quality variations than variation in quality
of staff.
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Table 8.4. Staff Mix and Grades by Hospital 1997/98.
Staff Category [1] [2]. [3] [4] [5] [6] Norms
SEecialists:
Obs. & gynae. 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
Surgery 0 0 1 0 2 0 1
Medicine 0 0 1 0 2 0 1
Paediatrics 0 0 1 0 1 0 1
Anaesthetics 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Ophthalmology 1 0 1 0 0 1 1
Psychiatry 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Matrons:
Grade I 1 0 1 1 1 1 1
Grade II 0 1 1 1 1 2 1
Grade III 1
Nurses:
SeN 27 S6 112 90 72 24 293*
SRN 83 68 242 135 115 52
Nurse Aides 34 20 23 21 24 7
Laboratory:
Lab. Scientist 1 2 3 2 6 2 6
Lab Technicians 5 0 4 4 0 2 **
S C. Lab. Ass. 0 0 0 2 0 **
Administration:
Hasp. Admin. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Snr Exec. Officer 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Executive Officer 1 0 2 0 1 0 1
RadiograEh~:
Radiographer 2 2 2 3 3 2 5
X-ray AsstlOp 1 0 0 0 0 2 2
Notes: * Not split according to SCN or SRN, .. There were no set standards by grade.
8.2.1.3 Drugs
Table 8.5 shows the drug availability situation for four of the study hospitals in 1997/98
from which data was successfully collected. None of the hospitals met the national
guideline on essential drugs availability of 80% (ZEDAP 1996) or the provincial
average of 70% (MOH 1997). Hospital 1 had a "satisfactory" level of drug availability
throughout the year. Hospital 5 had an "unsatisfactory" level of drug availability
meaning a higher number of drugs susceptible to frequent stock outs for longer periods
of time. Hospital 4 had the greatest number of drugs that went out of stock during the
year but for shorter periods of time (mean of 10 days). This means that drugs were
generally available (85%) but supply was erratic. Hospital 6 had a fairly consistent but
unsatisfactory supply of drugs, with a few drugs going out of stock for relatively long
periods oftime within the year.
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Table 8.5. Availability of essential drugs, Tertiary hospitals, 1997/98
Hospital Drugs Availability Mean frequency of Mean Stock out
Drug Stock Outs period in days
%never % never O/S+OIS Times/yr
OIS for<14 days
[1] 79 82 1.4 12
[2] - - - -
[3] - - - -
[4] 36 8S 1.3 10
[5] 58 67 1.3 22
[6] 70 76 1.0 21
Notes: Highly satisfactory =100%, satisfactory = ~ 80% and Unsatisfactory = < 80%
Essential drugs should have availability of80% (ZEDAP 1996)
Data from tracer analysis (Section 8.2.2) shows that drug availability at hospital 2 and 3
was satisfactory, although it does not tell us about the number and frequency of stock-
outs. In ranking these results a question that arises is whether or not it is preferable to
have a consistent supply of fewer drugs or an erratic supply of all essential drugs. The
frequency of drug stock outs may also reflect differences in utilisation levels, and
disease patterns managed at the hospitals. From that perspective, it is possible that one
hospital could have a fairly consistent supply of a specific drug because it is never or
rarely used.
8.2.1.4 Buildings
All the hospitals were built in the early 1960's as general hospitals and therefore the
condition of the buildings at the time of the study was a reflection of the hospital's
building maintenance activities. Hospitals 2, 3 and 4 had fairly good buildings as shown
by most of the quality ratings (Table 8.6). The other three hospitals rated poorly. There
was overcrowding of beds, wards without separate duty rooms and inadequate
ventilation. Hospitals 6 and 1 were relatively small, and the majority of the buildings
deserved major refurbishment. Hospital 2 was undergoing refurbishment, and hospitals
3 and 4 were spacious with the majority of the departments renovated. HospitalS had a
recently built outpatient department (3 years old) but the wards were small and usually
overcrowded.
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Table 8.6 A Comparison of the condition of hospital buildings across hospitals, 1999
Availability of Space:
Floor beds Nil Nil Nil Nil
HospitallFactor I 2 3 4 5 6
Isolation wards
Proximity of beds
Separate duty rooms
Ventilation of buildings:
Air circulation"
Condition of ventilators"
Condition of roofs:
Spoiled ceiling NA Nil Nil
Leaking Nil Nil Nil
Lighting": Adequate Adequate Adequate Adequate
Nil Yes Yes
Normal
Yes
NormalSqueezed
No
Normal
Yes Yes Yes
Average"
Poor
Good Good Good
Average Good Good
Nil
Nil
Yes Nil
Nil Nil
Squeezed Squeezed
No No
Average" Average"
Average Poor
Nil NA
Nil Nil
Adequate Adequate
Notes: • The majority of ward nurses wore facemasks most of the time.
•• Each hospital is electrified and had standby generators for emergency purposes.
From this structural analysis it is clear that all the hospitals experienced quality
problems but with observable differences. The common and key feature of structural
quality was availability of human resources. Hospital 1 could be generally rated as
structurally poor since it had relatively low funding per bed, no consultants, acutely
inadequate nurses, unsatisfactory building conditions, but a satisfactory supply of drugs.
Similarly hospital 2 was poor because it had the least funding per bed, no specialist
consultants, inadequate nurses, but buildings and drug supply were satisfactory.
Hospital 3 could be classified as good because it had average funding per bed, specialist
consultants, drug supply and buildings were satisfactory, and it had more nurses (90%
of expected number) than the rest. Hospital 4 could be rated as poor because it had
average funding per bed, no specialist consultants, unsatisfactory drug supply,
satisfactory buildings and inadequate number of nurses. Hospital 5 had good structural
quality since it had the highest funding per bed and the greatest number of specialist
consultants. Hospital 6 had relatively good funding per bed, few consultants, the least
number of nurses, unsatisfactory building conditions and poor drug supply--rated poor.
The overall picture obtained from this analysis is that there were differences in service
delivery potential across hospitals, but it does not tell us much about the differences in
quality of service delivery across the hospitals. The translation of capacity into service
delivery differs from one hospital to the other due to a variety of reasons. Using tracers
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it was possible to highlight differences in process quality across hospitals and identify
which aspects of quality were deficient in hospital services provision.
8. 2.2 Patient level: Tracer Analysis
8.2.2.1 Tuberculosis
The global mean weighted quality scores for pulmonary tuberculosis management for
four of the study hospitals are presented in Table 8.7. None of the hospitals fully met the
desired standard of services rating. However, actual scores exceeded 75% (1.10) of the
expected score. The global (or total) mean weighted scores were not significantly
different across the hospitals (p > 0.01) even though hospital2 had the highest score and
hospital 4 had the lowest score compared to the rest (Figure 8.3). Lack of significant
differences in quality scores signifies similarities in TB protocol compliance levels
across hospitals. To adequately interpret these aggregate scores, it is necessary to look at
the building blocks separately.
Table 8.7. Tuberculosis mean weighted quality scores, tertiary hospitals 1997/98
Hospitals/Quality Scores [1] [2] [4] [6] Expected. p-value"
(n=31) (n=41) (n=37) (n=29) Score
Global mean weighted score 1.16 1.19 1.14 1.17 1.46 NS
Mean weighted process score 1.07 1.22 1.08 1.33 1.58 <0.01
Mean weighted structural score 1.22 1.16 1.18 1.05 1.33 <0.01
Notes: ANOVA test
In interpreting structural quality scores note should be taken of the dearth of knowledge
on the relationship between structure and process. All the hospitals fell within the
upper-quarter of the expected score (Figure 8.3) even though statistically significant
differences were observed amongst them (p<0.01). This suggests that all the hospitals
could potentially provide services of comparable quality. Hospital 6 had the lowest
Sf; Good meant one could sleep and eat comfortably in the building, Average meant one could sleep but
not eat in the building, and bad meant that the building was totally unbearable.
S7 Good meant that there were enough functional ventilators per room. Average meant that all the rooms
had ventilators and some were working and others not. Poor meant that there were inadequate working
ventilators per room.
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structural quality score (1.05) followed by hospital2. For hospital2, it was because of
the following factors: wards had inadequate hand washing facilities, inadequate
functional equipment, and presence of floor beds. The low score for hospital 6 is
explained by poor ratings in the following factors: availability of drugs, presence of
floor beds (crowding), inadequate equipment, and poor condition of the buildings.
Hospitals 1 and 2 had ratings of 90% and 75% of expected scores, that is, structural
quality scores of 1.22 and 1.18 respectively. The high rating for hospital 1 was due to
better drug availability, working equipment and absence of floor beds (though
crowded). Hospital 4 had adequate hospital space, and water and sanitation facilities.
Significant differences in process quality scores were observed (p<O.OI) (Figure 8.3).
Hospitals 2 and 6 had relatively superior ratings for the majority of process aspects
except for supervision of sputum collection, direct observation of treatment and patient
privacy. This means that they provided relatively better diagnostic, clinical and nursing
services for inpatients. Hospital 6 had the lowest structural quality score but the highest
process score. This illustrates the difficulties in identifying the relationship between
structure and process. Hospitals 1 and 4 had relatively low process quality ratings even
though their overall ratings surpassed 75% (O.99) of the expected score. Low process
quality ratings could be linked to hospital clinical practice (protocol compliance), and
patient and environmental hygiene. During the study, it became increasingly clear that
important factors like patient counselling, direct observation of treatment, record-
keeping, and patient hygiene were usually ignored by hospital staff. It is tempting to
attribute these practices to high patient workloads, but negligence as a contributory
factor cannot be excluded.
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Figure 8.3. Mean quality scores for PTS, Tertiary hospitals
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8.2.2.2 Malaria
None of the hospitals managed to fully satisfy the expected score for simple malaria
(Table 8.8 and Figure 8.5). There were significant differences in the total quality score
across the hospitals (p<0.01). Hospital 5 and 3 had consistently low quality ratings in
both structural and process quality aspects as shown by their overall ratings. Caution is
necessary in interpreting results for hospital 5 because of the small sample of 5 simple
malaria cases. Frequency analyses of structural factors by hospital showed that low
ratings for hospital 3 emanated from the cumulative effect of a number of factors but the
following were key: inadequate ward toilets (92%), unclean toilets (31%), unavailability
of hand washing facilities in the wards, and inadequate microscopes. Low ratings for
hospital 5 were attributable to the following factors: no ward toilets, toilets were
unclean (40%), unavailability of hand washing facilities in the wards, inadequate
microscopes, crowding and floor beds. Hospitals 1, 2 and 4 had relatively higher ratings
in all respects. The staffing situation at hospitals 1 and 2 was not better than the rest of
the hospitals. It seems low utilisation levels may have enhanced the adequacy rating of
facilities at these hospitals in terms of staff, space, sanitary and ablution facilities, and
higher drug availability levels.
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There were similarities in the ratings across hospitals in treatment-specific factors (e.g.
choice of drugs, dosage, length of time and general measures) which implies high
compliance with the treatment protocol. However, differences in overall process quality
emanated from differences in nursing factors (personal hygiene, elimination, nutrition,
environmental hygiene), investigative factors (collection of specimen and laboratory
results turnaround time) and documentation of patient data. Hospital 5 and 3 rated
poorly in most of these non-clinical factors. For example, the accuracy and
completeness of patient records was rated as unsatisfactory in 92% and 80% of the cases
seen at hospital3 and 5 respectively.
Similar hospital rankings were found when severe malaria cases were considered (Table
8.8 and Figure 8.4). Again, hospitals 1, 2 and 4 had comparable and superior ratings
whilst hospital 3 and hospital 5 had low quality ratings. The source of difference was in
the investigative, nursing and structural quality clusters.
Table 8.8 Mean weighted quality scores for malaria, 1997/98
Hospitals/Quality Scores [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] Expect. p-value
Score
Simple malaria: (n=47) (n=21) (n=13) (n=12) (n=5)
Global mean weighted score 1.35 1.31 1.03 1.31 0.81 1.80 <0.01
Mean weighted process score 1.49 1.55 1.13 1.45 1.17 1.93 <0.01
Mean weighted structural score 1.19 1.05 0.91 1.18 0.47 1.60 <0.01
Severe malaria: (n=9) (n=l1) (n=37 (n=29) (n=18)
Global mean weighted score 1.37 1.30 1.24 1.36 0.90 1.64 <0.01
Mean weighted process score 1.SS 1.51 1.48 1.SS US 1.70 <0.01
Mean weighted structural score 0.99 0.86 0.73 0.99 0.38 1.S0 <0.01
For instance, hospital 5 was rated poorly in many factors some of which are: laboratory
turnaround time (83%), patient weighing (94%), checking quinine use before treatment
(88%), food quality (87%), records completeness and accuracy (94%), quinine stock
outs (61%), availability oftoilets (94%), adequacy of microscopes (89%) and conditions
of buildings (89%). The cumulative effect of these factors and others negatively affected
the weighted scores. The reverse was true for hospitals 1,2, and 3.
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Figure 8.4. Mean quality scores for severe malaria, Tertiary hospitals
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Figure 8.5. Mean quality scores for simple malaria, Tertiary hospitals.
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8.3 Summary of findings
8.3.1 Hospital level structural quality
• The distribution of non-salary recurrent expenditure shows that hospitals 3, 4 and 5
were better endowed than hospitals 1,2 and 3. Part of the differences emanated from
differences in hospitals' ability to recover costs and partly from the resource
allocation formula which is weighted using number or beds and workload data,
among other variables.
• All the hospitals experienced staff shortages compared to the national standards.
Staff shortages varied across staff categories and hospitals. However, hospitals 5 and
3 had better staffing in terms of number of specialist consultants and nurses whilst
hospitals 1,2, 4 and 6 experienced acute shortages of nurses and consultants.
Hospitals I, 2 and 4 had no specialist consultants, which brings into question their
role as tertiary institutions. It appears that the key issue was staff availability and not
necessarily quality.
• Although none of the hospitals strictly met the drug availability standard of 80%
there were noticeable differences in drug availability across the hospitals. Hospitals
4 and 5 had the worst drug availability percentage.
• Hospitals 1 and 2 were particularly old compared to hospitals 3, 5 and 4. Using
ward space as the key variable, only hospitals 3 and 5 had satisfactory structural
settings.
8.3.2 Tracer Quality
• There were no significant differences in the total quality (process and structure)
score for pulmonary tuberculosis across the hospitals. When the total score is
analysed in its decomposed form, significant differences are found among the
hospitals. Hospital 6 and 2 had higher process scores. Process variables that
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contributed to the observed differences were related to patient and environmental
hygiene.
• Both simple and severe malaria showed statistically significant differences in quality
across the hospitals. Hospital 3 and 5 had relatively low scores for both structure and
process aspects. This is largely explained by differences in protocol compliance and
to a limited extent by differences in case definition.
It is clear that quality differences existed amongst the study hospitals at both the
hospital and patient level. Differences in the physical setting and provider behaviour
(protocol compliance) contributed to quality variation. The next question to be answered
is: at what levels of resource use were these quality levels achieved? Was the observed
quality achieved at lower costs or at high cost? What prevailing circumstances (under-
use, misuse or abuse of services) are attributable to the observed quality-cost
relationships? These issues are pursued in the next chapter.
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Missing page
was matched by patient and hospital. All unmatched cases were excluded from the
analysis leaving a sample of 79 simple malaria, 95 severe malaria and 149 tuberculosis
patients for the first part of the analysis.
A graphical analysis was used in which each study hospital's mean cost per case and
quality score were mapped on cost-quality scatter graphs with specific mean cost and
quality score reference lines for each diagnostic group. Expected quality scores and
related costs per case were computed using national treatment guidelines, discussion
with experts and some of the general cohort results (see Annex IX). For each tracer, the
minimum input package for an acceptable level of quality was costed using the
ingredients approach. Deviations from the defined quality-cost reference lines were used
to explore efficiency differences across hospitals. Composite analysis used aggregate
mean costs and quality scores by hospital, and expected standards.
9.2. Results
9.2.1.Cost-quality trade-off using simple malaria
The cost and quality for simple malaria inpatients for five of the study hospitals are
shown in Table 9. Hospitals 1 and 2 had relatively low costs per case compared to
hospitals 3 and 4 even though they had comparable quality. All except hospital 5 had
mean quality scores exceeding fifty percent of the expected quality score. Hospital 3 had
intermediate quality and costs. Hospitals 4 and 5 had costs at least twice as much as
those of hospitals 1 and 2. The lower costs of hospital 1 and 2 could be attributed to
relative efficiency. These two hospitals achieved better quality with fewer resources.
Hospital 5 had particularly high costs (even higher than the mean cost for severe malaria
Table 9.1) but low quality (due to poor structural ratings), and seemed an outlier
because of the small sample size used. Another possible explanation is that simple
malaria cases were treated as severe cases since most of the cases seen at this hospital
were severe malaria cases (spillover effect).
.....,
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Table 9.0 Mean cost per case (ZW$) and quality score for simple malaria
Hoo~~ 1 2 3 4 5
(n=41) (n=18) (n=7) (n=10) (n=3)
Expected
Cost per case
Quality score
692.83 701.31 1,292.76 1,969.82 2,704.33
1.35 1.30 1.07 1.29 0.81
2,951.00
1.80
All the hospitals fell short of the expected quality and resource use (cost) point=point E
on the graph (Figure 9). What this means is that global resource use at each hospital was
below what was technically expected, and that available resources were being used
inefficiently as shown by the distance from the expected point (technical inefficiency)
and location below it (allocative inefficiency). This means that available resources were
not allocated to priority hospital activities, and that allocated resources were not used to
maximum benefit. Hospital 5 shows inefficiency problems because it had resource use
levels that were close to the expected level but the quality of services was relatively low.
This means that it had potential to achieve better quality by improving use of current
resources. This interpretation needs to be viewed with caution given the number of
simple malaria cases considered in the analysis. Conversely, hospitals 1 and 2 had lower
costs but higher quality suggesting relative efficiency. Inefficiencies can also be partly
explained by differences in mean length of stay (p<0.05). Length of stay in itself may
reflect necessary and unnecessary costs, hence efficiency or inefficiency. Hospital I and
2 had relatively low lengths of stay (3.1 days) whilst the others had a mean range of 3.2
to 5 days.
The results from the characterisation of the hospitals using the Pabon Lasso method (see
Chapter 5) had hospitals 1 and 5 in the desirable sector 3, hospital 2 in sector 2, and
hospitals 3 and 4 in sector 1 but within the expected performance area. What is
interesting to see is that not only had hospital 1 relatively good performance indicators,
it also achieved higher levels of quality at lower costs. Whilst hospital 5's scenario
suggests the opposite". The hospital had comparatively good performance indicators
but these were achieved at relatively high costs and lower quality. Hospital 2 had
intermediate cost and quality results corroborating the Pabon Lasso results of falling in
sector 2.
58 As mentioned earlier, the effect of the sample size warrants a cautionary view to this interpretation.
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9.2.2 Cost-quality trade-off using severe malaria
Results from a similar analysis using severe malaria show hospital 5 with poor quality
ratings compared to the rest of the hospitals with similar costs (Table 9.1 and Figure
9.1). This could be explained by inefficiency, because with the same resource basket,
other hospitals were achieving better quality. A comparison of hospitals 1 and 4, for
instance, shows similar quality scores, but considerably different costs. Generally,
hospitals 1 and 2 had lower costs per case for similar quality scores compared to the
rest. It appears that hospital 3 had intermediate costs and intermediate quality, and
hospital 5 had lower costs and lower quality. Differences in length of stay were
contributory to the observed cost-quality trade-offpattems (see Table 7.2).
Table 9.1 Mean cost (ZW$) and quality score for severe malaria
Hospital 1 2 3 4 5 Expected
(n=9) (n=l1) (n=34) (n=25) (n=16)
Cost per case 1562.85 1766.44 2084.64 2571.30 1683.56 5421.22
Quality score 1.37 1.30 1.24 1.37 0.89 1.64
9.2.3 Cost-quality trade-off using pulmonary tuberculosis
Table 9.2 shows the mean cost and quality scores per pulmonary tuberculosis inpatient.
Although there were statistically significant differences in the mean quality scores
across the hospitals (p<O.OI), all but one attained at least 75% of the expected score.
Most hospitals fell within the same quality band-1.01-1.33. Hospitals 4 and 6 had
higher costs per case but no better quality than the others. Hospitals 1 and 2 as in other
diagnostic groups, appeared relatively more efficient with superior quality scores for
less cost.
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Table 9.2 Mean cost and quality score for pulmonary tuberculosis
1.16
6
(n=25)
ExpectedHospital 1 2 3'Y 4
(n=30) (n=37) Cn=26) (n=Jf )
Cost per case 1531.66 1461.65 1358.22 2765.55
Quality score 1.18 1.01 1.14
3509.68
1.17
6996.55
1.46
Figure 9.2 clearly shows that all hospitals except hospital 3 had similar quality ratings
but different costs per case. For instance, the costs for hospital 6 were twice as much as
those of hospital 2 but with the same quality rating suggesting inefficiency problems. In
other words the same quality could be achieved at lower resource use levels.
Furthermore, all the hospitals were distantly located from the cost reference line but
closer to the quality reference line suggesting more allocative and less teclmical
inefficiency. The generally high quality ratings can be explained by similarities in
hospital compliance with TB national management guidelines.
Figure 9 Cost-quality tradeoff using simple malaria
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infectious disease hospital.
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Figure 9.1 Cost-quality tradeoff using severe malaria
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9.4 Summary of flDdlngs
The empirical exploration of cost-quality relationships in this study provided a number
of useful revelations and observations. The major findings are summarised as follows:
• For all the three tracer diseases none of the hospitals met the expected resource use
levels. This meant that the hospitals were experiencing allocative inefficiency and
resource inadequacy problems because the minimum standards set were
unachievable given resource constraints. The differences in the magnitude of the
deviations of actual costs from the expected costs varied across the six hospitals as
evidenced by their location on the scatter graphs. The definition of an acceptable
minimum resource-use package for a particular service presupposes that resource
allocation to hospitals follows a similar logic such that hospitals are expected to
achieve certain levels of performance. In practice, public hospital are funded using,
among other things, unweighted utilisation statistics such that an admission due to
malaria is financed at the same level as one due to a severe cardiac condition. This
effectively means that it is not possible, even if hospital management is aware of
minimum standards of resource use, to meet the standards. However, if resource
allocation to hospitals were based on a system such as DRGs, then failure to achieve
such minimum standards would clearly show resource use inefficiencies.
• A comparative analysis of the finding shows that hospitals 1 and 2 were relatively
better performers in terms of quality levels achieved for the costs incurred for all the
diagnostic groups. The two hospitals generated better value for money compared to
the rest. If the results for simple malaria for hospital 5 are ignored, hospital 5 had
comparable costs per case but the lowest quality score. That suggests that it was
relatively less technically efficient than hospitals 1 and 2 for instance.
• Hospitals 4 and 6 had mean quality scores within the range of hospital1 and 2 but at
higher cost. This suggests that hospitals 4 and 6 could potentially achieve higher
levels of quality with the same amount of resources. In other words, high cost did
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not mean high quality in this case. Hospital 3 exhibited average performance for all
the tracers compared to the rest.
It is interesting to observe that the classification of hospitals based on analysis of cost-
quality tradeoffs is generally consistent with hospital and patient level costing results
(Chapter 6 and 7). Although variations were found in some cost aspects, that general
consistency suggests a sound basis using these results to infer relative performance.
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CHAPTER 10 INTERNAL ORGANISATION AND MANAGEMENT
OF PUBLIC HOSPITALS
10.0 Introduction
Analysis of internal organisation and management of hospitals furthers our
understanding of the determinants of hospital performance, and enables reasonable
predictions to be made of hospital responses to change. The working hypothesis
underpinning this part of the study is that the way a hospital behaves is a function of the
incentive structure that key players within it face. It is through manipulation of this
incentive structure that appropriate behaviour can be nurtured in public hospitals.
This chapter addresses three objectives. First, to describe the internal organisation and
management of public hospitals, and the related incentive regime. Second, to relate
internal organisation and management, and the current incentive regime to hospital
behaviour with particular focus on cost and quality of services, and hospital reforms.
Third, to characterise and compare across the six case studies.
The chapter has four sections. The first section presents a conceptual review of internal
organisation. The second section presents a description of generic features of internal
organisation and management and decision-making space in public tertiary hospitals in
Zimbabwe. The third section presents results from the six case studies, and the last
section consolidates the results of the six case studies into a comparative analysis and
summary.
10.1 Conceptual issues in internal orpnisation
In theory, there is a multiplicity of interrelated internal and external factors that impinge
on hospital performance (Flood et al., 1982, Handy 1993, Chawla et al., 1996, Mullins
1999). This is even more the case for a hospital, given that it is a multi-input, process
and product organisation and inevitably has several performance dimensions. In order to
analyse hospital performance adequately it is necessary to clearly define the
',',.
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performance dimensions of interest. In this study, hospital performance is narrowly
defined in terms of inpatient service.quality and costs for two reasons. First, cost and
quality are considered key hospital performance dimensions. Second, it was necessary
to contain the scope of the study given its resource constraints. This definition excludes
other performance parameters such as consumer responsiveness, equity and other
system-wide functions such as clinical and preventive outreach programs (Lee and
Hoare 1989, Chawla and Govindaraj 1996, Over and Watanabe 1998). This study
focused on broad subject areas that allow both technical and qualitative processes of
hospital inpatient service production to be analysed.
Hospital performance is subject to environmental factors such as: the hospital's
designated role in the system (Lerberghe et aI., 1997, Hongoro and Musonza 1998),
functioning of the referral system, reimbursement methods (Barnum et aI., 1995,
Notennan et aI., 1995), competition (propper and Bartlett 1997, Zwanziger and Melnick
1988, Thompson 1994), intra-resource allocation, regulation, use of contracts (Paton
1994, Bartlett 1995, Ham 1997), community attitudes, demographic characteristics
(Schulz et aI., 1983), national policies and priorities, and the prevailing socio-economic
and political situation. The debate about whether or not internal or external structure is
important in understanding hospital behaviour is extensive (McGuire 1985, Champagne
et aI., 1993). Champagne et aI., (1993) argue that organisational performance is directly
affected by organisation factors, which are themselves influenced by environmental
factors. The argument is based on the adaptive view of organisations, according to
which organisations react, and take action in order to minimise the effect of
environmental constraints and seize upon opportunities to improve performance, Other
commentators (Berki 1972, Harris 1977) argue that the internal structure is of overriding
importance in the analysis of hospitals because it is through an understanding of
institutional characteristics that hospital performance can best be assessed and
explained. A hospital is viewed as a grouping of different actors with variable interests
and processes. McGuire (1985) concludes that there is an overlap between internal and
external structure, and that the development of a hospital theory should start with the
analysis of internal structure.
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Itwould seem that this debate need not be polarised, but that both factors are important
given the inherent overlap that exists between internal and external structure. However,
it may be argued that we can understand more about hospital performance and its
response to environmental change through an elucidation of the hospital "black
box"--herein defined as internal organisation and management. It would also seem that
the response of the hospital to environmental change is a function of the incentives
created for different hospital players, and how these players perceive them. Performance
is thus affected differently and with varying intensities depending upon the manner in
which the hospital is internally organised and managed.
Patient characteristics are equally important in influencing costs and quality of care.
Such characteristics include education, attitudes, health behaviour, type and severity of
illness, age and living conditions. Clearly, the hospital has limited control over these
factors. To a limited extent, however, public hospitals attempt to influence some of
these factors through admission policies and outreach preventative programs (e.g. health
education).
Figure 10 shows principal factor categories that potentially influence hospital
performance(Schulz et al." 1983)60. It shows that environmental, patient, institutional,
medical and professional and management characteristics and practices are inter-related.
It also shows that there is no single factor that influences quality and costs of care.
Institutional characteristics, management practices and medical and professional
practices may be collectively called internal organisation and management factors
(Table 10). Organisational theory argues for an analysis of these factors as a strategy to
understanding organisation behaviour (Handy 1993, Cole 1995, Buchanan and
Huczynski 1997). It would seem that a systems approach" to the analysis would be
ideal as it permits a holistic analysis of the determinants of hospital performance but is
difficult in practice (Handy (1993)
60 A similar framework is given by Over and Watanabe (1998).
61 System view means that "everything is related to everything else though in uneven degrees of tension
and reciprocity" (Perrow 1973). Handy (1993) identified 60 variables relevant to the understanding of an
organisation.
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Table 10.0 Description of Organisational Factor Categories
Broad Factor Category Specific Factors
Institutional Characteristics Hospital governance, ownership, size, facilities, scope and
complexity of services, decision-making space, utilisation levels
Resources: devolved! central budgets, planning, allocation,
accountability", revenue collection
Input procurement: structures, systems, internal distribution
Management practices Type of structures, (non)participative styles, skills mix,
experience
Medical and Professional practices Clinical practice: therapeutic guidelines, scope and depth of
technology used, clinical autonomy, medical audits
Staff attitudes and behaviour, incentive structure,
tension/conflicts, communication, coping strategies,
An understanding of the linkages between the different factors requires more than just
an understanding of their physical relationships, but also an understanding of underlying
behavioural aspects of the main actors associated with them (e.g. administrators and
doctors). Institutional factors are important in understanding organisational behaviour
because they define the degree of institutional flexibility, which is related to
performance. These factors influence and are influenced by environmental and patient
characteristics, and management and clinical practice. Understanding management
practice is fundamental in an organisation because it influences both internal and some
external factors. For instance, management might influence medical staffing, type of
patients served, resources, and technology used. The main internal organisation and
management factor categories are described and discussed in tum.
10.1.1 Hospital governance
Hospital governance" refers to relationships between owners, users and management.
Although public institutions are by definition publicly governed, the existence of
Hospital Advisory Boards exemplifies community involvement, and in a sense
community ownership through representative democracy. Members of the board are
chosen from the local community by a senior public official (e.g. Minister of Health),
and the board functions in accordance with government rules and regulations. This
62 Accountability is narrowly defined here to mean transparency and accountability to fellow hospital
workers
63 Hospital governance is defined as the relationship between ownership and management of hospitals
and how ownership is regulated.
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means that the level of flexibility allowed to boards is likely to influence organisational
effectiveness". The constitution of these boards, the skills mix (Sloan and Becker 1981)
and their level of participation in the governance of hospitals affect performance
(Kovner 1981, Judge and Zeithamal 1992). This is supported by evidence from UK
NHS hospital trusts (Peck and Spurgeon 1993). A key mandate of hospital boards in
bureaucratically run hospitals is usually mobilisation of extra-budgetary resources and
community involvement. The board's (in)activeness is related to hospital resource
endowment and hence its ability to perform its tasks. The relationship between the
board and hospital management becomes crucial in that respect.
Figure 10 Factors influencing cost and quality of hospital care
Environmental Institutional Characteristics
Characteristics ... Cost of care~ __.
~
t Management Practices t
Quality of care..
Patient Medical and Professional ...
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.. Practices..
Hospital Care
Source: Schulz et al., (1983).
10.1.2 Internal management structure
Organisational structure" has two purposes: (1) it facilitates the flow of information
within the organisation in order to reduce uncertainty in decision making which is
caused by information deficiency, and (2) for co-ordination of the different activities
performed by individuals, teams, departments and divisions that make up the
organisation (Cole 1995, Buchanan and Huczynski 1977). The type, role and
64 Flood et al. (1982) define effectiveness as the extent to which an organisation is successful in reaching
its goals. However, the actual definition of goals is not simple and straightforward.
65 Organisational Structure is defmed as . "simply as the sum total of the ways in which an organisation
divides its labour into distinct tasks and then achieves co-ordination between them" (Mintzberg (1979) in
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organisation of various internal management structures must adequately address these
two purposes lest decision making and information flow is impaired. By looking at what
management structures (including committees") exist and for what purpose, and how
each structure is positioned in the management hierarchy it is possible to explore
possible effects of internal structure on performance. Internal communication is
particularly important in allowing individuals and groups to share the vision, goals and
constraints of the organisation and thus promote informed decision-making (Williams
1991, Mullins 1999). Better communication between nurses and doctors has been found
to lead to better patient outcomes (Knaus et al., 1986). Similarly, communication
between management and employees is generally considered important to organisational
performance (Over and Watanabe 1998). Therefore an understanding of the nature and
channels of communication, nature and structure of management, and related
accountability structures is important in understanding organisations.
The merits and demerits of tall and flat management structures and the different
contexts within which they are appropriate are discussed in the literature (Buchanan and
Huczynski 1977, 1997, Handy 1993, Mullins 1999). On one hand, it is argued that flat
structures promote more contact and communication between management and
subordinates. Much of the success of flat management structures depends on an
organisational culture that emphasises personal responsibility. On the other hand, it is
argued that there are contexts such as the armed forces where tall structures are
necessary because a short span of control is crucial for effectiveness. Flat structures
might increase centralisation of decision-making by increasing the span of control (Cole
1995). This might happen in instances where the manager has to make all final decisions
and does not appropriately delegate certain functions. It seems therefore that the choice
of management structure depends on the type, size, and culture of the organisation", In
a bureaucracy, the intuitive argument is that any attempt to minimise hierarchy (through
participation and delegation) is likely to have a positive impact on performance given
Cole 1995:pp 12) or ", an intangible web of relationships between people, their shared values and the
tasks they set themselves to achieve those purposes (Cole 1995).
66 Cole (1995) defines a committee as a formally established group for the purposes of decision-making,
incorporating explicit roles (e.g. Chairman, Secretary) and rules of procedure (agenda, minutes, voting).
67 Organisational culture refers to what is commonly known as organisation values that define preferred
behaviour in an organisation.
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the culture of tight and central control over decision-making. Hospitals may be
characterised as professional organisations where different professional groups have
specific technical roles, and to effectively manage them requires flat management
structures. Flat structures provide opportunities for managerial participation". It would
also seem that the larger the hospital (scope of activities or specialties/sub-specialties)
the less the appropriateness of flat structures, as the span of control becomes larger and
larger (thus increasing the potential for centralisation of decision-making).
There seems to be debate in the organisation theory literature as to how managerial
participation affects performance. On one hand, participation is perceived as some form
of job enrichment (Duncan 1979) and a way of obtaining worker commitment through
shared mission, goals and constraints. This argument is well summarised by Buchanan
and Huczynski (1997:pp 625): "a participative management style can improve
organisational effectiveness by tapping the ideas of people with knowledge and
experience, and by involving them in a decision-making process to which they then
become committed. This style can thus lead to better quality decisions which are more
effectively implemented." Participation develops a sense of staff ownership and
willingness to implement decisions, and even volunteer new and creative ideas and
solutions. On the other hand no participation is preferred, if participation is perceived as
territorial violation (Handy 1993, Cole 1995:328). For example, physicians may
perceive territorial violation in greater patient or hospital management participation in
clinical decisions. In this context, other factors (than territorial violation perception)
would seem to be relevant. However, physician participation in managerial decision
making (e.g. budgetary control) may avoid perceptions of violation while encouraging
physicians to introduce managerial concerns to their decisions making. This would
suggest that in contexts where doctors and other resource users do not have clear
accountability structures for their activities, participatory management is likely to
improve organisational performance through consultation and information sharing.
68 Participation is loosely defined here to mean active involvement in influencing decision-making in the
hospital but without necessarily equal power. Idealy there must be equal power for effective participation
(Lee and Mills 1989).
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For participatory management methods to work, Handy argues that they must meet five
criteria: (1) call for participation must be genuine, (2) it must be considered worthwhile
by all involved, (3) role of participants must be clear, (4) participants must have the
skills and information to participate effectively, and (5) managers must want to
participate. Therefore, the success of participatory methods as management styles
depends on the extent to which these conditions are met.
Another aspect to consider in the analysis is the physical internal organisation ("the
anatomy"), that is, whether or not the hospital is organised by departments or
directorates and with what levels of functional autonomy from central administration
(Sloan and Becker 1981). It is argued that departmentalisation creates smaller groups, in
which individual activities can be observed, and monitored. An authority system can be
devised with the locus of control kept within the department (Sloan 1981, Champagne et
al., 1997). What is key to hospital performance is the level of departmental autonomy. It
would seem that if hospital departments have devolved budgets and authority to make
key decisions they are likely to perform better. The level of decentralisation of activities
in the hospital defines the level of departmental responsibility and accountability.
10.1.3 Managerial Capacity
This may be the most important factor in organisational performance because all the
other components (domains) depend on it. Performance is likely to vary with
managerial capacity: that is, the skills mix (competencies) and experience of
hospital "managers" at all levels. Management's role is to translate hospital policies
and objectives into practice: achievement of organisational effectiveness. That
requires a variety of simple and complex decisions to be made concerning
production techniques, use of staff, supplies and various other inputs. The hospital
situation is unique in that professionals take the lead in the production of services,
and it is only through internal communication and consultations that management
may influence the production process (especially clinical activities). The ability of
managers to communicate with doctors and consultants is likely to have a positive
impact on performance. The hypothesis is that those hospitals with management
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capacity to effectively engage doctors and other non-clinical managers through
communication and involvement are likely to perform better than those without.
10.1.4 Incentives and motivation
Incentive theories are but one component of motivation theories. Incentive theories" are
based on the assumption that individuals will work hard if they are given specific
rewards for their work effort. The role of incentives in driving individual and
organisational behaviour is thus key to understanding organisational dynamics and
performance. The key question is what are those things that make people in an
organisation work harder or not~he motivators. Bernard (1938) argues that "the
contributions of personal efforts which constitute the energies of organisations are
yielded by individuals because of incentives". Incentives can be monetary or non-
monetary as in job autonomy, status, power, authority and interesting work. Money is
important in our thinking about causes of behaviour both because of what it can
purchase and because of the status attached to it (pfeiffer 1995, Handy 1993). In public
institutions where staff are paid non-performance-related salaries, annual money
rewards may not necessarily motivate people but if high rewards are perceived as
returns for individual effort staff might be motivated to work harder (Xingzhu 1999). In
cases where staff are not paid according to performance, non-monetary incentives (e.g.
prizes, promotion, job enrichment, recognition, access to continuous professional
education, workshops and loans) may be more relevant in influencing individual and
group behaviour. For these rewards to be able to "incentivise" people to improve
performance they must be distributed in ways that are perceived to be related to work
effort, performance must be measurable and attributable to the individual, the individual
must expect the reward, and the increased performance must not become a new
minimum standard (Handy 1993, Pfeiffer 1995). In a hospital situation individual
performance might be difficult to measure because of "jointness" of activities between
different staff categories (e.g. doctors and nurses) which might require complex reward
systems (Xingzhu 1999)
69 The underlying assumption is that people are economically rational, can bargain and are concerned
about work, money and conditions of service (Handy 1993).
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It is important to distinguish between those incentives that reduce staff turnover and
those that motivate people to work more in an organisation. For instance, it may be
argued that high salary, subsidised accommodation and job security may reduce
turnover but not necessarily motivate people to perform better. Furthermore different
groups within the hospital organisation may have different incentives, and therefore
behave differently which might lead to sub-optimal performance (Harris 1977, McPake
and Archard 2000, McPake, Hongoro and Archard 2000). Differences in incentive
structures might create tension within and/or between staff groups. Revealed individual
coping strategies in relation to high workload and low income may be insightful in
understanding individuals' objective functions.
10.1.5 Financial management
Resource management is important in ensuring efficient production of hospital
services. In theory there is a relationship between internal organisation and costs
and quality of services. For instance, departmentalisation with functional autonomy
is argued to be a viable strategy for creating cost consciousness and responsibility
amongst hospital staff (Sloan 1981, Harris 1977). That is a similar concept to
clinical directorates in the British NHS in which hospitals are organised into
directorates with specific budget responsibilities (Propper and Bartlett 1997). The
merit of this system is that doctors become directly involved in both resource
planning and use. With devolved budgets, the locus of control is clear and resource
use accountability can easily be sanctioned. Though a plausible option of internal
organisation, line managers 70 and especially doctors may resist increased
accountability for departmental or committee performance preferring instead to
concentrate on patients or the service. That potentially creates tension between them
and administrators. How these tensions are actually resolved has been little studied.
70 Line manager in this study refers to a head of department, for example sisters-in-charge of
wards/theatre, beads of'pharmacy, laboratory and others. The terms are used interchangeably.
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10.1.6 Technology
Technology in this study refers to the hospital "plant" which includes equipment,
buildings and production processes that occur in a hospital organisation. The
assumption here is that those hospitals with relatively better equipment, and
buildings are more likely to produce better quality of services at low or high costs
ceteris paribus. The hospital "plant" can be organised in various ways. In some
hospitals, laundry services for instance, are contracted out and in others services are
produced in-house. Some hospitals have CT scans others not. The use of high
technology mayor may not increase costs (Rivers and Bae 2000). Differences in
production technology among hospitals may help explain observed cost and quality
differences. The analysis of technology may be done as part of structural quality
assessment.
10.1.7 Clinical practice
Sloan and Becker (1981) argue that the most important hospital input is the doctor.
Doctors make most resource consumption decisions since they decide on patient
admission, diagnostics, treatment and discharge (Drummond 1990, Bartlett 1995, Bennett
1997). In addition, they have influence on hospital equipment profiles by virtue of being
technical experts. Performance may vary across hospitals because of differences in clinical
practice (Ham 1988, Morgan 1988), which itself is influenced by many factors:
employment status and reimbursement methods of doctors, hospital reimbursement
methods, availability of facilities and differences in medical opinion (Ham 1988, Xingzhu
1999). It is generally argued that doctors are more concerned with services and! or quality
(Harris 1977, Crilly 2000), especially in cases where they are not budget holders and
therefore are not accountable for cost consequences of their activities. This is typical of
public hospitals where internal organisation is structured in such a way that doctors
operate fairly autonomously and are not involved in hospital-wide decision making.
Entrusting doctors with some management responsibilities or at least involving them in
management activities might make them cost conscious. That means that doctors would
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then be able to make informed decisions in relation to what services to provide (service
mix) and how to provide them.
The nature of functional arrangements for doctors in hospitals creates different
incentives. If public doctors are allowed to do private practice outside hospital environs
after hours as in Thailand (Pannarunothai and Mills 1997) and Zimbabwe, more doctor
time might be spent in private than in public practice. Hospital performance might be
affected as doctor waiting time gets longer, theatre lists increase and discharge of
patients is delayed. If doctors do practice privately within the hospital environs after
hours, it might be that quality of care does not change but health care costs might
increase due to relatively high service intensity for private patients. Doctors might also
encourage patients to attend privately by allowing quality of care to fall in public
services (McPake and Hanson 2000). Apart from the payment methods for doctors, the
different modes of facility organisation and physician remuneration have different
incentive structures and therefore are likely to lead to different types of behaviour by
doctors (Bennett 1997). Another aspect of clinical practice is use of clinical guidelines
(e.g. EDLIZ) and peer reviews or medical audits. Hospital performance is likely to be
influenced by the existence of medical audits (or its variants, for instance drugs and
therapeutic committees) and the degree of doctors' compliance with treatment protocols.
10.1.8 Input procurement and distribution
Conceptually, the capacity of a hospital to respond to internal input demands has a bearing
on its performance. Capacity is defined as the structures and mechanism hospitals have to
ensure efficient and effective production of hospital services. Unavailability of essential
inputs may create inefficiencies and poor quality due to inappropriate input mix and
levels. Inmost public systems in LMICs inputs are centrally procured in order to benefit
from economies of scale through bulk purchasing, to control input quality, and to
minimise pilferage. Often such systems are inefficient with poor distribution systems and
rigid rules for purchasing inputs elsewhere. Those hospitals that adapt by designing
flexible operational arrangements for procuring and internally distributing inputs are likely
to cope and perform better.
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The above eight areas of inquiry therefore guided the investigation of hospital internal
organisation. In addition, respondents were asked their views of a series of "tracer
reforms", This may assist in further understanding staff attitudes and behaviour towards
current performance. In other words, staff views about what mayor may not be
reformed reflects how they perceive the current system and their willingness to change
it. Willingness to change is a function of how people trade-off costs and benefits
associated with the status quo and those associated with change. These costs and
benefits are defined by what different individuals (or groups) perceive as their role and
objectives in the hospital. For instance, if change means abolition of private practice by
public doctors then doctors would perceive such a change differently from
administrators or nurses. The choice of tracer reforms must represent significant shifts
in existing incentive structures and in the culture of doing business in public hospitals, if
they are to reveal individual preferences. A related assumption is that reforms are
unlikely to succeed if key stakeholders (hospital staff) do not view reforms as necessary
and/or appropriate for improving performance.
To date, general frameworks of hospital performance have been applied in a few LMICs
(e.g. Needleman et al., 1996, Collins et al., 1996, Govindaraj et al., 1996) with some
limited success. In most of these, little attention is given to organisational behaviour and
its determinants. This is partly because of the difficulties associated with organisational
research, and partly because of the differences in reference frameworks used by
different researchers from different disciplines who tend to emphasise certain
dimensions of performance. Linking economic and organisation theory can yield
insightful results in understanding organisations (Williamson 1995, Champagne et al.,
1993, Mitchell 1997),
In order to explore organisational determinants of hospital performance, several specific
interrelated hypotheses were formulated to guide the qualitative component of the study.
As shown above the study used organisation theory to identify variables that potentially
affect performance. The idea was not to establish causation but to establish associations.
The hypotheses considered were:
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• The (in)activeness of a HAB influences hospital extra-budgetary resource
endowment and hence its capacity to perform its tasks.
• Hospital performance varies with differences in management capacity. The more
skilled and experienced the managers are, the better the performance.
• A management structure that facilitates information flow and co-ordination within
the organisation positively impacts on performance. Co-ordination and information
sharing increases general staff awareness of consequences of their activities on the
organisation.
• Participatory management styles improve consultation and information sharing and
hence performance. In other words, differences in management capacity to engage
clinicians and other hospital staff in making hospital-wide decisions is contributory
to performance differences.
• Hospitals with decentralised systems of resource-use are likely to be more efficient.
• Hospitals that are more structurally endowed are likely to perform better than those
that are not.
• Hospitals with adaptive operational arrangements for procunng and internally
distributing inputs are likely to cope with internal demands and hence perform better.
• Staff in public hospitals "satisflce"?' because of the incentive structure they face.
10.2 Methods
The study was conducted at six tertiary hospitals-a multiple case studies design (Rose
1991). A case study" design was used to allow for in-depth understanding of the
hospitals' internal environments, and a multiple case studies design to allow for
comparisons (Rose 1991, Schofield 1993, Traynor 1995, Keen and Packwood 1999).
The studies could be viewed as "snap shot" pictures because a period of two to three
weeks was spent at each site. The choke of hospitals was guided by the quantitative
analysis, and typicality (see Chapter 6) was a major consideration (Schofield 1993). A
71 Satisficing means seeking to attain a 'satisfactory' overall performance (e.g. work effort, fee income
and quality) as defmed by aspiration goals, rather than maximising it (Koutsoyiannis 1975).
72 A case study is an empirical enquiry that: investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real life
context: when-the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and in
which-multiple sources of evidence are used (Yin 1989:23 quoted inRose 1991).
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three pronged approach (triangulation) was used to ensure cross-validation and
supplementation of data collected (Rose 1991, Brannen 1992, Miles and Huberman
1994). The first and main approach was semi-structured interviews with hospital
managers at various levels of management using a semi-structured interview guide
(Annex X)73. The interview guide was loosely structured to permit flexible discussion,
further probing and exploration of issues, and consistency in the subject domains for
discussion across respondents (Allan 1991, Britten 1999). Respondents included
medical superintendents, heads of departments (line managers) such as nursing,
pharmacy, wards, laboratory, physiotherapy, and dietary services, and staff (doctors,
consultants and nurses). The target number of respondents per institution was 10 (60 for
the entire study). A total of 52 respondents were interviewed (Table Al 0.1). The
majority of interviewees refused to be tape recorded, and data were captured in note
form at the time of the interview and after. Informed consent was sought from the
respondents before the interviews and confidentiality guaranteed (see Burges 1984,
Jones 1991, Britten 1999). The second approach involved non-participant observation
through attending management meetings at the hospital as a way of exploring internal
dynamics, power and authority structures (packwood et al 1991, Hall 1993, Pope and
Mays 1999). The third approach involved a review of hospital records: memos, minutes
of meetings, and hospital reports. These methods were used to supplement and further
explore issues raised in the in-depth interviews.
Data was analysed manually and the same procedure was applied to all six case studies.
The analysis adapted the "Framework" approach" (Ritchie and Spencer 1994, Pope,
Ziebland and Mays 1999) because it permits a systematic and repeatable data analysis
process. Some stages of the analysis were combined or skipped as described.
Stage 1 Familiarisation: This involved randomly examining selected notes from
interviews, meetings and records to take stock of what data was available, and
identifying key themes and emerging issues.
73Table A2.1 shows a summary of some of the management subject domains for the interviews.
74 'SCPR's Framework approach' includes five stages of qualitative data analysis: familiarisation,
identifying a thematic framework, indexing, charting, and mapping and interpretation (Ritchie and
Spencer 1994). It is a deductive form of analysis.
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Stage 2 Identifying a thematic framework: In this study, the thematic framework was to
some extent established in advance because questions asked were based on predefined
subject domains (a priori issues). It involved exploration of response content and noting
of key issues (including emergent themes) that could be used to categorise the data. The
idea was to reduce the textual data into manageable categories that could be retrieved
and repeatedly explored. The themes were "lifted" from their original context and
rearranged according to the sequence of subject domains in the interview guide. It was
important in the process to organise data in such a way that original research questions
are fully addressed.
Stage 3 Charting: involved application of the thematic framework to transcriptions of
individual interviews from the case studies, and continuously reviewing it to
accommodate emerging case-specific issues. Instead of referencing the interview text by
themes (Indexing~), a system of tallying individual responses by theme (category) was
used. In the process of tallying responses, important respondent and hospital specific
quotes were captured per theme. This was feasible because the interview transcripts
were referenced (or coded) by hospital and respondent.
Stage 4 Mapping and interpretation: After sifting and sorting the data by core themes
the data were analysed and interpreted with the guidance of the research questions and
study hypotheses. This involved searching for patterns in perceptions, inter-linkages and
possible explanations, and generally attempting to build the overall picture of each case
study, and all the case studies. A constant search for deviant cases throughout the
analysis process was observed-deviant case analysis (May and Pope 1999).
10.3.1 Description of hospital internal organisation and management
The purpose of this section is to provide a descriptive synthesis of observed
commonalities across the study hospitals. It is against this background that specific case
75 'Indexing' refers to the process whereby the thematic framework or index is systematically applied to
the data in its textual form. ",
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study results are presented and discussed. It seems reasonable to argue that differences
in performance across hospitals cannot be explained by shared attributes but by
differences in institutional characteristics.
There are common organisational and management features of public hospitals in
Zimbabwe. These features are inherent in most bureaucratic systems, namely: core
management structures, hospital governance, and degree of functional autonomy.
However, differences in performance are still observed amongst them because of
differences in the way these structures function. It seems opportunities for innovation
exist within the bureaucratic system, as the results will show. The common features are
discussed in tum.
10.3.1.1 Organisational and management structure
The managerial structure of public hospitals is generic and prescribed by policy (MOH
1982). Hospitals are managed by an executive composed of five principal cadres that
include a medical superintendent (head of the hospital and must be a doctor), matron
(nursing manager), administrator, pharmacist and principal nursing tutor. In practice,
there is variation in hospital executive (HE) membership as additional members are co-
opted into the executive depending on the management style of the medical
superintendent. The executive is the top management team responsible for setting
hospital policies in accordance with national policy, planning and budgeting, and
ensuring the general wellbeing of the hospital. Below the executive are various
departmental heads", Linked to the HE is a Hospital Advisory Board (HAB) composed
of prominent community members appointed by the Minister of Health with the
guidance of the HE. The administrator is the secretary to the board whilst the medical
superintendent and the matron are ex officio members. The role of the HAB is to link
the community with hospital activities through mobilisation of community resources,
and to assist the hospital in a variety ofways(for instance, fund raising). In a sense, the
HAB acts as the political part of the hospital's management structure with hardly any
governance role.
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The HE is supported in its activities by national policy prescribed committees with
specific responsibilities such as the procurement, finance, and drugs and therapeutic
committees. The procurement committee is by necessity composed of the administrator,
the pharmacist and any other line managers. Its role is to discuss and advise on: input
requirements for the hospital in liaison with HODs, alternative ways of input
procurement, preparation of tender documents, and adjudication over prospective
suppliers' quotations and sanction expenditure. It also ensures that national tender
procedures are followed. The drugs and therapeutic committee is composed of the
pharmacist, doctor(s), laboratory technologist and nursing manager(s). Its main tasks are
to ensure that generic (or cheaper) drugs are rationally used, discuss prescriptive
practices and appropriate remedial action, ensure treatment protocols are followed (use
of EDLZ 1994), and any other issues related to drugs and therapy. The finance
committee comprises of the administrator, the medical superintendent and one or two
members from the HAB. Its role is to manage the hospital's extra-budgetary income
(retained fee income and donations) which is kept in a fund called the Health Services
Fund (HSF). Hospitals have the latitude to form other committees with other roles in
addition to ones described.
Internally, the hospitals are organised into departments and each has a head. There are no
clinical directorates but wards, which are, categorised by broad diagnostic groups, sex and
age of patients. For example, female medical ward, female surgical ward and others.
Wards are managed by in-charge sisters and not by clinicians. Operationally, the activities
of the HE inter-link with other departments through regular inter-departmental meetings.
Such meetings provide opportunities for wider discussions on hospital activities.
10.3.1.2 Hospital governance
Hospital governance is defined as the relationship between ownership and management
of hospitals and how ownership is regulated. Public hospitals as government entities are
managed by a bureaucratic and hierarchical system. The role of the hospital, that is, its
76 Departments include wards, laboratory, physiotherapy, kitchen, radiography, and pharmacy
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scope and scale of activities is determined by government (owner). In principle, the
government attempts to organise and direct hospital activities to meet the interests of
society (the principal) through deliberate policies and regulations. Hospitals cannot set
mission statements and strategic goals outside those of government. It was not
surprising that mission statements of the six study hospitals were the same and as broad
as the Ministry's, " ... to improve the quality of life of people." The governance situation
is different from autonomous hospitals where boards have much influence in hospital
operations.
10.3.1.3 Management functions and autonomy
The role of management and the degree of freedom it experiences is inextricably linked
to hospital governance. In other words HEs manage hospitals in accordance with the
government(owner} policies and objectives. The functions are summarised as seven
principal hospital domains (Table 10.1). The responsiveness of hospital management to
environmental changes depends on the degree of autonomy entrusted to it by the owner.
The study hospitals had limited decision-making space at both strategic and functional
level. The decision making space was explored by each hospital functional domain.
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Table 10.1 What the Hospital Executive can, and cannot do by functional domain.
Hospital Domain Specific functions Restrictions
Strategic Management • None • Direct control by government
• Cannot set mission and objectives
• Role defined by government
Financial Management • Planning and budgeting • Cannot finalise own budgets
• Cost control • Cannot vire funds between votes
• Expenditure decisions within votes without permission
• Relative freedom in the use of • Cannot use fee income for staff salaries
retained fee income (HSF) • Cannot make capital purchases or
disposals
• Cannot set hospital fees
• Non-distribution constraints
• Cannot borrow funds
Personnel Management • Staff recruitment within established • Cannot effectively appraise staff and
posts award or discipline deserving cadres
• Allocation and distribution of staff • Cannot effectively dismiss staff
• Recommend staff for promotions,
training, and discipline
Input procurement • Decide on what, when and how much • Cannot purchase capital inputs
to spend from the HSFlbudget • Cannot buy from the private sector
• Follow tender procedures in spending without bureaucratic approval [when
budgetary allocations using budget allocations]
Clinical Practice • Admission, discharge and referral • Drug prescriptions according to EDLIZ
polices • Use of treatment protocols for specific
diseases
Technology • Treatment choices within MOH • Cannot decide on capital equipment
guidelines. procurement. For instance, CATs.
• Clinical freedom • Cannot assume treatment protocols
outside EDLIZ.
Administration • Operational day-to-day decisions • No explicit restriction
through its members
Strategic management: Hospitals are unable to set long term goals concerning the scope
and scale of their activities. For instance, the decision of whether or not to provide
dialysis services or kidney transplant is made at national level. Therefore, activities can
only be planned and implemented on the basis of short-term objectives covering a
financial year. Inevitably, managers lack strategic vision and planning skills, and such
an arrangement stifles innovation and the ability of hospitals to adapt to changes in the
environment. The fact that tertiary hospitals are part of a referral hierarchy means that
their activities are also driven by other external factors.
Financial management: REs plan and make budget proposals to the Ministry through the
provincial directorate every year. The non-salary recurrent budget is disbursed in thirteen
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votes (line items)". The medical surgical vote forms the bulk (50-60%) of non-salary
recurrent expenditure and is managed through the pharmacy department. The provisions
vote is managed by the dietary department and the rest by administration. Budget
allocation is not fully devolved to departmental level and the HE, through the hospital
administrator, allocates resources to departments through an expenditure approval
process. All expenditure requests including those from pharmacy and kitchen are
sanctioned by administration. The salary budget is managed from the Ministry of
Health. Hospital management has freedom to make expenditure decisions within votes
but viring requires external approval. This in itself is a major handicap to efficient
service delivery. The introduction of fee retention in 1996 gave hospital management
the latitude and freedom to decide on the use of fee income. Use of hospital income is
considerably devolved to the hospital level with limited restrictions-that it cannot be
used for staff salaries or managerial benefits.
Personnel management: Hospital personnel are managed from the centre through the
Public Service Commission (PSC). However, hospitals can recruit staff within defined
staff establishments. That is to say, if a hospital has n designated posts in any staff
category, it cannot employ more than n people. Neither can hospitals retrench excess staff
(which is rare). All the hospitals had staff problems requiring more staff than was provided
for by PSC establishments (see Chapter 8). The problem is compounded by the fact that
staff establishments are not regularly reviewed to reflect changes in utilisation levels.
Related to this problem is the impossibility of switching service-specific posts (e.g. x-ray
operators) to other activities because of PSC restrictions. This makes hospitals
unresponsive to patient needs. Staff discipline is another problem because the executive
cannot effectively discipline staff. The executive can only recommend to the PSC but not
execute disciplinary measures. In many instances the disciplinary process takes long to be
effected, so limiting its intended effect on staff behaviour. The executive had no control of
staff remuneration. Staff is paid non-performance related salaries, and there is no
mechanism for rewarding good performers and punishing bad ones. In 1996, the
government introduced the concept of key result areas where each staff member agrees
77 Includes medical and surgical, provisions, printing and stationery, domestic expenses, fuel,lights and
water, office miscellaneous, bedding and linen,laundry services, fares, official travel, travel and
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with her manager, objectives and targets at the beginning of each year. At the end of the
year staff are appraised on the basis of agreed objectives and targets. Despite the potential
positive impact of this staff appraisal concept on hospital performance staff appraisal is
still not linked to remuneration, promotion or any other incentive and is judged to have
had little effect. One may conclude that existing human resource management strategies
do not encourage improved performance.
Input procurement: A key element in determining the supply side response of hospitals is
the ease with which hospitals can procure essential inputs. The six hospitals used similar
input procurement strategies except where non-budgetary resources were used. Most
inputs are centrally procured through the Government Medical Stores (GMS), and private
suppliers can only be used with the permission of the GMS. Lately, GMS has been
experiencing funding and inefficiency problems resulting in erratic supply of medical and
surgical supplies to hospitals. Hospitals had to use private suppliers who charged market
prices but supplied on time. This fuelled hospital cost escalation since hospitals were no
longer benefiting from lower input prices supported through bulk and central purchasing.
Although hospital fee income contributes a small proportion of hospital revenue, it was
used to bridge the input supply gap created by the time consuming private sector supply
approval process and inadequate resources. Clearly, such input procurement arrangements
are inimical to effective and efficient hospital services delivery. This was a major source
of frustration for managers, and fuelled regular breakdowns in internal resource allocation
systems.
Technology: Currently, tertiary HEs cannot make decisions on what services to produce,
how and for whom to produce those services. This can be explained by three factors. First,
tertiary hospitals are part of a referral chain in which they have a specific function, which
is defined by the centre. Second, decisions of whether or not to acquire modem or cheaper
equipment or new drugs is made at national level. Third, as public institutions, hospitals
services are intended for the general public with no specific target populations, Adoption
of hospital technology is not subject to user influence (as is sometimes the case in the
private sector). This could also be explained by the publicly tailored objectives rather than
subsistence, and post and telecommunication.
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profit or surplus motive of public hospitals. The decision-making environment in which
these hospitals are operating creates inertia, and innovation, even in the interest of the
principal, is risky.
Clinical practice: Clinical practice is the domain where there seems to be relatively
more decision making space given available hospital technology. Clinicians decide on
admissions, patient management, discharges and referral policies. Doctors and moreso,
specialist consultants tend to operate independently in the wards. This functional
autonomy might help explain variation in hospital performance as clinical practices may
differ. Hospital executives may have different degrees of influence on clinical activities,
and these differences might explain part of the differences in performance.
Administration; Day to day operational decisions were delegated to the administrator
and/or the medical superintendent with variable involvement of other members of the
executive (as the case studies will show). The only administrative restrictions
experienced related to those highlighted in the other hospital domains. Administrative
capacities varied across the hospitals (discussed later).
10.3.2 Hospital Financing
There are two methods of hospital financing. First, hospitals receive an annual budget
for non-salary recurrent expenditure. The salary and capital budgets are managed from
the Ministry of Health. The computation of the annual recurrent budget is based on
available facilities, activity statistics, and demographic factors. The budget covers the
provision of services for both paying and non-paying patients'S. Any budgetary savings
are returned to the national treasury, and this creates negative incentives to cost saving.
Managers may design spending strategies that ensure that the budget is used within the
financial year and no savings are made, even in the rare circumstances that such
opportunities exist. Managers have particularly strong incentives to highlight resource
inadequacies in this context. In practice, budgetary savings are rare because of
78 Paying patients are defined as those earning a salary income of at least ZW$400 (about US$8) per
month.
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inadequate funding and inherent system inefficiencies. Lack of direct linkage between
hospital budgets and performance creates an incentive regime for managers that may
lead to inappropriate hospital behaviour. Managers and doctors are not bound by the
budget to produce a given quantity and quality of services, and therefore can afford to
operate sub-optimally. This occurs at the expense of patients and society in general.
Second, hospitals retain all hospital fee income in a special fund called the Health
Services Fund (HSF). Hospitals have the latitude to use this fund to finance non-salary
recurrent expenditure targeted at improving the quantity and quality of hospital services.
The introduction of fee retention was meant to encourage hospitals to collect more
revenue. However, most people are eligible for free services and in order to maximise
revenue, managers have to strengthen cost recovery measures. There is an incentive to
increase service intensity for paying patients although this response has not been
established empirically.
10.3.3 Qualitative results.
10.3.3.1 Case Study 1:Hospital I
In this case study, in-depth interviews were held with 8 respondents: 4 hospital
executive members and 4line managers (see Table AIO.l). No meeting was attended at
this hospital because none was convened at the time of the study. Instead, a review of
minutes of previous meetings was carried out.
Internal management structures: The hospital had a typical public hospital
management structure as described earlier: a hospital executive and a procurement
committee. An addition was what was called an efficiency committee composed of the
administrator, matron, a doctor and a pharmacist. Its role was to regularly supervise
departments, checking and discussing on resource use, wastage; pilferage and any other
efficiency related issues. The activities of this committee were complementary to those
of the procurement committee. The hospital had no active drugs and therapeutic
committee and a hospital advisory board. Strikingly, most executive members were in
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acting capacities with no substantive medical superintendent, provincial pharmacist and
hospital administrator. According to national policy these are key cadres in hospital
management. Four out of eight respondents had some form of management training in
addition to their basic professional training. The mean time spent working at the
hospital by respondents was 5 years (7 months to 15 years). For instance, the matron
had spent 15 years working at the hospital.
At the time of the study, the HE had held no meetings in the previous ten months. A
review of hospital records for 1997/98 showed that HE meetings were irregular and ad
hoc. The newly appointed medical superintendent attributed this to lack of a substantive
hospital head (leadership) and the acting administrator (an executive officer)
complained instead of uncompensated extra-responsibilities. The administrator is
supposed to organise meetings as instructed by the head of the hospital. The outgoing
acting medical superintendent argued that clinical work tended to take precedence over
administrative work because of an acute shortage of doctors at the hospital. He said that
inevitably affected the management of the hospital. The hospital's policy was that heads
of departments (HODs) were supposed to meet once a month to discuss hospital-wide
activities. Records and staff interviews showed that no such meeting had been formally
convened for almost a year. Managers expressed concern that monthly meetings
provided the only formal opportunity of knowing what was happening in the hospital
and sharing experiences and problems with others. Given that no meetings were held, it
seemed clear that management was not formally working as a team and the hospital
assumed what could be called a laissez faire scenario in which individual managers
simply executed their jobs with only their job descriptions for guidance.
Internal communication: Formal communication between the HE and staff in this
hospital was lacking as reflected by what some respondents said:
"Basically, it is not clear what procedures to follow in doing a lot of things here because there are no
meetings. "[ 1]
"We just see new people here without communication or introduction. People are just transferred
without announcements. [Some] staff [members] get houses [hospital accommodation] in an unknown
way. Junior staff get better accommodation sometimes." [2]
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All the respondents (8) indicated that internal communication was a problem. Three of
them attributed this to what they viewed as an autocratic acting medical superintendent,
and two said they used informal ways of communicating their concerns to the HE, and
one said "to know [something] you have to insist." The consensus view amongst
respondents was that for the hospital to function well there must be consultation and
communication between hospital staff and the executive.
Internal HE accountability: Respondents were asked whether or not the HE was
answerable for its actions. It was reported that HODs, sisters-in-charge and ward
meetings were the traditional means of ensuring that management responded to staff
needs and problems, and for members of the management team to provide feed back on
a variety of issues. Because such meetings were infrequently held communication was
poor, and respondents felt it was difficult to tell whether the executive was accountable
or not. However, they perceived poor communication between staff and the executive as
indicative of lack of transparency and accountability. Two suggestions were proffered
on how to resolve the problems. First, regular consultation and informing people about
major hospital-wide issues. Second involvement of line management in executive
activities through co-option of HODs. Although the hospital had the necessary fora to
foster accountability the frequency of use, the discussion content (as observed in the
records) and exclusiveness of those structures was a problem.
Resource planning, use and accountability: Asked about their involvement in
financial management respondents said it was traditionally the exclusive responsibility
of the executive. They, however, acknowledged that the HE could only prepare budget
proposals for the provincial directorate. HODs complained that as line managers they
had no influence on the hospital's budget because they were not involved in the
budgeting process. The administrator controlled hospital expenditure without support of
the HE or the medical superintendent. What is interesting is that the hospital had no
clear mechanism for tracing costs and therefore accountability of resource use.
Departments drew resources from the same "pot" with no predetermined allocations.
This was in conflict with attempts to improve the rational use of resources.
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Input procurement and distribution: The purpose of this investigation was to explore
how the hospital acquired inputs and distributed them internally. The hospital had a
dormant procurement committee. A review of available records revealed that the
committee rarely met (which the members admitted themselves) because there were no
minutes of such meetings in the previous year. What was happening was that the
pharmacist in concurrence with the administrator procured inputs upon request by
departments. Wards and medico-technical departments procured inputs through the
pharmacy since it held the medical and surgical budget. Departmental requests were
made without prior knowledge of available financial resources and other hospital needs.
Input supply was based on a first-come-first serve basis without an overall input
procurement and distribution strategy. The absence of a rational resource use strategy
meant that the potential impact of the efficiency committee's efforts was undermined.
Most of the hospital inputs were procured from the central medical stores.
Incentives and disincentives: Respondents were asked to highlight what they perceived
as incentives and disincentives and how these affected them. The following perceived
incentives were reported: job security" (25%), availability of subsidised accommodation
(19%), continuous professional education (CPE) (13%), patient diversity (13%), on-call
allowances (9%), transport allowance (6%), job satisfaction (3%), good social
environment (3%), fair salary for work done (3%), proximity to capital city (3%) and
freedom in clinical decision making (3%). What was important was to identify those
hospital-specific factors that were likely to explain differences in hospital staff
behaviour across hospitals. These included access to subsidised accommodation, CPE,
fair workload, the social environment and proximity to the city. It became apparent
during the interviews that availability of monetary incentives were considered important
factors in retaining staff. The importance attached to each incentive differed from
respondent to respondent. However, the distribution of access to these incentives was
fairly similar which raises the question of whether or not they motivated staff to
enhance performance. Noteworthy is that most of the highlighted incentives were not
79 Some quotes of the reasons why some staff felt job secure: " Because I am a doctor", "I am
experienced and I have been doing this job for sometime now. Nobody can push me around", "Being a
medical officer is the most secure job in this country. You can never be fired but maybe expelled", and "I
am the only dental surgeon in this province."
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particularly related to individual perfonnance-they were perceived as entitlements.
Only one respondent said promotion was based on competence, the rest said it was
based on eligible (experienced) individuals applying for posts to the Public Service
Commission (PSC). Most importantly, there was no evidence from management of use
of (or attempts to use) potential "motivators" such as access to CPE and promotion as
levers for performance enhancement.
Similarly, the majority of disincentives highlighted by staff are intrinsic to civil service.
The responses included: low salary (28%), lack of a standardised CPE programme
(16%), shortage of essential inputs (20%), poor perks (4%), bureaucracy (4%), lack of
support from above (4%), hospital facilities in relation to the workload (4%), lack of
recreational facilities (4%), overwork (4%), poor internal communication (4%), extra
qualifications not rewarded by better pay (4%) and poor allowances (4%). Staff
registered their strongest objection towards incessant shortages of inputs such as staff,
drugs, equipment and other medical supplies. It would seem from these responses that
the general complaints related to working conditions.
Respondents also said what was particularly demotivating was the fact that patients who
could normally be appropriately managed at that level had to be referred or kept in
hospital for longer periods of time for example, because of input shortages. One
respondent's view was suggestive of despondency and low morale: "I feel I am just a
dedicated person, otherwise there are so many factors that militate against my being
here." Interestingly, only one member of staff viewed lack of internal communication as
a disincentive. An unstructured CPE programme was perceived as a problem because
there were no clear procedures for obtaining it. It seemed to be left to the whims of
managers. This complaint could have arisen as a result of disproportionate allocation of
CPE opportunities. One can only speculate that this may have been either due to
favouritism or merit.
Staff views on coping strategies: All clinicians interviewed said they did private
practice after hours to augment their income, and most other professionals said they did
nothing to supplement their incomes because opportunities for private practice were
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limited in the small provincial town. One respondent said, "We are on-call almost 24
hours everyday, we just work as much as we can do." That is what the national policy
dictates for all health cadres, which invites two questions: what time doctors did private
practice; and what their objective functions were in the hospitals-the dual practice
problem. The dual practice problem arises from the fact that it is unclear how doctors
balance their time between private and public practice, and to what extent this affected
patient referral patterns between public and private facilities and performance in the
public hospitals.
On the question of high workload, four said they worked extra hours to cope. Three said
the workload was manageable, and one said the hospital used student nurses. The
respondents admitted though that use of students affected the quality of services. One
respondent said, "We use supervised student nurses. There are more student nurses than
qualified nurses at this hospital" and another said, "We have to put in extra-hours, and
ask subordinates to do the same. However, we lose friends [in the process] because
people do not want to work extra hours." Overall nursing managers said they reduced
supervisory visits to wards during periods of high workload. The overall picture in this
case is that respondents expressed willingness to work extra-hours. The triggers for such
attitudes might be related to the informal nature of management at this hospital.
Staff tension: It was impossible to effectively explore the existence or non-existence of
staff tension at this hospital because staff meetings were a rarity and if anything
informal without recorded minutes. Records were scant and interviews did not yield
much because most executive members were in acting capacity, and all respondents
were unwilling to disclose any internal tensions. Although only one respondent
highlighted the problem of autocracy in the management of the hospital, it appears
reasonable to speculate that lack of meetings meant that a few members of the executive
were making hospital-wide decisions. The administrator appeared to have some control
of hospital activities in the absence of an active medical superintendent and executive.
Nonetheless, control of various activities was much more dispersed with HODs in
charge of departmental activities. By deduction, it appeared that the operational
characteristics of this hospital had all the ingredients for misunderstandings and
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tension-poor communication, unclear resource allocation, opportunities for private
practice for a few, and management without accountability.
Views on quality of services: All but one respondent admitted to the existence of
quality problems at the hospital. Perceived quality problems were chiefly structural in
nature: shortage of beds and space (29%), staff (29%) and drugs (14%), premature
patient discharge (14%), and patients not bathed (14%). One nursing manager alluded to
process quality [humanity and empathy] problems, "lack of appropriate staff attitudes
and use of refined language to communicate effectively with sick people." Another said,
"Sometimes bums patients become septic because they are not tumed regularly." The
hospital was viewed as small for its workload: "The hospital was built for 50 people and
now is catering for 300 patients."
These problems were attributed to lack of adequate staffing, financial and material
resources (50%), lack of supervision (13%), deficient infrastructural facilities (25%) and
problems related to input procurement like delays (13%). Asked what their role was in
solving these problems, the majority of the respondents felt that the constraints were
outside the hospital's realm of control, and a minority felt doctors were not quality
conscious. A number of suggestions were given on how to improve the quality of
services: increasing resource allocation, more supervision, staff training in supervision
and management, executive to plan and communicate with resource users, and
streamlining procurement of essential inputs. Despite awareness of quality problems,
there was local inertia, which marred the potential of hospital retained revenue, in
resolving some of the input constraints.
Views on hospital costs: Six out of seven respondents (86%) recognised that hospital
costs were indeed a problem, and they attributed the problem to rising input costs (83%)
especially for drugs and medical supplies, and that little was recovered since most
patients do not pay for services (17%). They argued that problems remained unresolved
because clinicians, as the main resource users, were unaware of costs, and because of
inadequate financial support from government. The administrator felt that sharing of the
hospital budget between hospital and teaching services made cost control difficult.
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Asked whose responsibility it was to control costs: 3/8 said hospital administrator, 118
said HODs and administrator, 118 said everyone, 118 said the HE and 2/8 said the
finance committee. It appears most managers felt it was the responsibility of someone
else (or committee) to control costs especially the administrator, and not their own
responsibility. Lack of an identifiable locus of cost control might explain why costs
were perceived as invariably increasing.
Views on hospital autonomy: A need for hospital autonomy was recognised by all
citing potential improvements in the decision-making system (517), and procurement of
inputs and transport services (117) as the main reasons. Respondents felt autonomy
would reduce problems of central procurement and control, as one respondent agreed:
" ..to reduce bureaucracy and improve decision-making. The CMED80 and government medical stores
are causing problems because of centralised procurement, like now we do not have paracetamol
because we cannot [are not allowed to] get it from the private sector. These organisations [CMED
and GMS] do not operate in a competitive environment."
Two respondents professed ignorance on what the consequences could be of making
hospitals autonomous. However, there was some degree of scepticism that reforms
might not bring the desired effects, if they were not appropriately implemented.
Reforms were widely recognised amongst the respondents as necessary. Four
respondents did not anticipate problems with hospital autonomy as long as adequate
resources and guidelines of how things should be done were provided. Inadequate
management capacity was identified as the main problem that needed to be addressed
first through staff training. It is clear from these comments that the existing decision-
making context and its associated disincentives was viewed as a constraint. However,
the fears raised of managerial inadequacies under reform, and the need for clear
guidelines is an acknowledgement that there were managerial capacity problems that
could be related to current performance. Autonomy meant extra-responsibilities which
HODs and the executive could not manage without further training.
80 CMED stands for Central Mechanical and Equipment Department. This is a department in the Ministry
of Transport that manages all government vehicles.
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Views on contracting out of services: The hospital seasonally contracted out laundry
services especially in winter when the local drier was ineffective. Only three of the
respondents knew about the contract and the rest either said no hospital service was
contracted out or they knew nothing about contracting. Even the outgoing acting
medical superintendent was unfamiliar with the laundry contractual arrangements. Only
the hospital administrator knew about the contractual arrangements for obvious reasons.
The rest of the respondents lacked basic knowledge about use of contracts, their merits
and demerits. The administrator was convinced that the laundry contract was "a good
deal" because "...the hospital operates on to-best-advantage (TBA) terms and changes
contracts if need be." Nursing managers believed that contracting out was costly
considering that the hospital paid for cleaning, transport and staff who did sorting and
linen mending. They also highlighted the complexities of contracting out services like
cleaning, catering and security services such as timeliness of ward cleaning, special
diets for some patients and controlling thefts.
Staff views on contracting out tell us two things. First, is that there was limited
involvement of other HODs in making hospital-wide decisions. Second, in-house
production of services was a preferred option of producing services because it was
perceived to be less costly and likely to be of better quality. However, the fact that
respondents were able to identify costs and quality as problems (or potential problems)
reflects their level of understanding of these two performance parameters.
10.3.3.2 Case Study 2: Hospital2
A total of seven respondents: two executive members and five heads of departments
were interviewed (Table A10.l). No meeting was attended at this hospital and minutes
of management meetings held were reviewed.
Internal management structures: The hospital had all the expected management
structures (hospital executive, procurement, finance and drugs and therapeutic
committees, and a hospital advisory board) and all of them were operational. The
hospital executive, interdepartmental, sisters-in-charge, and hospital advisory board
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meetings were regularly held to discuss various issues within their mandates. The HE
had full and substantive membership: matron, medical superintendent, health services
administrator, provincial pharmacist, and the principal nursing tutor. The hospital
advisory board, finance, drugs and therapeutic and procurement committees were
regularly convened. Five of the seven respondents had received some form of
management training (ranging from basic to executive management). The average
respondent work experience (in the same post) at the hospital was 5 years (8-108
months). The majority of the respondents had in excess of 10 years working experience
in the civil service.
Internal communication: Five out of seven respondents claimed there was poor
communication between the hospital executive and staff. This is unexpected given that
all management structures were working. One respondent said, "Communication was
disjointed and people do not know the hospital policy, and they do not know current
information." Even clinicians complained of non-involvement, "There is not much
communication because we see changes in which we were not part of in initiating." A
possible explanation to this could be that the content and quality of discussions held in
non-executive meetings were not informative enough. An analysis of minutes of
meetings showed that a wide range of mostly operational issues was discussed with a
wide spectrum of participants (except doctors). The medical superintendent supposedly
represented doctors even though there was no evidence of feedback meetings with the
rest of the clinicians. The negative responses seem to reflect the lack of policy relevance
of what was discussed in those meetings.
Internal HE accountability: There were mixed feelings about executive accountability
to its subordinates. Some respondents felt it was difficult to assess the accountability of
the HE. The argument was that, "It is not easy to evaluate your manager. For example,
poor services, [and the] budget finishing early. It is easy to blame subordinates on the
ground. Why is it that resources are not used effectively? It is difficult to establish the
root cause" One needs to have a closer link with management" or that "They are
answerable, [but] indirectly they do not mention mistakes." Both responses seem to
suggest an atmosphere of mistrust, and absence of transparency. However, executives
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argued that interdepartmental meetings were used for consultations and feedback on
decisions taken on specific issues. These disparate views allow us to speculate that
though meetings were held as expected the discussion content may not have been
sufficient for HODs to feel that they were adequately consulted and informed about
hospital-wide policy issues.
Resource planning and use: There was no evidence of involvement of HODs in
planning and budgeting for the hospital. That was viewed as the role of the
administrator. The administrator was also responsible for controlling expenditure using
monthly expenditure thresholds and approval of requisitions for various items from user
departments. In so doing, she indirectly allocated resources across departments. Apart
from pharmacy and catering no other department had a specific vote to manage. By
design, the system was incapable of checking who used what, how much and for what.
There were no local initiatives to address the problem. No working departmental
budgets were used to track expenditure patterns by source. A finance committee made
up of the administrator, a HAB member, medical superintendent and the matron
controlled and sanctioned use of Health Services Funds. On the whole the administrator
was responsible for controlling aggregate expenditure but was not able to pinpoint
leakages or inefficiencies in the system.
Input procurement and distribution: The hospital used public methods of procuring
inputs when using government budget. The administrator was assisted by the
procurement committee in procuring inputs whenever necessary. There was much
flexibility in using the HSF because management could easily purchase items from the
private sector if it was expedient to do so. The fund was used as a backstop in case of
disruption of the bureaucratic procurement system. At the time of the study the hospital
was relying much on the HSF for the purchase of patient food and other domestic
expenses. The interviews showed that the smooth operational linkage between the
finance and the procurement committee was instrumental in meeting local daily
demands of the hospital. Decisions on the purchase of inputs were made much quicker.
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Incentives and disincentives: The responses provided are categorised as follows: social
factors (20%), job security (12%), subsidised accommodation (12%) and food (12%),
free health services (12%), opportunities for private practice (8%), leadership challenge
(4%), CPE (4%), transport allowance (4%), job satisfaction (4%), proximity to the
capital city (4%), and provisions for car loans (4%). 'Social factors', encompasses
factors such as that staff had their families residing in the locality and had access to
educational facilities. The hospital is close to the capital city, and staff can commute
daily to and from the capital. The majority of these incentives relate to the working
environment which most of them shared. There is no relationship between access to
these incentives and performance, When public staff compared themselves with their
private sector counterparts, they believed there was no reason or motivation for any
member of staff to work beyond the average work effort. People tend to prefer to be
treated equally.
Disincentives raised were related more to the civil service in general than to the hospital
specifically: low salaries (54%), lack of support from above (8%), recreational facilities
(8%) and accommodation (8%), high exposure to infectious diseases (8%), bureaucracy
(8%) and a system that does not value people (8%). The first and last responses are
particularly interesting because they expose the relevance of a system that recognises
and rewards individual performance, which is fundamental in motivating people.
Monetary incentives topped the list of responses. This probably reflected peoples'
general perceptions of the value of their work effort in the public sector, which they
compared with the private sector.
Staff coping strategies: Five people responded to questions related to how they coped
with low incomes, and two refused for unknown reasons. Of the five, two said they
worked at local private surgeries, and three said they engaged in informal income
generating activities such as buying and selling goods, and knitting. No evidence on
how respondents balanced working time between official duties and personal duties was
obtained because of the sensitivity attached to such information.
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Several strategies were reported for coping with high workload: working extra hours
(517), use of student nurses (117), reducing the number of laboratory tests done and
sacrificing management for technical work (117). Respondents pointed out that working
extra hours always carried the risk of lowering the quality of services especially patient-
to-staff relationships- "..people [are] not treated as people but as cases, as staff aim to
clear queues." These results suggest a general willingness to provide adequate health
cover but sometimes at the expense of quality.
Staff tension: To unearth underlying tensions and to capitalise on critical incidences
requires considerable time investment in studying the hospital environment. During the
time of the study at the hospital no evidence of conflict was identified through
discussions with managers, review of minutes and daily observations of the dynamics of
hospital activities. The general impression was one of "operational harmony". It appears
the reason for this observed harmony was the proactiveness of HODs in preventing
overt tensions through discussions on potential sources of conflict such as resource use
amongst themselves. For instance, the pharmacist emphasised the importance of the
drugs and therapeutic committee in ensuring rational drug use. Furthermore, the
pharmacist regularly advised clinicians on the drugs supply situation. The hospital
laboratory technologist said requests for investigative tests by clinicians were constantly
monitored, and if need be, discussions were held with individual doctors on particular
cases. The administrator worked in close liaison with the medical superintendent who
had an explicit sense of control of the hospital. As Harris (1977) argues in the context of
US hospitals, there seemed to be a complex system of avoiding breakdowns in the
internal allocation system.
Quality of services: The majority of respondents (517) perceived quality of services as a
problem, one did not and another could not answer. The problems (responses) were
outlined as staff shortages (36%), poor nursing care (18%), shortage of beds and ward
space (9%), equipment shortages (9%), drug shortages (9%), poor staff-patient
relationships (9%) and poor timing of procedures (9%). The responses to the causes of
these quality problems were: lack of staff and financial resources (55%), low staff
morale (22%), lack of supervision (9%) and free health services (9%). Respondents
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argued that the problem was worsened by the fact that most people did not pay for
services, and cost recovery was low. On being asked why these problems were not
addressed, the blame was put on government for not committing enough resources for
hospitals. Whilst this might be true, there were no local initiatives to address these
problems.
Suggestions were offered as to how quality problems could be resolved: government to
increase its financial allocation (38%), increasing supervision (25%), staff training in
management and supervision (13%), promotion of teamwork (13%), increasing hospital
revenue by asking patients to pay (13%). Managers at this hospital seemed to have a
consensual vision of what needed to be done within and outside the hospital to improve
quality of services. Nonetheless there was no evidence of any concrete steps taken to
address some of the problems.
Service costs: Fifty seven-percent (4/7) of the respondents said costs were a problem,
and the rest (3/7) professed ignorance on the subject. The problem was attributed to
increasing input costs and lack of staff motivation to control costs. They felt the reasons
why costs could not be contained were that most clinicians were not particularly worried
about costs, frivolous use of services and lack of appreciation of individual efforts by
the system. One respondent summarised the problems by saying that, " people are not
motivated to control costs. Departments should ensure that disposals or wastage do not
exceed 7%81, and reduce repeat tests. Doctors are the main culprits, they demand x-ray
even for review [TB] patients." To redress the problems it was suggested that there be a
change in the funding policy of hospitals, patient education and greater communication
within the hospital.
All respondents felt that it was the responsibility of the hospital administrator to control
costs. The administrator admitted that it was her role to monitor monthly expenditures
but what is surprising is that there was apparently no mechanism for the administrator to
effectively do so. At departmental level, line managers acknowledged attempts to use
81 The respondent was further asked why 7% and how it would be measured. He said that he was taught
this figure at school. The crucial point here seems to be that wastage should be reduced to the minimum.
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resources effectively and reduce wastage. For instance, the head of laboratory services
cost control activities inc1uded-"Justify[ing] every diagnostic test and narrow[ing]
down tests to what is essential." The idea of departmental budgets was perceived as a
good one in creating cost consciousness amongst managers. However, some problems
were anticipated: they felt that departmental budgets would complicate daily operations
and increase managers' workload. For devolved budgets to work properly, staff needed
to be trained in budgeting and cost control.
Views on hospital autonomy: Five of the seven respondents recognised the need for
change in hospital governance, whilst the rest either thought otherwise or were sceptical
of such a change. Self-governance was perceived as an option to reduce bureaucracy.
One respondent argued: "Local people know their problems and urgencies rather than
someone making decisions for them." A number of potential problems (or fears)
associated with self-governance were raised: (1) financial insecurity, (2) difficulties in
infrastructural development because that has been the role of the Ministry of Health, (3)
potential abuse of power through corrupt practices such as nepotism and victimisation,
(4) mismanagement due to lack of capacity, and (5) that self-governance might disrupt
staff career structures. Solutions given for tackling these problems included
enhancement of hospital management capacity, establishing audit systems as safeguards
against perverse and opportunistic behaviour, asking people to pay for services and
monitoring from headquarters. The diversity of views expressed by respondents reflects
differences in understanding what autonomy entails in practice. In this case study
autonomy was viewed as total disengagement from government, as reflected by the
potential problems raised. Whilst some of the fears are true, others reflect general public
worker tendencies to avoid absolute responsibility or accountability.
Views on contracting out of services: Laundry, security and equipment maintenance
services were contracted out to private providers at this hospital. All the respondents
knew about the contracts, but all except the hospital administrator had little knowledge
about how they worked. However, other respondents were able to express their views on
operational problems associated with the existing contractual arrangements. First, they
felt contracts were costly compared to own production: laundry services for example.
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Second, they said the quality of laundry services was not good (delays in delivery,
stained and torn linen, and linen losses). Third, they said infection control was difficult
when linen was laundered outside the hospital. Contracting out services was generally
not perceived as a good idea. The concept of quality and value for money resonates
from the respondents' comments. Despite these comments, any changes, however, that
would make managers more accountable for costs and quality in a transparent way as in
contracts (e.g. devolved budgets) were seen as extra responsibility and complicated.
Although respondents saw the advantages of organisational change there was a general
reluctance to forego the benefits of unclear accountability structures.
10.3.3.3 Case Study 3: Hospital 3
Respondents in this hospital included three executive members and seven heads of
departments (see Table AIO.1). Two hospital executive meetings were attended and
minutes of other types of meetings were reviewed.
Internal management structures: The hospital's management structure was similar to
other hospitals: a hospital executive, heads of department and two active
committees-finance and procurement. The hospital advisory board was dormant, and
there was no drugs and therapeutic committee. The HE had full membership. The
medical superintendent was newly appointed. The previous medical superintendent had
been demoted to a GMO because of managerial incompetence", Seven of the ten
respondents had received some form of management training (from short course to
graduate level), and their average work experience at the hospital was 6 years (1 month
to 16 years). The activities of the executive were recovering after a spell of dispersal and
lack of co-ordination. Under the reign of the previous medical superintendent
management meetings were rarely convened. The interviews confirmed that
management was uncoordinated.
82 The medical superintendent had an alcohol problem, and neglected his duties. As a consequence the
hospital was a regular target of the local media and people complained about the quality of services. The
management team was characterised by severe tensions and conflict.
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Internal communication: Communication within the executive, and between the
executive and HODs was described as limited because executive and interdepartmental
meetings were infrequent (7/10). Heads of departments felt excluded in making
hospital-wide decisions. The credibility of the executive was questioned: "..many people
in the executive, do not seem to have a good footing. Information comes in bits and
pieces through the matron." Further discussions with the longest serving members of the
executive (administrator and matron) revealed that few formal executive meetings were
held. Instead ad hoc meetings were common with the relevant members depending on
the issue to be discussed. The hospital administrator liased directly with HODs on
matters that concerned their departments, and with executive members on matters that
concerned their management portfolio. The administrator became the interlocutor of
hospital activities instead of the medical superintendent. The few meetings that were
held were usually as a result of critical incidences like shortage of patient food or
critical drugs. Rather than playing a preventive or general management role, the HE
appeared to be "fire fighting". One nursing manager expressed dissatisfaction with the
work of the executive as, "Things are done by trial and error, people seem not interested
or have no priorities. To survive [here] you need to be hot-headed."
Nursing managers said they used sister-in-charge meetings, chaired by one of the
matrons, to raise issues and try to influence hospital-wide decisions. They felt that
because HOD meetings were not convened regularly, transparency and teamwork was
jeopardised. Specialist consultants felt ill-informed about general hospital activities:
"There is not much communication between me and the HE. I have lost interest in
them." It seems that both structures for fonnallateral and vertical communication were
dysfunctional.
Internal HE accountability: Accountability was perceived as a problem at this hospital
because of lack of communication and involvement. Most respondents felt that there
was no transparency in the way the hospital was managed. For instance, some said
minutes of HE meetings were not circulated to all the departments, and were worried
that accountability could not be achieved without teamwork: "..because of lack of
transparency and openness, there is no togetherness, so it's difficult to tell [how
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accountable the executive is]." It appears that lack of teamwork at executive level
disgruntled subordinates such that staff developed negative attitudes and suspicion
towards it. This is a clear example where internal management per se can have a direct
and detrimental effect on hospital behaviour and hence hospital performance.
Resource planning, use and accountability: The problem of lack of communication
was particularly severe at this hospital such that none of the seven line managers had an
idea of how resources were budgeted and allocated to various hospital activities. That
was perceived as the role of the HE who managed the budget and hospital services fund.
The finance committee was not operational, and therefore the administrator and the
medical superintendent used their privileges as signatories to the HSF account. From the
executive's point of view no financial resources were designated to specific departments
and this made it difficult for departments to account for resource use. The nursing
school and various other departments drew resources from the same source. It was not
feasible for administration to account for resource use by department but globally. The
situation meant that HODs could do whatever they wanted and still be unidentifiable
even in cases of gross inefficiencies.
Input procurement and distribution system: The pharmacy department procured
medical and surgical supplies for medical and non-medical departments through
requests. Procurement of inputs was subject to national guidelines, which required
hospitals to procure inputs from the GMS, and from the private sector only with the
approval of the GMS. The administrator alluded to the use of HSF for fast track
procurement of drugs from the private sector. National tender procedures were followed
when estimated input costs exceeded given thresholds. The procurement committee's
role was to put out tenders and subsequent adjudication of tender submissions. The
hospital had no global policy on internal input distribution or any local initiative to
promote efficient use of inputs.
Incentives and disincentives: Most respondents felt that access to CPE was a strong
incentive for them to work at this hospital (44%). Opportunities for further training were
said to be high, and were often government funded. Access to free health services
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(19%), and other social factors (19%) such as family local residence,job security (6%),
subsidised accommodation (6%) and leadership challenges (6%) were reported as some
of the incentives. What is particularly interesting is that most of the incentives
mentioned apart from salary are institution based and could be affected locally. Some
concern was raised concerning the distribution of access to training workshops, "Only
specific people go to workshops where there are financial benefits, and such
opportunities are not shared". It was not clear, however, whether or not this distribution
pattern was related to performance, in which case CPE was a performance enhancing
reward. In one ward, the sister-in-charge gave individual nurses annual prizes for good
performance. That type of incentive was more likely to make people work harder
because it was linked to performance and everyone in the ward perceived it to be so.
Respondents raised a number of disincentives they faced: low salaries (33%), shortages
of essential inputs (19%), poor internal communication (10%), in-fighting amongst
managers (10%) and overwork (10%), no call allowance for administrative staff (5%),
unrealistic patient expectations (5%), unclear career structure (5%) and unavailability of
CPE (5%). What is of particular interest is that, most of the cited disincentives apart
from salary are also institution based and can be addressed locally. It is these factors that
assist in explaining relative performance levels.
Staff coping strategies: Respondents were asked how they coped with the problem of
high workload and low salaries. Six of them said they worked extra hours, two said, "I
do what I can" and one said, "I do what I can within specified periods." Nursing
managers were concerned about the quality of services rendered when staff is over-
stretched:
"The ward is usually full. We have 39 beds but often we have 40-52 patients, with floor-beds. It
becomes difficult to give patients time because of high workload." [1]
"For example we ask night staff to do bed preparations because in the morning we will be too busy.
One person does two things at a time, shared attention can then affect care." [2]
Asked how they coped with low salaries, five (50%) of them said they did private
practice. This included doctors, radiographers, nurses, pharmacists and laboratory
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technologists. The rest gave various responses: doing nothing, informal jobs (knitting,
buying and selling goods), conducting research, securing bank loans and relying on
spouses' income. This hospital is located in a large city where opportunities for private
practice are abundant. The study was not able to gather evidence of how staff balanced
their time between public and private practice because respondents were reluctant to
divulge this sensitive information. The general comment was that they did private
practice when on leave days or after-hours which was expected.
Staff tension: The administrator was powerful in that she shouldered most of the key
decisions and interacted with provincial managers and HODs more than any other HE
member. Her position was strengthened by the ineptitude of the demoted medical
superintendent. The situation prompted one consultant to suggest that the entire HE
needed to be changed because it was inefficient, and he had lost faith in it". That view
was echoed by one of the nursing managers. Such comments show that there was overt
tension between clinicians and administration even though the administrator was
perceived as influential. The new medical superintendent admitted that most doctors at
the hospital were not informed about hospital management and budgetary allocations. It
would seem that this lack of knowledge or information created tension.
The problem was more visible among nursing managers who felt that the power struggle
between their top managers (Matron I, II and III) was stifling their work. Each vied to
be in total control of hospital nursing activities. To gain control each one of them did
not respect decisions made by the others even though Matron I was the overall manager.
Consequently there was discontinuity of activities when Matron I was not available. For
instance, it took three days for the author to convene a meeting with one of the matrons
because each one of them wanted to be interviewed, and was therefore not willing to
provide information about the whereabouts of the other. Management at this hospital
was characterised by lack of teamwork, poor internal communication and ineffective use
of management structures.
83" The whole hospital administration needs to be retrained or replaced completely. There is overstaffing
and people are not productive."
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Quality of services: The majority (70%) of respondents acknowledged the existence of
problems in the quality of services provided, but three respondents (30%) felt that
service quality was acceptable". The problems were reported as: staff shortages (27%),
poor staff-patient relationships (18%), poor equipment maintenance (18%), drug
shortages (9%), poor laundry services (9%), delays in laboratory tests results (9%) and
old equipment (9%). The results show that the majority of respondents were aware of
both' structural and process quality problems in the hospital. These problems were
attributed to lack of financial and human resources (42%), low staff morale (25%), lack
of supervision (8%), inefficient input procurement systems (8%), absence of nursing
care protocols (8%), and unfavourable nursing career paths (8%). Unfavourable nursing
career path meant that good nurses could only be promoted to administrative roles, and
not other roles that kept them practising nursing.
The main solution to quality problems given by respondents was that the government
should give the hospital more funds. Other solutions included increasing supervision,
training of staff in management and supervision, promoting teamwork and staff
motivation. Respondents felt that it was the responsibility of the HE and HODs to
address these problems. The interesting thing is that even though workable solutions to
these problems were readily provided, there was no evidence of attempts to put them
into practice.
Hospital costs: It was a majority view that costs were a problem at this hospital. Chief
among the causes raised was increasing input costs, particularly for drugs and medical
supplies (50%), lack of staff motivation to control costs (20%), expensive treatment
practices such as poly-pharmacy (20%), and expensive service contracts such as for
laundry services (10%).
The problem of escalating hospital costs was perceived as externally driven.
Respondents argued that the government was allocating inadequate funds to cover costs.
Managers of medico-technical departments such as laboratory and radiography felt that
84 One of the three respondents said, "1 do not see any problems with the quality of care we provide
especially in the gynaecological ward, we have no waiting list." .~
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it was difficult for them to control costs because their services were driven by doctors'
demands, whom they argued were difficult to control. They reported that sometimes
they got orders from doctors and other government agencies (e.g. police/prisons) to do
what they perceived to be "unnecessary" investigations. This made it difficult to plan
and control resource use in the respective departments.
Asked why the problem of increasing costs was not being addressed, one executive
manager gave this response, "People are generally not concerned with maintenance even
of their own health, that is why they come too late to hospital. They become concerned
when someone dies or the machine breaks down. Their level of tolerance is high and
therefore their reaction threshold is long." The essence of this response is that a culture
of prevention management was absent at the hospital.
Although there seemed to be lack of motivation among staff to control costs, the
problem was perceived as a collective responsibility. Respondents reported their own
initiatives in curtailing cost escalation: effective use of resources and supervision (4/13),
reducing ward wastage by (3/13), prioritising activities and expenditure (2/13), use of
ward stock cards and checklists (2/13), and controlling clinician demands for tests, x-ray
and blood products (2/13).
Use of functional budgets was perceived as a workable idea in controlling costs (5/8).
Respondents spoke of creation of awareness: "[With a departmental budget] I can plan
according to need, ensure priorities in the department are addressed, rather than be
considered globally. However, there is need for training to ensure that resources are
used properly." Some managers expressed reservations on the practicalities of
implementing such budgets considering that departments shared resources between
them.
Views on hospital autonomy: The majority of respondents saw the need for autonomy
(5/8), and a minority felt otherwise (2/8) or were sceptical about it (118). As expected,
the main reason given for wanting autonomy was reduction of bureaucracy. Other
reasons given were that autonomy would make the hospital collect more revenue and
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use it appropriately, and it would become easier to identify performers and non-
performers. The few sceptics spoke of lack of evidence that such reforms work, citing
Zambia as an example, where they argued reforms did not bring much change, and that
there was no management capacity to cope with autonomy. Generally, there was
enthusiasm for hospital autonomy but it was its design that bothered the respondents:
"Yes, if autonomy means operating as a company where people are accountable for their
actions, and there is no bureaucracy, and no room to lie and cheat as is the situation
now."
Respondents highlighted major challenges of self-governance such as: (1) lack of
managerial capacity by current executive and the proposed management boards to
shoulder increased responsibilities (4/10); (2) hospital financial sustainability since the
majority of users were eligible for' free services (3/10); (3) potential for abuse of power
and corruption (2/10); and (4) political interference should things go wrong under self-
governance (1110).
Suggestions were made as to how these potential problems could be avoided or
managed. They spoke of the following: that people should pay for hospital services
(3/10); hospital managers must be trained in non-traditional areas of work such as
management, book keeping and staff development (2/10); staff to remain under the PSC
(Ill 0); use of external advisors (1/10); involvement of senior staff in management (e.g.
consultants) (1/10); state to totally relinquish all budgetary controls (1/10); and one
respondent had no suggestion. Conservative respondents emphasised the need for
advisors on a regular basis, and that staff should remain under the PSC.
These views may be interpreted to mean that whilst respondents were pro-hospital
autonomy, any aspect of it that exposed them to total accountability and responsibility
was a source of apprehension. It is therefore not surprising that management capacity
was viewed as requiring further training in order to be able to assume the extra
responsibilities.
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Contracting out services: The hospital contracted out laundry services, equipment
maintenance and cleaning of hospital grounds to private providers. Eight of the ten
respondents were aware of such contractual arrangements but with limited knowledge
on how such contracts worked in practice. This is partly explained by the fact that
contracts, in this hospital were not managed by the hospital itself but by the provincial
directorate. This contractual arrangement had problems, because those involved in the
day-to-day interaction with the contractors had little influence on the nature of their
relationship because any threats for poor performance could only be made through the
provincial directorate. However, this management arrangement may be a reflection of
how the provincial executive viewed the hospital's management capacity.
Nonetheless, hospital managers were able to discuss practical problems they
encountered with existing contracts. 50% (5/l0) thought the quality of laundry services
was questionable. They complained that linen was stained, tom and there were regular
delays in the supply of clean linen. 30% (3/10) said there was only one laundry
company (Topline) in the city capable of handling hospital linen, which meant that the
hospital had no alternative provider whatever the performance of this company. One
senior manager strongly felt that the laundry contract was not a good idea: "That
contract is a disaster, we need our own laundry." It is interesting to note that the
majority of respondents were concerned more about quality than costs. This is likely
because the contract was managed elsewhere.
10.3.3.4 Case Study 4: Hospital4
The results for this case study are based on in-depth interviews held with ten different
managers (4 were executive members-see Table AI0.1). This hospital provided a
conducive environment for implementing the study because it was perceived as a self-
evaluation exercise by the executive management team. Three meetings were attended:
hospital executive, hospital advisory board and sister-in charge meeting. Records of
minutes of previous meetings were also reviewed.
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Internal management structures: The internal structure of the hospital was not
different from the other hospitals. The hospital had executive, finance and procurement
committees, which were functional. There was no drugs and therapeutic committee.
Interdepartmental meetings were convened as expected and the HAB was functional.
The organisation of services was essentially the same as the other hospitals-functional
departments managed by a head. Two of the ten managers had managerial skills
(training), and the average work experience of the respondents in current posts was 4
years (2-144 months).
Internal Communication: Communication within the executive, between the executive
and HODs and among HODs was not perceived to be problematic because all formal
mechanisms for information exchange and participation were functional. This was
confirmed by a review of administrative records, which indicated that such meetings
occurred. The author had the opportunity of attending a hospital executive, an
interdepartmental and a hospital advisory board meeting during the study. The executive
also held several impromptu meetings to deal with emergencies. From this perspective.
it would seem that there was teamwork within the executive as evidenced by regular
consultations on a variety of issues. The medical superintendent was fairly new in that
post but had been working at the hospital for five years as a general medical officer. The
previous medical superintendent had been demoted to a general medical officer.
According to other executive members, this demotion was prompted by poor managerial
performance. They reported that the former head of the hospital lacked leadership and
management skills but was a good clinician. The general shortage of doctors has led to
junior doctors assuming managerial posts without the relevant experience.
Internal HE accountability: While there was no identifiable evidence of mistrust,
within the management team, complaints about the hospital were expressed regularly in
the local press. Executive committee members argued that sometimes staff opted to use
the press to complain instead of internal grievance and complaints procedures: "We
always strive to respond to subordinates problems but sometimes subordinates use other
methods, for example the press, to express their dissatisfaction or complaints." This
maybe interpreted to mean that communication between the executive members and
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subordinates was not working or existing mechanisms for communications were not
considered to be effective. Nonetheless, the hospital had public relations officers, and
suggestion boxes as means for promoting transparency and participatory management.
Apart from these few cases, non-HE managers felt the executive was accountable for its
actions, and regular meetings provided opportunities for wider discussions and
feedback-managerial participation.
Resource planning, use and accountability: The hospital used a typical public system
of resource planning and allocation discussed earlier and there was no evidence of other
innovative ways of ensuring resource use accountability. All respondents felt it was the
role of the hospital administrator to allocate resources to departments and to account for
those resources. However, they also highlighted the role of the finance committee in
deciding upon use of the HSF. The perception that resource use accountability was the
administrator and not users' responsibility implies negative (or uncaring) staff attitudes
towards costs and cost control activities. It seems inconceivable, under the
circumstances that the administrator could effectively control resource use without some
form of devolved budgets. The existing system was incapable of identifying staff
engaging in inefficient.
Input procurement and distribution: The hospital used traditional bureaucratic input
procurement systems=use of the GMS. A procurement committee chaired by the
administrator was responsible for approving input expenditures beyond government
prescribed limits. There was much flexibility in the use of the HSF because the
resources were not tied to specific line items and strict expenditure approval processes.
There was no systematic process of distributing inputs within the hospital, and supply
depended upon departmental requests. In the regard the hospital could be described as
bureaucratically compliant.
Incentives and disincentives: Various issues were raised by staff as incentives:
opportunities for CPE (25%), subsidised food (19%), availability of social services
(19%), and free health services for the family (25%), job security (6%), and vested
interests in the area (e.g. private practice) (6%). However, the majority of the managers
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argued that most of these incentives were insignificant especially when compared with
the private sector. Incentives expressed related most to staff morale and individual
wellbeing and were not linked to performance. There was no evidence to suggest that
access to and distribution of the cited incentives was linked to performance. In addition,
most of these incentives fall into what organisational theorists call "maintenance
factors" which are associated with the physical working environment.
Discussions on disincentives were always animated, and several issues were raised.
Chief amongst them was low staff salary (40%). Shortages of staff, equipment, medical
supplies and drugs added to their frustration (27%) and so did poor infrastructure (7%),
lack of CPE (7%), lack of staff accommodation (7%), lack of call allowances for
administrative staff (7%) and lack of valuation of individual efforts (7%). In relation to
the last factor, an infection control manager said "I am never taken seriously in
whatever I do." The feeling of discouragement was apparent amongst the
respondents-"We are just working, what can we do" one said. This example points to
how working culture may influence individual behaviour and hence performance.
Staff coping strategies: The hospital workload was reported to be high relative to
available staff capacity. Only three respondents said they worked extra hours to cope
with the extra workload. The rest said they worked as hard as they could but within their
specified shifts: "We just work as much as we possibly can" [1], "We simply work our
hearts out" [2], and "I always work under pressure" [3]. Working time was perceived as
a constraint because of lack of willingness by staff to work outside prescribed working
times.
Asked about how respondents coped with low income only two admitted that they did
private practice, and/or informal jobs. Those who did private practice perceived it as
good coping strategy: "I did one locum last year in the private sector and it was so
satisfying. The working conditions were good and I enjoyed myself." The rest either
said their job was a calling or they did nothing about it. Others said, "We just soldier on.
We [just] have to do it. We have no choice at the moment." This was a particularly
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sensitive subject to discuss with respondents and their openness required time to
nurture. The veracity of their responses can only be viewed from that perspective.
Staff tension: Respondents were asked how they perceived their working relationships
with the medical and/or administrative staff. Clinicians felt the administrative group was
weak: "We have a weak administrator, and so we rarely have conflicts." This implies
some form of medical staff dominance. However, administrative staff had a contrasting
view: "The previous medical superintendent wanted to use HSF to repair cars and
purchase mobile phones and I refused. We had to go to the provincial medical director
for mediation. Later it turned out that the doctor was now the one calling for cost
consciousness." This critical incidence serves to show that breakdowns in the working
relationships between the medical and administrative group occurred in this hospital,
and resource use appeared to be the prime source of the problem.
Quality of services: The quality of services at this hospital was perceived to be below
acceptable levels. Quality problems raised (responses) included: shortage of staff
(23.0%), lack of specialist cover (15.0%), shortage of drugs (7.7%), equipment (7.7%),
beds and space in the casualty department (7.7%), poor patient-staff relationships
(7.7%), laundry services (7.7%), patient diet (7.7%), environmental hygiene (7.7%) and
poor specimen collection (7.7%). Clinicians felt strongly that lack of specialist
consultants at the hospital affected the quality of medical services: "Yes, on the medical
side, lack of specialist cover is a problem, sometimes we end up doing things that we
are not confident of." The problems were attributed to a variety of causes: lack of
human and financial resources (25%), lack of supervision (17%), pressure of work
(17%), old equipment that regularly broke down (17%), low staff morale (8%),
difficulties in disciplining staff (8%), and the absence of specialists (8%). Like in other
case studies, most of the reported problems and causes were structural in nature.
Asked why the problems remained unresolved, the following reasons were given:
inadequate financial support from government (30%), problem beyond the hospital's
control (20%), and that staff attitudes take time to change (10%). The rest of the
respondents (40%) could not say why problems remained unresolved. Nonetheless,
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respondents suggested local solutions to some of the problems: encouraging doctors to
be quality conscious in their decision making, learning to improvise, improving staff
supervision, reporting quality problems to the administration, and promoting
appropriate prescriptive (for instance, through the revival of the drugs and therapeutic
committee), and admission habits. The general picture portrayed by these results is that
of a management team that knew what quality problems existed but felt physically
constrained to resolve them.
Hospital costs: 70% of the respondents acknowledged that costs were a major problem
at the hospital. Cost escalation was seen to be a result of increasing input prices (70%),
wastage and pilferage (10%), lack of local specialists resulting in increased transport
costs due to unnecessary referrals to Harare (10%), and increased demand for services
due to HIV/AIDS (10%). Consequently, the hospital experienced regular input
shortages. At the time of the study, the hospital had serious financial problems. There
were no funds for patient food, drugs and other medical supplies because of monthly
over-expenditure", For instance, expenditure of the medical and surgical vote was two
months ahead, and the provisions vote was one month ahead. According to this
expenditure pattern the hospital was to run out of funds within the first seven months of
the year. The HE decided to intensify collection of fees by asking everyone to pay
unless the administrator saw fit to exempt them. This was against the national user fee
policy. It was perceived that emergency measures were necessary to avoid patients'
going without food and essential drugs for some time. The problem could not easily be
solved because the hospital had only received ZW$11 million in 1998/99 FY compared
to ZW$21 million in 1997/98. The short-term solution was to strengthen cost recovery.
The respondents felt that it was the responsibility of the administrator, and the hospital
management team to control costs. Some suggestions were made for tackling the
problem, namely: more supervision to ensure effective use of resources, ward stock
control, medical superintendent to check hospital expenditure every month, reducing
8' Each hospital has a set monthly expenditure threshold for each vote. The threshold is calculated
according to the annual allocation. For example, if the annual allocation for drugs and medical supplies
for a year is ZW$12 million, the monthly expenditure threshold is ZW$l million. Any expenditure more
of less than this figure will be either a saving or consumption of future resources.
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wastage and referring back some patients to local clinics, and for home based care
programmes.
The medical superintendent of the hospital had an interesting but contrasting view about
costs: "I check hospital expenditure regularly and take corrective action. Doctors only
become cost conscious when they are occupying the hot seat-like medical
superintendent." Whilst two other doctors who were interviewed together said "We do
not consider costs when deciding on patient treatment because its against my [our] ego
and medical ethics. We do the [what is] best for the patient." Hospital cost containment
is difficult to achieve under such circumstances.
The hospital had experience with a variant of functional budgets", In the financial year
1997/98, HODs were given shadow budgets for direct expenditures and assumed
responsibility for monitoring expenditure using departmental commitment registers.
Monthly departmental expenditure per vote was guided by the hospital's monthly
expenditure per vote threshold. In other words, aggregate monthly expenditures by
departments were invariably not expected to exceed hospital monthly expenditure.
According to the respondents, the system worked because HODs worked better, and
competed in making savings. The idea was abandoned in 1998/99 FY because the
hospital was allocated half of its previous year budget, and the HE considered the
amount was too little to split across departments. The majority of managers
acknowledged that the concept of devolved budgets was useful way in controlling costs.
Hospital autonomy: Respondents at this hospital did not support the idea of hospital
autonomy. This view was driven by fears and perceived potential problems, namely;
they did not know whether it would work or not because of lack of management
capacity, lack of funds, and that there was room for improving the current system. The
management team was conservative and apprehensive of change. The following are
some of the comments made on introducing self-governance: "No, with this funding
level, HSF is not adequate to sustain the hospital. In future it might work" [1], "No,
B6 These could be described as shadow departmental allocations because each hospital was just given an
annual allocation figure with line items. HODs were supposed to keep a commitment register.
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because of lack of capacity and administrative skills. Local authorities are not capable of
running a hospital. Currently they are running bottle stores [beer outlets] at a loss. Itwill
not work." [2], and "No. We need to improve on the current system, and not embark on
these proposals." [3]. However, the theoretical benefits of such change were
acknowledged (e.g. reduction of red tape) but the general feeling was that the hospital
was not prepared for such a change. They felt that it was necessary to improve
management capacity and ask patients to pay for services before autonomy could be
introduced. They also suggested that the provincial offices should still retain some
responsibility over the hospital so that the hospital can be assisted in times of crisis. It is
clear from these responses that hospital autonomy was not a preferred option to the
current system. This may be attributed to the financial crisis the hospital was facing.
Resources were consequently seen as the main problem, not lack of autonomy. The
negative views may also reflect fear of assuming absolute responsibility against a
background of limited resources.
Contracting out of services: The majority of respondents (6/10) could not say whether
or not the hospital contracted out some services. Contracting out of services was a new
phenomenon to them. However, HE members mentioned that the hospital used to
contract out laundry services to a private firm. The contract was cancelled when the
hospital received a donation of laundry machines to establish its own laundry.
According to the hospital administrator, the contract was expensive to run and the
hospital used to run out of funds before the end of the financial year. The perception that
own services were cheaper to produce shows how donated goods are generally treated in
government facilities. Donated goods are usually not costed, and depreciation costs are
excluded in the accounting system. This leads to a false sense of the actual costs.
10.3.3.5 Case Study 5: HospitalS
Results of this case study are based on interviews held with seven hospital managers,
three of which were members of the hospital executive (see Table Al 0.1). The author
attended one executive meeting at this hospital.
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Internal management structures: The hospital had all policy prescribed management
organs: a hospital executive, procurement, finance, drugs and therapeutic committees
and a hospital advisory board. All but one (the administrator) respondent were
substantive in their management capacities. One out of seven respondents had some
training in administration but the majority had considerable experience. The mean
numbers of years spent by respondents working at the hospital in their positions was
about 9 years (11 months to 29 years). The matron and the medical superintendent had
spent 29 years and 14 years respectively working at this hospital. All management
organs were operational.
What was unique about this hospital's management was that the HE co-opted HODs
from laboratory, dental, physiotherapy and radiography services on a permanent basis.
By widening membership to the executive committee, the hospital created opportunities
for enhanced communication and participatory management. This inclusion flattened
managerial hierarchy and improved horizontal communication. Another notable feature
was that the medical superintendent was one of the longest serving doctors in the
Ministry having started practising medicine in the late sixties. Unlike in other hospitals,
he was keenly involved in the general management of the hospital and did minimal
clinical work.
Internal Communication: The system of co-option of HODs into the HE enhanced
communication and access to information. In-charge nurses said they used the matron as
a conduit to the HE whilst other managers said that they used HOD meetings. Specialist
consultants felt excluded from the management of the hospital: "We do not know what
is happening outside the ward. As consultants we should be represented in some of these
management meetings and committees." The exclusion of clinicians from management
activities increased opportunities for internal conflict because clinicians lacked
knowledge, for instance about available resources. One consultant even suggested that
hospitals should retain fees something that had already been in operation for two years.
This exemplified how severe the problem of communication between management and
doctors/consultants was at the hospital.
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Internal HE accountability: Non-executive respondents felt that the HE
communicated most decisions to all departments either through interdepartmental
meetings or in writing (circulated minutes or circulars) or through direct involvement.
However, they admitted that, "Regular meetings are well enough." The weak link was
between the HE and specialist consultants and general medical officers. Co-option of
departmental heads not only increased communication but also accountability through
participatory management.
Resource planning, use and accountability: Resource allocation was the role of the
medical superintendent and the acting administrator. With the dismissal of the
administrator in 1996/97 FY, the medical superintendent assumed that role. He felt he
had to do the job himself because he felt "young people" had failed him by engaging in
fraudulent activities. The medical superintendent devoted more time to administration
and acknowledged doing clinical work only when it was extremely necessary. Like in
other hospitals, the organisation of resource use was such that it was not possible to
effectively trace resource use and ensure accountability. Resources were centrally
controlled, and departments kept no input registers. Expenditure was monitored using
monthly overall expenditure thresholds, which in many ways did not show resource
wastage or its source.
Input procurement and distribution: The hospital used the traditional system of
procuring inputs when using budgetary allocations-procurement through the GMS. It
had a procurement committee, which in liaison with requesting departments was
responsible for deciding how much and when to purchase, and from which supplier. In
instances where large amounts of funds were involved, supplies were put to tender. The
committee adjudicated tender submissions and sanctioned expenditure. Use of the HSF
allowed for some flexibility in input procurement since there were no restrictions in the
use of the funds. However, in this hospitals there was no evidence of any other approach
to input procurement apart from the conventional one. Internal distribution of inputs was
based on departmental requests through the pharmacy with no set guidelines. It was the
responsibility of the departmental manager to keep stock of essential inputs and request
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more when necessary. Opportunities for input leakage through pilferage and wastage
were abundant in the system because stock registers were used loosely.
Incentives and disincentives: Respondents were asked to describe their incentive
environment and highlight what they perceived were key incentives. Responses
included: CPE, transport allowance, car loans, free health services, departmental
independence, and travel and subsistence allowances. Access to CPE was perceived as
the major incentive. However, there was no evidence to suggest that staff CPE was
related to individual performance. Of the four respondents who had CPE, three
individually applied for it, and the provincial directorate nominated one. They all felt
CPE was necessary for improving their work performance. It is important to notice that
most of the highlighted incentives related to civil service conditions and not so much to
the specific hospital-working environment. In addition, none of the respondents saw
promotion as performance related because they all said it was based on training and
experience, and individual initiatives (e.g. applying for jobs when vacancies arise).
Those with better qualifications and experience were selected and interviewed for the
posts. It is surprising though that some managers felt they had departmental
independence in a context where resources were centrally controlled. Departmental
independence was probably perceived in terms of day-to-day activities and not so much
in terms of making strategic choices.
Managers' notions about perceived demotivating factors were biased towards monetary
disadvantages. Their views are summarised as follows: low salary (40%), shortage of
staff and other resources (20%), little appreciation and support from above (13%), lack
of accommodation (7%), no call allowances for pharmacists (7%), use of unqualified
nurses (ex-combatants) (7%), and lack of housing and educational allowances (7%).
Apart from salary, respondents felt that: resource shortages, quality problems, and a
system that did not appreciate and value individual efforts were the main demotivating
factors. The last factor is particularly interesting in that it shows that individuals did not
see the need to work harder because the system did not recognise them and award them
accordingly. It could be argued that under such circumstance, simply addressing some
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of the perceived incentives without changing the way staff are valued might not
necessarily motivate to work harder.
Staff coping strategies: High workload and low salaries were raised as major sources
of discontent among hospital staff and the study sought to determine how staff coped
with that. Three coping strategies for dealing with high workload were mentioned. First,
giving staff off-days for extra-hours of work. Second, through indirect substitution of
quantity for quality. In the pharmacy for instance, other activities were neglected to
meet daily patient demands: "Sometimes we compromise stock management, [and]
drugs expire on us. We need a full time person in the stock management room." Third,
prioritisation of patients on the basis of urgency and whether or not their condition is
life threatening-e-raticning services. One respondent said he coped with high workload
"by sheer hard work and encouraging subordinates to be more committed to the job."
The activities and strategies staff adopted at this hospital seem to suggest that they
recognised the need to increase coverage but were prepared to achieve that coverage at
the expense of quality.
There was general unwillingness amongst the respondents to disclose how they coped
with low incomes. Only one respondent admitted to doing private practice when on
leave. The hospital is located in the third largest city in the country with a thriving
private medical sector. The hospitals also had the highest number of consultants, who
seem to have de facto approval to do private practice wherever they are working. The
three who responded said they had no alternatives, relied on spouse's salary and had to
live within their means-"Focus on needs rather than wants", one said.
Staff tension: As mentioned earlier, the medical superintendent was actively involved
in the day-to-day operations of the hospital as head and administrator of the hospital.
That involvement together with his charisma, experience and respect created a sense of
harmony at the hospital. Being a clinician himself, he seemed able to effectively bridge
the gap between doctors/specialists and administrative staff. Clinical meetings with
specialists and other doctors provided a platform for him to share information and
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consult with them. Such meetings, however, tended to be for discussing clinical cases
and deaths.
Nevertheless, one senior consultant had this comment about operational relationships
within the hospital; "Administrators always win in our context because they simply do
not payor purchase whatever you demand. However, it is mostly because funds are not
available or the requested item might not be available at the GMS since administrators
can no longer [are not allowed to] purchase from the private sector." The dominance of
clinicians was somewhat checked by the relative power of the administrative group
bolstered by active involvement of the medical superintendent in both administrative
and clinical activities. The view that the administrator always won signifies
acknowledgement by clinicians that the administrator wielded some power at least in
resource allocation.
Quality of services: The majority view (5/7) was that the hospital was experiencing
quality of services problems. Two respondents thought the quality of services was
acceptable". Quality problems were perceived as: shortage of staff (57%) and drugs"
(14%), poor patient diet (14%), and use of unqualified nursing staff (14%). The problem
of unqualified nursing staff was a unique problem at this hospital. Poorly qualified staff
(ex-combatants with six months training) were employed by the hospital for political
reasons. One nursing manager said: "There is a mixed grill in the nursing profession [at
this hospital], that is nurses who were trained for six months only, eighteen months,
three years, and those with post basic training." The hospital was perceived by many as
having this structural problem.
These problems were attributed to inadequate human and financial resources (71%), and
the "free-for-all" policy on public health services (29%). The argument was that the
hospital budget was stretched because people had unlimited access to hospital services.
Respondents felt that the problems remained unresolved because: (1) the government
87 This is what the respondents said, "It is fair. We used to be well stretched with drugs. Food is not so
bad. I eat that food myself', and "Given available resources, the quality of care is good but there are
problems related to availability of drugs. HIV/AIDS is a major threat because some patients are not
responding to even the most expensive drugs."
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was doing nothing about it, (2) financial resources were inadequate, (3) the problem was
beyond the control of the hospital, and (4) fees could not be charged to everyone for
political reasons. Asked how the problems could be resolved, a minority (3/7) felt they
had no role in addressing problems related to staff and financial resources shortages.
Other suggestions made were: that internal meetings be held to discuss drug use,
increasing resource allocation to the hospital, retraining of nurses and decentralisation of
budget and staff recruitment to the hospital level.
The responsibility of resolving quality problems was seen as a collective one by only
one respondent. Others mentioned one of these cadres or groups: hospital executive,
doctors, hospital administrator, medical superintendent and administrator, consultants
and the provincial nursing officer. However, these suggestions were made within the
context of what each respondent perceived as a problem and who was likely to resolve
it. The perception that resolution of these quality problems was not a collective
responsibility raises questions about perceived individual responsibilities and attitude
towards quality of services. It is also indicative of lack of a collective vision on what
ought to be done to address these problems. Inertia is likely to occur where there is no
collective vision.
Hospital costs: All the respondents saw rising costs as a critical problem. Costs were
perceived as a problem because of three factors. First, rapid increases in input prices in
the light of limited funds (72%). Second, hospital fees were below cost recovery rates
(14%). Third, cost escalation occurred due to avoidable expiry of drugs (14%).
Unnecessary expiry of drugs was attributed to staff shortages in the pharmacy
department, and the high workload, such that there was inadequate time for stock
management.
As anticipated, the chief solution was that the government should increase funding for
the hospital. Other solutions included training of doctors in management so that they
88 There was a shortage of parae etamol at the time of the study.
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can understand costs", allowing hospitals to charge everyone and making hospitals
independent. Internally, respondents suggested that there be continuous communication
between resource users on cost control, and use of the Essential Drug List of Zimbabwe.
Increasing resource allocation appeared to be the popular soft option with less emphasis
on what could be done with what was available. That perception is likely to fuel rather
than curtail hospital cost escalation.
Asked to specify how as line managers they would address these problems within their
own departments. A number of suggestions were made: ensuring effective use of
resources through supervision, reducing wastage, justification of every diagnostic test,
and maintenance of books of accounts. Respondents knew what could possibly be done
to address quality problems but there was no evidence to show that they implemented
these measures.
The idea of functional budgets was perceived as a feasible option in creating cost
consciousness amongst hospital workers. One view was that "Functional budgets will
make us to be cost effective, [through] buying [supplies] wisely and buying when prices
are affordable rather than monthly competition of departments as is the case now." The
existing arrangement was that departments competed to order supplies every month
before the monthly hospital expenditure threshold per vote were realised. This created
incentives for HODs to request as much as possible rather than procuring minimum
requirements.
Views on hospital autonomy: The majority of respondents (6/7) said self-governance
was a good idea and that it was opportune and necessary for improving hospital
performance. Sceptics cited the example of an existing national referral hospital
(Parirenyatwa) which was granted autonomy years ago but still experienced chronic
problems because of lack of resources and political interference. Those pro-reform
argued for reduction in bureaucracy and an increase in local responsibility for costs and
89 This idea was confirmed by the views of one of the consultants who said, "I try as much as possible to
prescribe alternative drugs. However, junior doctors do not seem to be aware of the cost. There is no
forum (E.g. clinical meeting) where we can discuss these issues with junior doctors. Consultants are not
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hospital revenue. As one respondent commented "If done well it will work, people need
to be given real powers-in practical terms."
Autonomy was perceived as an option for supporting quicker decision-making,
however, respondents raised concerns over self-governance, namely: (l) there would be
no problems as long as adequate resources, and clear guidelines on how things should
be done are provided; (2) potential abuse of power by those in management, for
example corruption, victimisation, and nepotism, (3) lack of capacity may lead to
mismanagement, and (3) procurement of foreign inputs would be grossly affected.
These cautionary remarks represent need for pre-markers for policy success. Two pre-
markers were suggested for such a reform, that is improvement in management capacity
and instituting audit systems that dissuade people from engaging in perverse behaviour.
The respondents also suggested that hospital autonomy should be linked to financing
reforms that support cost recovery.
Views on contracting out of services: At the time of the study, the hospital contracted
out laundry services, grounds work and had some ad hoc hospital refurbishment
contracts. Only two members of the HE (medical superintendent and acting
administrator) knew about the existence of these contracts, and the rest admitted
ignorance and advised that the administrator was more knowledgeable. This was
understandable given that line managers had no administrative links with the private
providers except at operational level where services are delivered. Viewed from another
dimension, this lack of knowledge amongst line managers is an example of
communication breakdown within the system or limited scope of discussion content in
HODs' meetings. If the level of participation and consultation on hospital-wide issues
was high, it is likely that the knowledge level on contracting out both in theoretical and
practical terms would have been high.
even members of the Drugs and Therapeutic Committee. I feel that we should be represented in that
committee.
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10.3.3.6 Case Study 6: Hospital6
Nine people were interviewed at this hospital of which two were executive members
and seven heads of departments. The interviewees' profile is shown in Table AI0.1. No
meeting was attended and no records of previous meetings were reviewed at this
hospital. This was because we had no permission from the head of the hospital who
went on leave soon after we arrived.
Internal management structures: The hospital had two of the core management
structures, that is, a hospital executive and a procurement committee. It did not have a
finance committee, drugs and therapeutic committee and a hospital advisory board.
According to the administrator the hospital had no HAB because it was difficult to get
the right people as prescribed by national guidelines on formation of HABs. Most of the
eligible people were not interested in becoming board members. The hospital is located
in a small town and only a few people are eligible. Interviewees at this hospital had an
average of 6 years working experience (froml year to 12 years) at the hospital in their
managerial posts. 50% of the interviewees had some management training.
Internal communication: Despite the existence of traditional channels of
communication in the hospital, communication was perceived to be poor (6/9). The
hospital executive was considered to be inconsistent in communicating information to
other HODs and staff: "Sometimes they do not communicate, you have to be inquisitive
and aggressive [to get it]". Some argued that HE meetings were not made public: " We
are not told when there is a HE meeting so that we can communicate on issues to be
discussed." Clinicians were strictly not involved in all management meetings; however,
they had direct access to the head of the hospital. Nonetheless, they complained of non-
involvement "We are not told anything because we are not involved in any meeting at
the hospital." At the time of the study, no interdepartmental meeting had been held for
the previous four months. Opportunities for HODs to participate in decision making at
hospital level were limited.
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Views on HE accountability: Executive members interviewed reported that they
always tried to inform other workers through circulation of minutes, and discussing
similar issues in interdepartmental meetings. Some of the HODs argued that not
everything was communicated, and that excuses were given for bad decisions made:
"This is the major problem in government, anybody in charge can afford to be
complacent and not to do theirwork"[l], "No, in the past a lot of things happened which
we did not know"[2], "They always make excuses whenever they make a wrong
decision"[3]. What seemed to be happening in this hospital was that there was some
communication and feedback between the executive but HODs felt some issues were
not passed on. This could be interpreted as to mean lack of trust between "executive"
managers and HODs. A review of hospital records showed that few such meetings were
held in the previous year, and most such meetings were used to communicate new
information (e.g. new policies and guidelines), and were characterised by "question and
answer" sessions. This is not unusual in a bureaucratic context where accountability is
perceived more as a vertical than a horizontal concept.
Resource planning and use: HODs were only involved in preparation of the hospital's
budget proposals to the provincial directorate. Once budgets were approved and
allocated, internal resource allocation was the exclusive role of the HE. This also
applied to the use of extra-budgetary resources. It emerged clearly from the interviews
that the process of resource use did not consider original departmental budgets. In other
words, there was no relationship between what HODs asked for and what they actually
got. In addition, original departmental proposals were not used to request for inputs. The
hospital administrator saw the issue of resource allocation, use and accountability as an
integral part of his job description. In practice, this meant that HODs could afford the
luxury of using resources without having to account for them. It would seem such an
arrangement made it difficult to guarantee that resources were used to maximum effect.
Input procurement and distribution: Two thirds of the respondents felt that the input
procurement system was tortuous. They felt that it made it difficult for the hospital to
adequately respond to patient needs. Most inputs had to be procured through the central
government medical stores. Input procurement from the private sector had its problems.
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According to members of the procurement committee, it was a requirement that private
companies submit their curricula vitae, certificates of incorporation and latest audited
accounts for them to become eligible for public tenders. The hospital is located in a
small town where there are few potential suppliers, and most of them are small to
medium size businesses without the expected track records. This made the process of
tendering and adjudication slow and painstaking. Consequently input procurement could
not always match demand and shortages were not uncommon.
Internal distribution of non-staff inputs was linked to resource use as mentioned earlier.
Departmental inputs were ordered through the pharmacy, and it is in this department
and administration that distribution decisions were made. The pharmacy managed the
medical and surgical vote, which constituted about 60% of total non-salary recurrent
expenditure (1997/8 FY). The administrator approved all input requests before these
were sent to suppliers, and this afforded him the opportunity to monitor expenditure
patterns.
Incentives and disincentives: Responses obtained on staff incentives can be
categorised as follows: access to CPE (35%), availability of subsidised accommodation
(29%), free health services (18%), transport allowance (12%) and job satisfaction (6%).
The main incentive for many was opportunities for further continuous professional
education. This was followed by subsidised accommodation in which staff paid 5% of
their gross salaries as rent, which was well below the market rent. Two executive
members said they either got CPE through nomination by the provincial directorate or
individual initiatives. Most HODs obtained CPE though nomination by the HE (417),
professional associations (217) and individual initiatives (117). There was no evidence of
a relationship between access to CPE and performance since none of the respondents
saw the nominations as linked to individual performance. The same was true for
subsidised accommodation and other reported incentives.
Low salary was the major complaint (44%) followed by shortages of staff and material
resources (22%). Respondents felt that they worked under stressful conditions because
of inadequate staff, and shortages of essential inputs compounded the problem. A
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minority raised the problem of accommodation (6%), unavailability of housing and
educational loans (6%), lack of recreational facilities (6%) and CPE (6%), and rigid
career structures for some staff categories (6%). For instance, a pharmaceutical
technician cannot be promoted beyond a senior pharmaceutical technician to a
pharmacist. It is a dead end post.
Staff coping strategies: Asked how they coped with high workload, nursing managers
said they used student nurses and/or auxiliary nurses in the wards. Departmental heads
for radiography and physiotherapy felt their workload was manageable compared to
central hospitals. The rest of the respondents reported that they worked hard: "We do
our best under the circumstances", "I work extra-hours", and "We run around until our
feet are sore." Use of unqualified staff in cases of high workload appears to be a more
plausible strategy unlike the expected responses that staff worked extra time even
though they complained of low salaries.
Respondents were quick to point out that their salaries were low relative to the workload
(also when compared to the private sector). Asked how they coped with such low
salaries: A third (33%) said they did nothing because there was no alternative, 22% said
they did private practice, 22% said they either did cross-border trading or farming, 11%
relied on bank loans and 11% did not respond. It is most probable that there could be
other informal activities that staff employed which were not highlighted because of the
sensitive nature of the discussion.
Staff tension: None of the respondents saw any problems in the way different staff
categories interacted in the hospital. Conflicts within the hospital were perceived as
reflective of lack of communication. One respondent felt that potential problems
between the administrative group and clinicians could be avoided if "clinicians are
educated on funding and costs ofhospitaIs." The administrator felt he was in control of
resources in as far as expenditure was concerned. Although there was this general
understanding, the way hospital management was structured did not promote active
involvement of clinicians. This made the role of the medical superintendent and
communication much more important in avoiding staff tension and conflict.
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Quality of services: All respondents conceded that the quality of services at the hospital
was below par. Various quality problems were reported: overcrowding in wards (24%),
poor patient diet (18%), poor environmental hygiene (18%), staff shortages (11%), poor
patient-staff relationship (11%), shortages of drugs (6%) and equipment (6%), and poor
specimen collection (6%). The most cited problem was limited space especially in the
wards where patients were crowded. Patient diet was viewed as poor because patients
were said to be complaining about it. Environmental hygiene (ward cleanliness) was
perceived to be poor and this was related to crowding in the wards. The severity of the
problem could be sensed from what some of the respondents said: "I would not want to
be admitted here because, for example the male ward is congested and cleanliness is
poor."
They argued that high workload and staff shortages compromised patient-staff contact
time as staff aimed to finish rounds or queues rather than give maximum care. One
respondent summarised quality problems at the hospital by saying: "Nursing care here is
good compared to other places I have been because nurses here are committed, but the
wards are dirty and old, the hospital is dilapidated. Lack of investigative capacity
sometimes affects our medical care because we end up treating patients not knowing
exactly the disease-we use clinical presentations." In sum, the hospital experienced
quality problems from both structural and process perspectives.
These problems were attributed to several causes; lack of staff and financial resources
(50%), high workload (17%), inadequate hospital physical capacity to meet demand
(17%), lack of supervision (8%), and low staff morale (8%). Four main reasons were
given why quality problems persisted: (1) inadequate funding, (2) difficulties associated
with changing people's attitudes, (3) inability of the hospital to attract staff because of
its rural setting with minimal schooling and recreational facilities, and (4) that end users
were not consulted about their problems in health services planning. The consensual
view was that it is the responsibility of HODs to address those problems amenable to
local solutions because there are strategically located to do so.
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Views on hospital costs: There was general unanimity amongst respondents that costs
were a big problem facing the hospital. Rising costs were attributed to increasing input
prices. The hospital regularly procured inputs from the private sector at higher prices
because the GMS could no longer cope with timely hospital requirements. They saw
continued use of expensive approaches to patient management, wastage and pilferage as
contributing to cost escalation. Input shortages were regular, as available resources
became inadequate. Three main explanations were given why the problem remained
unresolved. First, staff was unconcerned about costs and unknowledgeable. Second,
clinicians were difficult to control. Third, HODs had no specific budgets to manage.
Clearly, these elements are ingredients for cost escalation. The first explanation is
particularly interesting given one of the respondent's perception of the issue;
"I consider patient costs mostly in making my clinical decisions. For example, I check whether or not
the patient can afford an x-ray or particular drugs before prescribing. Hospital costs, yes, if there are
alternative drugs I prescribe the least cost. However, we are not informed about how much the
hospital gets, or anything to do with costs. So 1 do not know much. All I know is that there is no
money."
This clearly shows how exclusion of clinicians may have a significant impact on
hospital costs. Solutions suggested for cost containment included communication with
resource users, ensuring use of EDLIZ and sustained education of staff (particularly
doctors) on cost control. Respondents felt it was the principal responsibility of the HE
and the administrator to control costs. The concept of functional budgets was generally
perceived as an option for cost control as evidenced by such comments: "It makes us
cost conscious but sometimes we cannot meet patient needs because of the [monthly
hospital expenditure] limit of ZW$315 000 (US$8,289)." Prices [of inputs] are just high,
we cannot buy much" [Pharmacy] and, "Each year should begin with each department
knowing its budget." This suggests that knowledge about resource availability was
considered important in provider behaviour.
At the time of the study the hospital administrator had held several meetings with
HODs, sisters-in-charge, doctors and even general hands on cost control. He had also
started a process of establishing departmental budgets by asking line managers to start
using commitment registers: "I have asked departments to have commitment registers as
a necessary step to understanding cost centres. This information can be used to develop
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unit and purchase plans." This is an example of a local initiative to address the problem
of resource use and accountability. Internal adaptive mechanisms seemed to be at play
in this case study rather than expectation of government support.
Views on hospital autonomy: The need to change hospital governance was commonly
accepted by all but two respondents who feared potential problems due to lack of
management capacity and funds", Those pro-reform respondents expressed strong
views that change was needed to reduce bureaucracy and its related problems, and allow
the hospital to focus on essential and priority issues. Nonetheless, hospital autonomy
was not perceived as problem-free and the following caveats were raised: (1) potential
shortages of finance as most people do not pay for services (sustainability problem), (2)
abuse of power by management (corruption), and (3) mismanagement due to lack of
capacity. It would seem that some of the' fears raised were a result of respondents'
misunderstanding about what hospital autonomy entailed in practice. It seems autonomy
was viewed as a total shift from central government to local government. Nonetheless,
the responses show that it was generally understood and accepted that the hospital had
management capacity problems.
In order to avoid these potential problems in training of hospital managers, changing the
user fee policy so that people pay, and reviewing the history of autonomy in the country
were suggested as preventative strategies. In general, the principles of hospital
autonomy were acceptable to most respondents provided policy makers adequately
considered these potential problems.
Views on contracting out of services: The hospital had an old contractual arrangement
for laundry services with a private provider because it never had its own laundry
facilities. It also contracted out hospital grounds maintenance and mortuary services.
The small hospital mortuary could not cope with the upsurge in the number of deaths at
the hospital in the last two years.
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HODs had little knowledge about contracting out of services. This knowledge was
restricted to the administrator and other HE members. This was particularly interesting
considering that the hospital had a long history of contracting out laundry services. The
few respondents that attempted to answer some of the questions believed that
contracting out laundry and mortuary services was costly. For instance, at the time of
the study the cost of keeping a corpse at a private mortuary was ZW$37 (US$t) for a
mean duration of stay of two days. The majority felt it was cheaper in the long run for
the hospital to have its own services. Contracting out is a new concept in the health
sector especially in the periphery, and it was not surprising that some respondents were
ignorant about it. Respondents felt strongly that the traditional way of organising
services was the best option.
10.5 Comparative analysis and summary
Clearly, the study hospitals were subject to both system-wide and hospital specific
constraints. However, as hospitals at the same level of care, they were exposed to a
fairly similar external context. They all had limited decision-making space in strategic
and some operational areas. That per se is not a novel finding because it is characteristic
of most bureaucratic systems. The basic question of the study was why similar hospitals
operating within the same bureaucracy performed differently. Logically those
differences are explored by examining what happens inside the hospitals. Tables 10.2
and At 0.3 provide comparative summaries of the main features and characterisation of
the internal organisation of the six hospitals.
Internal management structure
Three hospitals (1,3 and 6) did not have HABs because of either lack of eligible people
or interest among the eligible. That means that there were no explicit structures for
community involvement or consultation. In two of the hospitals (2 and 4) we witness
HABs actively participating in decisions concerning utilisation of fee revenue and
90 Quotes from two respondents: "If they make hospitals autonomous, I will leave because where will
these boards get the funds. Unless it is some rich company taking over then I will stay", "We are not yet
ready. Rural district councils do not appreciate [understand] how we function."
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mobilising community support. The boards had considerable autonomy in deciding on
what to spend hospital income on as long as it was not related to staff benefits but
patient welfare. Although they all fell under public governance there were noticeable
disparities in capacities to generate revenue and resolve local problems between those
that had a HAB and those that did not. This was reflected in the type of suggested
solutions given to hospital problems and who was responsible for addressing them.
Those without boards or active boards (1,3, 5 and 6) tended to "blame" government for
providing limited support. In a sense, hospital boards signified a slight departure from
bureaucratic governance and staff interviews showed that these structures allowed for
some flexibility in decision-making. There was no evidence to suggest differences in
performance across hospitals due to the presence or absence of a HAB. This may be
attributable to the fact that the boards had no "corporate" functions, for instance setting
the mission and strategic direction, as under proposed new autonomous arrangements.
Not all hospitals had policy prescribed management structures. Hospitals 2, 4 and 5 had
all management organs whilst hospitals 1, 3 and 6 only had the core structures: that is a
hospital executive and a procurement committee. The absence of some management
organs suggests that formal co-ordination and communication between medical and
non-medical departments, and clinicians was somewhat limited. For instance, the
absence of a drugs-and-therapeutic committee meant that formal interaction among
clinicians, executive members and heads of medical and non-medical departments on
clinical practice was absent. It appears that clinical practice was left entirely to
individual clinicians without any input from the committee or other HODs. Such
structural weaknesses were a source of tension as evidenced in Hospital 3 where
clinicians admitted ignorance about management activities but showed interest in
involvement. Ideally the internal structure must permit effective co-ordination and
formal communication (Buchanan 1977), and that seemed not the case in the three
hospitals.
Skills mix and experience tells us something about relative differences in management
capacity. All the hospitals had substantive executive members except Hospital 1 where
all but the pharmacist were in an acting capacity. There were similarities in the skill mix
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of hospital executives in terms of basic technical training because membership of the
executive is prescribed by policy. However, management skills and experience were
diverse (Table AlO.2). At hospitals 1, 2 and 6 at least 50% of management staff had
some form of management training (ranging from basic to graduate level), and Hospital
5 staff had the highest average management experience of 9 years. Medical
superintendents were appointed on the basis of clinical experience rather than
management training and/or experience and it was therefore not surprising that in three
case study hospitals (1, 3 and 4) the acting medical superintendents were reported to
have been demoted for managerial incompetence. This could be explained by four
factors: (1) lack of management or public health training for medical graduates, (2)
weaknesses in the recruitment criteria which emphasises clinical capacity and/or
experience at the expense of management capacity and/or experience, (3) lack of
appropriate on-job training and support for managers, and (4) the general perception
among clinicians that administration was an unnecessary burden given the similarity in
salary and perks between general doctors and medical superintendents. In addition,
shortages of doctors meant that junior doctors were promoted to hospital management
posts before they acquired the relevant experience.
Unlike the rest of the hospitals, hospitals 1 and 3 had more ad hoc than formal meetings.
This might be attributed to the dominance of the administrators who in many cases were
responsible for organising meetings. For hospital 1, this might also be explained by the
perceived autocracy of the demoted medical superintendent. From a bureaucratic
perspective, the operationalization of internal structures in hospitals 3 and 1 were
disorganised and not in accordance with hospital policy.
216
Table 10.2 Hospital Classification by major organisational factors
Colour intensity degree of realisation: High intensity = high score, Medium intensity =
medium score and low intensity = low score.
Despite intrinsic similarities in management structures across the hospitals, management
practices varied notably. Table 10.2 shows a summary view of the similarities and
dissimilarities. Interviews showed that Hospital 1 and 3 were perceived to be non-
participatory either because requisite internal meetings were not convened as expected
(e.g. HOD meetings) or there was apparent lack of involvement of HODs and doctors in
making hospital-wide decisions. It might be that informal communication was more
acceptable since meetings were mostly ad hoc and only a few interviewees expressed
interest in being involved in making hospital-wide decisions. Hospital 5 had a much
more structured participatory management style compared to the others since some
HODs were considered as part of executive management. That formalised their
involvement in management, and in a sense reduced operational hierarchy. In hospitals
2 and 4 participation by HODs in making hospital-wide decisions was by co-option and
depended on discussion subjects. If hospital discussions on specific subjects required
technical input, the respective HOD was co-opted into the discussion. Participation in
hospital 6 appeared to be a product of administrative exhortation. It is argued that such
type of participation is ineffective (Handy 1993).
It is surprising that hospitals 2 and 6 provided a contrasting view of limited internal
communication against a background of what was relatively considered as participatory
91 Refers to the expected number of functional policy prescribed structures: Low = non-functional
structures, medium = at least core structures (that is, executive and procurement committee) functional,
high = all expected structures functional.
92 Refers to skills mix and experience: low = none with management training and lor relevant experience
«5 yrs), medium = at least half with management training and/or ~ 5 years experience, high = all with
management and/or experience (> 5 yrs). See also Table AI0.2 .
93 Refers to level of involvement of HODs in hospital-wide decision-making: low = none involvement,
medium = systems of co-option practised, high = formalised system of involvement.
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management. One would have expected limited communication to be a major concern in
those hospitals where non-participatory management practices were perceived to exist
(as in Hospitals 1 and 3). The existence of limited communication and managerial
participation suggests that relevant information was not shared thereby increasing
decision-making uncertainty (Cole 1995). Accordingly, individual efforts tend to be
diffused thus increasing potential for wastage. Differences in the actual loci of
managerial control of hospital activities were particularly interesting. In principle, the
hospital executive should be the centre of control of activities as found in hospitals 2, 4,
and 5. In practice, administrators wielded considerable influence and power in hospitals
3 and 6 partly because they controlled the hospital budget and a large group of non-
medical staff, and partly because the respective executives were relatively weak.
However, the administrator's influence did not extend to doctors' clinical activities. It
was only in hospital 2, 4 and 5 that executive managers and HODs of medical
departments demonstrated relatively better capacity to engage doctors and consultants in
discussing hospital-wide issues.
By design all the hospitals had to a limited extent, structures for internal managerial
accountability. HODs were accountable to the medical superintendent who was the
chairperson of the hospital executive. Clinicians reported directly to the medical
superintendent and were not answerable to medical and non-medical heads of
departments or wards. The interviews showed that in hospitals 4 and 5, management
executives were perceived as fairly accountable because formal meetings were held as
expected, management was participatory, communication was good and the respective
hospital executives were in control of activities. Hospital 3 had the opposite situation,
and in addition, the administrator was relatively powerful. There were mixed views on
executive accountability for hospital 2 with some respondents alluding to the difficulties
of assessing it in a bureaucratic system, and others suggesting that the problem was
much more related to lack of communication between the executive and other staff. For
instance, lack of feedback meetings and the weak link between management and
94 Refers to both formal lateral and vertical communication: low = no formal meetings (scheduled and
with rules) of any type, medium "" regular formal meetings of some types of expected meetings, high =
regular meetings of all expected meetings.
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doctors. There was no evidence of executive accountability in hospital 1 because the
hospital functioned without any formal executive management activities.
A key feature of hospital internal organisation explored was mechanisms for resource
use and accountability. The perception that the administrator was "the controller" of
resource use and therefore the accountable-officer was a common finding across the
hospitals. This might be explained by the fact that hospitals were not organised into
clinical directorates or departments with devolved budgets. Centrally controlled budgets
created a situation where the actual resource users had no explicit obligation to account
for resources used. Hospitals responded to these organisational problems in different
ways. Hospital 4 experimented with the concept of devolved "shadow" budgets, and
that experiment was viewed as a success. The experiment had three advantages. First, it
entrusted HODs with responsibility for using and accounting for use of resources.
Second, that responsibility engendered cost saving activities such as use of stock control
cards and general parsimonious use of essential inputs. Third, it made the job of the
administrator of controlling global costs much more feasible. Although the experiment
did not include overhead costs and retention of departmental savings, it demonstrated
the potential benefits of using devolved budgets.
In Hospital 6, the administrator took the initiative to inform and consult widely about
hospital resource constraints and how to optimise use of available resources especially
with those who use or make resource use decisions. The executive at Hospital 1 had a
particularly novel way of dealing with the issue-through the Efficiency committee. No
such structure existed in public hospitals at the time of the study. This committee was
more proactive in that it physically checked whether or not resources were used
efficiently on a regular basis and educated staff on "efficient" practices. The incentives
and sanctions generated by such a committee had the potential of creating cost
consciousness among workers but not as much as devolved budgets.
Inextricably related to the above discussion is the extent to which HODs were involved
in hospital resource planning. This has implications for staff knowledge and attitudes
towards resource use practices. It is not surprising that managers and doctors were not
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involved in resource planning in hospitals 1 and 3 given the type of management style
observed there. In the other hospitals, HODs were at least involved in the preparation of
hospital budget proposals. However, their role ended with the preparation of budget
proposals and anything after that was the prerogative of the hospital executive. This is
another organisational feature that wascommon across the hospitals.
Incentives and functional impact
Financing hospitals through annual budgets without any link to performance is likely to
have adverse effects on performance, With such systems resources tend to be guaranteed
and that provides no incentives for staff and management to contain costs. This was a
common feature across the study hospitals. The internal structure of budget control and
use in all the hospitals created a situation where users of resources were not accountable
for their activities. Budgets were centralised and hospital administrators had the
formidable task of controlling costs with unsupportive structures. The link between
clinical activities and cost control were weak. Experiments in hospitals 4 and 6 signify
attempts to strengthen this relationship.
At individual level, it was clear that monetary incentives were considered to be
important by the respondents. However, the nature of the reward system was such that
good performance was not rewarded and neither was poor performance penalised.
Reported incentives were generally accessible to many without any observable link to
individual performance. This meant that the incentive structure was incapable of
improving performance but rather may have increased staff retention. Furthermore, the
non-discriminatory nature of the remuneration system meant that non-monetary
incentives were particularly important in explaining observed differences in staff
behaviour across the hospitals.
Staff perceptions on quality and costs of services
There is likely to be an inherent relationship between staff attitudes towards cost and
quality and the prevailing incentive regime. Respondents in all the hospitals admitted
that they were experiencing quality problems. Reported problems were generally
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structural in nature (e.g., resources shortages) and similar across the hospitals.
Noticeable perception differences were observed for costs at organisation, and less so at
individual level. As discussed earlier, some hospitals made deliberate attempts to
contain costs and increase efficiency of service delivery. Interviews showed that it is in
those hospitals that respondents tended to proffer local solutions and generally felt they
had a role to playas HODs in addressing the problems.
The broad consensus view on quality and costs was that these problems were beyond
hospital management control. Whilst this might have been the case, to some extent it
manifests two things: Firstly, that the problems were not locally owned but rather
viewed as government's problems, and secondly, that hospital staff had no shared vision
and goals on costs and quality expectations--the problem of goal clarity as defined in
expectancy theory (Wright, 1991). This attitude might be related to accountability
mechanisms and the absence of incentives created by non-performance related rewards.
Existing internal structure could not allow for identification of sources of avoidable
poor quality of services and resource wastage.
Perceptions of proposed hospital reforms
Organisation reforms change the incentive structure both within and outside the
organisation. The concepts of hospital boards, and autonomy in general were perceived
as necessary provided specific safeguards were established. These perceptions show that
hospital managers were aware of the organisational constraints related to bureaucratic
governance and decision-making. It was particularly interesting that respondents,
despite their limited knowledge of contracting, expressed concern about the cost and
quality of contracted services. Contracts were generally perceived as costly even though
costs of own production were unknown among the respondents. The problem of quality
and costs of services was mentioned in all the hospitals that had at least a contracted
service. The common argument raised by respondents was that it was not possible for
them to control the quality of contracted services even though it affected the quality of
their own activities (e.g. infection control in laundry services). This loss of control of
service quality and costs was perceived as disadvantageous to the hospitals.
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Using the two tracer reform policies it was possible to expose core hospital management
capacity problems, the likely signals these reforms would provide and how differently
hospitals were likely to respond. For instance, management at hospital 4 was more
conservative arguing that more could be achieved by strengthening the existing system.
Most respondents feared that the majority of hospitals lacked management capacity to
become autonomous, and to effectively manage service contracts. Capacity building was
therefore viewed as a necessary prerequisite for hospital reforms to succeed.
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CHAPTER 11 OVERALL DISCUSSION OF METHODS AND
FINDINGS
11.0 Introduction
This chapter is organised into two broad sections. The first section starts with a
discussion of the approach to the study and its implications for generalisability of
results. It then discusses specific methods used for measuring hospital performance
including qualitative analysis. Section two is a discussion of findings. It begins by
discussing use of activity statistics in performance assessments. This is followed by a
discussion of relative costs and efficiency, quality of hospital services, and cost-quality
tradeoffs. The chapter ends with a discussion of the relationship between performance
and internal organisation.
11.1 Discussion of methods
11.1.0 General methodological approach and generalisability of results
The general methodological approach of the study was a multiple case study design with
both quantitative and qualitative methods designed to meet the differences in logic of
inquiry of the study objectives. The study sought to do three things. First, measure
hospital performance. Second, describe and analyse internal organisation and
management. Third, analyse the relationship between performance and internal
organisation and management. The first objective (performance measurement) was
addressed quantitatively (step-down and micro-costing, assessment of structure and
process quality) and qualitatively (interviews and non-participant observation). The
second and third objectives were addressed qualitatively because of the multitude and
non-tangible nature of some of the variables.
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Figure 11 General Methodological Approach to the study
Quantitative & 'V'u.~u,,'u
methods
Qualitative methods
Organisational
context
Hospital H, where n = 1-6
Some studies have made attempts to quantitatively measure the influence of
organisational factors on hospital performance (Scott et al 1979, Sloan and Becker
1981, AI-Haider and Wan 1991, Rivers and Bae 2000) but as highlighted above it is not
possible to include all relevant variables. This study did not attempt to measure causal
relationships between performance parameters and its determinants but it sought to
describe and analyse in detail the organisational context within which specific
performance levels were achieved. Through this process organisational determinants of
hospital performance were explored. This approach was preferred to the statistical
approach because rather than aiming to accurately measure performance and failing to
adequately explain relative performance, it was considered better to take a two pronged
approach that not only measured performance accurately but also allowed for a better
understanding of its institutional context. Performance levels were then related to
institutional characteristics.
Since this was a multiple case study of six out of seven tertiary hospitals the results are a
reflection of the national situation at that level of the hospital system. Some of the
findings can be assumed similar to those expected in central and secondary hospitals
because they operate within the same bureaucratic environment. However, it is also
important to realise that the institutional focus of the study (case study) meant that some
of the findings would be peculiar to tertiary hospitals and to specific institutions, and
hence cannot be generalised. Some hospitals introduced innovative approaches to doing
things, which were perceived to have improved their performance compared to their
own previous performance, but may not have resulted in better performance than other
hospitals.
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11.1.1 Measurement of hospital performance
11.1.1.1 Use of utilisation statistics
The Pabon Lasso method was useful for screening hospitals to get an initial sense of
relative performance across the study hospitals. Although in this study, the method was
able to predict hospital performance of most of the study hospitals, in larger samples
including diverse types of hospitals that might not be the case. Unlike the study
hospitals, hospitals at different levels of the hospital system are likely to have markedly
different demand (utilisation levels) and disease profiles (e.g. acute and chronic cases).
Nonetheless, it may still be argued that if resources are scarce for using other methods
of assessing hospital performance, this method alone is insightful. It helps raise relevant
questions about the performance of hospitals. For instance, why hospitals have high or
low bed turnover rates compared to the average especially when similar categories of
hospitals were grouped. The specificity and sensitivity of the method is amenable to
manipulation (altering the confidence intervals) which makes it accessible to hospital
managers and policy makers. Data demands for this method are also manageable in
LMICs where information technology is still developing.
11.1.1.2 Relative costs and efficiency
Only inpatient services were considered in the measurement of relative costs and
efficiency in this study. Within inpatient services specific wards (medical, surgical and
maternity wards) were chosen for the analysis. These wards constituted more than 80%
of inpatient workload. Those excluded were outpatients/casualty departments, eye and
psychiatric wards, MCHlFP units, dental units and others. All these departments were
considered in the actual costing (apportionment of costs) but were not used for
comparison purposes. If economies of scope existed between inpatient services and
other excluded services, they were captured in the costing exercise and are reflected in
the unit costs. Because of the nature of the costing methods and available data used,
economies of scope or scale were not explored. Data aggregation was the major
constraint. That means that the observed cost estimates were not insightful in
identifying hospitals that might have had high (or low) average costs but low (or high)
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marginal costs. Cost accounting methods assume a straight-line cost function in which
average cost equals marginal cost. Information on marginal and average costs is useful
in determining economic efficiency and making policy recommendations regarding the
contraction or expansion of services (Hansen and Zwanziger 1996, Kumaranayake
1996). The study, however, did not seek to explore issues of optimal hospital size. The
study hospitals had similar bed numbers and service mix (e.g. inpatient and outpatient
services), and therefore exploring whether economies of scope existed or not was
unlikely to yield additional information relevant to comparing performance across them.
The situation could have been different if service mix or scale was substantially
different between the hospitals.
Measurement of hospital efficiency is not a straightforward process because it does not
comply with the engineering perspective of input-output relationships-many other
factors come into play (McGuire 1989). Therefore, the interpretation of the results of
such attempts must take cognisance of a variety of contributory factors including
organisational factors and case mix. Case mix is a particularly important factor in
influencing unit costs (Chawla and Govindaraj 1996, SOderlund et al., 1997, Tatchell
1983). Barnum and Kutzin (1993) and Bitran (1995) argue that for there to be credible
comparison of hospital efficiency (or performance generally) between hospitals three
conditions must be met: that there be correction for case-mix, case-severity, and an
adjustment for quality of services. The study employed a facilities and service mix
approach to standardising output. This approach was appropriate given the similar roles
the hospitals had and the general lack of quality data to use for adjusting for case mix.
In addition, tracer diseases were used to calculate costs per case as a way of adjusting
for case mix and severity differences. The results of tracer costing dovetailed with those
of hospital level costing implying that the use of facility and service mix was adequate
in addressing differences in case mix and severity. Ideally, case mix and case severity
adjusters are constructed to ensure comparability of hospitals. Intermediate outputs
(patient days and admissions) were used in the analysis. Therefore the findings show the
relationship between hospital costs and levels of output (Tatchell 1983) from which
insights about relative efficiency of hospitals were drawn.
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Application of bottom-up costing methods in tandem with top-down costing (e.g. for
staff costs) yielded high quality estimates by minimising the limitations of each method.
In most studies, hospital costs for specific diseases have been calculated based on
retrospective data (De Jonghe et al., 1994, Saunderson 1995, Sanders et al., 1998,
Kirigia et al., 1998, Migliori et al., 1999, Sanyika et al., 1999). Very few prospective
institutional disease-costing studies have been carried out (Babson 1972, Eisenberg et
al., 1984). Data used were patient-specific and therefore produced better estimates of
actual costs than top-down costing methods. This is because costs associated with
inefficiencies (e.g. expired drugs) were eliminated.
Use of tracer costs has its limitations. Kessner et al (1972) argue that tracers must be
used in sets that can fully reflect patient and hospital characteristics (representative).
The use of three tracer diseases did not meet that criterion. For example, no surgical
case was considered so that a review of theatre and surgical recovery activities could be
made. Nonetheless, the selected conditions were among the top five causes of hospital
admission and deaths in public tertiary hospitals (See Chapter 4). Tracer data were not
uniformly available across the hospitals. For instance, malaria data were not available
for Hospital6 because fieldwork activities at the hospital were carried out outside of the
malaria season. Inconsistencies and incompleteness adulterated tuberculosis data for
hospital 5, and those for hospital 3 were incompatible with the rest because of the non-
admission (referral) policy for confirmed TB cases. These information gaps affected the
completeness of data across the six hospitals and the ability to achieve unambiguous
rankings.
Use of time and motion surveys for calculating staff costs could have improved the
accuracy of the costing approach but was impossible within the resources available to
the study.
11.1.1.3 Measurement of quality of services
Quality measurement, as highlighted throughout this thesis presents difficulties.
Outcome measures of quality are preferred but are the most difficult to measure and
attribute. The study measured quality using the structure-process approach at two levels:
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hospital and patient level. At hospital level, structural inputs were assessed in order to
establish and compare the potential of hospitals to provide quality services. This
approach has intrinsic weaknesses in that the relationship between structure, and
process/outcome is unclear. It seems valid though, to assess structure in contexts where
structural constraints are prominent in the delivery of hospital services. It would seem
inappropriate to assess processes when the means to support the processes are not
available. Data on availability of drugs at hospitals 1 and 3 could not be obtained and
that might have affected the comparative analysis. Furthermore, aggregation of
structural quality for comparative purposes might have hidden differences in specific
departments or wards across the hospitals.
At patient level both structure and process dimensions of quality were assessed using
the same cohort of tracer patients. The use of explicit quality criteria for prospectively
recruited patients, enhanced the validity and reliability of the results. Uniformity in the
assessments was relatively high but as expected, use of explicit criteria meant that any
deviations from the expected, even though clinically justified in some cases, might have
been rated negatively. Differences in quality rating between the "health accountants"
were not assessed in the analysis on the assumption that the quality criteria were explicit
enough to minimise any potential differences. Differences might have occurred in
practice. The results were highly dependent on the weighting system used and it might
be that another system of criteria setting might have yielded different results. Use of a
panel of local experts in the development of the criteria authenticated the process. As
. aforementioned, use of only three tracers might have biased the results. A representative
sam~le of tracer conditions might have given different results. Overall however,
although the study did not use outcome measures of quality, it was able to assess the
appropriateness of what was done to and for the patient.
11.1.1.4 Measurement of cost-quality tradeoffs
Difficulties were encountered in the application of the cost-quality trade-off conceptual
framework discussed in Chapter 9 especially the construction of a best practice curve
(cost-quality curve) for each tracer condition under the assumption of efficient delivery
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of services. This was because whilst the panel of experts were able to establish the
expected quality and associated resource consumption level for each tracer, it was not
possible to establish a series of such combinations that would trace out the best practice
curve. This is explained by the uncertainty surrounding the effectiveness of medical
interventions (Bunker 1988) and therefore difficulties in predicting positive outcome.
Instead of defining the best practice curve, scatter plots with defined expected cost and
quality reference lines were used to assess the relative performance of the six hospitals.
Use of the reference lines shed light on both technical and allocative efficiency.
However, the results generated by this model could be improved by further
identification of points on the "best practice curve".
11.1.2 Qualitative analysis of organisational factors
The main advantage of using qualitative methods in analysing organisational factors and
performance was that it was possible to look at several factors, which other methods (for
example statistical methods) cannot readily accommodate. The majority of these factors
are not tangible and measurable in quantitative terms (for example attitudes, behaviour,
and power) for statistical modelling. It would seem that no amount of statistical
modelling could adequately capture the idiosyncrasies of different hospital
organisations. The underlying assumption of the study was that it is through looking
beyond the technical relationships that we can understand why systems work or do not
work. Aiken et al (1997) propose a similar argument that organisational attributes
obtained through secondary sources do not reflect how those attributes are perceived by
and affect the behaviour of practitioners in the organisation. For instance, a good cost
control system might not work in practice due to low staff compliance. This might OCcur
if cost control is not perceived to be important or if responsibility for costs is unclear.
The limitation of this approach was that causation could not be established definitively
but inferred through characterisation of internal structure. Related to the foregoing was
the problem of "aggregation" of the various internal organisational variables. The most
feasible and practical approach was to focus on those features of the organisation (based
on organisational theory and evidence) with the greatest potential to influence
performance.
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11.3 Discussion of findings
11.3.1 Relative hospital performance using activity statistics
According to the Pabon Lasso method, fifty percent of the hospitals were "outliers"
(Hospitals 1, 2 and 6), and another fifty percent (Hospitals 3, 4 and 5) conformed to
expected performance (were located within the expected performance zone) (see Figure
5). The outliers were outliers in the sense that they either performed above average or
below average. However, hospitals 3 and 4 were located in sector 1 and hospital 5 in
sector 3, which suggests that some differences still existed amongst the hospitals. None
of the hospitals was located in sector 4 (high BOR and low BTR). Hospital 6
demonstrated poor performance because of its high bed occupancy rate (82%) and low
bed turnover rate (43%) which might have been influenced by relatively high bed
availability (2.6 beds per 10,000 people) at comparable demand (utilisation) levels (11
admissions per 1,000). It was clear at this stage of the study, that Hospital 6 exhibited
characteristics of a poorly performing hospital. Hospital 1 provides an opposite scenario
to hospital 6 in that it had relatively high performance indicators: high turnover rate
(83%), bed occupancy rate (97%), and high utilisation levels (17 admissions per 1000
per year). Although Hospital 2 was classified as an outlier, it was a borderline case in
sector 2 characterised by high BTR and low BOR. There are several possible
explanations of such performance differences across the hospitals and chief among them
was likely to be professional and management practices.
The next stage of the study was to explain the hospital positions in the Pabon Lasso
framework. Similar positions were observed when medical wards were placed in the
same framework except that Hospital 2 and Hospital 3 swapped location in sectors 1
and 2 (see Figure 5.1). Variation in hospital service statistics is a function of many
factors: demand and/or supply, hospital size, management and clinical practice,
morbidity patterns, and randomness (McPherson 1988, Rhodes et al 1997). Conclusions
about performance could not be made based on these results alone without exploring
some of these key factors as the succeeding discussions attempt to do. Two important
things were learnt at this stage of the study. First, that the hospitals had variable
performance levels. Second that although the six study hospitals were all tertiary
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hospitals, they had some distinctiveness, and it would be improper to treat them as
homogenous in their performance evaluation. Each one of them warranted a thorough
analysis of possible internal and external determinants of observed performance.
11.3.2 Relative costs and efficiency of hospital services
a) Hospital and ward level.
The distribution of costs between inpatient and outpatient services was 79% (74-85%)
and 21% (15-26%) respectively. This was consistent with findings from other LMICs
(Mills 1990b), and some developed country settings (McPake 1992). The results show
that the major cost component of inpatient care was recurrent costs, which constituted
an average of 58% (ranging from 41-64%) of total hospital costs. Unlike the others,
hospitals 2 and 5 had relatively high proportions of capital costs at 59% apiece. These
proportional differences might be explained by differences in levels of capitalisation,
and the type and age of equipment and buildings. This raises concern about the
rationality of equipment purchase and use across hospitals. Currently, public hospitals
do not individually budget for capital items. This is done at central level since the centre
owns the assets. Such an arrangement creates inappropriate signals to hospital
management and consequently affects the manner in which capital equipment is used
and maintained. Lack of ownership is associated with indifference and lack of
consciousness about the cost and quality implications related to use of equipment. The
hospital staff has rights to use capital items without having to worry about costs of wear
and tear, and replacement. Nevertheless, capital resource allocation is determined at
central rather than local level, and problems associated are unlikely to be affected by
hospital management. Furthermore, in four of the six hospitals variation in costs was
largely explained by variations in recurrent costs. In addition, recurrent costs better
reflected the impact of management and professional practice on costs and efficiency.
This is because recurrent costs are a function of resource use patterns of managers and
professionals in the delivery of services.
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Table 11.0 Hospital ranking by relative efficiency (recurrent and total unit costs)
Hospital Ranking I Low.:!.: .. :!::! .. :1: • 2 • t:. !!•.. ::!: .:: J : : J' : : t •• ! .. : t , .: , .1I1II1IJigh
Hospital level:
Cost per day (recurrent)
Cost per day (total)
Cost per admission (recurrent)
Cost per admission (total)
Cost per bed (recurrent)
Cost per bed (total)
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
5
3
5
3
5
3
3
4
3
4
3
4
4
6
4
5
4
6
6
5
6
6
6
5
Hospitals 1 and 2 had relatively lower unit costs per patient day and per admission at
both ward and hospital level (Table 11). Activity levels partly explain Hospital 1 and
Hospital 2's relatively low unit costs. The hospitals had relatively high bed occupancy
and bed turnover rates. However, the two hospitals had generally similar demand levels
as the others as evidenced by the number of admissions and patient days per capita
(Table 5), which meant that there were other explanatory factors.
When recurrent costs are considered, Hospital 5 had medium costs per unit of output in
most departments and even at hospital level. This was consistent with results from
analysis of hospital service indicators. Its ranking changed when total costs were
considered (Table 11). The total unit costs were invariably high and unexpected given
its hospital service indicators. The high total costs per output were attributable to its
high capital cost component, and internal managerial activities (see section 11.3.5).
Hospitals 3 and 4 could be described as moderate performers (based on averages across
the hospitals) as predicted by the Pabon Lasso analysis. The hospitals had a similar
proportion of recurrent costs (70%) to total costs, which explained why they had
relatively high recurrent unit costs and medium total unit costs.
Hospital 6 had consistently high costs per day and per admission. This is partly
explained by relatively long periods of hospital stay (Table 5). The hospital had more
beds per capita but comparable demand level for inpatient services. Excess capacity
might explain the observed tendency to keep patients for longer (Morgan 1988). Low
utilisation of beds meant that the hospital was vulnerable to periods of under-utilisation
of staff and equipment despite the high bed occupancy (82%). In theory it is argued that
the cost per day of acute cases decreases with the length of stay (Barnum and Kutzin
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1993). The longer the patient stays in hospital the less the daily demands for diagnostic
tests and other medical interventions. The hospital had costs per inpatient day of
ZW$713 and cost per case of (ZW$5,024) (Figures 6.1 and 6.2). It may be argued that
the aggregate effect of longer length of stay on costs per day did not outweigh that of
low throughput or other professional and management practices (e.g. high resource use
intensity).
At ward level, unit costs varied across wards and hospitals (summary Tables A7 and
A7.l). These variations depicted underlying differences in utilisation levels and clinical
practice. What is interesting is that a similar pattern of hospital ranking by ward unit
costs emerged. Figure 11.1 illustrates hospital rankings using cost per admission for
male and children's medical wards. Hospital 6 was consistently ranked the most costly
whilst hospitals 1 and 2 were ranked the least costly. The observed similarities in
rankings show within hospital similarities in the pattern of resource use across wards
This is supported by the significant relationships found between ward unit recurrent
costs per admission except for maternity and children's surgical wards (Table 6.4 and
6.5). Maternity admission costs were relatively low in hospitals 2 (ZW$572) and 5
(ZW$1,228) whilst hospitals 3 and 6 had costs of ZW$2,496 and ZW$2,060
respectively. The different hospital rankings might be attributed to different resource use
patterns for maternity services. Differences in the proportion of normal deliveries, and
admission and discharge policies across the study hospitals were probable contributory
factors to cost differences.
Figure11.1Hospitalrankingby recurrentcostper
admission
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b) Patient level.
The results of tracer analysis showed that there were significant differences in case mix
across the hospitals as evidenced by differences in proportions of severe and simple
malaria cases, malaria length of stay and malaria positivity rates across the hospitals
(Tables 7.2 and 7.12). The number of self-referrals was high (47% and 55% for malaria
and tuberculosis respectively) which indicates two problems. Firstly, that the referral
system was not functioning properly. Secondly, that the study hospitals had notable
proportions of "inappropriate" use as a result of the poor referral system. A further
analysis of how many self-referrals were actually inappropriate would have shown the
magnitude of each problem. The fact that 42% (83) of malaria cases seen at these
hospitals were simple malaria corroborates the argument that primary care services were
being provided at these tertiary hospitals. The acceptance of by-passers of the referral
system at tertiary level impacted on overall hospital performance. However, there was
no relationship between referral status and malaria severity indicating that differences in
proportions of self-referrals across hospitals did not explain case severity and hence
costs (see Chapter 7). This implies that referring staff at lower levels of the health
system bear some responsibility for the position of inappropriate use at tertiary level.
The average cost per case of malaria and TB were ZW$I,528 and ZW$2,203
respectively. These figures fall within the unit cost range established at hospital ward
level analysis (ZW$554-5,000) except that the ranges of tracer costs were wider (e.g. the
recurrent cost per malaria case ranged from ZW$144-S,S80) which would be expected
as the unit of analysis moves from ward to individual. The distribution of cost
components per case was particularly insightful. The biggest cost component was hotel
services contributing an average of 60% (Tables 7.1 and 7.11). Similar results were
found at district hospitals in Malawi in which kitchen costs ranged from S6 to 80% per
inpatient day (Mills et al., 1993). A cross-country study (involving Malawi,
Mozambique and Tanzania) on tuberculosis hospital costs by De Jonghe et al., (1994)
found kitchen costs ranging from 30 to 53% of patient costs. The results show that it is
not only costly to treat but to keep a patient in hospital. It also reveals severe resource
constraints, which force hospitals to keep patients without the technical resources
234
required for treating them. Therefore, an extra day in hospital implies that hotel costs,
equal to a high proportion of cost per day are incurred, irrespective of clinical activity.
The contribution of staff costs per case across the hospitals ranged from 21% to 50% for
malaria and 19% to 44% for tuberculosis. Variations in percentage contributions are
attributable to differences in staffing levels and grade mix. Low staff costs observed in
this study were due to reliance on technical and auxiliary staff, and student nurses
(especially in hospital 1). All six hospitals had training schools for nurses who provided
a cheap source of hospital labour. The hospitals were considerably understaffed (see
Chapter 8). Experienced and qualified staff was going into private practice or
emigrating to neighbouring countries.
Drug costs contributed relatively little per case (about 3%). For malaria, this might be
explained by the high proportion of simple malaria cases that are treatable with
inexpensive drugs like chloroquine or pyrimethamine and sulphadoxine. De Jonghe and
colleagues (1994) found a proportion of drug costs per TB case of 6%. Drug costs
referred to in this case are not total drug costs per episode of TB but per episode of
hospitalisation.
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A similar pattern of cost distribution across the hospitals is shown for malaria with the
exception of hospitals 2 and 6, which had relatively high proportions of staff costs and
low proportions of amenity costs per case. For instance, hospital 2 had 50% staff costs
and 38% hotel services costs per case of malaria (see Figure 11.2). A comparison of
mean costs per malaria patient across the hospital shows that hospital 1 had the least
costs followed by hospital 2 (see Tables 7.4 and 7.14). Hospital 4 had generally high
costs per case probably due to relatively longer lengths of stay and high proportion of
severe cases. Hospitals 3 and 5 had intermediate costs. These cost differences are
explained by variations in efficiency and/or quality of services. Use of auxiliary staff (as
in hospital 1), alternative input procurement systems (e.g. provisions in hospital 2), and
alternative ancillary service providers (equipment and building maintenance, domestic
services and others) are some of the factors that might have influenced hospital cost
variations between providers.
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Hospital 3 had the lowest cost per TB case treated. This was because no patient was
kept at the hospital once confirmed as TB positive, unless there was some other
underlying secondary problem that required tertiary care. The average length of stay was
atypically short. If Hospital 3's results are excluded; the pattern of cost variation
between the hospitals becomes similar to that observed for malaria where hospitals 1
and 2 had lower costs compared to the rest. Hospital 6, as predicted by analysis of its
hospital performance indicators, had the highest cost per tuberculosis case treated.
Despite the absence of malaria cost data for hospital 6 and TB cost data for hospital 5,
the ranking of hospitals using cost per case consistently shows hospitals 1 and 2 with
the least cost, hospital 3 and 5 with medium costs, and hospitals 4 and 6 with highest
costs (Table 11.1). The ranking of hospital "costliness" by tracer disease dovetails with
the rankings using average costs at ward and hospital level. It may thus be argued that
hospital level costs are adequate, especially in such contexts where resources to conduct
detailed studies are scarce. Nonetheless, tracer analysis permitted closer tracking of
resource use and identified possible areas of resource wastage.
Table 11.1 Summary ranking of hospitals by tracer costs
Hospital cost ranking Low .... High
cost per case: malaria 1 2 5
simple malaria 1 2 3
severe malaria 1 2 5
Cost per case TB 3* 2 1
3
4
3
4'
4
5
4
6
Notes: * atypical because of the hospital's admission policy
What seems clear is that unit costs substantially varied across the hospitals, even for
tracer diseases adjusted for severity (simple and severe). Case severity adjustment did
not change hospital rankings but showed significant cost differences between simple
and severe malaria which suggests that case severity had an impact on the length of stay
(p<O.0195). Furthermore, differences in malaria case severity across hospitals were not
explained by referral status (see Chapter 7). It would seem that cost variation amongst
the hospitals was partly influenced by length of stay. The results are consistent with
95 Using a T-test to compare mean LOS by malaria severity.
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those from a severity study conducted in Australia (Beaver et al., 1998), but inconsistent
with that of Lezzoni et al., (1996). Lezzoni and colleagues showed that case severity did
not explain average LOS differences among hospitals but other factors like patient
characteristics, practice patterns and institutional differences. Such factors were also
contributory to the performance of the six case study hospitals (see Section 11.3.5)
11.3.3 Quality of hospital services
a) Hospitallevel
Aggregation of structural quality assessment results at hospital level was considered
unnecessary. This was because an overall quality picture could be developed by looking
at specific structural attributes of a hospital that are likely to influence the quality of
services. It may be argued that the relative weighting of each attribute depends on the
context. Weighting should consider the magnitude of the structural problem. This study
considered three structural attributes, namely: staff, drugs and buildings because they
are major problems facing public hospitals in SSA.
Notable differences in quality across the hospitals were found from a structural
perspective. Human resources are an important input in the production of hospital
services, and therefore variations in the quality and quantity of personnel reflect
potential differences in quality of services provided (Sochalski and Aiken 1999).
Clearly, none of the hospitals met the expected staffing standards for all staff categories
(Table 8.2 and 8.3). Nevertheless, differences in medical staff categories (e.g. specialist
consultants, general doctors, and nurses) were more apparent than in medico-technical
and other supportive staff categories. Each hospital was expected to have seven
specialist consultants to support the referral chain but only hospitals 5, 3 and 6 had at
least a consultant. The absence of specialists at tertiary level meant that general doctors
were referring cases to their peers at tertiary level. That can be interpreted as an
indicator of poor quality tertiary care because the capacity of hospitals 1, 2, and 4 to
provide acceptable tertiary services was low. This problem was also raised in the
qualitative analysis (see Chapter 10).
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All the hospitals had at least 50% of the expected number of doctors but there were
marked differences in inpatient workload per doctor (Figure 8.1). Hospitals 5,3 and 6
had relatively lower doctor to patient day ratios if specialist consultants were included.
Wide disparities in nursing numbers and mix were observed across the hospitals.
Hospitals 6 and 1 had acute nurse shortages such that they relied on student nurses and
auxiliary staff. Hospitals 6 and 1 had only 76 out of234 expected nurses, and 110 out of
257 expected nurses respectively (Table 8.1). In sharp contrast, hospital 3 had at least
90% of expected nurses whilst hospitals 2, 4 and 5 had at least 50% of required nurses.
These disparities become marked when workload per nurse is considered (Figure 8.2).
Nursing care is a critical component of hospitalisation, and any deficiencies were likely
to affect the quality of care profoundly both in terms of process and outcome measures.
Staff grade mix was not markedly different across the staff groups. It would seem that
the problem was more of staff availability than its quality.
Drug availability results need to be interpreted with caution because they are based on a
limited list of essential drugs, and only four out of six hospitals (excluding hospitals 3
and 5). Drug assessments for hospitals 3 and 5 used analysis of tracer results as a proxy.
In might be that drug availability for malaria and tuberculosis patients were not
representative of the hospital situation. Overall drug availability was at least 70% across
the hospitals, which is below the acceptable level of 80 % in Zimbabwe (Zimbabwe
Essential Drugs Action Programme 1996). If fortnightly drug stock-outs are considered
acceptable, drug availability becomes high (>80%) fo~some hospitals (Table 8.5). The
marginal differences in drug availability across the study hospitals may be explained by
differences in availability of financial resources and pharmacists, utilisation patterns,
prescriptive practices and input procurement systems. Hospitals 1 and 6 had fairly
consistent supplies. Drug shortages were more frequent at hospitals 4 and 5, and the
duration of stock-outs was twice as long for the latter compared to the former.
According to the tracer structural quality analysis, drug availability at hospitals 2 and 3
was classified as satisfactory.
The overall quality judgement for the six hospital buildings was based on the
availability and quality of hospital space (especially ward space). Hospitals 1, 5 and 6
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score despite its structural constraints, which demonstrates the importance of
understanding quality at lower levels-patient level. The following variables were the
main sources of structural score variation: ward space, availability of hand washing
facilities, availability of functional equipment, and presence of floor beds.
Quality results for simple and severe malaria were significantly different across the
hospitals at both aggregate or disaggregated level (Table 8.7). None of the hospitals met
the expected quality scores. Hospitals 3 and 5 had consistently lower structural and
process scores for both simple and severe malaria whilst hospitals 1, 4 and 2 had
relatively high scores (Figures 8.4 and 8.5). Unlike for PTB, protocol compliance varied
across hospitals such that both structure and process contributed to the variation in
overall score. These results might be partly explained, at a much broader level, by
possible differences in the classification of cases into simple and severe malaria. There
was a practical possibility that cases could have been classified in either group
depending on the degree of compliance with the malaria protocol. For instance, the five
cases of simple malaria at hospitalS are suspect, especially if one looks at average cost
per case (see Chapter 7).
The absence of comparable malaria data from hospital 6, and tuberculosis data from
hospitals 3 and 5 rendered aggregation of patient level quality analysis unachievable.
Both mean process and structural quality scores varied across the diagnostic groups and
across the hospitals. However, the utility of the results was in highlighting specific areas
of service strength and deficiency by hospital. All in all it would seem that hospital 1, 2
and to some extent 4 provided better quality of services as shown by the high and
moderate ratings in all diagnostic groups. Hospital 5 had the lowest quality rating
mainly because of its structural and delivery weaknesses. Hospitals 6 and 3 had better
results than hospital 5 but nonetheless lower than expected quality scores. It is
particularly worrying that all the hospitals failed to meet the expected minimum
standards. Heidemann (1993) argues that minimum standards, unlike optimal standards,
must be met, and anything below that is unacceptable. This is an understandable
argument given the fact that minimum standards are set on the basis of what is viewed
as achievable in practice (given available resources). Though all the hospitals had
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comparable structural capacity to provide services of minimal quality, hospitals 5 and 3
had considerably lower quality ratings. Interestingly, these hospitals had the highest
number of specialists but their process scores were lower than the rest.
The divergence between some of the results of quality assessment at hospital and patient
level clearly demonstrates the inadequacy of solely using non-patient specific methods
of quality assessment. In addition, it also shows that structural assessments need to be
interpreted in the context of process factors in as much as process factors need to be
interpreted in the context of outcome factors. The results from hospitals 1 and 6 attest to
that. From a supply perspective, both hospital and patient level assessments are useful in
ensuring that hospital services are structured to optimise quality. If the quality definition
is widened to encompass patient acceptability, structural aspects considered in the study
are more likely, amongst other things, to be perceived as important by patients and
would-be patients. As mentioned before this is because these are usually the major
constraints facing hospitals in SSA.
11.3.4 Exploration of hospital cost-quality tradeoffs
The purpose of this study component was to attempt to answer one of the fundamental
questions in hospital performance assessment: "When does high cost mean high quality
and when does it mean low efficiency?" Some insights about the answers to this
question enable us to understand relative performance differences between hospitals.
The empirical exploration of cost-quality relationships in this study provided a number
of useful revelations and observations. The findings show that hospitals 1, 2 and 3 were
better performers in terms of quality levels achieved for the cost incurred. Hospitals 4, 5
and 6 had consistently high mean costs for comparable or lower quality scores. This
suggests that resources in these hospitals could have been better used to achieve better
results. This type of variation across the hospitals was similar to that found by Schulz
and colleagues (1983) using a sample of 13 acute inpatient psychiatric units in the USA.
Hospital costs and quality were mapped on a graph that located hospitals in different
performance areas. Using qualitative research techniques they found that observed
variations could be assigned to differences in management practices.
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Resource use (costs) per case for all the hospitals fell short of anticipated levels
(reference cost line). This was indicative of resource allocation problems or resource
inadequacy. The framework used in this analysis was able to show that hospitals had
problems of both technical and allocative inefficiency but the degree of each problem
varied across the hospitals". Therefore progress of hospitals towards the expected level
of performance requires combined improvement in both technical and allocative
efficiency. Interestingly, the results were consistent across the three diagnostic groups,
and whether or not inpatient samples used for analysis were further randomised or not.
Hospitals 6 and 4 were characteristically inefficient as evidenced by high unit costs and
low or comparable quality, whilst hospitals 1 and 2 provided a contrasting scenario of
low costs and better quality. The performance rankings were congruent to those found
using the Pabon Lasso method, except in the case of Hospital 5 which was classified as
technically inefficient in this analysis because it had comparable costs per case but
lower quality (Figure 9.1). Common quality problems observed may have been related
to the patient's physical environment and its impact on other process factors (e.g.
overcrowding). High levels of utilisation in the face of limited personnel and resources
might have encouraged use of "short-cuts" (non-compliance with protocols).
There are two main reasons for having some confidence in the validity of the results.
First, the study focused on hospitals that are at the same level of referral hierarchy.
Second, the three diagnostic groups (simple and severe malaria, and pulmonary
tuberculosis) used contribute significantly to the disease burden in the country.
However, there are also some significant limitations to the study design. First, the
estimation of the expected performance levels was not definitive owing to the practical
difficulties of estimating resource use and related effectiveness. There is not much
empirical evidence on hospital resource use and effectiveness for most medical
interventions. The use of local experts was the only feasible option at the time of the
study. Second, costs calculated per case excluded overhead and capital costs. Hogan
(1997) argues that this is a typical problem of organisational research, that is, its
inability to produce patient-specific costs especially in the presence of large overhead or
indirect costs. Third, the ideal comparison should have been between cost and outcome
96 The distance of each hospital from the reference point signified the variations.
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measures such as risk-adjusted mortality, readmission rates and others (Morey et al.,
1992, Schulz et al., 1983, Fleming 1991). Nevertheless, the difficulties of measuring
outcome quality cannot be underestimated. These caveats notwithstanding, the cost-
quality model enabled a systematic exploration of costs and quality using tracers, and
also created opportunities for exploring hospital efficiency questions. It was possible to
characterise hospitals by their cost-quality performance, and relate the results to activity
statistics analysis in Chapter 5. This linkage showed considerable congruence.
Any attempt to empirically grapple with the hospital cost-quality trade-off conundrum
requires clarity in the definitions and measurements of costs and quality. The cost-
quality conceptual framework used in this analysis could be applied to more hospitals in
tandem with other methods that empirically construct best practice curves. Balancing of
costs and quality has become inevitable in all health systems, and if any success is to be
achieved, there is need to overcome the cost taboo". As Eddy (1997) argues, "The
biggest threat to both cost and quality in health care today is to be found in the cost
taboo itself." The clash between medical ethics and costs is becoming more intense
today in LMICs than in the past. The clash comes from the fact that clinicians are
trained to do the best for the patient and not to save resources for the benefit of many.
The latter entails some form of rationing care (e.g. prescribing low cost and possibly
less effective drugs). Experience from high-income countries bears testimony to this
inevitable and unenviable clash.
11.3.5 The relationship between performance and organisational factors
Performance comparison across the six case studies has shown that hospitals 1 and 2
performed better both in terms of costs and patient-specific quality of services. In
contrast, hospitals 4 and 6 had relatively high costs for comparable or lower quality. A
comparison of hospital 4 and 6 with hospital 1 and 2 clearly demonstrated that more
could have been achieved with the same basket of resources per patient. Hospital 3
invariably had intermediate performance and hospital 5 had average unit costs and
below average quality of services. The study sought to describe the institutional or
organisational contexts under which hospitals realised observed performance levels.
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Although the study did not focus on the effect of environmental factors on performance,
the relationship between hospital performance and organisational factors needs to be
understood and interpreted within the context of the prevailing environment.
Background statistics show that hospital morbidity and mortality profiles were similar
across the regions (Table 4.1). The profiles reflect the nature of the disease burden
hospitals encountered in the respective regions. Availability of tertiary services as
measured by the number of tertiary beds per population differed across the regions. For
instance, region 6 (for hospita16) and 5 (for hospitalS) had 2.6 beds per 10,000 people
compared to a mean of 1.98 beds per 10,000 people. The utilisation pattern of hospital
services (Table 5) shows hospital 1 (in region 1) with high patient-days and admission
per 1,000 people of 70 and 17 respectively. Hospital 6 had the highest number of patient
days per 1,000 people of 79 but an average admission rate of 11 per 1,000 reflecting its
high length of stay. Observed hospital utilisation patterns can be explained by
differences in demand for services. The functioning of the referral system influences
demand. The coverage of secondary and primary care facilities was not markedly
different in the study settings but results from tracer analysis indicated differences in
proportions of non-referred admissions across the hospitals. Hospital 6 had a
particularly high number of referred admissions for malaria cases of 91%. The study did
not explore what proportion of non-referrals technically required tertiary level services
(necessary versus unnecessary care). Such information might have provided further
insights into the impact of the functioning of the referral system on hospital utilisation.
It would seem that the hospital utilisation pattern is a function of internal and external
factors, but clinical practice (admissions and discharge policies) plays the most
important role in explaining it. Clinicians make the ultimate decisions on which patient
to admit or not to admit whether referred or not referred.
Another important external variable to performance was difference in availability of
resources. It might be expected that hospitals with more resources are likely to perform
better than those with fewer resources though this expectation is complicated by the role
that cost plays in the performance measurement. Hospitals 1 and 2 were relatively
97Th .
e notion that costs should not be considered in clinical decision making.
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under-resourced (ZW$64,000Ibedlyear each) compared to hospitals 4, 5 and 6 with
ZW$90,000, ZW$103,000 and ZW$93,000 respectively (Table 8.1). What was critical
in this study, however, was differences in organisational effectiveness (quality of
services) and cost (see Chapter 9). Tracer analysis showed that all the hospitals were
under-resourced in absolute terms but nonetheless some achieved more from their
expenditures than others.
The location of the study hospitals was indirectly associated with performance through
its effect on staffing patterns, especially those specialist clinicians. It might be expected
that staff availability and quality is likely to vary with access to cities (because of the
attendant benefits) and potential for private practice. By policy, public consultants are
permitted to do private practice as long as they are available when needed in public
facilities. Currently, private practice in Zimbabwe thrives in urban areas where some
people can afford to pay for private services. Hospitals 1, 2, 4 and 6 had one or no
consultants even though they were within an average distance of 80 km from a big city.
Hospital 4 is located about 262 km from the capital city but is located in a more
urbanised setting than hospitals 1, 2 and 6. Hospital 6 is located in a relatively more
rural regional setting with the least and dispersed population. Availability of nursing
staff was particularly acute for hospitals 1 and 6 and the main reasons given in the
interviews were lack of accommodation and other social facilities (e.g., good schools).
Hospital 3 is located in the third largest city and hospital 5 in the fourth largest city in
the country. It is therefore not surprising that the two hospitals had relatively more
specialist consultants compared to the others (Tables 8.2 and A8.2). The shortage of
doctors and specialists reflected the fact that those cadres had more discretion as to
where they wanted to work. This emerged from the interviews, when clinicians were
asked what kept them working in these hospitals. It would seem therefore that
differences in the level of urbanisation, potential for private practice and other social
factors contributed to differences in staffing patterns-hence differences in structural
quality.
The study hospitals were part of a bureaucracy and therefore experienced similar
hierarchical control in strategic spheres of management such as personnel, capital
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equipment, financial management and structuring of hospital functions among others.
Within this veil of control, however, this study demonstrated that performance was
variable. It would seem inadequate to explain the observed differences between
hospitals using utilisation levels and input constraints alone without looking at other
professional and medical practices, institutional characteristics and management
practices. The question was: ''what are some of these factors?" For discussion clarity,
the hospitals are categorised into three overall performance groups: high performers
(Hospitals I & 2), intermediate performers (hospitals 5 & 3) and low performers
(hospitals 4 & 6).
The amount of slack in bureaucratic governance as evidenced by the degree of
involvement of Hospital Advisory Boards in hospital activities varied across the
hospitals. HABs were not only involved in fund raising but also in resource allocation
decisions for hospitals through finance committees in which one member took part. The
finance committee approved expenditure of funds from the Health Services Fund, which
implies that HABs had some influence on management decisions. These management
decisions were not only operational but also strategic in some cases (e.g., infrastructural
development as in hospitaI4). In fact, hospital managers indicated in the interviews that
fee retention and HABs provided them the latitude to make quicker decisions based on
local consultations. This they argued enhanced hospitals' capacity to respond to patient
needs. For instance, instead of waiting for approval to acquire drugs out-of-stock at the
central medical store, the administrator in consultation with the finance committee could
use alternative sources, which they said were not always cheap but reliable.
The degree of involvement ofHABs depended upon the amount of resources in the HSF
and also the size of expenditure items. An analysis of hospital income showed that
hospitals with active HABs such as hospitals 2 and 4 relied more on fee income and
other resources mobilised from the community to meet budgetary shortfalls. At the time
of the study, hospital 4 was solely relying on fee income and funds mobilised by the
HAB to purchase patient food and meet domestic expenses. The rest of the hospitals had
HSFs but no, or inactive HABs. This made use of HSF resources difficult and time
consuming because of lack of legitimisation. When overall performance is considered,
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hospital 2, which had an effective HAB, had relatively better results in contrast to
hospital 4's relatively poor results. The other hospitals without active hospital advisory
boards performed variably. This provides little support to the hypothesis that HABs
contributed to observed performance levels. However, on a case by case basis, HODs in
hospitals 4 and 2 attested to the difference made by active HABs in reducing
bureaucratic decision-making, and its positive impact on performance In addition, the
attitudes of heads of departments in hospitals with HABs appeared different to those
without HABs. In the former, HODs ac~owledged local responsibility in resolving
some of the hospital problems whilst in the latter everything was perceived to be
resolvable by government alone.
The study sought to discover whether differences in operational management structures
contributed to differences in performance. The rationale was that differences in the
operational status of standard structures of management in public institutions influenced
performance levels through information flow and co-ordination. The study showed that
all the hospitals had the core management structure-the hospital executive. In hospital
1, the executive was inactive and its meetings were ad hoc. None of the supportive
operational structures were active suggesting that input procurement and distribution
might not have been rationalised, and clinicians had no formal opportunities to interface
with the executive. Instead, the hospital had a functional efficiency committee. Unlike
the drugs and therapeutic, and input procurement committees, the efficiency committee
was proactive in that it was investigative and involved regular departmental visits by its
members to check and discuss resource use issues. This meant that even though the
hospital had no formal meetings, hospital efficiency issues were nonetheless informally
shared and discussed amongst heads of departments. In contrast, hospital 2 had all
mandated structures operating in accordance with bureaucratic expectations. Both
hospitals had relatively better performance. Intermediate performers, hospitals 3 and 5
had equally diverse operational management structures. Hospital 3, like hospital 1 had
none of its management structures functioning as expected and co-ordination of
activities was therefore questionable. Its partner hospital, hospital 5 had all mandated
management structures operational. This contradictory performance paring is also
observed with hospitals 4 and 6. In hospital 4, the hospital executive and the input
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procurement committees were active except for the drugs and therapeutic committee. In
hospital 6, we witness an active hospital executive but inactive input and drug and
therapeutic committees. Failure of some management structures to function may be
viewed as failure by management to co-ordinate hospital activities, or may indicate that
other informal means of communicating and co-ordinating activities were used.
Nevertheless, the study results show no systematic relationship between operational
management structures and observed overall hospital performance.
The study hypothesised that hospitals which employ participatory management styles,
are likely to perform better through regular consultation and information sharing among
staff, a view shared by many commentators (Scott et al 1979, Knaus et al., 1986,
Marriot and Harris, 2000). Evidence from this study failed to support this hypothesis.
The high performers, hospitals 1 and 2 had contrasting scenarios. Management team
members in hospital 1 operated informally but with what could be described as a high
degree of individual responsibility for their technical mandates. Executive meetings
were ad hoc and infrequent. There was no evidence of formal consultations of HODs on
hospital-wide issues. Traditional structures for communication and discussions such as
heads of department meetings were rarely convened. The operational structure was
similar to what is often termed "professional bureaucracy'?" in which there is limited
formalisation, and professionals constitute the operating core (Flood et al., 1982,
Perryman-Starkey et al., 1999). The situation was different at Hospital 2 where co-
option of professional heads to executive meetings depended on agenda item. Heads of
department were only co-opted to provide technical details of subjects pertaining to
their area of specialisation and responsibility. However, HODs considered this type of
involvement inadequate. It was clear from the interviews that they were interested in
greater involvement and some were even proactive in engaging each other in discussing .
issues on rationalisation of services.
Hospitals classified as intermediate performers had similarly diverse management
styles. Results from case study 3 show that although the operational arrangement was
98 Hospitals are generally viewed as professional bureaucracies because of the dominance of professionals
in their activities. In this particular case study. professionals enjoyed relatively more autonomy.
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informal as in case study 1, there was compelling evidence of overt tension between
administration and professional heads of departments. The latter highlighted the
problem of lack of trust within the management team, and the apparent dominance of
the administrative group appeared to fuel this tension. Formal managerial involvement
at this hospital was essentially weak. Hospital 5 had a formalised approach to
managerial participation where key professional heads were considered as part of the
hospital executive. This meant that the operational hierarchy was flattened, and
communication (both lateral and horizontal) and co-ordination of activities enhanced.
The only salient omission in this strategy was specialist consultants who nonetheless
expressed interest in involvement in executive decision-making. The low performing
pair of hospitals (4 and 6) had one thing in common, and that was that management
strictly operated in accordance with national policy, and therefore co-option of HODs
was rare. Results for hospital 4 indicate that communication between the executive and
staff was not considered a problem because all mandated meetings were held according
to set schedules. The same was not true for hospital 6 where respondents argued that
information was not shared adequately across staff.
Given this diversity in the degree of managerial participation across performance
categories, it seems that managerial participation per se might not explain observed
performance differences. However, questions could be raised about the nature of
managerial participation (Marriott and Harris 2000), which might have influenced the
observed results. If power relationships between staff groups are maintained then
managerial participation is unlikely to influence performance. Some commentators,
such as Becker et al (1980) argue that as long as there is effective co-ordination between
medical and nonmedical departments there is no need for clinicians to be involved in
management. Performance varied with both formal and informal management styles.
The study also looked at hospital differences in internal systems of resource use. One
might expect that hospitals with decentralised operational systems of resource use and
control would be more likely to be efficient. In other words, systematic deviations from
standard bureaucratic procedures would yield positive benefits. What is clear from the
results is that most hospital management teams appreciated the weaknesses of central
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budgets as evidenced by their endorsement of the idea of functional budgets. In both
high performing hospitals (1 and 2), administrators saw control of resource-use as
central to their work even though that was difficult to achieve given the internal
structure. The link between the administrative group and clinicians was weak in hospital
1, and relatively better in hospital 2 where the head of the hospital had meetings with
clinicians. Itwas not clear what was discussed in these meetings because there were no
records. In hospital 2, the HAB was active and therefore decisions on the use of extra-
budgetary resources were made by a finance committee which included members of the
HAB. Hospitals 3 and 5 had centralised budget control systems and resource-use was in
accordance with public procedures. The only difference between the two case studies
was that the head of the hospital in hospital 5 was actively involved in administration
(including budget control) whilst in hospital 3, the head of the hospital was not actively
involved and most resource allocation decisions were made by the administrator. Both
hospitals did not have finance committees, which also meant that administrators made
decisions on use of extra-budgetary resources.
Two hospitals (4 and 6) that made innovative attempts to minimise the negative effects
of central budgets had relatively high average costs. The experiment with shadow
departmental budgets in hospital4 was perceived by staff to be a success. However, this
success can only be viewed relative to its previous performance and not with other
hospitals. In hospital 6, attempts were made to engage clinicians and other staff in cost
containment activities through persuasion and information sharing in meetings. The idea
was to educate staff on resource availability and the need to save resources. Despite all
these attempts, the two hospitals had relatively high unit costs. There is need to be
cautious in interpreting the link between costs and budget control because only one
hospital actually implemented shadow devolved budgets in the period under review.
Evidence gathered in this study was insufficient to address the hypothesis that devolved
budgets enhance efficiency. However, the finding that the majority of the respondents
thought that departmental budgets could enhance hospital efficiency reflects structural
weaknesses in the way resources are currently used and controlled. The general view
was that current internal arrangements are inimical to resource use accountability.
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Hospital input procurement and distribution systems in public hospitals are usually
associated with budgetary control mechanisms. The study explored the ability of
hospitals to acquire and distribute inputs and how this might have affected hospital
performance. This was done by looking at the functional status of existing structures
and how hospitals adapted these structures to meet hospital needs. Procurement
committees were functional in four hospitals except in hospitals 1 and 3 where the
administrator appeared to make most of the decisions on input supply. In hospitals 2 and
4, HABs were particularly active and extra-budgetary resources generated provided an
avenue for quicker acquisition of essential inputs. The funds allowed management to
acquire inputs (e.g. food items and drugs) without going through the government
approval process. It would seem that the degree of flexibility in input procurement was
determined by the ability of the hospitals to generate extra income. There was no other
evidence, apart from the foregoing, of hospitals employing innovative strategies for
acquiring inputs and internally distributing them. The only evidence of formalised
attempts to control input use was found in hospital 1, which had an efficiency
committee. Interviews showed that there were several uncoordinated input control and
distribution activities at departmental level in the rest of the hospitals. The overall
picture that emerges from these results is that procurement committees essentially
followed government procedures when using budget appropriations, but had some
discretion and flexibility over the use of other hospital income.
Hospital management capacity was assessed in terms of skills-mix, staff experience and
ability to relate to clinicians. It might be expected that performance would vary with
management capacity, and involvement of clinicians promoted hospital policy practice.
At least 50% of HODs interviewed in hospital 1 (4/8) and hospital2 (5/7) had received
some form of management training, and average management experience was S years
(Table AI0.2). This was relatively high considering that the overall mean number of
people with management training was 3 and the average number of years of experience
was 6. Hospitals 3 and Shad 7/10 and 1/7 HODs with management training, and the
mean number of years of experience was 6 and 9 years respectively. Staff at hospitalS,
though highly experienced lacked management training. In hospitals 4 and 6, 2/10 and
3/6 of those interviewed had management training, and mean years of experience of 4
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and 6 respectively. The results show variation in both management training and years of
experience across the hospitals. It would seem this pattern of variation provides limited
support to the hypothesis that performance varied with management capacity. Hospitals
1 and 2 had, on average, relatively more trained and experienced managers, and
performed well. What is distinct is that even though most of the cadres interviewed were
experienced, they lacked management training. In addition, the ability of management
in all the hospitals to involve clinicians in hospital-wide issues was limited.
Clinical practice is of central importance in explaining variation in performance
(Wennberg et al., 1987b). The study focussed on what organisational factors potentially
influenced the behaviour of clinicians, and their compliance with specific treatment
protocols. Some studies have shown that clinical autonomy is associated with better care
(Flood and Scott 1978) whilst others have failed to show that relationship (Becker et al.,
1980). It was clear in all the case studies that the way hospitals are currently organised,
in which clinicians do not have explicit departmental responsibility is not conducive to
either clinical or resource-use accountability. In-charge nurses who had no control over
clinicians managed hospital wards. In the wards, clinicians were only responsible for
patient admissions, management and discharge. Clinician activities appeared divorced
from other non-clinical activities or concerns. This lack of co-ordination increased the
potential of clinical decision-making that did not support hospital efforts such as cost
containment. Admission and discharge practices affect length of stay and ultimately
cost--especially hotel costs as shown in this study. The problems were compounded by
the exclusion of clinicians from hospital-wide decision making processes. Similar
problems were observed in the UK NHS in the 1980s leading to the establishment of the
Resource Management Initiative in 1986 (Farrar 1993). However, Farrar (1993) argued
that changing physician behaviour required more than just managerial involvement but
changing clinicians' payment systems so that performance was linked to clinical
performance,
An analysis of tracer quality showed that there were variations in compliance with
treatment protocols as revealed by differences in quality scores (Chapter 8). For
instance, hospitals 3 and 5 had low mean process scores for malaria even though they
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had the highest number of specialist consultants (Table 8.8). Conversely, hospitals 1, 2
and 4, which had either one or no specialist consultant, had relatively higher mean
process scores for malaria. Protocol compliance at hospital 6 was also high when
tuberculosis treatment was considered (Table 8.7). It is particularly interesting that those
hospitals that had specialist consultants had generally low protocol compliance (or
variable clinical practice) whilst those that did not have consultants had high protocol
compliance. There are two possible explanations. First, specialist consultants
deliberately ignored explicit treatment criteria and relied on own knowledge and
experience (using implicit criteria). Second, the presence of consultants did not
influence clinical activities of general doctors who were more likely to deal with malaria
and tuberculosis cases. It would seem that on the basis of process quality, the presence
or absence of consultants did not influence performance or influenced it negatively. A
major caveat to the foregoing is that protocol compliance per se does not necessarily
mean positive outcome because non-compliance might lead to better outcome (Flood et
aI., 1982). It simply means that what was expected to be done to and for the patient was
done (acceptable care).
A simplistic view of hospital technology was used to explore capacity differences in
providing tertiary services. Technology assessment was considered in structural terms:
staff mix and skills, drugs, and buildings. Section 11.3.3 (a) discusses the structural
differences between the six hospitals. As aforementioned, differences in functional
equipment endowment could have shed more light on capacity differences but lack of
tertiary hospital equipment standards and time made the assessment impossible. The
general service delivery frameworks were similar across the hospitals. All the hospitals
contracted out laundry services to private providers. In addition, hospital 2 contracted
out security and equipment maintenance, hospital 3 grounds-work and equipment
maintenance, and hospitalS grounds work. The major capacity differences were in staff,
drugs and buildings as discussed above. Clinical services were not contracted out which
meant that comparisons of clinical practice (and performance generally) across hospitals
were not confounded by private practice behaviour.
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Underpinning the relationship between organisational factors and performance was the
incentive structure and its influence on staff attitudes and behaviour. It was apparent in
this study that, at a macro level, hospital financing through annual budgets without any
link to activities undermined organisational performance. Equally important was the
payment of non-performance-related salaries and other benefits. The inclination at both
hospital and individual level to maximise work effort and improve performance tends to
be limited under such reimbursement systems (Barnum et aI., 1995). This was a
common feature across the study hospitals, which may help us explain absolute
performance levels, but not necessarily relative performance.
The case studies also show that the current hospital internal structure where there are no
budget holding departments or directorates, and limited involvement of doctors creates
perverse incentives. These disincentives may be worsened by the manner in which
hospitals are actually managed-management style. For instance, it was found that in
hospitals 1 and 3 HODs and doctors were excluded from the general management of the
hospital. This might have exacerbated the effect of disincentives generated by
organisational design weaknesses. Hospital 5 provided a typical example where
management made deliberate attempts to reduce the design effect (disincentives) by
making some HODs "permanent" members of the executive. Proactive management
approaches as evidenced in hospital 6 were clear attempts to be inclusive and build
management consensus, and so was the co-option system used at hospitals 2 and 4.
That, as other commentators argue reduces conflict especially with medical staff (Sloan
1981), and might enhance performance.
At individual level incentives/disincentives raised in this study were typical of civil
servants in most LMICs. They were mostly monetary and/or related to working
conditions or "hygiene factors?", This is because people tend to think of types of
incentives that are measurable and can more easily be linked to performance than
security, prestige or power for instance (Wright 1991). It would be expected that with
appropriate incentives, staff is more likely to be motivated to work harder and
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contribute to better hospital performance. For an individual to be motivated to work
harder, the incentive rewards that s/he faces must meet a number of criteria: (1)
distribution of the rewards must be seen to be performance based, (2) performance must
be measurable and attributable to the individual, (3) the individual must expect the
reward, and (4) realised performance level must not be used as the new minimum for the
future (Handy 1993). It may be argued, ceteris paribus, that those hospitals with
incentive systems that approximated to these criteria performed better. However, the
majority of incentives reported in the six case studies did not meet these criteria, as they
were mostly "hygiene factors". Such incentives are likely to increase work satisfaction
and reduce turnover but not necessarily motivate staff to work harder.
Reported incentives were generally accessible to many without any observable link to
individual performance. There were either no identifiable or generalisable systems of
accessing non-monetary rewards within each case study. The concept of ward prizes
mentioned in study hospital 3 was one isolated example with potential to induce ward
staff to work harder, but its impact was most likely to be limited because it was used for
individuals in one medical ward only. It is important to recognise that there was
potential for hospital management to be innovative and to use rewards such as access to
CPE and recommendations for promotion, as performance-enhancing levers. According
to interviews, this potential was not exploited. Given that incentives were mostly
perceived in monetary terms, it is not surprising that there was general similarity in the
incentive/disincentive regimes reported across the hospitals. It seems therefore that
differences in hospital performance were more likely to be explained by other non-
monetary incentives particularly related to the hospital organisation, management
structures, capacity and styles (see earlier discussion).
Because perceived incentives were largely monetary, it was inevitable that their strength
in hospitals was dependent on wider economic and social factors. For instance, those
hospitals that had subsidised accommodation and social facilities and were located close
to or in major cities such as hospitals 2, 3 and 5 were favourably viewed. However, it
99 A collective term coined by Herzberg (1968) in his two-factor theory for describing dissatisfying factors
such as conditions of work-organisational policy and administration, supervision, salary, interpersonal
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would not follow as discussed above that such incentives induced performance-
enhancing behaviour among workers. Nevertheless, much can be learnt from what
respondents raised as disincentives because the system had more reported disincentives
than incentives. Addressing some of the disincentives raised such as lack of supervisory
support, high workload, staff tension, input shortages, risk of infection and poor
remuneration can form the basis of wider human resource development and
strengthening of hospitals in general. All these factors are addressable in the long term
and would require both institution-specific and system-wide changes to ensure optimal
impact.
It is important to recognise that reported incentives or disincentives were created by
both internal and external factors to the hospital organisation. It seems that performance
enhancement can be achieved if external and internal incentives are mutually
supportive. In other words, internal pressures on staff must complement external
pressures exerted on hospitals or vice versa. The study showed that different staff
groups sometimes faced different incentives because of internal operational
arrangements and differences in opportunities for earning extra-income.
In sum, cognisance should be taken of the case study approach used, which attempted to
identify and explore relationships and was therefore not expected to establish definitive
causal relationships. It is important that further research picks up and tests variables
suggested by qualitative evidence from this study to be important for performance, for
example: presence of HABs, management skills and styles, information flow, co-
ordination, supportive management structures, internal resource use and distribution
systems, accountability, input procurement systems, hospital technology, organisation-
based and individual-based incentives. The study's lack of success in demonstrating
quantitatively, relationships between these variables and performance is not unexpected.
relationships and physical working conditions.
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CHAPTER 12 CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
12.0 Introduction
This chapter presents conclusions made from the study relating to public hospital
performance: its measurement and determinants. It discusses the extent to which study
objectives were met. It then presents the methodological, theoretical and practical
contributions of the study. This is followed by a discussion of implications of the results
for hospital reform in Zimbabwe and ends with suggestions for future research. Study
conclusions are presented by the specific objectives of the study.
12.1Measurement of hospital performance
The first objective of the study was:
a) To use cost accounting methods to measure inpatient costs at both hospital, and
patient level in six public tertiary hospitals.
A prior performance assessment to hospital cost analysis was done using the Pabon
Lasso framework. The method proved to be reliable for initial screening of hospitals. It
made it possible to classify hospitals into performance categories. The method was
fairly sensitive in reflecting performance levels of the study hospitals. A notable degree
of congruence was found between its performance classifications and cost analysis
results. Hospitals with high throughput had lower unit costs and the converse was true.
Some commentators argue that the method can be used on its own to measure hospital
performance (Mahpatra and Berman 1994). It is simple to apply but requires quality
hospital activity statistics to generate quality results. Its simplicity makes it accessible to
hospital managers and planners who usually work under pressure to make decisions.
With this method, suspected poorly performing hospitals can be identified for further
investigation.
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Cost accounting methods were successfully used to measure costs of inpatient services
at the six study hospitals. The costing process was time consuming and required
innovation at every step of the method since cost and activity data were invariably not in
the expected form. Despite the inability of the methods used to calculate marginal costs
and to show whether or not economies of scope and scale existed, the study was able to
demonstrate differences in resource use patterns (at hospital, ward and patient level)
across the hospitals. The relative cost performance of the hospitals on a ward to ward
basis was generally similar to that at hospital level. There were similarities in ward
resource use patterns except for maternity wards in each hospital. It might be that unit
costs for maternity varied according to the proportion that was normal deliveries. The
study could not establish the exact proportions of hospital maternity cases, which were
normal deliveries because of data aggregation problems. Observed unit cost variations
were largely due to differences in recurrent costs, as they constituted a high proportion
of total costs. However, two of the hospitals had high proportions of capital costs. There
is a possibility that some of the capital structures and equipment at some hospitals were
undervalued because of absence of audited equipment inventories with details for each
piece of equipment and furniture. Furthermore, capital items were controlled from the
centre and this arrangement negatively affected their effective management. For
instance, there were no depreciation accounts and proper estate management.
Using tracer diseases, it was feasible to measure the costs of hospital services at patient
level (cost per admission). The cost distribution per admission showed that the major
recurrent cost component per admission was hotel services followed by staff costs. This
points to the fact that differences in hospital admission and discharge policies and use of
tertiary care generally were contributory to relative cost differences. With such a cost
pattern, unnecessary admissions or delayed discharges are likely to have a significant
impact on hospital costs. Drugs and medical supplies contributed a small proportion of
inpatient costs. Unit recurrent costs calculated using tracer diseases reflected the order
of magnitude of similar costs at ward and hospital level. It would seem that hospital
level costing was probably adequate in understanding relative hospital efficiency given
the costs (in terms of time and resources) of carrying out prospective disease-specific
costing. Ranking of hospitals using relative unit costs per tracer produce similar results
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to the same exercise conducted at hospital level. This supports the sampling strategy of
using service and facilities mix (by selecting hospitals at the same level-tertiary in this
case) to control for case mix and severity.
The second study objective was:
b) To determine appropriate methods for measuring quality of inpatient services,
and to use them to measure quality of services in six public tertiary hospitals.
The Institute of Medicine's definition of quality is comprehensive. In this study that
definition was operationalised by looking at those few aspects of quality that could be
measured given available data and resources. Global structural quality analysis
(focussing on staff, drugs and buildings) permitted comparisons of overall hospital
potential or capacity to provide quality inpatient services. Staff availability and quality
assessment was made possible by the existence of national staffing standards. There
were clear disparities in staffing patterns across the hospitals and the problem seemed
more closely related to staff availability than staff quality. Differences in availability of
drugs .across the hospitals were a reflection of differences in procurement, distribution
and use strategies, and demand levels. Absence of coherent standards for tertiary
hospital buildings and equipment affected the objective measurement of these aspects.
Because of that, hospital equipment inventory assessment results are not presented in
this thesis. Development of a standard list of tertiary hospital equipment with each item
weighted by importance would have addressed the problem. This could not be done due
to time constraints. Nevertheless, building quality was assessed using three methods:
observations, interviewing HODs and tracer analysis. The aggregate comparison across
hospitals used availability of space as the key quality dimension. The three structural
aspects of quality considered in the study are common concerns facing hospitals in
many SSA countries. A caveat to this type of quality assessment is that although useful
in its own right, it is broad and remote from patient care or experience. Structure does
not tell us much about the process and outcome of care. That relationship is unclear.
However, there is some evidence that staffing and skills mix (nurses and specialists) has
260
an inverse relationship with mortality (Kovner and Gergen 1998, Aiken et al.,. 1999,
Waterhouse and Trump 2001).
Patient level analysis using tracer conditions was used to review process-related aspects
of inpatient service quality. The underlying rationale for using this approach was that
hospitals are complex organisations with multiple inputs and processes, and by using
tracers it is possible to explore the quality of these various facets of services. Indeed, it
was possible to compare process aspects of inpatient care across the hospitals and
identify which aspects of quality were deficient. Prospective methods of quality
assessment using tracers (in homogenous groups) and explicit criteria, though time
consuming, proved a reliable way of exploring inpatient quality where data problems
exist. In this study, a small number of tracer diseases were used which were important
but not necessarily representative of the hospitals' disease profiles.
On average the quality of inpatient services was high for the six hospitals when
compared to the expected quality level. Relative differences in quality emanated from
differences in clinical practice (or protocol compliance) and structure. The divergence
between the results of global structural and patient level assessments for some hospitals
confirmed the argument that structure per se is not an indicator of service delivery.
Patient level assessment is therefore more useful in analysing service delivery quality
because it enables explanation of the relationship between patient need and service
delivery (process).
The third objective of the study was:
c) To explore hospital quality-cost trade-offs using tracer diseases: malaria and
pulmonary tuberculosis.
Assessment of whether or not a hospital is efficient requires some understanding of the
quality of services. As discussed in Chapters 6, 7 and 8 measurement of these
parameters is subject to constraints depending on which approach is used. The manner
in which costs and quality are defined and measured affects the nature of the
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relationship between these two measures. The cost-quality trade-off framework used in
this study was able to distinguish hospitals according to their relative performance and
in reference to the expected performance. The framework was also able to locate
hospitals in a way that allowed some interpretation to be made of relative technical and
allocative efficiency. The results indicated that, among these hospitals, there were
divergences in the relationship between cost and quality. Hospitals 1 and 2 were judged
to be relatively more technically efficient, hospitals 3 and 5 intermediate, and hospitals
4 and 6 least efficient.
These conclusions need to be viewed within the context of the limitations of the cost-
quality model derived from the measurement of costs and quality. It was not possible in
the study to construct best practice curves for the chosen tracers. This was because of
practical difficulties associated with lack of evidence on the effectiveness of different
combinations of inputs (medical interventions). That notwithstanding, the adapted
model (based on expected reference lines) enabled a systematic exploration of costs and
quality, and relative performance.
12.2Hospital performance and internal structure
After measuring hospital performance, the study sought to meet these two specific
objectives:
(1) To describe the internal organisation and management of public hospital
services, and associated incentive structures, and (2) to analyse how incentive
structures, internal organisation and management relate to costs and quality of
services.
It was clear that public hospitals in Zimbabwe operated under a constrained
environment owing to lack of autonomy in strategic management domains. Internal
structure was characterised by central control and minimal involvement of operational
managers and clinicians in making hospital-wide decisions. Departments were not
accountable for resource use because there were no effective mechanisms for
accountability. Budgets were centralised and the locus of control was with the hospital
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executive (or administrators) while doctors, nurses and others who have no budget
responsibility control resource use. Incentives for cost containment and efficiency were
largely absent. Policy prescribed supportive management structures such as finance,
procurement and drugs and therapeutic committees were present and functional in some
hospitals and absent in others. This created a situation where key activities pertaining to
rationalisation of hospital activities (e.g. rational use of inputs, information exchange
and co-ordination) were not formalised. The current internal structure is not conducive
to high performance or organisational effectiveness. Hospital financing strategies are
equally not supportive.
Hospital workers face an incentive regime that does not support performance-enhancing
behaviour. First, the design of the management structure itself creates disincentives for
key hospital cadres such as clinicians because it does not provide for their effective
involvement and sharing of information and responsibilities. This provided the weakest
link between hospital policies and actual practice especially in a system where clinicians
still wield considerable power by virtue of their social status. Accountability structures
for clinicians were weak because of lack of explicit supervision mechanisms. Second,
staff reward systems were not related to performance, and this was compounded by
unsupportive management practices (styles). The study showed that monetary incentives
were viewed as the important form of incentives. Moreover, the majority of incentives
in these hospitals, however small, were structured to "satisfy" and not necessarily to
"motivate" staff because they were not related to performance. If at all some rewards
were performance-related; the system was so unstructured that this study could not
gather supportive evidence. It is therefore not surprising that, all in all, staff attitudes
towards costs and quality of hospital services were largely apathetic despite a high
degree of staff awareness of these problems.
The six case studies provide diverse institutional contexts and variable performance
levels. The study draws some conclusions based on the hypotheses highlighted in
Chapter 10 concerning possible relationships between specific institutional
characteristics and performance:
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• There was little evidence from the study that the degree of participation of the HAB
influenced performance. Having or not having an active HAB could not be
associated with performance differences across hospitals. Hospitals 2 and 4 that had
active HABs performed differently as did the other hospitals. However, in absolute
terms an important finding was that heads of departments of hospitals with active
HABs attested to enhanced local decision-making and flexibility associated with
mobilisation and utilisation of extra-budgetary resources. They argued that extra-
income improved the capacity of the hospital to respond to patient needs, and
resolve some problems locally.
• No systematic performance differences were observed according to operational
differences in the management structures. Itwould seem that mandated structures do
not work, and that some innovation applied in hospitals 1 and 2 might be helpfully
standardised across hospitals (e.g. creation of an efficiency committee, and effective
co-ordination between medical departments and clinicians).
• Evidence obtained from this study does not suggest any association between the
level of managerial participation and performance. Diverse management styles, and
capacities to engage heads of departments and clinicians in hospital-wide issues
characterised the hospitals. The actual nature of managerial participation (not
pursued in this study) might have affected this relationship. Itwould also seem that
co-ordination between departments should be based on what mechanisms are
favoured by staff, that is, formal (planned meetings) or informal (unplanned
meetings) rather than based on policy prescription.
• The majority of the study hospitals had centralised resource use systems, and
therefore little evidence was gathered by the study to explain relative performance
differences in these terms. However, if performance is compared on a case by case
basis, hospitals that made attempts to deviate from standard bureaucratic approaches
of resource use and control were perceived to have achieved better results compared
to previous years. This means that although "decentralised" resource use patterns
could not be associated with performance differences across the hospitals, they may
have had an impact on individual hospitals' performance (HospitaI4, for instance).
• Management capacity both in terms of management skills and training varied across
the hospitals suggesting that the relationship between management capacity and
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relative performance was not definitive. For instance, at least 50% of respondents at
hospitals 1 and 2 had management training and considerable experience but so were
respondents at hospitals 3 and 6. It might be argued that management capacity is a
structural attribute of a hospital organisation and therefore its relationship with
performance can only be understood by looking at managerial processes (e.g.,
capacity to engage staff). The skills mix and management training of hospital
managers was poor across the hospitals.
• The behaviour of clinicians in public hospitals could be associated with the internal
organisational and management structure. The position of clinicians within public
hospital organisations did not place pressure on their clinical activities to consider
hospital-wide issues. This scenario applied to all the study hospitals. Variations in
treatment protocol compliance, however, suggest differences in professional and
medical practices, which might have influenced relative performance, Drugs and
therapeutic committees whose role was to ensure compliance with treatment
guidelines and rational use of drugs were not functional in most hospitals, and where
functional they met irregularly. It may be concluded that although there were
structures in place to standardise clinical practice and rationalise resource use, these
structures were non-functional and therefore ineffective. Similarly, the presence or
absence of specialist consultants did not seem to affect protocol compliance. This
might be explained partly by lack of clinical meetings.
• The study explored the hypothesis that hospitals with adaptive operational
mechanisms for procuring and distributing inputs were likely to cope with internal
demand and therefore perform better. In the majority of the case studies, the
procurement committee operated in accordance with government input procurement
procedures. There was minimal flexibility when using budget appropriations in
comparison to when using extra-budgetary hospital income. Innovative strategies in
internal input distribution systems where observed at hospital 1 (the efficiency
committee), and in hospital 4 with shadow devolved budgets where HODs had to
keep commitment registers and input stock-cards. However, there was little evidence
of innovative input procurement and distribution activities, and lack of a systematic
association between such activities as were identified and relative performance to
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support the hypothesis. It was nevertheless evident that the general system of input
procurement stifled innovation and that influenced absolute hospital performance.
These conclusions need to be viewed within the context that they are based on only six
case studies. In summary, what seems salient from the study is that those hospitals that
made systematic attempts to depart from bureaucratic management procedures were
acknowledged to have achieved better absolute (rather than relative) performance
results. What is particularly important is that the study demonstrated that hospitals have
different internal (operational) contexts and should therefore not be treated as
homogenous entities even if they have similarly designated roles in the health system.
Considering one or a few organisational variables as surrogate for others in evaluating
hospitals (e.g., Pauly and Wilson 1986, AI-Haider and Wan 1991) carries the risk of
classifying different hospitals as similar. The foregoing might lead to inappropriate
policy prescriptions. The study showed that there were marked differences in
management capacity and styles, degree of involvement of HODs and clinicians, staff
tensions and power dynamics, internal communication and co-ordination across the
hospitals. These factors affect hospital performance in a variety of ways. One such way
is through the incentives and disincentives that these organisational factors create for
different staff categories. It would appear that the multiple inter-relationships between
these factors, and the absence of clearly superior or inferior constellation of factors has
precluded the identification of clear causal relationships. More research is required to
further elucidate the effect of these organisational factors.
12.3Methodological contribution
Hospital performance has traditionally been measured using singular approaches: input
productivity or costs or quality of services. Rarely has it been measured
comprehensively as attempted in this study. The study first subjected the hospitals to an
analysis of utilisation indicators, which was followed by an assessment of costs and
quality of services. Assessment of quality of services has generally been ignored or
inadequately factored into hospital efficiency assessments regardless of method
sophistry. This is not surprising given the complexity of hospital organisations.
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Significant strides in the measurement of quality of services have been made in
developed countries with the advancement of information technology but very little has
occurred in LMICs.
A combination of bottom-up and top-down costing methods was used in order to
optimise merits and minimise demerits of both methods. Standard step-down methods
yield unit costs that may obscure inefficiencies (e.g. costs of expired drugs and other
wastage) whilst use of prospective costing methods at patient level allows estimation of
unit costs that reflect better the underlying production function. Use of prospective
methods in contexts where data are usually incomplete and of poor quality yields
valuable and insightful results. Through this method it was possible to establish the
distribution of costs per case.
The measurement of quality of health services, and especially hospital services in
LMICs poses major difficulties. Global hospital structural assessments gave a sense of
hospital capacity differences in potentially providing quality inpatient services. The
study also employed tracer conditions to prospectively explore the quality of hospital
inpatient services. The underlying assumption was that tracers would allow an
exploration of various components of hospital services (pinpointing quality concerns) as
patient go through the hospitalisation process. By following patients from admission to
discharge it was possible to assess and compare what was done to and for the patient
versus what ought to have been done to and for the patient. This was rare in that most
quality assessment studies that have used tracers have done so using retrospective data.
The relationship between cost and quality remains a conundrum despite the existence of
illustrative conceptual models in the literature. Empirical evidence to date on this
relationship is equivocal. The cost-quality framework used in this study was driven by
patient-specific data and facilitated an analysis of relative performance across the
hospitals. The quality measurement used captured both structural and process
dimensions.
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Use of qualitative methods in exploring and developing a deeper understanding of
possible determinants of hospital performance is a notable methodological contribution
to the small body of available literature. One of the problems associated with
quantitative methods in measuring organisational performance is the difficulty of
incorporating the range of possible organisational factors into the models. The problem
is compounded by the fact that the majority of these factors cannot readily be measured
in quantitative terms. Although qualitative methods cannot demonstrate causal
relationships they provide the latitude for detailed analysis of behavioural factors and
organisational contexts within which different performance levels are achieved. It is
through this process that hospital performance and its determinants can be further
understood.
12.4 Theoretical contribution
This study represents one of the first attempts to approach hospital performance
assessment using a non-traditional conceptual framework. It argues that internal
organisation and management impacts on performance, and the effect of factors such as
clinical practice, cost and quality control activities on performance is not just physical
but based on the perceptions of those responsible for them. Concepts of organisation
theory (such as internal structure, management styles, motivation/incentive and social
comparison theories) have a contribution to make in exploring and understanding
hospital organisations. The case studies' results demonstrated that observed
performance is an outcome of complex relationships in internal structural and
behavioural factors. The traditional engineering approach (input/output approach) to
measurement of organisational performance (especially hospitals) needs to be
complemented with a thorough analysis of the institutional context. It would seem that
performance improvements might be fostered through creation of the appropriate
organisational contexts.
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12.5 Practical contribution
Information generated by the study is useful in a number of ways. First, it fills a gap in
our understanding of hospital cost structures, efficiency and resource flows in
Zimbabwe. There has not been any previous detailed analysis of tertiary hospital costs
in the country apart from isolated project-funded pilot studies that become ends in
themselves. Unit cost information can be used to design fee structures that ensure
effective cost recovery programmes-and hence contribute to hospital financial
autonomy. Second, data on costs and quality can be used to support decision making on
matters concerning hospital funding levels and options (through grants or service
contracts). contracting out of services and monitoring of hospital performance. Third,
the hospital sector is undergoing reforms (e.g. entrusting hospitals with greater
autonomy and contracting out of some services). If reforms are to succeed they must be
tailored on the basis of facts and empirical data to ensure policy impact. The study
highlights the nature of current organisational and management problems in public
hospitals and that for reforms to achieve expected results they must create and align
appropriate incentives to enhance performance at both individual and institutional level.
Evidence from the case studies suggests that hospital reforms are likely to meet intended
objectives if they are perceived to be essential by the relevant constituency, and if they
address what individual providers perceive as important in changing their behaviour and
hence that of the hospitals. Fourth, the results provide detailed baseline (benchmark)
data for future evaluation of hospital reforms. Besides, organisational reforms are
expensive and time consuming and require therefore empirical evidence to increase their
chances of success.
12.6 Policy implications
A number of policy implications (both specific and general) can be drawn from this
study. These include:
• Affording hospitals greater autonomy in operational and strategic areas of
management: for example, finance, personnel, service delivery options (self or
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contracting out services, estate and equipment management appears worthy of
further consideration. This could take the form of entrusting hospital advisory
boards with greater governance and strategic powers as currently proposed or
establishing entirely new management boards. The process of doing so should be
gradual given the observed lack of managerial capacity across tertiary hospitals. The
major policy marker to such changes is that there must be interest and willingness
for change amongst the relevant constituency affected by that change, since in
addition to readiness, this may indicate confidence in hospital management among
hospital workers.
• Current systems of financial management control do not contribute to performance
improvement because they are structured to monitor general expenditure but not to
track (or monitor) expenditure patterns by source. There is scope for improving
hospital efficiency by ensuring appropriate use and managerial control of recurrent
costs. There are grounds for saying that management and responsibility for capital
costs (depreciation and replacement) should be decentralised to the hospital level.
• Strengthening hospital management capacity: Investments in management training
to date have been broad and not focused on specific hospital management needs.
Hospital heads and administrators need to be exposed to the concepts of general
management (including estate management, personnel management, public
relations, designing contracts, the contracting process, managing contracts and
financial management). This type of training would give managers an overview of
how macro and micro-decisions can influence the overall performance of the
hospitals. As it stands, hospital management is taken as an add-on activity to a
senior clinician's activities. Evidence from the case studies showed that the hospital
management is often allocated to clinicians without requisite training (or
experience) to meet the challenges of looking after both workers and patients. As a
result, staff tensions are frequent, staff morale is low, resource management is poor,
and that inevitably affects the quality of services. Management of a hospital is much
more complex than management of a supermarket for example, and therefore
medical superintendence should practically be viewed as a full-time managerial job.
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The concept of introducing chief executives at national referral centres (as at
Parirenyatwa central hospital) is a move in the right direction.
• Reorganisation of hospital internal structure: the way public hospitals are currently
organised internally does not support efficient behaviour. Selected clinicians and
other HODs (medical and nonmedical departments) need to be given departmental
responsibilities including budget management. This could be an adaptation of the
clinical directorate system in the UK NHS (introduced under the Resource
Management Initiative) where each directorate receives a budget with incentives for
cost containment (e.g. retaining budget savings) and quality improvement. Hospital
administrators would retain overall responsibility for the hospital budget with the
assistance of administrative clerks in each directorate. Clinical directorates could be
established according to broad diagnostic groupings such as medical, surgical,
maternity, orthopaedic, outpatient/casualty and others. Currently, wards are
operationally overseen by sisters-in-charge who have no control over clinicians.
Nevertheless, it is clinicians who control resource use. This form of restructuring
would create more staff awareness of costs and quality of services, and resource-use
accountability. Farrar (1993) argues in the context of UK NHS that involvement of
clinicians in management may not lead to improved hospital efficiency because of
the inherent differences in the underlying objective functions of doctors and
administrators. Giving selected clinicians more say over use of resources may allow
them to pursue their own objectives, which might be at odds with efficiency
improvement. Similarly, self-selected clinicians may choose to become
administrators thereby defeating the purpose of addressing conflicting objectives of
administrators and clinicians. She argues that one way of counteracting such
behaviour would be to link "good practice", monitored by adherence to standards,
with immediate financial gain rather than distant threats of specialty closure or
contraction. The case studies showed that the popular incentives among hospital
staff were monetary, which supports the plausibility of Farrar's suggestion in the
Zimbabwe context.
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• To ensure that clinical practice conformed to national guidelines (EDLIZ 1996) and
hospital specific policies, drugs and therapeutic committees as currently constituted,
must compulsorily be held at regular intervals, and a systematic process of
continuous professional education for medical staff must be established. The
potential benefits of having such hospital committees were not being realised
because they were simply not operating as expected. Expanding their mandate to
include quality assurance activities or by establishing separate but complementary
quality assurance committees could also enhance the impact of drugs and
therapeutic committees.
• As mentioned earlier, the system of input procurement needs greater flexibility if
hospitals are to better respond to patient needs, and take advantage of market
opportunities. Although central procurement has inherent advantages (economies of
scale). poor functioning of the government central medical stores has affected
hospital activities by causing delays and consequently unnecessary expiry of drugs.
However, flexibility in input procurement requires checks and balances at national
and regional level to minimise opportunistic behaviour. It is necessary that
appropriate audit systems are instituted first to discourage such behaviour.
Moreover, hospital internal input distribution systems are likely to improve with the
introduction of departmental budgets.
• If all the above suggestions are to work as intended, reward systems for hospital
staff must be restructured accordingly. Systems of performance related rewards
(e.g., salaries, bonuses, merit awards, training, promotion, job enrichment and
enlargement) for staff needs to be introduced in ways that channel staff efforts (or
motivation) towards improved hospital performance. This is not an easy process but
a vital one if the behaviour and attitudes of staff towards costs and quality are to
change for the better. To nurture performance-enhancing behaviour, good practice
must be rewarded and poor performance discouraged. The reward system must be as
transparent as possible such that all staff are aware of the immediate benefits of
good practice. However, in a hospital situation difficulties may be encountered in
identifying good performers because of the jointness of activities between staff (for
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example nurses and doctors). In practice, that role can only be played by immediate
supervisors using locally (or nationally) agreed standards of assessing good practice.
A review of empirical evidence is necessary before decisions about which systems
to adapt are made. Alternatives include systems of performance related pay and
merit awards in education and health in the UK, and doctor's bonus systems in
China.
• Strengthening the referral system: In order to ensure appropriate use of tertiary
hospitals there is need to strengthen the referral system through deliberate policies
(e.g. penalty fees for by-passers), increasing coverage and quality of primary and
secondary care services (especially in urban areas where these hospitals are located).
A significant proportion of hospital costs can be reduced through minimising
unnecessary hospitalisations at tertiary hospitals. The major cost component per case
found in this study was hotel services suggesting that decisions on whether or not
patients required inpatient or outpatient care had marked influence on hospital costs.
Hospitals need to develop admission and discharge guidelines for use by clinicians.
The option of using one admitting and discharging clinician, though plausible,
would create problems because of the acute shortage of doctors in the country.
• Establishing an essential package of tertiary services: Related to the above point is
the fact that, unlike secondary hospitals, the specific role of a tertiary hospital is not
clearly defined. The majority of tertiary hospitals provide significant amounts of
secondary care and that creates confusion in the referral system. Setting out the
essential package of tertiary hospital services would assist in the rationalisation of
hospital admission and discharge policies, and clinical practice in general. Both
technical and allocative efficiency would potentially improve. In additional, hospital
technology (loosely defined as equipment, staff, and buildings) would be equally
rationalised for tertiary services.
• Methods of hospital funding need to be reviewed to ensure that hospitals respond
better to patient needs and are accountable for resource use. This requires
establishing systems of monitoring hospital performance on a regular basis.
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Current reform proposals in Zimbabwe on hospital autonomy and introduction of
service contracts point in the right direction but require thorough analysis and major
refocus. Two important aspects of the reform process must be considered:
(a) Appropriate packaging of hospital reforms: This is crucial for policy success. The
tendency in the past has been to implement policies that target specific organisations or
staff groups (e.g. administrators or managers) without targeting all key groups so that
they work collectively towards achieving the intended policy goals. The result is that
some policy targets are met at the expense of others. For example, waiting lists are
reduced at the expense of quality of care. It is important that reform policies are
designed to create appropriate incentives to meet intended goals. Incentives so created
must focus on both individuals and organisations. This would not only enable reforms to
change systems for better performance but also change staff compliance with the new
systems. Staff attitudes towards change are a function of their perceptions of the need
for that change. Changing systems without concomitantly changing staff behaviour
might create unintended consequences.
(b) Incremental reform implementation strategies: Good reform policies many times fail
to achieve their intended goals because of the way they are implemented.
Implementation of hospital reforms must consider capacity differences across hospitals.
It may be argued that gradual and experiential approaches are more likely to increase
policy practice and impact. This entails prior consideration of a number things, namely:
provision of adequate resources (because reforms are not cost free), clear guidelines on
how things should be done, and audit systems that engender good practice.
12.7 Areas for future research
Unravelling the complexities of hospitals remains an under-researched area. Hospitals
are dynamic organisations whose behaviour needs to be understood in the context of
prevailing circumstances. This study attempted to not only measure hospital
performance but to also qualitatively explore the relationship between institutional
contexts and hospital performance. However, in the light of the study findings, there is
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scope for enhancing our understanding of hospitals by improving the focus, scale and
methods used in this study.
(1) Improvement of methods for adjustment for case mix and case severity in LMICs.
Literature shows that case mix and severity differences explain a great part of cost
differences across hospitals. This study used facility and service mix as crude measures
of case mix and severity, which might have obscured some differences. Statistical
approaches can be used to compute case mix and severity indices or adjusters using
locally collected hospital information (for example disease classifications, age, sex and
weighting systems), which can be used in tandem with cost accounting methods such as
those used in this study. The interpretation and conclusions to be drawn would become
firmer. However, no system of patient classification can generate entirely homogenous
groups that are also practically manageable. The aim would be to minimise variation in
patient characteristics within groups and maximise variation between groups.
(2) Further exploration of hospital cost-quality relationships: This may be done by
looking at service outcomes adjusted for case mix, case severity and costs with larger
sample sizes. Recent studies on quality of care are increasingly focusing on outcomes,
and attempts to implement similar studies in LMICs would be insightful. Finding
methods for measuring and explaining outcomes in contexts where there are data
problems is a major research challenge in itself. The "staging method" where the
condition and history of cases is noted at admission (to assist in the prognosis) may be
used to address this attribution problem. Furthermore, this study was not able to
construct "best practice" cost-quality curves for use in mapping out hospital
performance. This can be pursued further by thorough examination of existing literature,
and consultations with local experts. Understanding cost-quality relationships in this
way requires much bigger studies with larger sample sizes.
(3) Understanding hospital behaviour is important in understanding hospital
performance. The study lacked the guidance of an underlying hospital behavioural
model and, further empirical evidence and conceptual thought would be needed to help
articulate one. The development of a hospital model can be explored through studying
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hospital objective functions of key hospital staff categories using both statistical and
qualitative methods. The implicit assumption of that would be that by understanding the
behaviour of individuals and groups within the hospital we may infer the hospital
objective function. This is important if we are to understand and predict hospital
behaviour. Crilly (2000) used qualitative and quantitative methods in trust hospitals in
the UK to explore the objective functions of hospital staff. In addition, to studying
hospital staff views on what hospitals aim for, community views on the role of the
hospital can also be captured using qualitative methods and compared.
(4) This study was able to show that internal organisational and management factors
such as internal structure, management capacity and styles, incentives, level of
involvement of HODs and clinicians, staff tensions and power dynamics, internal
communication and co-ordination are important for hospital performance. A deeper
understanding of the effect of these dimensions of public hospital performance in
Zimbabwe requires a series of focused studies looking at the specifics of each
dimension over a larger number of hospitals. One approach ofto this would be to search
for natural experimental sites where some hospitals exhibit certain characteristics of
interest and others do not. The effect of specific factors can then be explored in a more
structured manner. Intervention studies could also be carried out, focused on these
factors in the local context. The rationale of such studies would be to elucidate specific
aspects which when considered together could provide a broader picture of how
hospitals function.
(5) This study was able to show differences in resource use patterns across hospitals but
was unable to measure marginal costs and whether or not economies of scope and scale
exist. Although this would have been relevant to a slightly different research question, it
is still important that the issue of hospital size be explored given that some hospitals in
the study appeared to have excess capacity (which in tum seemed to influence
managerial and professional practices). Such information is important for decisions
related to expansion and contraction of hospital services. It could be that some hospitals
are performing poorly because of they are either too small or too big given current
levels of utilisation.
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(6) Need for evidence based reforms: Any reforms in the health sector should be
preceded by a thorough review of the current situation noting specific strengths and
weaknesses. Such context specific evidence is valuable in deciding whether to reform or
not, and in adapting and adopting reform policies for optimal impact. Reforms must be
guided by need and not by fashion. Implementation of reforms will now be evaluatable
against this baseline.
In sum, understanding hospital performance and its determinants is a complex process
that requires innovative approaches to tackling the myriad of potential factors involved.
As shown in this study and other studies before, tackling all the potential factors
(quantitatively or qualitatively) in one study is practically impossible. The challenge is
in identifying relevant factors to consider under different circumstances. Whilst
qualitative approaches might not establish causation, they allow for a deeper
understanding of internal factors (or institutional characteristics/performance context)
especially from the views of individuals or groups within the organisation. It is the
individuals or groups within the hospital organisation that influence its behaviour and
hence its performance.
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Annex I Proposed Decentralisation of Health Care Sector: Overall Relationship
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Table Al.O Ministry of health expenditure by level of health care
Level % Share 1992/93 % Share 1994/95
Parirenyatwa * 15.8 9.4
Central hospitals" 22.9 24.2
Provincial hospitals** 10.2 11.2
General hospital*** 5.3 5.7
District hospitals*" 13.3 14.3
Rural hospital and RHCs .. ** 8.9 9.5
Councils & Voluntary Org'ns 7.8 7.2
Preventive Services 15.3 11.2
Other! 0.7 7.3
Notes: *central hospitals (quaternary), **provlllcial hospitals (tertiary), ***secondary level hospital,
****primary care facilities.! Explanation of expenditure item could not be obtained from MOH.
Source: MOH (1997)
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Annex II: Methods of measuring quality and empirical evidence from LMICs
Literature abounds on methods that can be used for measuring the three aspect of quality
discussed above. A few methods amenable to use in LMICs are summarised here.
Quality assessment Methods
The "Staging method" coined by Gonnella and Govan (1975) is based on the classification
of patients or cases into homogenous groups so that their progress can be attributed to
differences in health care. The method does not focus only on adverse outcomes and
investigation of antecedent care, it also considers the stage at which the case first comes in
contact with the health care system (e.g. when a patient is admitted into hospital). In this
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way it provides an idea of the level of effectiveness of the system of care received by the
case prior to admission (e.g. at primary care level). With this knowledge it is possible to
explain the outcome of hospital care for a particular case taking into account non-hospital
events that could have influenced the final outcome. This method is similar to the
"trajectory method" (Brook and Stevenson 1970) which is based on selecting a cohort of
patients and following their progression through a system of health care so as to note how
successfully they attain specified landmarks in the process of care. The only difference with
the staging method is that the condition of the case is not noted at uptake into the system.
Williamson's (1978a) approach, the "health accounting" method, is a more systematic
method of quality assurance. It is hospital or clinic based, patient specific and focuses on
diagnostic categories or specific clinical procedures. Standards are set consensually by
doctors for doctors. The method involves four steps: setting of standards, specification of
predicted outcomes, measurement of actual outcomes in a sample of patients by a 'health
accountant' (e.g. a paramedical), and comparison between actual and predicted outcomes.
Any observed difference is called achievable-benefit-not-achieved (ABNA). The goal of
quality assurance is to reduce the ABNA gap to zero. The method is based on the
understanding that a patient-doctor interaction leads to a diagnostic outcome and to a
therapeutic process with a therapeutic outcome. Diagnostic outcomes are classified into
true-positives, false-positives and false-negatives (missed diagnosis). Therapeutic outcomes
are measured using an index which classifies the overall health and functional status of any
given population or group of patients. For example, a hospital can scale outcome for the
treatment of a hip fracture as follows: impaired running, impaired walking, impaired
climbing, and visible deformity. This method can be applied to all aspects of health care, be
it ambulatory or inpatient, acute or long term, as viewed from either the provider or
consumer's perspective. Analysis can be at individual or at national level of social
aggregation. The underlying premise of the method is that quality assurance must integrate
health and management sciences to analyse care benefits and "disbenefits" with the same
rigour as profits and loss analysis in a business (Williamson 1988).
Assessment of quality of services can be done using tracers (Kessner et al., 1973). Kessner
and colleagues define tracers as "a specific health problem, that, when combined in sets,
allow health care evaluators to pinpoint the strengths and weaknesses of a particular
medical practice setting or entire health service network by examining the interaction
between providers, patients and their environment". The choice of care or conditions to be
reviewed is dictated by the circumstances and purposes of the assessment (Donabedian
1985). The main assumption is that there is a relationship between the quality of care of the
tracer conditions and other conditions, which the tracer represents. The tracers whose
trajectories are to be delineated are first rigorously systematised by a matrix, which defines
the features of the health care system concerning which information is sought. Secondly,
criteria and standards of assessment are specified. Thirdly, the necessary data should be
obtained. Possible data sources are hospital medical records, insurance claims or through
primary data collection. The main limitation of using tracers is the amount of generalisation
that can be made from the results.
Criteria setting for quality assessment
Common in all the methods discussed above is the use of criteria or standards. Criteria can
either be explicit or implicit or a mixture of both. Explicit criteria refer to criteria that are
set up by a panel of competent practitioners (experts) based on current clinical science
knowledge and experience. They must be expert consensus in setting up such criteria.
Implicit criteria are individual sets of rules based on clinical science training and
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experience of individual medical cadres. Therefore, medical decision making processes are
not pre-specified but are based on experience and what is deemed medically correct at a
given point in time, and for a given medical problem by the assessor (Donabedian 1982,
Mitchell et al., 1997).
The main caveat in the use of explicit criteria in quality assessment is that the criteria must
be a good translation of concepts and definitions of quality (structure, process and
outcome). As measurement tools their properties determine the reliability, inclusiveness
and validity of resulting judgements (Donabedian 1982). Failure to set up appropriate
criteria might lead to inappropriate quality assessments and hence ineffective monitoring
and quality improvement strategies.
Both types of criteria have merits and demerits. Explicit criteria cost less to use once
formulated but are costly to formulate. Pre-specified criteria allow for consistency in
professional opinion and uniform judgement of cases. However, they require rigorous
analysis of medical literature, experts and consensus building. Consensus can be achieved
using methods such as the Delphi technique and others. The main demerit of explicit
criteria is that once set they are not easily adaptable. Flexibility can be introduced by using
branchings that specify different contingencies (criteria map or algorithmic criteria). On the
other hand, implicit criteria are adaptable to individual circumstances. Their main demerits
are that they require highly experienced experts, and assessment of cases by different
people might create inconsistencies. The lack of a common framework of analysis can
create difficulties in making generalised comments on the quality of care and what actions
to take. In order to maximise benefits from both types of criteria, Donabedian (1985)
suggests that both can be used. Explicit criteria can be used as a screening process by
which cases that deserve further review using implicit criteria are identified. The
effectiveness of this approach depends on the level of specificitylOO and sensitivitylOl of
explicit criteria used.
Quality assessments studies in LMIC
Literature on quality of hospital care studies in industrialised countries is vast. A variety of
quality of care indicators are used in the studies: e.g. risk adjusted mortalities, re-admission
rates, infection rates, and complication rates. There has been growing interest in the use of
outcomes in hospital quality assessment. In developing countries, relatively fewer studies have
been down and indicators of quality used in the studies have been largely structural and process
aspects of care. Quality of health care studies in developing countries from 1981 to 1993 are
extensively reviewed by (1995). Table Al.l is an updated version of De Geyndt compilation.
What is striking is that all the quality assessment studies reviewed by De Geyndt up until 1993
looked at structural and process aspects of care, with none looking at outcome aspects. One of
his explanations was that ".researchers with a strong background in economics seem to prefer
quantifiable and measurable inputs..". It would seem, however, that quality assessment studies
in LMICs are in the main only feasible when one looks at structure and process assessment.
Furthermore, in countries where resources and the necessary infrastructure is deficient, it seems
realistic that the mere availability of inputs and an idea of the process of care provides a fair
picture of the quality of care. As he rightly argues, outcome measures are the most desirable
indicators of quality but because of lack of appropriate tools and the tenuous cause-effect
100 "Specificity"in this casemeansthe proportionof non-questionablecases they correctlyexcludefrom
furtherreview.
101 "Sensitivity"meanstheproportionofquestionablecasestheycorrectlyreferforfurtherreview.
301
relationship between process and outcome few studies have been done. The attribution problem
is exacerbated by poor living conditions in which the users of services generally live in.
Therefore, it takes no other profession to do outcome assessments under such circumstances of
data inadequacy or the expense involved in doing such assessments. This is the main reason
why even after 1993 studies on quality are still focusing on structural and process. However,
there is evidence there is emerging evidence on use of outcomes (Weakliam at a1.1994, Bitran
1995, Broomberg 1997).
Table A2.0 Quality of Health Care Studies in LMICs
Year Country Author Indicator used Unit of analysis
1981 Ghana Amonoo-Lartson Process rural clinic
1985 Ghana Amonoo-Lartson Process rural clinic
1986 PNG Pust and Burrell Process health centres
1988 Jamaica Walker et al. Process hospital
1989 All WHO Process PHC setting
1989 India Ghei Structure teaching hospital
1990 PNG Garner et a1. Structure Health centrel
1990 8 countries Bums et al., Process PHC setting
1991 Dominican Rep Lewis et al., Structure hospital
1991 PNG. ThomasonlEdwards Structure hospital
1991 Zaire/Zimb. Wishik Structure urb/rur clinics
1991 Bangladesh Begum Process hospital
1991 Ecuador Robertson et al., StrlProc rural clinics
1991 Phillippines PeterslBecker Str/Proc hospital
1991 12 countries Nicholas et al., Process PHC setting
1992 Angola Bjorck Process health centre
1992 Nigeria Kim Process FP clinic
1992 Brazil World bank Structure hospital
1992 China Kaufman et al., StrlProcess rural clinics
1992 BanglEgyptIVN Forsberg et al., Process PHC setting
1993 Kenya Mwabu Structure rural centres
1993 Phillipines Loevinsohn et al., Process rural centres
1993· Ghana Haran et al. •. Str/Process Hospital OPD
1994* Ghana Weakliam, Str/Proc/Outcome Health Centres
1994· Tanzania Gilson et al., Str/Process Health centres
1995· Morocco Brown et al., StrlProcess FP/deliverylPts
1995· Kenya Gilson et al. Structure PHC setting
1995* Senegal Bitran R StrlProc/Outcome HosplPHC facilities
1996* Zimbabwe Needleman et al., Structure hospital
1996· Ghana Govindaraj et al., Structure hospital
1996* India Chawla/George Structure hospital
1996· Kenya Collins et al., Structure hospital
1997* Zimbabwe Mills et al., Structure hospital
1997* South Africa Broomberg Stru/Proc./outcome hospital
Source: Updated table from De Geyndt (1995)
Notes: • added studies
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Table A2.1: Activities within Management Functions
~anagementFunctions Specific Activities
B. Hospital Domain:
Strategic Management Mission Definition, Strategic planning, Operational
guidelines, asset management
Financial Management Resource planning, mobilisation, allocation,
accounting, devolved/central budgets
Human Resource Management Incentive structures, tensions, coping strategies
Procurement External procurement of inputs, internal
distribution, equipment/technology, and
accountability structures
Administration All other day-to-day management activities
required in implementing hospital mission and
running the hospital, such as: time schedules, space
allocation, information management, and public
relations.
Clinical Practice Level of autonomy, treatment guidelines, medical
audits
Source: Adapted from Chawla et al., (1996).
Table A4: Estimates of Total Expenditure on Health care - Financial Year 1994/5
Public Sector Z$ million Percentage
~oHCW 1067 29.0
Other Ministries 171 4.7
Local Government 194 5.3
Donors 450 12.2
Total Public Sector 1882 51.2
Private Sector
Individual direct payments 1 119 30.5
Health Insurance benefits 432 11.8
Employer based care 208 5.7
Missions and other NGOs 33 0.9
Total Private Sector 1792 48.8
Total Health Spending 3674 100
Source: Schwartz and Zwizwai 1995
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Annex VI: Step Down Analysis of Hospital costs
Different sources of expenditure data are used in this method making it laborious (central, local
and other ministries' records). In most cases, data is in aggregated form making it difficult to
reconstruct actual expenditures. However, the process of reconstructing costs and showing
resource flows has the attendant advantage that hospital managers can identify main resource
consumption points, and how to properly allocate resources.
The first step is to ensure that total recurrent expenditure is established. This involves looking at
line item expenditures, and adding other expenditures incurred by the hospital but paid for
elsewhere. Other costs like depreciation and costs of donated goods have to be added. The next
step in the estimation is to allocate these costs to cost centres. These vary from one context to
the other. Generally there are three categories of cost centres (Barnum and Kutzin 1993):
(a) Overheads: these are centres that produce services that are consumed by other cost centres
and not directly by patients (e.g. administration, maintenance and utilities).
(b) Intermediate: these are departments that produce services that are consumed by other
departments and also directly by patients. These include diagnostic services (laboratory, x-ray),
theatre, pharmacy, laundry, kitchen, physiotherapy and others.
(c) Final: these are the primary departments that provide direct services to patients only. These
consist of inpatient and outpatient departments. Inpatients can be disaggregated into specific
wards such as obstetrics-gynaecology, medicine, surgery and paediatrics.
Step down costing method can be shown algebraically as follows:
let Cjo =direct cost in Overhead cost centre i;
CjI = direct cost in Intermediate cost centre j; and
CkF = direct costs in Final cost centre k.
The direct costs are the costs attributed to each cost centre prior to their allocation to the cost
centres associated with hospital outputs. After CjO, CjI and CkF are established the step down
method is applied to allocate all costs to final cost centres. The allocation method should reflect
the consumption of resources of the source department by the receiving department (i.e. the
apportionment of kitchen costs should be based on the proportion of patient days or actual
meals consumed in each ward). First to be allocated are overhead costs to all other cost centres.
Allocation of overhead costs is based on proportions that can be represented as
aij = the proportion ofp of Overhead cost centre i's costs "used" by Intermediate cost centrej;
aik = the proportion p of Overhead cost centre i's costs "used" by Final cost centre k;
Pjk = the proportion ofp ofIntermediate cost centrej's costs "used" by Final cost centre k;
where
!:pj = 1
In the first step the overhead costs are allocated to intermediate and final cost centres using
allocational proportions aij and ajk, resulting in the first step allocated cost, C'jI and C' kF.
Explicitly,
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where
C'j/= fully allocated costs ofIntennediate cost centrej; and C'kF= partially allocated costs of
Final cost centre k.
In the second step, the allocated ("indirect") costs from the intermediate cost centres in the first
step are allocated among the final cost centres using proportions ~jk. The fully allocated costs
are
where
C"kF= fully allocated costs of final cost center k.
Once all the costs have been allocated to final cost centre, average costs are then calculated
using appropriate activity statistics as denominators. Average costs of Intermediate cost centres
can also be calculated if the relevant service statistics are available.
Table A6.0 The generic anatomy of a tertiary hospital in Zimbabwe
Service Departments Medical and non-medical support departments
Male Medical Ward
Male Surgical Ward
Male Orthopaedic Ward
Female Medical Ward
Female Surgical Ward
Female orthopaedic ward
Children Medical Ward
Children Surgical Ward
Gynaecology Ward
Post-natal ward
Maternity Ward
Intensive Care Units, Eye Unit, Dental Unit
Outpatient/Casualty/Observation
Laboratory
Physiotherapy
Kitchen
Mortuary
Central Steam Sterilisation Unit (CSSD)
Radiography
Administration
Pharmacy
Storerooms
Workshops
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Table A6.1 Hospital unit costs (excluding capital costs) by department across the
hospitals, 1997/98FY (ZW$)
Hospital Ward/ Male Male Female Female Children Children Maternity
medical Surgical medical Surgical Medical Surgical
1 Patient days 315 315 344 344 377 377 504
Admissions 2,446 1,652 972 1,754 1,157 2,122 1,610
Per Bed 136,719 97,423 114,303 111,402 85,968 162,649 215,832
5 Patient days 502 438 408 343 434 418 464
Admissions 2,547 4,153 2,371 2,850 1,995 3,538 1,228
Per Bed 180,112 116,039 123,273 116,374 120,605 212,031 185,979
6 Patient days 437 415 424 395 441 408 482
Admissions 2,997 4,358 2,146 3,629 3,068 5,204 2,497
Per Bed 111,949 167,385 91,404 158,392 117,726 195,686 127,518
2 Patient days 166 161 169 172 160 153 158
Admissions 895 1,304 608 1,068 629 1,065 572
Per Bed 18,770 27,392 35,178 64,831 43,645 73,460 75,085
3 Patient days 526 292 385 347 409 363 311
Admissions 2,287 1,942 1,723 2,808 3,037 1,470 2,060
Per Bed 117,010 87,578 89,216 89,433 116,910 101,899 280,870
4 Patient days 384 459 400 401 408 371 433
Admissions 2,848 3,426 2,425 2,349 1,698 2,828 1,685
Per Bed 106,605 100,954 111,787 88,154 84,428 140,269 286,473
Table A6.1 Hospital unit costs (including capital costs) by department across the
hospitals, 1997/98FY (ZW$)
Hospital Ward Male Male Female Female Children Children Maternity
Medical surgical medical surgical medical surgical
1 Patient days 380 380 390 380 468 461 602
Admissions 2,955 1,996 1,100 1,936 1,438 2,600 1,923
Per Bed 165,204 117,719 129,435 122,940 106,801 199,313 257,770
5 Patient days 668 585 549 451 603 589 639
Admissions 3389 5545 3191 3751 2774 4979 1691
Per Bed 239665 154922 165920 153168 167689 298351 256148
6 Patient days 551 505 517 475 554 489 651
Admissions 3782 5297 2617 4356 3713 6246 3376
Per Bed 141245 203450 111468 190122 1425 234861 172457
2 Patient days 388 353 375 431 270 251 282
Admissions 2091 2852 1346 2673 1058 1750 1023
Per Bed 43827 59900 77918 162330 73449 120712 134181
3 Patient days 680 389 456 432 433 507 361
Admissions 2957 2588 2043 3493 1752 3765 2387
Per Bed 151307 116711 105812 111222 121450 144952 325461
4 Patient days 436 525 441 463.16 458.35 421 480
Admissions 3240 3924 2677 2715 1906 3210 1870
Per Bed 121282 115606 123402 101915 94784 159209 317813
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Table A6.3 Descriptive statistics of ward recurrent cost per admission by hospital,
1997/8 (ZW$)
Hospitals Range Mean SD CV
Min. Max.
1 972 2,446 1,673 511 0.31
2 572 1,304 877 283 0.32
3 1,723 3,037 2,190 566 0.26
4 1,685 3,426 2,466 634 0.26
5 1,995 4,153 2,669 968 0.36
6 2,146 5,204 3,414 1,071 0.31
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Table AS.O Broad Weighted Criteria for the Tracers
Quality Cluster Weighting # Valid Expected PPI
variables Score (0-1)
a) Pulmonary Tuberculosis
Structural factors: 30(56%) 18 1.46 1
Staff availability (11%)
Drug availability (19%)
Physical Environment (26%)
Process Factors: 24 (44%) 19 1.58
Diagnosis (11%)
Therapy (19%)
Patient & environ. (15%)
Overall Expected Score 54 (100%) 37 1.33 1
b) Simple Malaria:
Structural factors 24 (32%) 15 1.60 1
Staff availability [6](8%)
Drug availability [8](11%)
Phys. Environment [10](13%)
Process Factors: 52 (68%) 27 1.93 1
Diagnosis [3](4%)
Therapy [33](43%)
Patient & environ. [16](21%)
Overall Expected Score 76 (100%) 42 1.80 1
b) Severe Malaria:
Structural factors 18 (28%) 12 1.5 1
Staff availability [6](9%)
Drug availability [2](3%)
Phys. Environment [10](16%)
Process Factors:
Diagnosis [3](5%) 46(72%) 27 1.70
Therapy [28](44%)
Patient & environ. [15](23%)
Overall Expected Score 64(100%) 39 1.64 1
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Table A8.1 Weighted criteria for calculation of the weighted mean scorelProvider
Performance Index
Criteria
Weighting Total
Simple Malaria Severe Malaria
Weighting Total
Laboratory
Blood slide for MPs
Laboratory turnaround time
Weighing of patient!"
Total possible laboratory score
Treatment't" •
Administration of:
Chloroquine
Or pyrimethamine & sulphadoxine (po)
Or quinine (0)
Plus (optional doxycycline (po)
If complicated:
First choice drug quinine
Checked previous use quinine
If applicable referred to coma scale
IV quinine loading dose
Duration of loading dose
Close monitoring of infusion
Time lapse before maintenance dose
Maintenance dosage
Period of maintenance dose
Number of repeat doses
Ifpa't can swallow, quinine given orally
Duration of quinine (0)
Total possible treatment score
General measures:
If in coma, airway maintained
Nursed in cot bed
Two hourly turns
Other causes excluded
If convulsing, treated appropriately
Checked for hypoglycaemia
Monitoring of blood glucose screening
Given dextrose 50% lmllkg (diluted 1 to 1 in
children)
or 20-50 ml in adults followed by dextrose
infusion
If anaemic, transfusion of packed cells in HB<6g/dl
If having acute pulmonary oedema
Reviewed fluid balance
Monitored infusion rates carefully
If overhydrated, given IV frusemide
Lumbar puncture for meningitis
Total possible general score
Nursing Services:
Personal hygiene
Elimination
Nutrition
Environmental hygiene
Patient records
1
3
9
9
9
6
•
'"•
•
'"
'"
'"
'"
'"
'"
'"
'"
33
•
•
•
•
•
'"•
•
'"•
'"•
'"
'"
3
2
6
3
2
3
'"
'"•
'"
3
1
I
3
3
1
3
3
3
3
1
3
28
1
1
I
1
I
1
14
2
2
6
3
2
120Not necessarily a laboratory activity but a necessary precursor to effective treatment
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Total possible nursing score 16 15
Structural Factors
Availability of antimalarial drugs 8 2
Availability of toilets 1 1
Cleanliness of toilets 1 1
Availability ofsafe water 1 1
Availability of lighting 1 1
Availability of hand washing facilities 1 1
Availability of floor beds 1 1
Availability of microscopes 1 1
Condition of microscopes 1 1
Condition of buildings 2 2
Availability of staff (nurse & doctors) 6 6
Total possible structural score 24 18
Total weighted score 76 79
Notes: * process factor, ** structural factor, ***drug choice, dosage and duration criteria
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Table AS.2. Staff Availability by Category, Provincial Hospita11997
Staff Category [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] Norm
(171 (160 beds) (250beds) (235 (223 beds) (l56 (200
beds) beds) beds) beds)
Specialists 1 0 4 0 6 2 7
GMOs 7 6 8 7 9 5 10
Med. Sup. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
RGN/SCN 110 123 350 225 189 76 293
Pharmacist 2 2 2 1 1 1 2
Pharmacist Tech. 1 4 1 2 3 2 5
Matrons 1 1 2 0 2 3 2
Therapists 1 3 4 5 5 1 6
Orthopaed. Tech 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
Rehab. Tech. 2 4 3 4 4 4 4
Lab.Technologist 1 2 3 2 6 2 6
Dietician 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Radiographer 2 2 2 3 3 2 5
X-Ray Operator 1 0 '0 0 0 2 2
Clin.Pyschologist 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
Med. So. Worker 0 1 1 0 0 0 2
Inst. Dorn.Super. 2 2 2 3 2 2 4
Hosp.Admin" 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Clerical & Secre 10 11 18 11 14 9 21
Ancillary 50 66 167 82 146 57 95
Nursing Students 60 120 119 39
Inpatients 60247 45199 73956 68301 74990 46772
Table A8.3. Staff to facility ratios in clinical care facilities
Staff Category [5] [1] [4] [3] [6] [2] Norms
Specialists 6 1 0 4 2 0 7
Medical Sup. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Matrons 2 1 2 2 3 2 2
Therapists 5 1 5 4 1 3 6
Rehab. Tech. 4 2 4 3 4 4 4
Orthopaedic Tech. 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
Dietician 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Clin.Pyschologist 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
Equipment tech. 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
Hosp.Admin 1 1 1 1 1 1 3
Med. Soc. Worker 0 0 0 1 0 1 2
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Annex VIII: drug availability at provincial hospitals July 97-June 98
Hospital nam.e: .
NAME OF DRUG FREQ. of STOCK-OUTS PERIOD OUT OF STOCK
< 2 weeks 2-5 weeks > 6weeks
Chloroquine
Fansider ...
Quinine (Tablets)
Quinine (Injectibles)
Doxycycline
Isoniazid
Ethambutol
Rifampicin
Pyrazinamide
Bupivacaine
Lignocaine
Methyldopa
Reserpine
Indomethacin
Ibuprofein
Cotrimoxazole
Oxytocin
Nifedipine
Ergometrin
Lithium Carbonate
Benzylpenicillin
Metronidazole
Insuline Soluble
Insulin Zinclente
Postaglandin
E2 (dinoprostone)
Procaine penicillin
Dextrose
Ringers Lactate
Normal Saline
Gentamycin
Phenobarbitone
Paracetamol
Sutures"
Maintelyte
Notes: "Very Satisfactory" means 80 -100% of the drugs never out of stock in a year. "Satisfactory" means 60-
79% of drugs never out of stock a year. "Unsatisfactory" means less than 60% of drugs never out of stock
in a year. • Not a drug but an essential surgical input. Check all types
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Annex IX: Minimum acceptable level of tracer Inputs for acceptable quality
A) Pulmonary Tuberculosis'"
Case definition: a patient with two consecutive smear examinations or with one positive smear
examination and a chest x-ray suggestive of tuberculosis
New case a patient who never received TB treatment for less than one month
Ideal Patient Treatment Inputs (Key)
Input Quantity Comment~emarks
Doctor's timel2l At least 24 minutes per patient per day
Nursing time
General Hand
Laboratory tests
Chest X-Ray
Drugs (Category 1)
Hotel services
Stationery
Expected LOS
At least 12.3 hrs per patient per day
At least 12 minutes per patient per day
AFB tests(3 sputum tests)
1 x-ray
Isoniazid l00mg each (3 tablets) per day
Rifampicin 150mg each (4 tablets) per day
Pyrazinamide 500mg each (4tbts) per day
Ethambutol400mg inj or Ig/3 tbs per day
3 meals per day
Bedding and linen
1 card per patient
7 to 14 nights
Calculations done based on the a doctor
to patient ratio of 1:20
Calculations based on a nurse to patient
ratio of 1:0.65
Assuming 40 patients! ward. 1 GWward
Based on the national guideline.
One x-ray taken on admission
Streptomycin is rarely used
7-14 days intensive phase using DOTS
(or 60 days Short Term Chemotherapy-
Conventional method)
It is estimated that 80-90 percent of TB cases in hospitals are HIV positive. There were no significant
variations in this proportion between hospitals.
B) Malaria
Case definitions!":
Simple malaria: patient with fever and either lives in or has travelled in a malarial area within the past
three weeks.
Severe Malaria: patient presenting with any of the following signs; impairment of consciousness,
fits/convulsions, pallor, jaundice, "coca-coal" urine, breathlessness, prostration, low blood pressure,
persistent vomiting and bleeding from the mucosa.
a) Simple malaria
CommentslRemarksIdeal Inputs
Staff
Laboratory Test
Quantity
Dr: At least 24 minutes per patient per day
Nurse: At least 12.3 hrs per patient per
day
At least 12 minutes per patient per day
MP (Malaria Parasites) Test: 1
Calculations done based on the a
doctor to patient ratio of 1:20
Calculations based on a nurse to
patient ratio of 1:0.65
Assuming 40 pts/ward. 1 GWward
Done at referral centres and not
121 MoH&CW, 1994. Zimbabwe Tuberculosis Control Programme Manual.
122 Staff figures derived from the Human Resource Study by the MOH&CW (1999)
123 From the Revised Standard Treatment Guidelines on Malaria. March 1999. Produced by The Malaria
Control Technical Committee on Case Management and Drug sensitivity and endorsed by National Drug
and Therapeutics Policy Advisory Committee, Ministry of Health and Child Welfare.
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Drugs Chloroquine (Adult): 10 tablets (150mg
each)
Fansiderl14 (Adult): 3 tablets
Quinine (po): 4 tablets (60Omg) every 8
hours for 7 days
Paracetamo124 tablets
Hotel services 3 meals per day
Stationery
Expected LOS
Bedding and linen
I card per patient
1-10 days, mean=3 days
a) Severe malaria
necessarily at primary care facilities
Quinine could be given in a short
course of 3-5 days in which case
Doxycycline (po) is added. I tablet
(IOOmg) daily for 7 days. Used long
term course since the majority of
cases in the cohort had it.
Cases fed IV considered equivalent
to 3 balanced meals/day at ZW$120
Based on LOS
At ZW$13.94 per card
Based on cohort cases (n=79)
Ideal Inputs Quantity CommentslRemarks
Staff Dr: At least 24 minutes per patient per
day
Nurse: At least 12.3 hrs per patient per
day
GH: at least 12 minutes per patient per
day
MP (Malaria Parasites) Test: 1Laboratory Test
Drugs IV Quinine (Adult 60kg):
Loading dose: 1200mg(2 ampuoles)
diluted in 200-500mls of 5% dextrose
Maintenance dose: 600mg (1 amp). Six
doses over 48 hours= 6 amp of Q
Quinine (0) 300 mg for 7 days= 14
tablets (i.e. if patient can swallow)
Paracetamol42 tablets
3 meals per dayHotel services
Stationery
Expected LOS
Bedding and linen
1 cardlFile per patient
3-5 days (5 days]
Calculations done based on the a
doctor to patient ratio of 1:20
Calculations based on a nurse to
patient ratio of 1:0.65
Calculations based on a 40
patients ward per day with 1 GH
Done at referral centres and not
necessarily at primary care
facilities
600mg =2 ml= ampuole
Took maximum dose of 1200mg
Cases fed intravenously
considered as those on a having 3
balanced meals a day
Based on LOS
Based on cohort results (n= 95).
Notes:
1. Unlike simple malaria, a typical case of severe malaria could go through the whole treatment regime
from simple to complicated malaria. That is why it was necessary to look at the inputs (or costs) and
quality scores, as a range or band.
2. Staff time and hotel services vary with length of stay.
124 Fansider tablet contains sOOmg sulphadoxine and 25mg pyrimethamine
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Annex X: Interview guidel25
Interviewees: Medical superintendents, doctors and nurses (Matrons & SICs), and heads of departments
(physiotherapy, laboratory, domestic services, dietary services, radiography, infections control, dental
services and pharmacy)
a) Background Data:
Current position: Length of time in your current position ..
Previous Position: Length of time in that position ..
Qualifications: Management team member: YESINO .
(B) Incentive Structure
1. For how long have you been working here?
2 Do you like it here?
3 Are you satisfied with current remuneration levels?
Why?
3.1 Are they other rewards apart from your salary that you enjoy?
3.2 What strategies do you use for coping with problems oflow salary income?
3.3 Do you feel job secure?
Why?
4. How can you move from one grade to the other?
5 What strategies did you use (or do you need) to move up your career structure?
6. What aspects of staff emoluments affect you morale and motivation?
6.1 How can they be changed?
8. How do you cope with problems of high/low workload in the hospital?
Have you received any training (For example, CPE) for your job in the last five years?
10.1 Do you think it is necessary?
10.2 What do you do in order to get it?
11.Apart from what we have discussed so far, what other factors influence your morale and
motivation 126?
c) Relationship between structures, internal factors and hospital performance
i) Governance
12. What are your views on current hospital governance and its effects on: (Explain and Probe):
Decision space:
(2) Management
14.Who are the main decision-makers in this hospital?
14.1. What decisions do you make in the following area:
Financial, Clinical, Personnel, Administration, Input procurement and Others.
15. Are the main decision-makers answerable (and identifiable) for the mistakes or the good
decisions they make? [Explain]
16. How are decisions by management communicated to you? [If applicable]
17.Which issues are communicated and which ones are not?[If HE member]
18How does it affect your work?
19.Are you involved in making important decisions for the hospital? YesINo
19.1 If Yes, how?
m The objective of the guide is to focus the in-depth interviews to specific areas of interest. It is not a
questionnaire. The listed questions do not have to be followed in a sequential order to allow for natural
discussions. EXPLANAnONS and further PROBING will be used to follow up issues raised in the
interview. What is important is that all the pertinent issues are adequately discussed.
126 Notes for Researcher: also look out for such issues: ''use of public facilities for private purposes",
prestige, security, and authority.
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20. IfNot, what strategies do you use for putting your concerns to management?
21. What must be done to improve the decision making process in the hospital?
(3) Quality
22 Do you see any problems with quality of inpatient services in this hospital
23. What are the major causes of these problems?
4. Why are the problems not resolved?
25. Do you have any role to play in resolving these problems?
26. How can these problems be resolved?
27. Who are the key actors in addressing quality problems?
(4) Costs
Do you see any problems with hospital costs? YesINo
29. What are the main problems?
30. Why are these problems not resolved?
31. How can they be resolved?
32. Who is responsible for controlling hospital costs?
33. What is your role in cost control?
34. Do you have departmental or functional budgets Yes/No
35. If yes, how do they affect hospital activity?
36. If Not, in what ways are functional budgets likely to affect hospital activity
[Explain and discuss]
(D) Views on proposed reforms
37. Is there need to change existing hospital governance? YesINo
Why?
38. How is self governance likely to affect your work
39. How is self-governance likely to affect hospital activities?
40. What problems are likely to occur with hospital autonomy?
41. How can these problems be resolved?
42. Is there need to change existing hospital financing mechanisms?
43. Do you have any form of contracts in the hospital? Yes/No
44. If Yes, for what services?
45. If Not, what is your understanding of use contracts in health services provision
46. How do they work?
47. What aspects of hospital activities are likely to be affected by use of service contracts?
[Explain and probe]
48. What problems are likely to occur with use of service contracts?
49. How can they be resolved?
THANK You
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Table AI0.1. Profile of respondents in the Study, Tertiary Hospitals
IntervieweesIHospitals 1 2 3 4 5 6 Total
General Medical Officers 1 1 2 1 5
Specialist Consultants 1 1 2
Medical Superintendents 1 1 1 1 4
Matrons"? 2 1 1 1 1 6
Heads of Radiography 1 1 1 1 1 5
Heads Laboratory 1 1 1 1 1 5
Heads of Physiotherapy 1 1 2
Dental Surgeon 1 1
Heads of Pharmacy 1 1 1 1 4
Sisters in Charge of Wards 2 4 2 1 1 10
Heads of Domestic Services 1 1
Hospital Administrators 1 1 1 1 1 1 6
Total 8 7 10 10 7 9 51
Table AI0.2 Management skills and experience audit across hospitals
Hospital No. with management training Average number of years in
post
1
2
3
4
5
6
4(50%)
5 (71%)
7 (70%)
2 (20%)
1 (14%)
3 (50%)
5
5
6
4
9
6
127Th •ese are nursing managers
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